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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This dissertation explores the composition, construction and framing of Al-Qa’ida 
leadership communiqués – understood as the statements, messages, interviews, written 
work and other output from the movement’s predominant leaders: Usama bin Ladin and 
Ayman al-Zawahiri. The thesis argues existing research into this corpus is insufficiently 
rigorous, systematic and comprehensive in scope, thus failing to elucidate nuances and 
dynamics in the narrative of the Al-Qa’ida leadership since the movement’s inception. 
The current study presents results from the coding of 240 communiqués produced by the 
two leaders from 1991 to August 2011.  
 The analysis was informed by the literature on Collective Action Frames, which 
understands this material as the communicative effort of movement leaders towards 
identified audiences and constituents. This approach divides each message according to 
diagnostic, prognostic and motivational appeals contained within the narrative and 
assesses the impact of this collective according to its narrative fidelity (as regards the 
wider socio-cultural milieu), empirical credibility (in terms of consistency and 
continuity) and experiential commensurability (in light of experiences and realities of 
designated constituents).   
 The dissemination of communiqués highlighting the values, aspirations, 
frustrations and grievances of Al-Qa’ida is a central objective of its leadership. This 
material provides the metrics to understand the way in which the movement has evolved 
since its formation. The leaders themselves recognise the importance of communicating 
with diverse audiences in this way. The longitudinal analysis of the leadership 
communiqués, however, found that bin Ladin and Zawahiri failed to present coherent 
justifications for the solutions presented or how they should be focused. Moreover, it 
found that the leadership failed to reflect the interests of the vast majority of Muslims, 
particularly in the West, and gradually denounced those it claims to represent – the 
Muslim ummah. This dissertation thus illustrates how Al-Qa’ida has failed as a 
revolutionary vanguard based on evidence garnered from a systematic and long-term 
analysis of the leadership’s communiqués.   
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Part I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Establishing, designing and contextualising the enquiry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Introduction: Research Agenda 
 
The death of Usama bin Ladin in a raid by US special forces on the Al-Qa’ida leader’s 
compound in Abbottabad, just north of Islamabad, on 2 May 2011 dominated news 
coverage across the globe in the following days and weeks. Bin Ladin had been 
America’s most wanted fugitive and his organisation was seen (and in some 
manifestations still is seen) as the principal enemy of the world’s premier superpower. 
Many hoped his death would signal the demise of Al-Qa’ida. As members of the press, 
academia, and the security and intelligence community began to debate the impact of bin 
Ladin’s death, The Economist commemorated his end on the front cover, featuring an 
image of the leader superimposed on a mosaic of scenes from the inappropriately-named 
‘war on terror’ and snapshots from Al-Qa’ida’s protracted campaign of violence. The 
title under the mosaic read: ‘Now, kill his dream.’1 Although the images reflected scenes 
of physical involvement in violence at group level, the caption referred to a different 
phenomenon: the set of ideas and beliefs communicated by the Al-Qa’ida leadership, 
beyond direct instigation of specific attacks. 
 Indeed, ‘Al-Qa’ida’, in the broader sense, encompasses not only a terrorist group 
per se but also a much wider, deeper and more comprehensive ideology that forms part 
of and contributes to the wider discourse of Islamist violent extremism. This set of 
beliefs and ideas has, arguably, spawned a host of separate threats of physical attack 
designed to serve a common cause. This relates to the ability of the Al-Qa’ida leadership 
to mobilise activists and garner support from key communities in order to strengthen and 
sustain the violent campaign. Rather than dissecting group dynamics or discussing past 
or existing threat patterns, this thesis addresses the ideational elements that have been 
communicated by the Al-Qa’ida leadership and the ways in which these have evolved 
over the past two decades. The goal is to develop understanding into the construction of 
these communiqués as a distinct, central and expansive facet of Al-Qa’ida, in that they 
constitute a corpus that is fundamental to comprehending the way in which the Al-
Qa’ida leadership perceives and communicates with its wider environment as well as a 
method of analysis which is valuable in terms of contributing to our knowledge of 
political violence more generally. In addition to developing the case for analysing this 
aspect of terrorism in general and the Al-Qa’ida leadership in particular, the thesis 
tackles the following core questions:  
 
• What is the importance of understanding the Al-Qa’ida leadership communiqués 
and how can the content conveyed through these messages be understood? 
• How are the messages constructed and how have these elements evolved? 
• How can we understand the effectiveness of the message and what can blunt its 
impact in terms of appealing to a wider audience? 
 
These questions concern the linkage between terrorist leaders and their perceived 
constituents and wider communities and underscore the importance of understanding the 
broader socio-political, religious and cultural forces that underpin and channel 
involvement in violent extremism and construct the wider ideational environment. For 
although there is the individual terrorist as an object of analysis, as Horgan noted, ‘there 
is also the group and the broader network to which he or she belongs, the community 
being represented by the terrorist, and the broader social, cultural and other issues that 
can impinge upon the individual terrorist at any time and at any phase of their 
                                                
1 The Economist (2011) (7 May). 
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development.’2 The focus here is on how the Al-Qa’ida leadership has sought to 
construct, present and affect this community and wider environment through its 
communiqués. The case is made for studying these leadership communiqués (as 
represented by the corpus produced and disseminated by bin Ladin and Ayman al-
Zawahiri since the movement was established) as a comprehensive way of developing 
systematic understanding of Al-Qa’ida’s stated aims and desires within an environment 
of competing ideas, containing (often conflicting) Islamist revolutionary and puritanical 
precepts, other ideological strands and diffuse actors and audiences. The case is also 
made for appreciating these communiqués, once systematically coded (as they are here), 
as detailed metrics contributing to our understanding of Al-Qa’ida’s agenda, scope and 
development, as well as challenges and weaknesses that can be discerned once the 
communiqués are elaborated in this way.  
 The thesis is divided into four parts. Part I introduces the focus of analysis, 
explaining key concepts and wider context. This part is split into two chapters, the first 
(Chapter 1) exploring the background of Al-Qa’ida and existing attempts to 
conceptualise the phenomenon, whilst the second (Chapter 2) discusses the ideology of 
the Al-Qa’ida leadership and ways in which this aspect can be understood. Part II sets 
out the theoretical and methodological principles underpinning the study. This part is 
also split into two chapters: Chapter 3, which presents the framing aspect of the social 
movement approach as the organisational principle of the current study; and Chapter 4, 
which details data design and procedural models. These chapters, in turn, provide 
grounding for Part III, which presents the results from the longitudinal study of Al-
Qa’ida leadership communiqués, understood as the written statements, audio-visual 
messages and books that the two principal Al-Qa’ida leaders produced during the period 
under review (1991 to August 2011). Arranged according to framing aspect, this part is 
split into three chapters. Chapter 5 explores diagnostic framing of the Al-Qa’ida 
leadership communiqués, Chapter 6 investigates prognostic frames, whilst Chapter 7 
details aspects of motivational framing. The thesis concludes with Part IV which 
investigates the effectiveness of this discourse, according to the framing paradigm, 
presenting some final thoughts concerning the construction and content of the Al-Qa'ida 
leadership communiqués as presented by bin Ladin and Zawahiri. 
                                                
2 Horgan, J. (2009) Walking Away from Terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement from Radical and 
Extremist Movements, Routledge, London:  page xx. 
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UNDERSTANDING AL-QA’IDA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Al-Qa’ida: A Conceptual Challenge 
 
Few social and political phenomena following the end of the Cold War have attracted as 
much scrutiny, shaped international relations and driven public debate to the same 
degree as the formation of the global ‘network of networks’ known as Al-Qa’ida.3 As 
social science scholars tried to come to terms with the factors that led to the collapse of 
the Soviet Union – dismissing, amending and creating models designed to address the 
socio-economic and political factors involved – a new and completely different set of 
conceptual challenges was presented as Al-Qa’ida thrust its way onto the global stage.  
The study of terrorism attracted ever more attention as the leaders of Al-Qa’ida – 
formed by veteran militants from the war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan – 
began to see the results of their active sponsoring and instigating of terrorist strikes 
against the United States, its interests and allies.  
The formation of the group can, of course, be partly traced to the turmoil, 
upheaval, vacuum of power – and resulting opportunities – presented by the decline and 
implosion of the Soviet Union. In August 1988, four months after the Red Army began 
withdrawing from Afghanistan, the principal leader of the Arab contingent of fighters in 
Afghanistan called a meeting in Peshawar. Abdullah Azzam, eager to recognise his 
aspiration – based on the perceived success of the Afghan campaign and the need to 
retain that momentum – for a ‘pioneering vanguard’ to be established4 resolved to 
consult Usama bin Ladin, his protégé, along with other major Arab figures involved in 
the war. Prominent among them was Ayman Al-Zawahiri, later leader of Al-Jihad in 
Egypt, who had fled the country after being imprisoned for involvement with militant 
groups in 1981. Having followed his mentor (and fellow surgeon) Sayyid Imam Al-
Sharif (a.k.a. Dr Fadl), another leader of Al-Jihad, to Peshawar, Zawahiri established 
contacts with hardened veterans of the Egyptian militant scene, including Amin al-
                                                
3 To borrow Wilkinson’s conceptualisation: see e.g. (2005) ‘International Terrorism: The Changing Threat 
and the EU’s Response’ in Chaillot Paper (no. 84, October). Institute of Security Studies, European 
Union.  
4 See Wright, L. (2006-A) The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda’s Road to 9/11. Penguin Books, London: 130; 
Burke (2004-A) Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam, Penguin Books, London (2nd edition): 2-3. 
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Rashidi/Abu Ubaydah al-Banshiri and Mohammed Atef/Abu Hafs who later became 
influential within Al-Qa’ida.5 
United as they were in their determination to establish a group carrying forward 
the jihad beyond Afghanistan to break secular regimes and sever links with foreign 
powers, these men could not agree on its scope. A memo discussing the future direction 
of jihad dating from this period and summarising the position of all the major Arab 
veterans from Afghanistan illustrates this dilemma. Azzam, of Palestinian origin, wrote 
of the importance of ‘spreading the spirit of jihad among the Arabs, with the long-term 
goal being the waging of jihad against the Jews in Palestine.’6  
Zawahiri and other members of Al-Jihad, by contrast, argued: ‘Egypt is the heart 
of the Islamic world and it is necessary to establish the Caliphate there first.’7 Azzam’s 
affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood (Azzam led the Jordanian Brothers at one time) 
also angered Zawahiri, who wrote in his book Bitter Harvest: ‘The Brothers have 
abandoned pursuing legitimate Muslim government in place of the current governments 
that rule Muslim lands. This deviation has made the Brothers idle from fulfilling their 
true calling, as Allah wills it.’8 With bin Ladin’s backing, the new vanguard could 
become a powerful force undermining secular governance in Egypt. Bin Ladin’s 
preoccupation, meanwhile, was the Arabian Peninsula and ‘the liberation […] of the 
south of Yemen from Communism.’9 
Three months after calling the Peshawar meeting, Azzam was assassinated, 
leaving bin Ladin the undisputed leader of the group that later became known as Al-
Qa’ida. A year before Azzam’s death, though, bin Ladin’s organisational prowess and 
financial largesse had already made the latter the pivotal figure within the organisational 
predecessor to Al-Qa’ida, Maktab al-Khidmat or ‘services bureau (formally led by 
Azzam), which coordinated the activities of the Arab fighters in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan.10 Wright and others have argued that Bin Ladin was predominantly reliant on 
Zawahiri’s strategic guidance during this period and the experience of his Egyptian 
colleagues, who retained their association with Al-Jihad. The Zawahiri-bin Ladin 
alliance, at this stage, appears primarily to have been a marriage of convenience: ‘each 
man filled a need in the other’, argues Wright. ‘Zawahiri wanted money and contacts, 
                                                
5 Wright, L. (2006-A): 128-129; Bergen, P. & Cruickshank, P. (2008) ‘The Unravelling: The Jihadist 
Revolt against bin Laden’ in New Republic (Wednesday, 11 June). 
6 See Harmony Archives (n. d.), document number AFGP-2002- 600086; Combating Terrorism Center 
(2007) Cracks in the Foundation: Leadership Schisms in Al-Qa’ida from 1989-2006, Harmony Project. 
West Point, NY: 8-9. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Zawahiri, A. Al (1991) The Bitter Harvest: The Brotherhood in Sixty Years, translation in Ibrahim, R. 
(2007) Al Qaeda Reader, Broadway Books, New York and Kepel, G. & Milelli, J.P. (2008) (eds.) Al 
Qaeda in its Own Words (2008). Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA.  
Zawahiri was, however, a great admirer of Qutb and other more hard-line elements of the brotherhood. His 
criticism focused on the political processes prescribed by Hasan Hudaybi, who took over as Supreme 
Guide shortly after Qutb’s execution, and those of similar disposition within the movement. See further on 
internal ideological tensions within different strands of the Brotherhood in Kepel, G. (2008-A) ‘The 
Brotherhood in the Salafist Universe’, Current Trends in Islamist Ideology (vol. 6, pp. 20-29), Hudson 
Institute, Wash. DC. Many key figures in and around Al-Qa’ida have, however, had close engagement 
with the Brotherhood, including bin Ladin and Mustafa Settmariam Nasar. See Filiu, J.P (2009) ‘The 
Brotherhood vs. Al-Qaeda: A Moment of Truth?’ in Current Trends in Islamist Ideology (volume 9).  See 
on bin Ladin Brotherhood links and resulting tensions with Zawahiri: Kepel, G. (2004) The War for 
Muslim Minds: Islam and the West (transl. by Pascale Ghazaleh), The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge MA: 85. 
9 Harmony AFGP-2002- 600086.  
10 See e.g. Ibid: 49-50; Zelikow P. et al. (2004) Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks Upon the United States (‘The 9/11 Commission Report’). US Congress, Washington: 56. 
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which bin Laden had in abundance. Bin Laden, an idealist given to causes, sought 
direction; Zawahiri, a seasoned propagandist, supplied it.’11 For Scheuer, however, it 
was Bin Ladin who altered Zawahiri’s agenda in the long term, much more than vice 
versa.12 Nonetheless, for the time being, in terms of direction and scope, the elements 
that made up this nascent alliance of displaced militants remained remarkably focused 
on their respective native regions. 
The process towards further globalisation was initiated, at this stage, by a series 
of local events in the Arab world. In May 1990, South Yemen – following the loss of its 
major sponsor in Moscow, protracted conflict with the northern Yemen Arab Republic 
and the discovery of oil in the disputed border territories – resolved to unite with the 
north, forming the Republic of Yemen.13 This transformed Usama bin Ladin’s chief 
preoccupation after the Red Army withdrew from Afghanistan (February 1989) and local 
militant cadres fighting the Najibullah regime in Kabul fractured and lost their focus due 
to internal tribal disputes, mutual mistrust and a lack of direction and coordinating force. 
Bin Ladin had been eager to focus the post-Afghanistan momentum on toppling the 
socialist regime in South Yemen and had provided crucial material support to this end, 
as well as sponsoring assassination campaigns in the region that continued well beyond 
unification. He had, however, failed in securing support from the Saudi authorities, 
which remained suspicious of his agenda and concerned about bin Ladin’s perception of 
his apparent ability to operate freely in the region.14 This tension marked the beginning 
of the Al-Qa’ida leader’s isolation and the severing of ties with his Saudi homeland. 
Events in Yemen, however, quickly became superseded by even greater cataclysms in 
the region affecting Saudi Arabia in particular. A few months after Yemeni unification, 
Iraqi president Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, prompting a UN-sanctioned 
international military response (again, made feasible by the collapse of the USSR).  
Bin Ladin, almost an outcast in Saudi Arabia, was angered by the refusal of the 
Saudi ruling elite to form an Islamic response against the Iraqi secular regime and the 
threat it posed to the ‘Land of the Two Holy Places’ and outraged by its acceptance of 
US military aid (placing ‘infidel’ troops on hallow ground – where the Prophet himself 
embarked upon his hijra), which received backing from Grand Mufti Ibn Baz and the 
official Saudi religious establishment.15  
Keen to invest in regions amicable towards various forms of Salafism and his 
own support network for puritanical Islamist militancy, bin Ladin had already started 
pursuing some of the opportunities presented by Hassan al-Turabi’s consolidation of 
power in Sudan through the National Islamic Front (NIF) in June 1989.16 As events in 
Saudi Arabia forced bin Ladin to relocate, he found in Sudan a haven to formulate his 
organisation further, although the influence of al-Turabi during this process was also 
considerable.17 Here, he established an ‘Islamic Army Shurah’, which included the 
advisory council (shurah) of his own group, for all the militant Islamist fringe groups 
that had been courted and invited to Sudan by the NIF.18  
                                                
11 Wright (2006-A): 127. 
12 Scheuer, M. (2011) Osama bin Laden, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 12-13. 
13 Riedel, B. (2008) (2nd ed.) The Search for Al Qaeda: Its Leadership, Ideology and Future. Brookings 
Institution Press, Washington DC: 47.  
14 Wright (2006-A): 153-154. 
15 Ibid: 49-50; Zelikow P. et al. (2004). 
16 Zelikow et al. (2004); Randal, J. (2005) Osama: Making of a Terrorist, I.B Tauris, London: 115 
17 See further in Taylor, M. & Elbushra, M. (2006) ‘Hassan al-Turabi, Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda in 
Sudan,’ in Terrorism and Political Violence (vol. 18, pp. 449-464).  
18 Zelikow et al. (2004): section two. 
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Zawahiri was one of bin Ladin’s closest allies during his stay in Sudan and also 
relied on Al-Turabi and president Bashir for protection, following his eviction from 
Egypt. He remained focused on his activities for Al-Jihad, however, and orchestrated a 
plot from there to assassinate Egyptian president Mubarak in Ethiopia where he was due 
to visit in June 1995.19 That same month, bin Ladin penned an open letter to the Saudi 
religious establishment entitled ‘Saudi Arabia Supports Communists in Yemen’ where 
he warned that ‘all those who oppose the faith of the ummah’ would face defeat through 
violent jihad.20 
Following a series of such open denunciations of Saudi authorities and his ever-
rising profile as significant financier of Islamist terrorist groups, bin Ladin had his 
passport revoked, thus rendering him stateless, and was formally disowned by his 
family. The need for him, and those who relied on his financial support, to secure a more 
permanent sanctuary was thus compounded.21 Amidst mounting pressure to expel bin 
Ladin and Zawahiri from Sudan, meanwhile, Khartoum resolved to direct them to leave. 
Continued involvement in their affairs was no longer worth the effort.  
Al-Qa’ida, as an organization, has always relied on some form of haven or base 
(after all, ‘haven’ or ‘base’ is one of the English translations of its name) to direct the 
operations of the vanguards. Following Taliban victory over Najibullah in Afghanistan, 
bin Ladin, Zawahiri and their followers were now free to settle again in the region that 
spawned the alliance in the first place. 
The Afghan-Taliban period from 1996 up until the 11 September attacks, which 
prompted the downfall of the Afghan sanctuary in this form, became, in Sageman’s 
words, Al-Qa’ida’s ‘golden age.’22 The group went from being ‘the most significant 
financial sponsor of Islamic extremist activities in the world’ according to a 1996 State 
Department memo23 to being the most prominent and globally focused terrorist 
organisation in the world.  
The isolation of the Afghan sanctuary was unprecedented. The Al-Qa’ida 
leadership was protected not only by the virtually impassable terrain and geographical 
remoteness of the Taliban-ruled territories, but also by the latter’s all-encompassing 
regime of terror, designed to stifle alternative voices and opposition and implement their 
extreme and puritanical vision of Pushtun Deobandism, or what Esposito terms the 
‘militant neo-Deobandi movement.’24 This provided the perfect platform from which to 
launch a public campaign against perceived treachery and corruption of local regimes, 
principally Saudi Arabia, the external entities that shored up these regimes, namely the 
US and its allies, and the perceived impact of these alliances on the Muslim world. 
Whilst based in a camp near Khost called Masada or the ‘Lion’s Den’ (for which 
he fought a decade earlier)25, bin Ladin published the ‘Declaration of Jihad Against the 
Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Mosques’ in August 1996 calling for 
Muslims (especially in the Arabian Peninsula) to mobilise against the ‘Israeli-American 
alliance occupying the land of the two holy mosques and the land of the ascension of the 
Prophet.’26 A year-and-a-half later, Zawahiri joined bin Ladin in the ‘World Islamic 
                                                
19 Ibid. 
20 See Harmony Archive (n. d.) document AFGP-2002-003345. 
21 Reidel (2008): chapter three; Kepel (2004): 87. 
22 Sageman, M. (2008) Leaderless Jihad. University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia: 49-50. 
23 Bergen, P. (2001) Holy War Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden. Free Press, NY: 2.  
24 Esposito, J. L. (2002) Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 16. 
The Deobandi movement is a strand of Sunni Islam established in 19th century India, now prominent 
throughout the Subcontinent, the UK and elsewhere. 
25 Zahab, M. & Roy, O. (2002) Islamist Networks: The Afghan-Pakistan Connection, Hurst, London: 15. 
26 Bin Ladin, U. (1996) ‘Message From Usama Bin-Muhammad Bin Ladin to His Muslim Brothers in the 
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Front against Jews and Crusaders’27 with the now infamous declaration of war that 
announced ‘the ruling to kill the Americans and their allies – civilians and military – is 
an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible 
to do it.’28  The initiative served as a prelude to the first major attacks successfully 
orchestrated by the leadership against US embassies in East Africa six months later.  
The transition from confined militancy and localised activism to an increasingly 
global campaign against the West and its secular power networks and influences was 
neither straight forward or immediate. Mohammad ‘Abd-al-Salam Faraj, an Egyptian 
electrician and great admirer of Sayyid Qutb, who later became leader of Al-Jihad 
(exercising considerable influence over Zawahiri) is thought to be the first contemporary 
militant leader to have defined a distinction between near and far enemies, which 
subsequently has become prominent in many analytical accounts of Al-Qa’ida.29 
In his attempts to rally support for militant implementation of Qutb’s notions of a 
vanguard eliminating jahiliyyah – where people and societies are in ignorance of divine 
prescriptions – Faraj wrote a short book titled Jihad: The Absent Obligation, which was 
distributed as Soviet forces entered Afghanistan.30 Here, Faraj sought to channel the 
limited resources of Islamist militancy in the Middle East against the perceived 
inhibitors to the establishment of hakimiyyah – society base on the sovereignty of God – 
namely the secular Arab rulers of Egypt and neighbouring countries. Faraj wrote:  
 
the believer […] is aware of what is beneficial and what is harmful and gives priority to the 
definite and radical solutions. This point necessitates the illustration of the following: […] 
fighting the enemy that is near to us comes before that which is far. […] Therefore to begin 
with destroying the Imperialists is not a useful action and is a waste of time. We have to 
concentrate on our Islamic issue, which is to establish the laws of Allaah in our land first 
and make the word of Allaah the highest. This is because there is no doubt that the prime 
field of Jihaad is to remove these leaderships and replace them with the complete Islamic 
system, and from here we start.31 
 
Based on his interpretation of Ibn Taymiyyah’s Mardin fatwa that classified 13th Century 
Mongol invaders who embraced Islam as legitimate targets outside the realm of Islam 
(Dar al-Islam), Faraj saw local secular leaders within the realm of just conflict (Dar al-
Harb). This led to the crucial jurisprudential implication that rendered fighting these 
rulers not only legitimate, but an obligation for each individual Muslim (fardh al-ayn), 
invoked only when Islam is under direct attack from enemy forces and jihad has been 
declared by the leader of the Muslims.32  Faraj’s interpretation of the Mardin fatwa, 
however, assumed direct political rammificattions for contermporary socio-political 
                                                                                                                                           
Whole World and Especially in the Arabian Peninsula..’, published in Al-Islah (London: 2 September), 
translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Compilation of Usama Bin Ladin Statements 1994 - 
January 2004: 20. 
27 Co-signatories were by Abu-Yasir Rifa'i Ahmad Taha of the Egyptian Islamic Group, Shaykh Mir 
Hamzah of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan and Fazlul Rahman of the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh. 
28 Bin Ladin, U. et al. (1998) ‘Text of World Islamic Front's Statement Urging Jihad Against Jews and 
Crusaders’, published in Al-Quds Al-Arabi (London, 23 February) translated in Compilation of Usama Bin 
Ladin Statements 1994 - January 2004. 
29 Sageman (2008): 39; Hegghammer, T. (2009-A) ‘The Ideological Hybridization of Jihadi Groups’ in 
Current Trends in Islamist Ideology (vol. 9, pp. 26-46) Hudson Institute, Wash. DC. 
30 Kepel (1984): 47; Qutb, S. (2006) Milestones, Islamic Book Service. 
31 Faraj, M. S (2000) Jihaad: Absent Obligation, Maktabah al-Ansaar, Birmingham: 50-51. This version is 
still available from Muhammad al-Maqdisi’s website tawhed.net [www.tawhed.net/dl.php?i=AbsntObl] 
(as of 18 January 2011).  
32 Ibid: 60-61; Esposito (2002): 46. 
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realities and ammmounted to, what Michot terms, a ‘fundamental misconstruction of it’s 
meaning’ that ignored the ‘juridical-religious, ethical and person-orientaded character,’ 
which Ibn Taymiyyah originally sought to convey.33 
Zawahiri had joined Faraj (who was executed for his role in the Sadat 
assassination in April 1982) down the path of local jihad against the near enemy. By 
1998, however, he was frustrated with the lack of progress this strategy had brought, 
angered by the withdrawal from fellow Egyptian jihadists (who were increasingly 
isolated after the 1997 Luxor massacre), ever more reliant on bin Ladin’s patronage and 
resolve, and attracted by the possibilities and attention that would no doubt be garnered 
by targeting the distant enemy.34  
This transition, which kept local secular leaders within Dar al-Harb, initiated a 
re-prioritisation of target sets as a result of shifting hierarchies of enmity. Violent jihad 
in the name of Allah, as an individual obligation of all Muslims, which was used so 
prominently in Azzam’s works mobilising the ummah for jihad in Afghanistan became a 
‘cosmic war’ between Al-Qa’ida and the West, alongside its local interests.35 
This ambitious agenda was well received by what Gerges terms ‘a new 
generation of freelance roaming jihadis’: displaced (mostly Arab) militants and 
disillusioned sympathisers from Muslim Diasporas in the West.36 In Al-Qa’ida they 
found a relatively structured group, which could provide seed money for operations, 
training and more direct involvement in the planning of terrorist attacks, as well as 
strategic guidance.37  
 
 
 
1.2 Splintering, Regrouping, Imploding? Adding to the Conceptual Ambiguity 
 
As well as removing the Taliban-sponsored Afghan sanctuary, the aftermath of the 11 
September (9/11) attacks marked the end of anything resembling conceptual clarity and 
analytical consensus in approaches to Al-Qa’ida in the literature. The international 
response to the 9/11 attacks and the removal of Al-Qa’ida’s bases of operation seriously 
weakened the movement, but so did criticism from Islamist and jihadi figures, 
compounding the isolation of the Al-Qa’ida core leadership. At the same time, however, 
the vast impact of the 9/11 attacks on US society, economy, and politics, and to a lesser 
extent in other countries, along with the prominence the movement achieved in public, 
media, and political discourse, created a powerful ‘brand’ which vastly surpassed the 
actual operational capacity of Al-Qa’ida as a terrorist group. According to one West 
Point study the attacks left the ‘brand managers the only ones standing’ from a group 
                                                
33 Michot, Y. (2006) Muslims under non-Muslim rule: Ibn Taymiyya on fleeing from sin; kinds of 
emigration; the status of Mardin; domain of peace/war, domain composite; the conditions for challenging 
power. Interface Publications, Oxford: 46, 49. Faraj’s work, according to Michot, formed part of the 
‘Mongolizing’ of Islamism, where Ibn Taymiyyah’s ‘anti-Mongol fatwas were being exploited to call to 
an armed rebellion against the rulers or governments of certain modern Muslim countries’ (49).  
34 Kepel (2004): 72; Gerges, F. (2005) The Far Enemy: Why Jihad went Global, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge: chapters 1-2; Reidel (2008): chapter 2; Lacroix, S. (2008) ‘Notes to Part III: Ayman Al-
Zawahiri’, in Kepel & Milelli (eds.) pp. 316-341. 
35 To borrow Jurgensmeyer’s concept (see Jurgensmeyer, M. (2003) Terror in the Mind of God: The 
Global Rise of Religious Violence (3rd edition), University of California Press, Berkeley: 145. 
36 Gerges (2005): 57. 
37 See for instance Sageman, M. (2008) Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-first Century, 
University of Pennsylvania Press, Phil.: 40-51. Although Gerges (2005) emphasised the importance of Al-
Qaeda in developing a transnational agenda, as noted above, he also illustrated how the group was only 
one actor in a complex tapestry of Islamist militancy. 
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‘largely reduced to a media organization.’38 Roy, similarly, saw Al-Qa’ida emerge from 
9/11 as an ‘organization and a trademark. It can operate directly, in a joint venture, or by 
franchising. It embodies, but does not have the monopoly of, a new kind of violence.’39  
Thus, Al-Qa’ida as a movement was far from being a holistic entity. Weakened 
at the core, its capacity to direct operations against its far enemy was greatly diminished. 
At the same time, however, groups of affiliates, associates and admirers proliferated.40 
After the fact rationalisations aside, descriptive efforts to capture the essence of Al-
Qa’ida as it emerged from the post-9/11 turmoil consisted primarily of studies 
highlighting the importance of autonomous affiliates and admirers of Al-Qa’ida on the 
one hand and a continued preoccupation with the central leadership on the other. Some 
attributed the proliferation of affiliates as well as greater focus on ‘grassroots’ militancy 
to a series of informed decisions as well as strategic necessities brought about by 
external pressures. Fragmentation, according to this view, had always been the plan. 
According to Cruickshank and Hage, for instance, the decentralisation of Al-
Qa’ida was, to a substantial degree, down to “intelligent design”, following doctrine 
from prominent jihadists, primarily Mustafa Settmariam Nasar/Abu Mus’ab al-Suri.41 
Despite being a close associate of bin Ladin’s in the 1980’s and 90’s, al-Suri remained 
highly critical of the former’s leadership style and many of his decisions. One Libyan 
jihadist even claimed Al-Suri referred to bin Ladin as a ‘dictator’ and ‘Pharaoh.’42 Some 
years before 9/11 he had accused bin Ladin of alienating the Taliban after catching ‘the 
disease of screens, flashes, fans, and applause’ facilitated by access to world media.43 
However, the greatest strategic failure, according to this doctrine, was to initiate an 
attack on the scale of 9/11, the repercussions of which ‘collectively destroyed what 
remained of [secret jihadi] organizations.’44 Ironically, however, the attacks brought 
about conditions that enabled the implementation of Al-Suri’s vision, set forth in his 
book The Call for Global Islamic Resistance, of an Islamist resistance movement with 
reduced hierarchy and structure, thus reducing the risk of detection and offering 
newcomers more freedom to develop their campaigns independently.45 In a post-9/11 
world, such a hierarchy would be a liability. According to Real, ‘the ideology has 
already had its effect, and it is neither necessary nor convenient for any direct central 
control to exist; they are safer without it.’46  
For other observers, fragmentation and decentralisation leading to greater 
operational autonomy of affiliates and sympathisers was simply a myth. Scheuer, for 
instance, insisted that Al-Qa’ida was no less a ‘functioning, hierarchical organization 
                                                
38 Combating Terrorism Center (2007): 1-2. 
39 Roy, O. (2004) The Rise of Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah, Columbia University 
Press, NY: 294. 
40 E.g. existing groups rebranded (Algerian GSPC), groups pledged allegiance or declared links to the Al-
Qa’ida leadership and the 9/11 attacks featured prominently in Islamist militant propaganda and imagery 
(beyond that disseminated by the Al-Qa’ida leadership itself and its media wings). 
41 Cruickshank, P. & Hage, M. A. (2007) ‘Abu Musab Al Suri: Architect of the New Al Qaeda’, in Studies 
in Conflict and Terrorism (no. 30, pp. 1-14): 2. 
42 Lia, B. (2008). ‘Dissidents in al-Qaida: Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri’s Critique of bin Ladin and the Salafi-Jihadi 
Current’. Lecture at Princeton University, 3rd December 2007, Norwegian Defence Research 
Establishment (FFI), Oslo: 4. 
43 Cited in Cullison, A. (2004) ‘Inside Al Qaeda’s Hard Drive,’ in Atlantic Monthly (294:2, September): 
68. 
44 Al-Suri, A.M. in Lia, B. (2007) Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of Al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus’ab 
al-Suri, Hurst, London: 352. 
45 Ibid; Cruickshank & Hage.(2007); Lia (2008).  
46 Real, M.’s Introduction to Greenberg, K. (ed.) (2005) Al-Qaeda Now: Understanding Today’s 
Terrorists. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: xvii. 
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with clear command-and-control capabilities,’ in the aftermath of 9/11 than it had been 
before the attacks.47 Such polarisation is typical of analytical accounts of Al-Qa’ida, 
particularly those centring on organisational issues. The truth, of course, rests 
somewhere in the middle, between these polar opposites. The Al-Qa’ida leadership was 
under tremendous pressure after the 9/11 attacks and subsequent invasion of 
Afghanistan, but managed to partially regroup in Pakistan. From here, the leadership 
sought to orchestrate further attacks as well as inspire grassroots to mobilise to the same 
end.  
In September 2007, after three years of silence, bin Ladin published (via Al-
Qa’ida’s favourite media label As-Sahab) a video titled: ‘The Solution: A message from 
shaykh Osama bin Laden to the American people’ where he questioned the innocence of 
the American public and invited them to embrace Islam in redemption.48 This was seen 
as a sign of the durability of the Al-Qa’ida leadership’s organisational structure and its 
savvy media production wing.49 Furthermore, Riedel (and others) correctly warned of 
the impact the Iraq war had had in opening a new front for Al-Qa’ida to exploit, as well 
as providing (through re-direction of allied military emphasis) a sanctuary in the 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas, known in Pakistan as ilaqa-e-ghair or the ‘lawless 
land’,50 (in particular North and South Waziristan Agencies) and Balochistan on the 
Afghan-Pakistan border. As a result, Riedel argued: ‘Al Qaeda is a more dangerous 
enemy today than it has ever been before.’51 
Echoing these sentiments, Bergen declared in an earlier 2007 article that: ‘Osama 
bin Laden’s army is back in business […] from Algeria to Afghanistan, from Britain to 
Baghdad, the organization once believed to be at the verge of impotence is again 
ascendant.’52 The deteriorating security situation in Iraq (in no small part due to the 
groups endorsed by Al-Qa’ida) and a truce between authorities in Islamabad and 
militants in Waziristan provided further breathing space for the group’s central 
leadership to regroup and appeared to foster closer links with the Taliban.53  
Hoffman’s February 2007 testimony submitted to the House Armed Services 
Subcommittee emphasised the continued resonance of two dimensions to Al-Qa’ida, 
depending on level of analysis and approach: ‘The al Qaeda of today combines, as it 
always has, both a “bottom up” approach encouraging independent thought and action 
from low (or lower-) level operatives and a “top down” one issuing orders and still 
coordinating a far-flung terrorist enterprise with both highly synchronized and 
autonomous moving parts.’54  
                                                
47 Scheuer (2011): 152.  
48 Distributed by As-Sahab (with subtitles), widely available on online Islamist forums. A transcript can 
also be located in IntelCenter (2008) Words of Osama bin Laden Vol. 1, Tempest Publishing, Alexandria 
VA.  
49 Whitlock, C. (2007) ‘The New Al-Qaeda Central…’ in Washington Post (9 September). 
50 Solomon, J. (2008) ‘The Funding Methods of FATA’s terrorists and insurgents’, in Combating 
Terrorism Sentinel (vol. 1, iss. 6, May): 4. 
51 Riedel, B. (2007) ‘Al Qaeda Strikes Back..’ in Foreign Affairs (86:3, May-June). Others voicing the 
same concerns include Scheuer (2011): 139; Wilkinson (2006) Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal 
State Response (2nd ed.). Routledge, Abingdon: 46. 
52 Bergen, P. (2007-A) ‘Where you Bin? The Return of al Qaeda’ (January 29th) in The New Republic (vol. 
236, no. 5). 
53 See e.g. Gregory, S. (2007) ‘Al-Qaeda in Pakistan’ in Brief Number 5 (1 March), Pakistan Security 
Research Unit; Khan, I. (2005) ‘Waziristan Draft Accord Approved’, in The Dawn (2 February); Gul, P 
(2006) ‘Waziristan Accord Signed,’ The Dawn (6 September); Bergen, P. (2007-B), ‘House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs’, (15 February), <http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/ber021507.htm> (as of 19 January 
2011). 
54 Hoffman, B. (2007) ‘Challenges For the U.S. Special Operations Command Posed by the Global 
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This perception has been challenged most prominently by Sageman who 
presented his thesis on ‘leaderless jihad’ as an alternative analytical framework to that 
assuming an organisational core with a fluid and autonomous support base. For 
Sageman, whilst this core was in hiding and in decline, the ‘al Qaeda social movement 
has flourished’ – spurred on by the resentment caused by the Iraq war and new channels 
of communication through the Internet. This had empowered the grassroots who 
operated autonomously of any hierarchical leadership or structure. Indeed ‘the structure 
of the Internet has become the structure of global Islamist terrorism’, according to this 
model.55   
A similar approach was adopted in the National Intelligence Estimate of July 
2007 assessing the ‘threat to the US Homeland’, which warned that the spreading of 
‘radical – especially Salafi – Internet sites […] and the growing number of radical, self-
generating cells in Western countries indicate that the radical and violent segment of the 
West’s Muslim population is expanding.’56 The UN Security Council warned of the 
impact of such fluidity and that ‘the Al-Qaida and Taliban leadership continues to try to 
exert control over a movement that it inspires but does not direct.’57 
In the context of asymmetrical conflict, as Stepanova argued, such an emergence 
of a ‘multiple-cell, transnational post-al-Qaeda movement’ – as an autonomous, 
adaptable and de-structured actor – presented substantial analytical challenges.58  
This apparent split in analytical approaches produced ever more polarised 
academic debates represented by Hoffman’s view on the one hand (organised structure 
with operational capacity at the core is retained) versus Sageman’s approach on the other 
(the leaderless grassroots should be the focus of analysis).  
Ironically, but unsurprisingly, it might be argued that both approaches are 
essentially correct and reveal relatively scant differences in terms of the perceived 
elements that explain the inner workings, nature and fluidity of the Al-Qa’ida network. 
Both concern the shifting balance between the organisational capacity of a network 
channelling experience, training and funds and the recipients, sympathisers and 
supporters, united by a broadly common agenda and prepared to instigate or assist in the 
planning of terrorist attacks. Swathes of the academic community have become 
distracted by these quarrels interrupting the more theoretical and conceptual 
deliberations that need to be addressed in order to develop cohesive analyses into the 
concept of Al-Qa’ida. Ronfeldt summarised these developments succinctly: 
 
For a while, the pressures put on the al-Qaeda network evidently reduced its structure from a 
hub-and-spoke design back to a scattered-cluster design. But now it is growing again, 
apparently into a multihub design. Which design is it? Do the pieces consist of chain, hub 
(i.e. star), or all-channel subnets? And where are the bridges and holes that may connect to 
outside actors? The answers matter, for each design has different strengths, weaknesses, and 
implications.59  
                                                                                                                                           
Terrorist Threat: Al Qaeda on The Run or on the March?’ Written Testimony Submitted to The House 
Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, Washington DC.  
55 Sageman (2008): 133, 121. 
56 ODNI (2007) National Intelligence Estimate: The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland (July). 
57 Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (2008) Report of the Analytical 
Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team pursuant to resolution 1735 (2006) concerning Al-Qaida and the 
Taliban and associated individuals and entities (2008/324): 5. 
58 Stepanova, E. (2008) SIPRI Research Report No 23 Terrorism in Asymmetrical Conflict: Ideological 
and Structural Aspects, SIPRI, Stockholm: 26 
59 Ronfeldt, D. (2007) Al-Qaeda and its Affiliates: A Global Tribe Waging Segmental Warfare, RAND 
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An underlying problem that has contributed to polarised debates and ambiguous and 
conflicting analytical accounts, that have proven so remarkably unhelpful in shedding 
light on the Al-Qa’ida phenomenon, lies in the preoccupation of these accounts with 
organisational structures that are based on familiar models reflecting command and 
control mechanisms rather than long-term, testable empirical analyses. This thesis 
departs from a focus on the elements that may or may not form different layers of Al-
Qa’ida and their operational impact and relies instead on a systematic, empirical and 
longitudinal analysis of communiqués. This repository constitutes an un-tapped resource 
that is central to understanding Al-Qa’ida.  
 
 
 
1.3 Conceptualisations and Typologies 
 
Ronfeldt’s own conceptual model for Al-Qa’ida was based on a ‘tribal’ paradigm in 
which the central leadership of Al-Qa’ida operated through a network of kinship and 
bonds, projecting ‘ancient patterns of tribalism on a global scale’ through ‘segmental 
warfare.’60 Constructing a broader spectrum, Mishal and Rosenthal argued that Al-
Qa’ida had moved from a relatively hierarchical structure, through a network phase in 
the run up to 9/11 morphing into what the authors termed a ‘Dune organization’, 
following a process of de-territorialisation. This condition was manifest in an effective 
‘geopolitical vertigo’ whereby clusters of variously unrelated networks of groups 
represented Al-Qa’ida in various regions of the world without being centred in a single 
location. There was no overreaching institutional presence, the activity was dynamic, 
command and communication chains were fluid and fragmented, and the structure and 
scope of the components was variable.61  
Such networks operated as a ‘collection of nodes connected through links’, in 
Sageman’s words62, differing in composition according to type of activity, reach and 
ability to preserve operability, according to the ‘netwar’ paradigm.63 Again, however, the 
ambiguity of such operational conceptualisations contrasts the simplicity of ideational 
approaches. Looking beyond structures and ‘nodes’, for example, Burke developed his 
concept of ‘Al-Qaedism’ to capture the essence of what the leadership and its followers 
stood for. Bale’s ‘Bin Ladenism’ emphasised similar notions.64 Some accounts have 
sought to reconcile these ideational approaches with the development of organisational 
and agency models. Soriano’s study of Al-Qa’ida messages relating to Islamist militant 
activism focused on Spain, for instance, defined a cluster of agents (with variously local 
or international ambitions) in a wider ‘global jihadist movement (GJM).’65 Similarly, the 
                                                
60 Ibid: 35-36. 
61 Mishal, S. & Rosenthal, M. (2005) ‘Al Qaeda as a Dune Organization: Toward a Typology of Islamic 
Terrorist Organizations’ in Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, July (28:4, pp. 275-293). 
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64 See Burke, J. (2004-B). ‘Think Again: Al Qaeda’ in Foreign Policy (May/June, no. 142, pp.18-26); 
Bale, J.M. (2009) ‘Jihadist Ideology and Strategy and the Possible Employment of WMD’ in Ackerman, 
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‘Terrorist Perspectives Project’ developed the concept of ‘Al-Qa’ida and Associated 
Movements – AQAM.’ According to this model, ‘AQAM represents a large number of 
individuals united by a common theology, albeit with differing ethnic backgrounds, 
experiences, and perspectives on jihad’, where ultimately, the ‘view of AQAM as a 
global movement with a revolutionary vanguard at its head is the dominant 
perspective.’66  
A discussion of movements centred on specific belief systems with organised 
components espousing prompters to collective action in support of a common agenda, 
leads logically to the contribution of social movement theory to the current debate. The 
social movement approach is particularly relevant to this thesis as the literature provides 
a framework with which to understand the importance and meaning of message 
dissemination between movement leaders and broader environment of constituents, 
potential followers and other audiences.67 This focus on ideational constructs is 
particularly central to the concept of message framing which informs the longitudinal 
analysis of Al-Qa’ida communiqués of the current thesis. Framing and its application to 
the corpus in question are explored in detail in Part II of this thesis. The relevant 
theoretical context, however, is introduced in the next section. 
 
1.3.1 Social movements and complex global microstructures  
 
Social movements can be understood in terms of the ‘organized and sustained effort of a 
collectivity of interrelated, groups, individuals and organizations to promote or resist 
social change with the use of public protest activities.’68 A vast range of movement types 
and activities can of course be grouped under such a banner, but the common features – 
according to Wilkinson’s ‘working concept’ – include ‘conscious commitment to 
change’; ‘minimal organization’; and a scope for wider ‘normative commitment and 
participation.’ 69 In terms of some of the above approaches, this can clearly be applied to 
Al-Qa’ida, a loosely organised movement with a central leadership that seeks to channel 
the frustrations of the broader community towards amending the status quo.  
Some social movements, as Wilkinson observed, are fuelled by millenarian 
fervour of expected imminent cataclysms, espousing a ‘revolutionary promise of the 
advent of an age of bliss, abundance and perfect justice.’70 In terms of understanding Al-
Qa’ida, this could refer to promises of divine social justice through introduction of (their 
interpretation of) shari’ah law, or ascent to paradise for those who die seeking to 
introduce such a society. As a related concept, in turn, Wilkinson defined specifically 
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69 Wilkinson, P. (1971) Social Movement, Pall Mall Press, London: 46. 
70 Ibid: 71. 
Part I: Introduction 
 22 
religious social movements as those laying claim ‘to a source of doctrinal authority’; 
focusing on the need to ‘reorient radically individual personality and behaviour’; using 
religion as a source for ‘primacy and […] authority on the basis of [a] monopoly of 
revelatory or rational ideological truth’; utilising ‘religion’s power of promoting social 
integration and solidarity.’71 According to this framework, therefore, Al-Qa’ida can be 
understood as a religious social movement pursuing religious socio-political goals 
basing activist messages on interpretation of doctrine and the need to defend core 
religious values.  
Other scholars have explored ways in which social movements, religious or 
otherwise, have adopted and promoted violence as the way to address grievances and 
achieve stated goals. Della Porta, for instance, saw violent social movements as having 
adopted ‘political violence as a particular repertoire of collective action that involved 
physical force, considered at that time as legitimate in the [respective] dominant 
culture.’72 Again, when applied to Al-Qa’ida, this highlights the centrality of jihad – as a 
central concept of faith – for the leadership, interpreted as the individual duty of 
Muslims to fight for their religion. Gusfield, moreover, saw social movements as 
contributing to ‘the existence of a vocabulary and an opening of ideas and actions which 
in the past was either unknown or unthinkable.’73  The presentation of suicide bombings 
against non-combatants as the noble sacrifice of martyrs furthering the cause of Sunni 
Islam would be illustrative of this process.   
Several accounts of Al-Qa’ida have, in turn, adopted social movement theory 
approaches. For Riedel74 and Brachman75 for instance the extent to which Al-Qa’ida had 
become an adaptable social movement was central to its strength and continued survival. 
Several authors meanwhile have emphasised the ability of the Al-Qa’ida leaders to 
create a globalised social movement through inspiring followers to collective action.76 
Finally, the Islamist treatises themselves, have directly identified the creation and 
nurturing of social movements as essential features of a future uprising. Kepel, for 
instance, noted how Qutb’s references to the need for a vanguard to lead the ummah out 
of jahiliyyah (ignorance of religious duties) necessarily relied on the establishment of a 
‘movement’ (haraka) with popular support.77 Qutb wrote: ‘we need to initiate the 
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movement of Islamic revival in some Muslim country. Only such a revivalist movement 
will eventually attain to the status of world leadership, whether the distance is near or 
far.’78 In Qutb’s earlier works, moreover, when the parameters for social change were 
less focused on religious purity, popular movements, nonetheless, constituted the 
essential vehicle for change in order to put Islam into practice in wider society.79 
How can Al-Qa’ida be defined as a social movement? Within the context of 
Wilkinson’s ‘working concept’, defined above, Al-Qa’ida is a conscious driving force 
for change in violent opposition to the status quo. Rather than relying on tiered or 
hierarchical structures or substantial levels of organisation exclusively, however, 
principal sources of strength are based on perceived common norms within a wider 
community and a source of identity that connects leaders with members of this wider 
community. This environment can be understood in terms of Cetina’s conceptualisation 
of global microstructures, defined as ‘structures of connectivity and integration that are 
global in scope but microsociological in character.’80 These structures of connectivity 
are coordinated through norms and informal interactions rather than through complex 
hierarchies and by formal authority. Actors gain effectiveness not through established 
authority and instrumental procedures, but through exploiting ‘systems of amplification’, 
such as new forms of media – something that has been central to Al-Qa’ida’s ability to 
reach larger audiences. According to Cetina’s model, therefore, the socio-cultural 
environment in which Al-Qa’ida operates is not to be understood as a formal, 
hierarchical or institutional set of interactions but, rather, as complex and diverse 
networks of social structures. Global coordination efforts within this environment thus 
rest to a substantial degree on the use of ‘scopic media’ (see further Chapter 3) as formal 
and institutional lines of control are not feasible or appropriate.81  
For the Al-Qa’ida leadership, the source of socio-cultural identity rests on Islam, 
the wider community of social structures consists collectively of the ummat al-mu’minin, 
the Islamic nation, and norms are reflected in a narrative communicated through public 
messages. These communiqués highlight grievances and aspirations of this ummah, 
alternatives to the status quo, prescribed methods for change and the adversaries that 
threaten the common values of the community.  
 
1.3.2 Tiered typologies 
 
It can be deduced from the above-mentioned approaches and in particular from the 
contribution of the social movement literature and the concept of global microstructures 
that an analysis of Al-Qa’ida needs to take into account message generators as well as 
message recipients. Any typology of Al-Qa’ida needs to represent the different cohorts 
that together form the layers of analysis that have evolved as the original components 
have expanded ideationally whilst transforming operationally and inspiring affiliates. 
Such a typology needs to capture the atomisation of the concept of Al-Qa’ida, the 
different actors and actor-relationships at play and the contrast between a vulnerable 
sanctuary-dependent ‘conventional’ group relying on a semblance of infrastructure and 
tangible networks on the one hand and a quasi de-territorialised (or globalised) corpus of 
message recipients on the other hand who form a latent support base and become the 
focus group for further mobilisation into activism and militancy.  
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Here, the widely adopted tiered typologies prove helpful. Hoffman developed his 
categories based on the premise that the ‘current al Qaeda […] exists more as an 
ideology that has become a vast enterprise – an international franchise with like-minded 
local representatives, loosely connected to a central ideological or motivational base but 
advancing the remaining center’s goals at once simultaneously and independently of 
each other.’82 
Correspondingly, Hoffman discerned four layers: (1) the Al-Qa’ida central, 
comprised of the Afghan veterans and their direct associates who founded the group in 
the first place (or their replacements), (2) Al-Qa’ida affiliates and associates, consisting 
of formal and established insurgent groups that followed the guidance of the central 
leadership, (3) Al-Qa’ida locals, as individuals with militancy experience and some form 
of linkage with the other levels above and (4) the Al-Qa’ida network, the diffuse corpus 
of ‘home-grown’ Islamist radicals and militants.83  
Brachman based his division on similar principles:  
 
the al-Qaida high command (Bin Laden, Zawahiri); al-Qaida affiliate groups and individuals 
(Jemaah Islammiyyah, Lashkar-i-Taiba, al-Qaida in the [Arabian] peninsula, al-Qaida in the 
Islamic Maghreb) and those individuals and groups who are supported by al-Qaida (Istanbul 
bombers, London 7/7 bombers); and those individuals and groups who are inspired by al-
Qaida but have no direct ties to it (Toronto cell).84 
 
When put into this context, it emerges that Sageman’s ‘waves’ of Islamist militancy are 
not necessarily so dissimilar. These involved, firstly, the ‘old guard’ of Afghan veterans 
who established Al-Qa’ida and secondly, a corpus of younger, mostly middle class, 
veterans of militancy in Bosnia, Kashmir, Chechnya and elsewhere. Finally, Sageman 
defined a third wave of post-Iraq invasion mix of Diasporas and privileged youngsters 
from the Middle East and North Africa who constitute the mainstay of the ‘leaderless 
jihad.’85 The friction between the two approaches obviously revolved around the 
perceived durability of different phases (for Sageman) or levels (for Hoffman) and the 
question of control and initiative.  
Beyond academic deliberations, organisations engaged operationally in 
counterterrorism have also adopted tiered typologies for Al-Qa’ida. The UK Joint 
Terrorism Analysis Centre, for example, introduced a three-tier model into its 
assessments in 2005 to ‘describe the varying degrees of connection between targets and 
the Al Qaida leadership: “Tier 1” describing individuals or networks considered to have 
direct links with core Al Qaida; “Tier 2”, individuals or networks more loosely affiliated 
with Al Qaida; and “Tier 3”, those without any links to Al Qaida who might be inspired 
by their ideology.’ Although different from Hoffman’s model in terms of focusing on 
stages and variations in terms of linkages with Al-Qa’ida central, the model nonetheless 
conveys similar notions in terms of a core leadership on the one hand and a more diffuse, 
autonomous base on the other. The majority of individuals of concern fell within the 
latter two tiers, subjects ‘who were only loosely affiliated to Al Qaida or entirely 
separate (albeit with shared ideological beliefs).’86 FBI director Muller’s trichotomy for 
Al-Qa’ida is virtually identical: 
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I refer to it in three levels. The first is al Qaeda itself – bin Laden, the core, […], and the 
second level is individuals who are not necessarily directed from the outset and the planning 
is not accomplished by core al Qaeda but have some ties to al Qaeda, whether it be financial 
or recruiting or otherwise. And the third level is self-radicalized without any ties whatsoever 
to al Qaeda.87 
 
The Economist defined a journalistic ideal type with essentially the same components: 
‘Al-Qaeda is a terrorist organisation, a militant network and a subculture of rebellion all 
at the same time.’88 
The most interesting tiered conceptualisations, however, are those developed by 
the militant Islamist thinkers themselves, thus adding credence to those presented above. 
Wali al-Haq, for instance, a prominent member of militant Islamist forums, described 
Al-Qa’ida as ‘not only an organization seeking to fight the Jews and Crusaders; rather 
it’s an ideology and a mission calling on all Muslims to uphold God’s religion and 
rescue the weak monotheists.’89 The resemblance with Al-Suri’s tiered model for 
contemporary militant Islamist activism is more striking. The strategist found ‘three 
organizational circles in the units of the Global Islamic Resistance Call.’90  
The first circle consisted of a ‘militarily active […] centralized unit’, which 
spread ‘the literary production of the Call [to Global Islamic Resistance], its political-
juridical, educational and organizational programs, among various segments of the 
Islamic nation, [oversaw] the issuance of media, and programmatic communiqués.’ The 
second circle comprised ‘de-centralized units’, ‘elements […] [that] can be subjected to 
ideological, programmatic, and educational qualification courses’ that ‘upon request’ 
could ‘spread throughout the world, each one according to [individual] circumstances 
and life situation, and operate completely freely and separately from the Centralized 
Unit.’ Al-Suri termed the third and final circle ‘the Da’wah circle or the General Units of 
the Global Islamic Resistance Call’, ‘youth, who are determined to fight a jihad […] and 
form their own Units entirely independently […] without any organizational links with 
the Center.’ 
Al-Suri thus presents perhaps the clearest illustration of the current object of 
analysis and the context in which it operates. The core and original leadership of Al-
Qa’ida communicates with other tiers of a militant network of groups and individuals, 
supported and inspired by the core or operating in its name, through its public messages. 
Message generation, conveying the ideology, narrative and communicative strategy of 
Al-Qa’ida’s leaders – particularly the late bin Ladin and Zawahiri, his successor as 
formal leader – now constitutes the primary role and the principal activity of the 
leadership corpus within the militant network, as well as the existence of Al-Qa’ida as a 
political entity. Arguably, this has always been the leadership’s focus. A Combating 
Terrorism Center report, for instance, posited:  
 
In what boils down to a struggle between branding and bureaucracy, al-Qa’ida has 
consistently put its ability to inspire a broader movement over the development of its 
organizational capacities to pursue strategic military goals. While its guerrilla strategists 
have fought for the resources to build an effective command-and-control military 
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organization, its two supreme leaders – Usama bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri – have 
preferred press releases over battlefield preparedness.91 
 
Figure 1, below illustrates the position of the core, its relationship with subsequent levels 
and the direction of messaging.  
 
 
Figure 1: TIERED CONCEPTUALISATION OF AL-QA'IDA AND MESSAGE DISSEMINATION 
FROM THE CORE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The core constitutes the traditional leadership and original founders of the group 
alongside those who have replaced fallen leaders or become prominent within the central 
movement. This first layer, therefore, represents Al-Qa’ida proper. 
Affiliated and associated movements form the second layer. These are militant 
groups which have sought direct association with the core, sometimes incorporating its 
name to illustrate the allegiance and operate according to Al-Qa’ida’s strategic 
principles. The third layer hosts the support network: individuals or small groups that 
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seek guidance, endorsement or material support from the first two tiers, without prior or 
more substantial engagement with them as movements. Finally, the outer layer consists 
of the inspired base whereby individuals are inspired by the Al-Qa’ida message and 
mobilise on their own initiative, without support from the other tiers. As a fluid 
collection of like-minded sympathisers, these individuals are naturally exposed to other 
militant Islamist groups, narratives and a wider set of variables distinct from the Al-
Qa’ida core.  
The militant network associated with Al-Qa’ida also operates within a wider 
framework of Islamist militancy. This context has generated experiences, narratives, 
language, and alternative groups that impact upon Al-Qa’ida. Furthermore, the network 
engages with a host of other actors that together form the environment in which Al-
Qa’ida operates, providing its wider audience and enemy targets. Ultimately, this 
involves the community with which Al-Qa’ida identifies and that the leaders seek to 
mobilise; the Islamic ummah. This complex structure, in Cetina’s words, thus centres on 
the ‘richness and diversity of elements and practices that layer global social forms’ and 
the extent to which the Al-Qa’ida leadership is informed by and seeks to influence these 
social structures and norms.92 In essence, therefore, this tiered conceptualisation merely 
serves to deconstruct the ambiguous notion of Al-Qa’ida into descriptive layers designed 
to situate the core leadership within its wider environment, rather than a model 
describing how this leadership perceives itself or Al-Qa’ida. According to this model, 
the outer layers of the movement constitute divergent militant facets which, in turn, 
operate within a wider environment that consists both of other militant groups and 
radical Islamist strands as well as the perceived adversaries and potential followers that 
feature in the Al-Qa’ida leadership’s messages.    
The current study thus relies on this corpus as the point of departure to 
understand the way in which the Al-Qa’ida core has sought to influence others, the 
ideology the leadership (as represented by bin Ladin and Zawahiri) has espoused since 
the group’s inception and the way in which its message has evolved, as well as 
weaknesses detectable in this narrative. The next chapter explores the way in which this 
ideology is constructed and how it can be approached.  
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THE IDEOLOGY OF AL-QA’IDA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
As analysts and observers debated the increasingly ambiguous operational relationship 
between the Al-Qa’ida central leadership and any peripheral cohorts, as well as the 
linkage between the perpetrators behind Islamist-inspired terrorist plots (both successful 
and unsuccessful) in the post-9/11 period and the core leadership, the role that ideology 
played in inspiring ‘followers’ to mobilise became an increasingly prominent focus of 
analysis. Islamist ideology became central to terrorist ‘threat assessments’, as observers 
feared the impact of this ideology on local admirers of Al-Qa’ida, who in many cases 
were Western nationals and therefore constituted ‘homegrown’ radicals. A recent 
Washington Institute report warned, for example, of ‘how the transnational threat posed 
by global terrorist networks is increasingly bringing the front line of the struggle against 
terrorism to our shores. Ideology, in other words, is the common strand that binds these 
plots and individuals and is a driver for this global movement.’93 As organisational 
hierarchies disperse, therefore, ‘the ideological tenets of al-Qaeda thrive, and other, 
arguably smarter, adversaries continue to exploit its “ideological package.”94 
Investigations into Al-Qa’ida needed to account for this ideational element. The 
threads of Islamist militancy, Ronfeldt argued, were ‘held together not by command-
and-control structures […] but by a gripping sense of shared belonging, principles of 
fusion against an outside enemy, and a jihadist narrative so compelling that it amounts to 
both an ideology and a doctrine.’95 Regardless of the Al-Qa’ida core leadership’s 
involvement in individual plots, the success of the movement depended on wider 
mobilisation and support. In this sense, the focus was on the ability of the Al-Qa’ida 
leadership to generate a narrative, through the conveyance of communiqués, to create a 
wider support-base for militancy that went beyond the operational initiatives of the 
leadership itself. The US Director of National Intelligence, for instance, warned of the 
role this process played: ‘homegrown extremists, inspired by militant Islamic ideology 
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but without operational direction from al Qaeda, are on an evolving course for danger 
inside the United States.’96 
In seeking to understand this ideational element of the Al-Qa’ida phenomenon, 
Stout et al. correctly emphasised the need for systematic and evidence-based analyses. 
Dissecting what Al-Qa’ida stood for and the impact this would have on potential 
followers required ‘constant study of the enemy’s thinking. The alternative is 
catastrophe.’97 Cigar, moreover, argued such insights would help ‘policymakers shape a 
more realistic profile of its leaders and of its strategy, which can be key in developing 
effective counterterrorism and counterinsurgency policies.’98 Similarly, Riedel observed, 
‘understanding al Qaeda’s ideology is the first key to defeating the group.’99 Or in the 
words of the Terrorist Perspectives Project, ‘understanding the culture and ideology of 
global salafi jihadism is the single most important component’ in comprehending the 
nature of the threat.100 As a result, ‘ideology is […] an essential component of any 
strategy designed to counter al-Qaeda.’101 To what extent, however, is the concept of 
ideology clear in this respect? How can we fathom what constitutes the ideology of Al-
Qa’ida and how can this be situated within its wider ideational environment? The 
following three sections deconstruct the ambiguous concept of ‘ideology’ in relation to 
militant Islam in general and the Al-Qa’ida core in particular. The remainder of the 
chapter explores how this ideational aspect can be understood through analysing 
communiqués in terms of dissecting messages according to ways in which the narrative 
is constructed and framed. 
 
2.1.1 Definitions 
 
The ideology of militant movements can be defined as a set of belief systems and 
principles guiding their political behaviour and defining the goals and rationales of 
individual and collective action.102 As Aldis and Herd note, ideological treatises and 
public messages are used to legitimise the existence of a movement and the activism 
prescribed, whilst appealing to a wider support base.103  
Terrorist movements frame their message by (1) identifying socio-political 
problems, (2) proposing solutions to these problems, and (3) seeking to mobilise their 
target audiences to address the issues identified.104 These are the central framing tasks 
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(see next chapter), which allow us to dissect the Al-Qa’ida communiqués in terms of 
message content. These ideological imperatives structure the strategic goals of a terrorist 
movement’s communication efforts. Corman and Schiefelbein identified these as: (1) 
legitimising the movement, (2) expanding its message, and (3) intimidating opponents. 
For Al- Qa’ida and other Islamist militant and revolutionary movements this entails 
justifications for the prescribed methodology, which – in this case – involves terrorist 
violence.105 In terms of processes contributing to activism, moreover, Della Porta 
suggested how ideology offered ways of ‘reducing the psychological costs of 
participation in terrorist organizations.’106 This relates to the extent to which the 
ideology of a militant movement instils feelings of righteousness, legitimate violence 
and noble causes using language and terminology that are central to the core belief 
system. For the current study of Al-Qa’ida leadership communiqués, these references to 
core beliefs and emotions are centred on notions of puritanical Islam through ideational 
strands known as Salafism.   
 
2.1.2 Salafism 
 
‘Al Qaeda’s ideology’, Heather argues, ‘is not new; it has its roots in several Muslim 
thinkers from the 20th century who developed the vision for an Islamic revolution.’107 
Indeed the framing, context and language applied in the Al-Qa’ida leadership narrative 
and the foundation of its faith-based strategy relies on modern Islamist revivalism and 
the puritanical interpretive strand of Salafism.108 Although this depends on the 
interpretation of pure religious tradition, this tradition, as Esposito notes, was ‘redefined 
and standardized’ over the centuries.109 
The term ‘Salafism’ is developed from the Arabic concept of ‘al-salaf al-salih’, 
the pious forefathers or the first three generations of Muslim leaders and the societies 
over which they presided.110 This ‘golden age’ witnessed the rise of Islam.111 Salafism 
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teaches a return to the core tenets of Islam, ‘stripped of local customs and cultures’,112 as 
conveyed through the Qur’an, Hadith (oral reports of the Prophet’s teachings and 
choices) and Sunnah (records of the Prophet’s practices and what he forbade or 
permitted).113 Ostensibly, therefore, Salafism rejects any form of taqlid or blind 
following of the four juridical schools of Islam, in favour of individual interpretation 
along prescribed guidelines (ijtihad).114 Those who follow this path (according to their 
own interpretation) therefore belonged to the ‘helped group’ (taifat al-mansura) or 
‘saved sect’ (al-firqa al-najiya).115 This is important because the theological foundations 
are laid for individuals who lack official religious schooling to become prominent 
religio-political personas (Salafism of course does not separate religion from 
government), espousing a far more radical message that challenges and seeks to 
undermine the mainstream religious establishment, especially when this is seen as 
corrupted by semi-secular authoritarian rulers. For the militant activist fringe, moreover, 
this freedom to manoeuvre elevates violent attacks to levels of religious expression 
whereby violence is a manifestation of religion in practice. Bin Ladin, for example, 
insisted the 9/11 attacks had been ‘more effective than a million books in clarifying the 
doctrine of allegiance to the believers and disassociation from the unbelievers’ (al-wala’ 
wa-l-bara’, see further in Chapter 6).116 
A central concept of Salafism is tawhid, literally the ‘oneness of God’ or the core 
principle of monotheism. The importance of the concept and the extent to which it 
demands a response from believers depends, as Meijer notes, largely on political issues. 
In the interpretation of Taqi al-Din ibn Taymiyyah (who informed much of Faraj’s work 
as mentioned above) and much later by Qutb, the activist and purist (and even militant) 
insistence on tawhid in practice and the removal of rulers who failed to live by the tenet 
and implement sharia was paramount.117 This version has remained central for militant 
Islamists (witness, for instance Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, 
before it merged with Al-Qa’ida). 
This pursuit of uninterrupted tawhid and exclusive relationship with God, free 
from any cultural innovations (bida’) that had corrupted the Islamic creed (aqidah) and 
led to shirik (idolatry or polytheism) was the driving force behind Ibn ‘Ad al-Wahhab’s 
revivalist movement that swept the Arabian Peninsula in the 18th century. Building upon 
the activist foundations laid by Ibn Taymiyyah, the followers of Wahhab denounced 
those whom they perceived to be in breach of this doctrine as kuffar, unbelievers outside 
the realm of Islam, or murtaddun, apostates who had infringed upon the core principles 
of Islam. Excommunication (takfir) of Muslims places them outside the realm of dar al-
Islam, as mentioned above, thus justifying violence against them.118 By associating takfir 
with politics, Wahhabists unleashed ‘a monster mainstream Salafism desperately tries to 
keep in its cage while other currents within the movement have done their best to let it 
escape.’119 The branch of Salafism which endorses militancy as a method to achieve the 
above goals and punish those who stand in the way, which some have termed ‘jihadi-
Salafism’ is the most modern manifestation of the doctrine (albeit with spurious links to 
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its classical arguments). ‘It concentrates,’ Meijer argues, ‘on the analysis of a political 
reality, devising strategies and practices for how to change it.’120 Not all manifestations 
of Salafism, therefore, demand violent solutions. There are also, moreover, violent 
manifestations that do not rely on excessive application of takfir, including – as this 
thesis will argue and as Scheuer posits121 – the Al-Qa’ida core. 
 Wiktorowicz defined three major strands of Salafism: ‘purists, politicos and the 
jihadis:’ 
 
The purists emphasize a focus on nonviolent methods of propagation, purification, and 
education. They view politics as a diversion that encourages deviancy. Politicos, in contrast, 
emphasize application of the Salafi creed to the political arena, which they view as 
particularly important because it dramatically impacts social justice and the right of God 
alone to legislate. Jihadis take a more militant position and argue that the current context 
calls for violence and revolution. All three factions share a common creed but offer different 
explanations of the contemporary world and its concomitant problems and thus propose 
different solutions. The splits are about contextual analysis, not belief.122 
 
In tracing principal facets of the contemporary jihadi Salafi current, moreover, 
Paz identified three major components. Firstly, the Egyptian branch from ‘among the 
radical sections of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’ (mainly Sayyid and Mohammed 
Qutb, Sayyid Imam al-Sharif/Dr. Fadl). Second, ‘neo-Wahhabism’ as developed 
primarily by Shaykh ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Baz (even though he later softened his response, 
endorsing the placing of US troops in Saudi Arabia, prompting bin Ladin’s public 
rebuttals) and other Saudi religious leaders. Third, the branch led by the ‘Palestinian 
Trio’ of Abdullah Azzam, Umar Abu Qatada and Islam al-Burqawi/Abu Muhammad al-
Maqdisi.123 
The temptation to identify anything resembling holistic or linear processes in the 
development of ‘jihadi-Salalfi’ thought and practice, however, should be avoided. 
Stemmann, for example, argued: 
 
The transition from Salafism to terrorist militancy is easy given the radicalization that 
accompanies integration in the Salafi community. Support for or justification of terrorism, 
rejection of integration in host societies, and the creation of an Islamic State in Europe [in 
the case examined] are all ideas shared by those who adopt Salafism as their system of 
values and behavioral model.124 
 
These assumptions risk ignoring the question, ‘why is it that so many do not engage in 
terrorism?’125 Furthermore, such assumptions also risk attaching greater theological and 
juridical rigor and consistency to the ideology than can justifiably be discerned. Meijer, 
again, offers a concise and pertinent observation: ‘living in a virtual and paranoid world, 
Jihadists plunder the Salafi terminological toolkit of intolerance, xenophobia, 
                                                
120 Ibid: 24. 
121 Scheuer (2011): e.g. 152. 
122 Wiktorowicz, Q. (2006) ‘Anatomy of the Salafi Movement’ in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (29:3, 
pp. 207-239): 208. 
123 Paz, R. (2009) ‘Debates within the Family: Jihadi-Salafi Debates on Strategy, Takfir, Extremism, 
Suicide Bombings and the Sense of the Apocalypse’, in Meijer, R. (ed.): 269. Al-Suri’s assessment as to 
the origin of the jihadi ideology is remarkably similar, see Lia, B. (2009) “Destructive Doctrinarians”: Abu 
Mus’ab al-Suri’s Critique of the Salafis in the Jihadi Current’, in Meijer (2009) (ed.): 286. 
124 Stemmann (2007): 88 
125 Horgan, J. (2005) The Psychology of Terrorism, Routledge, Abingdon: 166. 
Part I: Introduction 
 34 
sectarianism, war against apostate governmental and unbelieving forces of global 
oppression with which Islam is locked in an apocalyptic clash of civilizations.’126 
Central themes of this narrative include: overall victimisation of Muslims; 
rejection of pluralism; ‘liberation’ of the Middle East and Maghreb followed by 
implementation of sharia; the use of violence as religiously sanctioned due to actions of 
the West and ‘apostates’; with Muslims duty-bound to assist the vanguard in achieving 
victory and establishing the described order.127  
However, despite the plethora of analytical works and journalistic accounts 
aimed at elucidating these core aspects that are cited as drivers for Al-Qa’ida as a 
militant movement and for those who established or joined the movement in the pursuit 
of a common cause, consensus regarding these most fundamental precepts has remained 
elusive. Differences rest, in part, on the development of an unhelpful dichotomy 
separating politics and religion, even though no such distinction exists within the wider 
Salafist belief system.128 Hamid Mir, for instance, who interviewed bin Ladin on three 
occasions, argued the latter was not following interpreted doctrine but rather ‘doing 
politics in the name of religion.’129 Mohamedau too emphasised the ‘primacy of the 
political’ in Al-Qa’ida’s agenda.130 Similarly, Ronfledt questioned the significance of 
religion in the strategic thinking of the Al-Qa’ida leadership, arguing their perception of 
Jihad was based more on ‘virulent tribalism’ than religion.131 
These notions informed Tibi’s understanding of Al-Qa’ida and similar 
organisations as fighting for ‘religionized’ political causes that rendered ostensibly 
conventional political concerns non-negotiable. In this sense, Al-Qa’ida was not fighting 
for the establishment of a Caliphate, but rather a vaguer form of ‘Islamic order.’132  
Nascent reconceptualisations within the study of political Islam that decouple religion 
and politics appear to be attractive to some analysts and policy makers, particularly to 
those responsible for the generation of ‘counter-narratives’ and appeals aimed at any 
potential supporters of violent extremist groups. A recent Washington Institute report, 
for instance, urged the Obama administration to ‘ensure that Islamism−a radical political 
ideology separate from Islam as a religion−is recognized internally within the U.S. 
government as the key ideological drive of the violent extremist threat posed by al-
Qaeda and other radical Islamist groups.’133 
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Some analysts have voiced concerns over the validity and accuracy of this 
apparent distinction between religion (and religious culture) and politics in the context of 
Al-Qa’ida’s campaign of violence and terrorism. Tololyan, for example, warns of the 
‘disciplinary rush to the politicization of terrorism,’ whereby ‘the profession of political 
science seems powerfully impelled to turn enormously complex events into mere, or 
only, or just political facts that can be seen as motivating other political acts, including 
terrorism.’ He argues: ‘terrorism with an authentically popular base is never a purely 
political phenomenon.’134 Although the extent to which the Al-Qa’ida core, in its current 
form, constitutes or can rely on a popular support base is debatable, the leaders have 
enjoyed broader appeal within certain communities throughout the life of the movement. 
The ambiguity surrounding the role of and the interplay between religion (and religious 
concepts and interpretations) and politics (and political ambitions) in the construction of 
these appeals appears to result from insufficient empirical understanding of the way in 
which the core leadership communicates these values.  
The case for empirical, systematic research is strengthened when the dynamic 
nature of this ideological periphery is considered. Indeed, the radical fringe upon which 
the ideological foundations of militant Islam and Al-Qa’ida are perched is far from a 
holistic entity. Differences of opinion persist, divergent strands are forged and arguments 
flourish in an ideational community, which is essentially fluid and dynamic. Selective or 
limited sampling is thus unlikely to be representative. 
 
2.1.3 Ideology as a dynamic process 
 
Apart from the core traditionalist and puritanical Islamist tenets, the content, breadth and 
scope of Islamist militant ideologies differ substantially. ‘The ideology of jihad’, as Al-
Rasheed notes, ‘is a postmodern hybridity, whose sources, if ever we can accurately 
identify them, are found in the past and present, and in both the Muslim and Western 
worlds.’135 Indeed, in their analysis of the ideology of Islamist militancy, Snow and Byrd 
complained of the prevalence of many existing studies into the topic to underplay the 
complexity and multifaceted nature of the ideational forces at play:  
 
The ideas and bundles of meaning that are supposedly constitutive of ideology are treated as 
given […] and the use and application of ideology is viewed in an almost mechanistic 
fashion rather than as a social production that evolves during the course of interactive or 
dialogic processes among activists, targets, and events in the world.136 
 
Beliefs and values conveyed by movement leaders are, according to Snow and Byrd, not 
coherent in the sense of functioning in a ‘programmatic and doctrinaire fashion’ but 
rather, are to be seen as a ‘variable phenomenon that ranges on a continuum from a 
tightly and rigidly connected set of values and beliefs at the one end to a loosely coupled 
set of values and beliefs at the other end.’137 By extension, these values and beliefs 
associated with Islamist militancy should not be considered ‘as of one cloth 
ideologically.’ Many facets of Islamist militant ideology include conflicting strands and 
opposing viewpoints and areas of contention.   
The antagonism between Zawahiri and Azzam over the viability and direction of 
the Muslim Brotherhood was mentioned in the previous chapter. The tension centred on 
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the pragmatic approach the Brotherhood had taken to politics, with allegations from 
detractors that the movement’s engagement in mainstream politics diluted its emphasis 
on religious purity. Such accusations were initially prompted, in part, by Nasir al-Din al-
Albani, a 20th century reformer who criticised the Brotherhood for prioritising politics 
over religious knowledge.138  
Al-Albani’s criticism of other Salafist strands, including the way in which 
Wahhabism relied on the Hanbali juridical school (in contrast with overt and apparent 
Wahhabite rejection of taqlid) reiterates the importance of recognising the conflicting 
elements that fall under the category of Salafism. Subsequent prominence of 
Wahhabism, based to no small degree on the school being propelled by the largesse of 
the Saudi elite, did impact upon more radical elements of the Muslim Brotherhood.139 
Zahab and Roy, moreover, show how elements of Deobandism – established by Al-
Wahhab’s contemporary Shah Wali Allah in India – and the curriculum of Pakistani 
madaaris became ‘Wahhabised’ due to the influence of Saudi benefactors.140 This and 
other developments contributed to the creation of a ‘contemporary Deobandi movement 
[that] has been key in spreading Islamist radicalism in Pakistan’141 and undermined the 
school’s traditional tolerance (and indeed incorporation) of Sufi thought.142 
This fusion of neo-Wahhabism with other forms of puritanical Islamism should 
not disguise frictions that remain and even differences and dynamics that are present 
exclusively within the militant camp. Among the actors underpinning and sustaining 
militant Islam, for instance, Lia identified a ‘struggle between ideological purists and 
politico-military pragmatists.’143 Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, according to Lia’s analysis, 
belonged to the latter camp, warning against the disruptive impact of the exclusivist 
narrative he identified with the former group. According to his more inclusive and 
pragmatic approach, which bin Ladin also embraced, the narrow agenda of some 
extreme forms of Salafism could do immense damage. Describing a prominent Islamist 
militant thinker, Al-Suri wrote: ‘Abu Qutada was extreme in his support for Salafism 
and the Ahl al-Sunnah school and the ideas of the Wahhabite Call. He was strongly 
opposed to other schools within the broader circle of Ahl al-Sunnah.’ Even the Taliban 
were criticised for doctrinal impurity and for their short-lived pursuit for UN 
recognition.144  
Indeed Sunni militant groups in Pakistan and elsewhere on the Subcontinent 
include a host of divergent ideological strands and membership compositions. Intra-
Sunni tensions also complicate matters, particularly in terms of tribal dynamics and 
ethnic cleavages.145  
Moving beyond the differences within Al-Qa’ida’s alliance structure to the group 
itself, closer inspection reveals how homogenous stasis should not be assumed even at 
such a narrow level of analysis. The emergence of the ‘Zarqawi doctrine’, following the 
Al-Qa’ida representative’s campaign of ethnic slaughter in Iraq, prompted fierce debate 
which again pitched the more pragmatic proponents of militant Islam against Salafi 
puritans and their endorsement of ‘indiscriminate violence against everyone who does 
not support Jihadi-Salafism.’146 Al-Qa’ida’s record in Iraq has provoked harsh criticism 
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from within the Islamist milieu from former militants and scholars.147 One Saudi Imam, 
for instance, released a fatwa asking the leadership: ‘do they think that by exploding a 
building or killing a tourist, they will defeat a state and establish a new regime?’148 
At a discursive, structural and strategic level, too, there has been change. 
Hegghammer, for instance, observed how ‘the distinction between near enemy and far 
enemy groups seems less and less relevant.’ ‘A process of ideological hybridization has 
occurred, with the result that the enemy hierarchies of many jihadist groups are 
becoming more unclear or heterogeneous than they used to be.’149 The Terrorist 
Perspective Project reached a similar conclusion: ‘AQAM’s strategic thought is evolving 
over time, this is bad news for those who would offer simplistic strategies for countering 
the Salafi jihadist threat.’150 Along the same lines, Ranstorp and Herd argued: ‘In many 
ways, it is clear that al Qaeda’s ideology is a constant work in progress with many 
directions of influences by salafist-jihadi thinkers and clerics and that its multiple 
strands change character according to circumstances.’151  
In light of such shifts and dynamics, references to Al-Qa’ida’s ‘constant 
message’152 or ‘single narrative’153 appear problematic. The point is a host of different 
actors, ideational strands and environmental imperatives shape different facets and 
manifestations of salafi jihadist thought and practice. As a result, any in-depth analysis 
of the communiqués that construct and communicate the belief system in question needs 
to rely on concrete points of departure and a clear delineation of the actor sets under 
review. For this reason, the current thesis focuses on the two key individuals within Al-
Qa’ida’s ‘core’ leadership and their recognised message output as sources of the metrics 
studied.  
Clear identification of actor sets is underscored by what Kimmage termed 
‘virtual media production and distribution entities’ (online repositories of Islamist 
militant media material often created by admirers rather than the terrorist groups 
themselves) as well as user-generated content (from those Brachman would refer to as 
‘Jihobbysits’), which challenge the ability of the Al-Qa’ida leadership or other groups to 
exert exclusive control over the message of transnational militant Islamism.154 Any 
emergence of a nascent ‘virtual democracy’155 in this respect (ironic, given Al-Qa’ida’s 
denunciation of people power) underlines the importance of disaggregating sub-currents 
of the militant Islamist universe156 in order to isolate the object of analysis (in this case, 
the ‘core’) as well as developing methodologies that detect dynamics and other nuances 
in the narrative.  
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2.2 The Ideology of Al-Qa’ida: Theory and Methodology 
 
The previous chapter began by introducing the emergence of Al-Qa’ida as a conceptual, 
methodological and theoretical challenge for an academic community still debating the 
end of the Cold War many had failed to predict.   
Prior to that pivotal event, Schmid and Jongman warned against the lack of 
systematic research in academic approaches to political violence arguing that there were 
‘few areas in the social science literature where so much is written on the basis of so 
little research.’157 Even earlier, Howard lamented how this literature had produced ‘more 
incompetent and unnecessary books than any other outside […] of sociology. It attracts 
phoneys and amateurs as a candle attracts moths.’158 
Attempts of the academic community to catch up with Al-Qa’ida’s terrorist 
campaign and the monumental impact it had on politics and society exposed further 
shortfalls in the literature. Many accounts were reactive and rushed. The literature has, 
moreover, suffered from what Ranstorp, Crenshaw and others have identified as ‘an 
event-driven fashion.’159 ‘Terrorism research has tended to focus on the here and now’, 
in Weinberg’s words.160  
As a result, too little emphasis has been placed on long-term analyses and sound, 
systematic methodologies that rely on primary sources rather than re-interpreting 
secondary accounts. The field still suffers from insufficiently rigorous empirical research 
and a dearth of individual data generation.161 
Studies into Al-Qa’ida, in particular, need to rely on, what Hoffman termed 
‘sound, empirical judgement’. ‘What remains missing’, he argued, ‘is a thorough, 
systematic understanding of our enemy: encompassing motivation as well as mindset, 
decision-making processes as well as command and control relationships; and 
ideological constructs as well as organizational dynamics.’162 
Indeed, there is a particular need for rigorous research into Al-Qa’ida’s 
ideological base and the public messages of the group’s leaders. Ranstorp identified the 
importance of investing more energy into this strand of research by ‘understanding the 
role of ideology, the constituent parts of Al-Qaeda’s narrative, and efforts to counter 
these ideological dimensions on the global and local levels in an age of globalization.’163  
The fact that ‘the ideological front [had] been severely understudied’ needed to be 
addressed.164 Scheuer, who constructed his biography of bin Ladin using a 
comprehensive collection of communiqués, meanwhile, lamented how existing accounts 
of Al-Qa’ida and the personalities involved almost completely ignored this corpus of 
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primary texts and messages.165 Hegghammer also made an important case for this 
direction of research:  
 
More research is needed on the drivers of ideological change in general and on the blurring 
of enemy hierarchies in particular. The link between a lack of ideological clarity and group 
weakness, while yet to be firmly established, is a potentially important contribution to the 
nascent theoretical literature on militant group decline.166 
 
Equally, Stout found that ‘the idea that strategic thought might exist and be important 
within modern terrorist groups has received insufficient attention.’167 
For those works that do rely, in part, on Al-Qa’ida leadership communiqués, 
many lack in systematic data collection, coding and analysis.168 Riedel, for instance, 
claimed his book was based ‘heavily on al Qaeda’s own words and statements’ and yet 
only sixteen public messages from Zawahiri – one of Al-Qa’ida’s most prolific leaders – 
were referenced. Rabasa et al. based their commentary on the major themes of the Al-
Qa’ida narrative on an equally scant number of primary documents and excerpts from 
the Middle East Media Research Initiative.169 Scheuer assessed existing prominent 
works on Al-Qa’ida and found references to primary documents to be remarkably 
absent.170 Kepel’s analysis, meanwhile, dissected a few communiqués in detail providing 
some immediate contextual insights, without presenting a long-term, systematic review 
of the development of the narrative over an extended period.171 
The current study, therefore, relies on a standardised coding mechanism allowing 
for the systematic processing of Al-Qa’ida communiqués, identifying pertinent themes 
and variables in the great majority of the leadership’s public messages spanning the two 
decades from the group’s first engagement with the outside world. The methodological 
design will be elaborated further in Part II of this thesis, as will the theoretical 
underpinnings. Preliminary observations in this regard, however, should be clarified at 
this point. 
 
2.2.1 Theoretical frameworks 
 
The academic study of Al-Qa’ida has produced several different analytical approaches 
seeking to capture its scope and structural dynamic. Ronfeldt identified  ‘five levels of 
theory and practice’ contributing to our understanding of such ‘networked adversaries’: 
(1) the organisational level (relating to aspects of networked design); (2) doctrinal level 
(collaborative strategies and methods); (3) technological level (especially relating to 
information systems); (4) social levels (focusing on personal ties between members) and 
(5) the narrative level (the network’s ‘story’).172 
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Dissecting Ronfeldt’s five categories, Ranstorp and Herd developed sub-
categories in terms of analytical approaches to the study of Al-Qa’ida.173 Organisational 
approaches – seeking to detect and explain different elements of the nodes creating and 
interoperating within the network – could be divided into:  the social network paradigm; 
the crime-terror nexus; corporate management and organisational theory; complexity 
theory and finally; the ‘post-network’ phase represented in Mishal and Rosenthal’s 
‘dune’ typology, as described above.174 
The doctrinal level has produced a ‘plethora of different schools of thought’,175 
including contextual analyses situating Islamist militancy within a wider framework of 
radical Islamism and the development of juridical arguments. Other studies, such as 
Lia’s work on Al-Suri, adopt a narrower focus of analysis through examining individual 
concepts, doctrines and thinkers. In terms of thought processes relating to tactics, 
mobilisation and resistance, works that incorporate experiences and perceptions from 
other forms of uprising and militancy, including the importance of rational choice 
paradigms, also fall within this category.  
The technological level is important, particularly as regards opportunities 
presented by the Internet. The creation of online forums have allowed potential 
sympathisers and dispersed observers to monitor and contribute to militant Islamist 
debates (although this ‘virtual democracy’ does present challenges, as discussed above). 
New types of online distribution networks, which offer ever-greater bandwidth, enable 
scores of groups and individuals to maintain and distribute media content independently 
of older, more established, journalistic channels. 
In terms of social dimensions, Sageman’s approach and other studies looking at 
grass root, bottom-up fluidity were mentioned above, as were perspectives looking at 
tribal paradigms and other social levels of an Islamist militant framework.   
The narrative level has yielded particularly interesting perspectives, even more 
poignant as Al-Qa’ida’s role as message generator and de-territorialised ideological 
entity supersedes other roles, dissecting message direction and propaganda content. 
Shortfalls in terms of methodological rigour, however, as mentioned above, still need to 
be addressed. 
As regards theoretical underpinnings, moreover, there is a need for studies of Al-
Qa’ida to move beyond the organisational model. A network analysis can be helpful 
when describing various nodes and links of Al-Qa’ida and understanding its tactical 
terrorist activities, but as Milward and Raab noted, ‘while it is important to be able to 
visualize what the known parts of Al Qaeda look like, it tells us nothing of its strategic 
plan.’176 The previous discussion revealed the importance of this direction for the study 
of Al-Qa’ida. The theoretical approaches, therefore, need to rely on accurate descriptions 
regarding the components that form Al-Qa’ida and the role of the leadership – or core – 
in particular. The Terrorist Perspectives Project made this case concisely: 
 
Salafi jihadist leaders do not constitute a general staff that can promulgate binding strategic 
guidance to the movement’s constituent organizations and to the masses. At best, leaders of 
individual organizations can exercise significant, though not total, control over their own 
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people. Leaders of the movements often make their wishes known, however, through public 
statements and internal communications.177 
 
Theoretically, this underlines the importance of identifying, what Hegghammer terms 
the ‘ideal-type’ of the ‘discursive theme’ or ‘frame’ setting out the ideological rationales 
of an actor communicating with an audience.178  The literature on collective action 
frames constituted by social movement leaders, which Wictorowicz and others have 
utilised in their analyses, provides such a framework.179 Wictorowicz presented theories 
on social movements as a ‘unifying framework and agenda that can provide effective 
modes of inquiry to further the boundaries of research on Islamic activism.’ In particular, 
this related to ‘the mobilization of contention to support Muslim causes.’180 In this 
respect, the faith-based narratives are presented as the ‘source of a mobilizing ideology’, 
along the lines of the model designed by Snow and Marshall.181  
This allows for a theoretical approach that exhibits ‘fluid boundaries, flexible 
leadership structures, and malleable divisions of labor’,182 emphasising the importance 
of narrative, ideology and audiences, as a dynamic process beyond rigid and limited 
interpretations presented by organisational structures. 
Approaching the Al-Qa’ida leadership narrative in terms of distinct framing tasks 
that together form the composition of this narrative thus allows for the content and 
nature of the leadership communiqués to be understood as a specific feature central to 
Al-Qa’ida. This approach highlights the ways in which the Al-Qa’ida leadership has 
identified a specific set of problems that need to be addressed, formulated prescribed 
solutions to these problems, as well as set about communicating these messages to 
identified audiences with the aim of influencing message recipients. The next chapter 
illustrates how this theoretical model is constructed, how it applies to the Al-Qa’ida 
leadership communiqués and how this model informs and structures the longitudinal 
analysis, presented in Part III of this thesis, in terms of the core diagnostic, prognostic 
and motivational framing tasks that are being pursued. 
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UNDERSTANDING FRAMING 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
On a descriptive level, important similarities in terms of levels of analysis have emerged 
through representations of tiered typologies of Al-Qa’ida (even though analysts continue 
to argue over the significance of individual components). As illustrated in the previous 
part, these typologies combine the organisational remnants – the experiences and 
networks of personalities derived from Al-Qa’ida as it was created two decades ago – 
and the narrative and faith-based strategy espoused by its leaders and a wider milieu of 
transnational militant Islamist proponents.  
Although tiered typologies inform the analytical approach of this thesis, 
particularly as regards the positioning of a ‘core’ leadership, the focus of the current 
analysis is not on tiered networks or the interrelationships between actors or nodes. Such 
organisational or ‘network’ approaches can be attractive in their simplicity. The danger 
of such approaches, however, is that objects of analysis (and by extension investigative 
scopes) become ill-defined with observations relying on speculation rather than testable 
and empirically based linkages. Raab and Milward, for instance, noted how the 
continued survival of Al-Qa’ida after the Afghan invasion of 2001 was illustrative (a 
posteriori) of the strength of ‘covert networks’ through their ‘flexible structures.’ These 
‘structures’ included different ‘nodes’ and sub-networks, such as threads of financial 
support.  
From the organisational perspective, these observations had implications for 
operational counterterrorism initiatives, based on perceived strength through adaptability 
whereby the more complex the web of ‘hubs’ within a network, ‘the more redundant and 
resilient the network will be and the harder it will be to destroy.’183 This resilience rested 
on networks being, as Powell observed, ‘lighter on their feet than hierarchies.’184 
In this sense, a ‘significant fraction of nodes can be randomly removed without 
much impact on its ability to function effectively.’185 By extension, such approaches led 
to the simplistic notion (based on conceptually ambiguous interrelationships) that ‘if 
                                                
183 Milward & Raab (2005): 31-32. See also Milward & Raab, J. (2003) ‘Dark Networks as Problems’, in 
Journal of Public Administrations and Theory (13:4, pp. 413-439). 
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enough hubs are destroyed, the network breaks down into isolated, non-communicating 
islands of nodes.’186  
Aside from the conceptual ambiguity of such notions, the underlying assumption 
that designed and controlled organisational elements could be ‘targeted’ in isolation in 
order to destroy (in this case) Al-Qa’ida proper, appeared to overstate levels of control 
and undermine the complexity of relationships between individuals within the Al-Qa’ida 
leadership and constituents of their wider environment. 
Mayntz’s ‘three distinctive features of organized terrorism [as] a functional 
response to the exigencies of survival confronting it’ are particularly problematic. These 
three ‘distinctive features’ consisted firstly of elements of central control whereby 
‘notwithstanding the large scope for autonomous action that lower level units possess, 
their activities are effectively steered by the central leadership, not through specific 
orders, but by generally formulated goals and strategies.’ The second feature spoke of 
‘latency of both vertical and horizontal relations’ where ‘organizational units, and 
especially the operative cells, are relatively isolated from each other’ in a deliberate and 
pre-designed structure formulated to operate as a clandestine network. This latency was, 
according to Mayntz, tied to the third distinctive feature of terrorist groups, namely:  
 
The strong identification of individuals with the organization and its goals. This 
identification is based on ideological indoctrination and practical learning; a deeply felt 
religious belief may be particularly effective here. The unquestioning consensus based on 
shared beliefs is reinforced by close personal relationships grounded in ethnic or family ties 
or in a common experience, for instance in training camps.187 
 
Such a functionalist approach assumes significant levels of control and unity of thought 
within terrorist leaderships which fails to account for internal dissent and schisms, 
internal narrative inconsistencies, the importance of divergent individual interpretation, 
and a multifaceted, complex and often unpredictable relationship between leaderships 
and followers, perceived followers or potential supporters.   
Functionalist representations of movements also risk simplifying the 
complexities of entry and engagement. Wiktorowicz’s criticism of resource mobilisation 
theory, for instance, rested on its inadequate perception of movements ‘as rational, 
organized manifestations of collective action. As an approach, its central contention is 
that while grievances are ubiquitous, movements are not.’188 By extension, the autonomy 
of ‘constituents’ or perceived support communities and recruitment pools is undermined 
and dynamics in the relationship between these cohorts and the message disseminators 
remain unexplained. 
Snow et al. echoed Wiktorowicz’s concerns whilst underlining the structured, pre-
designed and systematic methodological approach applied in the current thesis: 
 
Both the psychofunctional and resource mobilization perspectives ignore this interpretive or 
framing issue. The psychofunctional approaches do so by assuming an almost automatic, 
magnetic-like linkage between intensely felt grievances and susceptibility to movement 
participation. Lip service is given to subjective/interpretive considerations, but they are 
rarely dealt with thoughtfully or systematically. Resource mobilization perspectives also 
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skirt this interpretive issue by assuming the ubiquity and constancy of mobilizing 
grievances.189 
 
In other words, no matter how universal or deeply resonant a particular grievance may 
be, the response from the affected public is by no means pre-determined and uniform. In 
addition to the individual’s own interpretation of grievances, movements filter and 
contextualise events, thus framing the grievance-based narrative for their intended 
audience. This study scrutinises this dynamic in the Al-Qa’ida leadership messages. 
In approaching the matter theoretically, Cozzen’s ‘culturalist’ alternative to 
functionalist approaches to Al-Qa’ida can be helpful (see further below). This built upon 
Fukuyama’s and Uimonen’s ideas of ‘cultures of networking’ and of networks as social 
capital, rather than necessarily reliant on functional structure.190 As noted in the first 
chapter, Cetina’s understanding of media as a ‘scopic system’ within a complex network 
of social microconstructions is also helpful in appreciating conveyance of media content 
and dissemination of communiqués as a central element worthy of independent analysis. 
According to this interpretation, these communiqués are often ‘intentionally moral and 
performative in the sense of “calling” the audience to particular forms of actions,’ as of 
course, is the objective of the Al-Qa’ida leadership. Thus, for Cetina, bin Ladin’s and 
Zawahiri’s messages are designed to have a ‘coordinating force […] [in terms of] 
reiterating and extending the transcendent project to which the audience is committed, 
that of renewing an affective community, and that of creating for this community a 
background world that grounds their activities and experiences.’191 This highlights the 
importance of norms and ideology. Furthermore, it underscores the significance of 
allowing structure to emerge from evidence rather than from preconceived assumptions. 
By focusing on the role of media and communiqués within a system of social 
microconstructions, moreover, testable metrics have been identified to explore the 
efforts and robustness of Al-Qa’ida as a ‘coordinating force.’  
 
 
 
3.2 Ideology and Communication 
 
The current analysis understands communication of values, grievances and goals as an 
integral part in the composition and operation of Al-Qa’ida and public communiqués as 
central to its output over the years. Only a systematic, longitudinal study can illustrate 
the features and dynamics of message content, relationship with diffuse actors (as 
message recipients) and strategic and operational rationalisations. Such an approach 
needs to account for the complexity and actor heterogeneity that characterises the 
environment in which the Al-Qa’ida leadership operates. Ranstorp and Herd note how: 
 
This enduring battlefield [of the West against terrorism] will have no definable frontiers, no 
apparent or visible enemies and these battles will be waged not only physically but also 
ideologically and across the virtual domain. This ideological battlefront is proving 
increasingly complex, elusive and multifaceted in an era of globalization where like the 
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famous ‘butterfly effect’ on small local event translates in seconds into global 
consciousness.192 
 
Rather than a vague set of ‘nodes’ or ‘hubs’, therefore, the current object of analysis is 
clear and consists of the Al-Qa’ida leadership as established and represented by the late 
Usama bin Ladin and, his successor as overall leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri. Furthermore, 
rather than attacks, plots, explicit support activity or other behaviour – a perspective 
which in this context relies on equally ambiguous assumptions regarding the nature of 
relations and affiliations between actor and ‘core’ – the ‘activity’ under review is clearly 
defined: the content of publicly disseminated messages. Finally, and most importantly, 
the evidence upon which the current observations were based was collected and 
processed systematically, relying on articles that are openly available. 
The construction of public messaging in this context raises questions that are 
central to Al-Qa’ida and the Islamist extremist milieu more broadly but nonetheless 
move beyond the explanatory power of organisational approaches. How does the Al-
Qa’ida leadership interact with its wider environment? How does it define and justify its 
actions? How does it build its narrative, to whom is it directed and how has it changed? 
These questions relate to the important relationship between the leadership as message 
disseminators and elements of the wider environment as message recipients. These 
questions become all the more important when we remember that Al-Qa’ida’s campaign 
of public communication preceded any direct involvement in violence and today 
constitutes its principal raison d'être.  
This concerns what Cozzens termed the ‘less apparent “expressive” and 
“existential” quality to al-Qaeda’s character and its warfare that is not given due 
attention in the literature.’ This, Cozzens argued, was shaped by ‘the “identity” of 
combatants and the myriad of qualities resident in that term, such as group culture, 
religion and ideology that expresses this culture – in effect, the variables that construct a 
symbolic world.’193 
Indeed, ‘the grand strategic level of warfare – whether that of a state or non-state 
actors – cannot be fully understood apart from the protagonist’s culture, or the ideologies 
that express them.’194 
Tololyan, as another advocate of a ‘cultural’ approach to understanding 
terrorism, emphasised the importance of narrative nuances and ways in which events do 
not impact movements or individuals unidirectionally. In this sense, narratives encase, 
shape, interpret and contextualise events according to ideological foundations and 
movement agendas. To this end Tololyan developed the concept of a projective narrative 
as one that ‘not only tells a story of the past, but also maps out future actions that can 
imbue the time of individual lives with transcendent collective values.’ These narratives 
‘tell individuals how they would ideally have to live and die in order to contribute 
properly to their collectivity and its future.’195 
Tololyan, therefore, highlighted the importance of mediation and the ‘possibility 
that the past events […] are perpetuated, disseminated and experienced in a particular 
culture not as political events but as narratives that transcribe historical facts into moral 
or immoral acts, vehicles of social values.’196  
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As this thesis demonstrates, events and catalysts do not occur in an interpretative 
vacuum. Although individual or public anger and outrage, elation or sympathy following 
watershed events do not depend on specific conduits, movements seek to translate these 
events (and the emotions they provoke) into action, support or acquiescence, in a sense – 
different layers of mobilisation – for their cause. 
The communiqués that convey this narrative, moreover, can be understood in 
terms of the problems identified, the solutions presented to address these problems and 
the communication strategies employed to deliver this message. The framing literature, 
and in particular Benford and Snow’s conceptualisation of diagnostic, prognostic and 
motivational frames and different aspects of frame effectiveness, provides a model with 
which to deconstruct the communiqués, understand their impact and organise the current 
analysis.  
 
 
 
3.3 The Framing of Communiqués 
 
In his study of Islamic activism, Wiktorowicz, defined frames as: 
 
interpretive schemata that offer a language and cognitive tools for making sense of 
experiences and events in the “world out there.” For social movements, these schemata are 
important in the production and dissemination of movement interpretations and are designed 
to mobilize participants and support. As signifying agents engaged in the social construction 
of meaning, movements must articulate and disseminate frameworks of understanding that 
resonate with potential participants and broader publics to elicit collective action.197 
 
For the purpose of the current thesis, therefore, framing can be understood as the 
interpretive work undertaken by the Al-Qa’ida leadership and communicated to 
audiences in the wider environment with the aim of promoting the movement and 
elevating its causes. The focus is on ‘the way in which meaning is produced, articulated 
and disseminated by movement actors through interactive processes.’198  
According to Benford and Snow’s understanding of framing and Goffman’s earlier 
work on the concept,199 social movements were not merely carriers or transmitters of 
mobilising beliefs and ideas (essentially, ideology) but could be seen as ‘actively 
engaged in the production of meaning for participants, antagonists, and observers.’200 
Al-Qa’ida is, in this sense, not to be understood merely by studying essential principles 
of Salafism but rather through dissecting the leaders’ own production of meaning, as 
articulated through communiqués aimed at adversaries, potential followers and the wider 
community whose support Al-Qa’ida seeks to secure. The ways in which movement 
leaders ‘frame, or assign meaning to and interpret, relevant events and conditions in 
ways that are intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner 
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bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists’201 is thus directly relevant to Al-
Qa’ida and central to the approach of the current thesis. 
This understanding is also important in terms of wider processes of counterterrorism. 
Violent extremists, according to this approach, do not respond directly or in isolation to 
grievances that can be ‘addressed’ (minimised, contextualised or eliminated) or 
individual/communal frustrations that can be ‘countered’ (refocused, channelled). The 
reality is more complex. These frustrations, grievances, values, norms, aspirations and 
related emotions form part of a wider culture and narrative that justify and encourage 
violence and prompt activity in support of the cause. Thus: 
 
the strategic action pursued by SMOs [social movement organisations], their resource 
acquisition efforts, and their temporal viability are all strongly influenced by their 
interpretive work. Accordingly, a thoroughgoing understanding of the participation process 
requires that closer attention be given to the interpretation of grievances and other ideational 
elements, such as values and supportive beliefs.202 
 
Interpreting the wider environment according to the central belief system and 
communicating this perception thus becomes essential for leaders of movements, 
particularly those established in revolutionary opposition to the status quo: ‘whatever 
else social movement actors do, they seek to affect interpretations of reality among 
various audiences. They engage in this framing work because they assume, rightly or 
wrongly, that meaning is prefatory to action.’203 
For this reason, framing is necessarily a dynamic process. It is ‘an active, processual 
phenomenon that implies agency and contention at the level of reality construction.’204  
 
[Framing] is active in the sense that something is being done, and processual in the sense of 
a dynamic, evolving process. It entails agency in the sense that what is evolving is the work 
of social movement organizations or movement activists. And it is contentious in the sense 
that it involves the generation of interpretive frames that not only differ from existing ones 
but that may also challenge them.205 
 
Benford and Snow classified the outcome of this framing process as ‘collective action 
frames’, that ‘function as innovative amplifications and extension of, or antidotes to, 
existing ideologies or components of them.’206 Simply put, ‘collective action frames are 
action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and 
campaigns of a social movement organization.’207 They are frequently created to 
encourage mobilisation against perceived injustice.208 Seeking to rouse the ‘Islamic 
nation’ against perceived injustices and the identified sources behind these injustices is 
central to the narrative of the Al-Qa’ida leadership. 
For any movement trying to mobilise support for a given set of goals, establish a 
presence within a wider socio-political environment with existing competitive 
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movements, or sustain the momentum and publicity of past activities, collective action 
frames are fundamental.  
For the Al-Qa’ida leadership, this relates not only to contextualisation and 
legitimisation of past attacks or violent campaigns. Messages to the wider public must 
also demonstrate the continued relevancy of opinions and options presented by the 
leadership and its ability to address concerns of those for whom the appeals are 
generated. Additionally, through collective action frames, the leadership must, in order 
to remain relevant, incorporate emerging issues within the broader framework of Al-
Qa’ida’s ideational positioning. 
This relationship between a movement’s collective action frames and the socio-
cultural and political environment in which it operates thus involves a continual and 
interactive process. Benford and Snow observed:  
 
Taken together, research on the core framing processes indicates that collective action 
frames are not static, reified entities but are continuously being constituted, contested, 
reproduced, transformed, and/or replaced during the course of social movement activity. 
Hence, framing is a dynamic, ongoing process. But this process does not occur in a 
structural or cultural vacuum. Rather, framing processes are affected by a number of 
elements of the socio-cultural context in which they are embedded.209 
 
Hence, a model is presented to shed light on the continuity and change in the narrative of 
the Al-Qa’ida leadership communiqués over the past two decades, based on the Salafi-
jihadist context in which they are disseminated and the globalised Islamist militancy 
which they are intended to defend and promote. Based on this interaction, and that of 
movement leaders, constituents and movement adversaries, Benford, Snow and others 
have defined a set of frame variants whereby the ideational message is constructed and 
determined by the interplay of these factors.  
 
3.3.1 Frame variants 
 
Benford and Snow, and following on from Wilson’s Introduction to Social 
Movements,210 saw their frame categories as closely tied to the composition of an 
ideological framework. This produced three core framing tasks:211 
 
1. Diagnostic. The first task concerned the need to diagnose ‘an event or aspect of 
social life as problematic and in need of alteration.’ Diagnostic appeals thus ask 
‘what is or went wrong?’ and ‘who or what is to blame?’212 For Salafi-jihadi 
activists, for instance, this would relate to religious ignorance, man-made laws 
and the absence of a pious Caliphate with more immediate concerns relating to 
the presence and influence of non-Islamist actors, forces and ideas and derived 
grievances. In his seminal book Join the Caravan, for example, Abdullah Azzam 
began by listing reasons Muslims had to go out and fight in jihad.213 
 
2. Prognostic. The second task, by extension, involved a ‘proposed solution to the 
diagnosed problem that specifies what needs to be done.’ This framing task 
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concerned the identification of ‘strategies, tactics, and targets,’ specifying ‘what 
is to be done.’214 For militant Islamists, this would involve universal support for 
jihad by the sword. 
 
3. Motivational. Finally, a ‘rationale for engaging in ameliorative or corrective 
action’ had to be produced. This concerned the ‘elaboration of a call to arms’ that 
went beyond diagnosis and prognosis, as agreement about causes and necessary 
solutions did not ‘automatically produce corrective action’ or the type of activity 
that the given movement was trying to encourage. ‘Participation is thus 
contingent upon the development of motivational frames that function as prods to 
action.’ As Snow and Byrd noted: ‘constituents have to be moved from the 
balcony to the barricades.’215 Here, militant Islamists direct the content of the 
diagnostic and prognostic phases towards specific audiences in an emotive 
narrative in the hope of provoking a specific set of actions, detailing the 
consequences for those who fail to respond, and the rewards for those who do. 
 
Accordingly, the diagnostic and prognostic framing tasks are ‘directed toward achieving 
consensus mobilization’, providing the rationale for action and the ‘motivational impetus 
for participation.’216 
The ability of movements to address these tasks can vary and be compromised in 
several different ways. When assessing framing capacity it is important to assess the 
type of movement in question and the conditions in which it operates (e.g. is the 
movement engaged in illegal and clandestine activity, as Al-Qa’ida is?); relevance of a 
given movement and its messages may also differ at specific junctures in its career; a 
movement may develop into different and differently focused components; and frames 
may also vary in terms of resonance with intended target audiences.217 As a movement, 
Al-Qa’ida and its core leadership have travelled through several such phases since the 
movement’s inception. 
As a result, an understanding of the ‘role ideational factors and meanings play in 
relation to the course and character of both specific genres of movements and 
movements in general’ depends on a rigorous analysis of these mobilising ideas and the 
way and extent to which the three core framing tasks have been addressed.218  
Further features of a movement’s ideational and physical environment that can 
affect its ability to address diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing relate to the 
competition of ideas. Borhek and Curtis219 and Converse220, for example, emphasised the 
need to assess the relative importance of specific ideational elements that movement 
leaders pursued within a wider web of ideas that constituted the belief system in which 
they operated; the expanse and life-span of these ideational elements; and the extent to 
which these elements were tied to further ideational strands of the belief system. Success 
and efficacy of message generation would, thus, depend on the ability of movement 
leaders to address principal concerns of constituents, tie these to prescribed solutions, 
and ensure these emphases did not undermine or contradict other core ideational pillars 
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of the belief system in which they operated. For the Al-Qa’ida leaders, this is 
particularly important in relation to liberal attitudes towards violence that could infringe 
upon established religious guidelines and doctrine (as will be explored in further detail in 
the third and fourth parts of the thesis). 
Fundamentally, the impact of collective action frames could be affected by, what 
Benford and Snow termed, the ‘phenomenological life world of the targets of 
mobilization.’221 This related to the extent to which framing struck ‘a responsive chord 
with those individuals for whom it is intended’ and was relevant to their life situations. 
This relevancy was dependent on three interrelated but analytically distinct constraints: 
‘empirical credibility; experiential commensurability; and narrative fidelity.’222 
 
1. Empirical credibility concerns the fit between the framing events and real life 
events and the extent to which framing is testable and claims are empirically 
verified. According to this observation, therefore, framing must rely on events or 
a state of affairs that can be used as evidence substantiating the diagnostic, 
prognostic and motivational claims. As a result, hypothetically at least, ‘the more 
culturally believable the claimed evidence, and the greater the number of slices 
of such evidence, the more credible the framing and the broader its appeal.’223 In 
this sense, empirical credibility is potentially problematic for those studying 
Islamist-inspired narratives, as many rely on fabrications or exaggerations of 
existing problems to provoke outrage.224 It is therefore important to note that 
empirical credibility in this context does not, according to the framing theory, 
necessarily imply generally believable statements – only that claims are believed 
by a segment of actual or potential adherents.225 This is particularly important for 
adherents who do not have direct access to alternative sources to verify claims.226 
Credibility depends on two additional factors, however: 
a. Frame consistency: inherent contradictions in the narrative (as detected 
over time or in relation to different subject matters) can weaken overall 
message framing. 
b. Claimsmaker/communicator credibility: speakers who are regarded (by 
their potential adherents) as more credible are generally seen as more 
effective and persuasive.227 For militant Islamists, for example, ‘practical’ 
experience from the ‘fields of jihad’ is often thought to add credence to 
the words of radical speakers (and, by extension, is problematic for those 
lacking such experiences). Abdullah Azzam, for instance, is revered for 
his leadership role as a fighter, as well as his written work and speeches. 
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For bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri the physical presence of an assault 
rifle in many of the footage and still images from public messages serves 
precisely this purpose. 
 
2. Experiential commensurability relates to the need to ensure that framing matches 
the everyday experiences of potential participants, rather than being abstract or 
distant. Framing must suggest viable solutions to the identified problems. 
Although appealing to a sense of religious purpose and responsibility, therefore, 
extremist Islamist-inspired collective action frames must, according to this 
hypothesis, also tie the doctrinal narrative to more day-to-day concerns of normal 
people and feelings of injustice, socio-economic alienation, disenfranchisement 
as well as cultural specificity, pride, identity and related emotions in order to be 
effective. 
 
3. Narrative fidelity, builds upon a concept developed by Fisher228 and concerns the 
degree to which framing resonates with cultural ‘myths’229, ‘domain 
assumptions’230 or the ‘inherent ideology’231 and core narratives that constitute a 
given cultural heritage, thus adding depth to accounts of events and experiences 
in the immediate present for the potential participants in question. Myths, 
especially when sourced from original accounts of the Prophet Mohammed’s 
deeds and advice, are central to any Islamically sourced collective action frames. 
For discourses conveying violent and puritanical interpretations, these accounts 
and narrations are of central importance, as are glorifications of ‘martyrs’ who 
died for the cause.232   
 
The linkage between individual interpretive orientations, interests, values, beliefs and 
priorities on the one hand and the activities, goals and ideology of a social movement 
leadership on the other is therefore crucial for the overall resonance of the latter’s 
message. Snow et al. refer to this linkage as ‘frame alignment.’233 
As a result, according to this hypothesis, ‘if a frame is empirically credible, 
experientially commensurable, and narratively resonant, the stronger the consensus 
mobilization and the more fertile the soil for action mobilization.’234 Subsequent 
chapters will explore the extent to which the framing of Al-Qa’ida leadership conforms 
with these parameters for message impact and effectiveness.  
These core assumptions, and the framing literature in general, have spawned a 
host of other identified collective action frame variants reflecting divergent message 
direction, scope and composition. Those covering a broad scope and a holistic set of 
issues, as many Al-Qa’ida messages do, have been termed ‘master frames’ that link to 
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more specific sub-frames.235 Another distinct framing feature is the contrast between 
flexibility and inclusivity versus rigidity and exclusivity,236 although analyses should 
account for a degree of overlap. Most violent extremist framing exercises, for instance, 
would involve a set of non-negotiable values and demands, whilst relying (for practical 
and doctrinal reasons) on continual appeals to non-members to join the movement. 
Of further relevance to the focus of the current thesis is the identification, by 
Gamson and others, of victim orientated ‘injustice frames’, used extensively by religio-
political movements.237 In this regard, movement leaders seek to encourage participation 
and action by appealing to a sense of injustice and victimhood. Grievances are central to 
the output of Islamist extremist groups and their demand for further support and 
mobilisation from the wider ummah. Grievance framing and presentation will thus form 
part of the analysis of Al-Qa’ida leadership communiqués below.  
As part of the diagnostic framing tasks, grievance or injustice frames normally 
include ‘attributional processes that seek to delineate the boundaries between “good” and 
“evil” and construct movement protagonists and antagonists.’238 This concerns, what 
Gamson termed, ‘adversarial framing.’239 Delineations according to this framework are 
an essential feature of the discourse of Islamist extremists, whereby the pious vanguard 
is pitched against the ‘Zionist-Crusader’ alliance and related ills. These are framed using 
doctrine-based distinctions between amity and enmity and related vocabulary that 
provide the context for re-framing and inclusion of new challenges and adversaries. As 
Snow and Byrd observed: ‘cultural or religious ideologies function much like established 
vineyards from which different varietals can be innovatively grafted together to generate 
a new yield.’240  
In terms of prognostic framing tasks, moreover, religio-political movements rely 
on ‘accenting and highlighting some events, issues, or beliefs as being more important 
than others’241 according to strategic agenda and proximity to central doctrinal issues. 
Snow and Byrd termed this framing emphasis ‘frame elaboration’ as opposed to more 
balanced ‘frame articulation.’242 Islamist militant declarations of responses to hostilities 
as individual rather than collective obligations upon all Muslims are a case in point.  
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The prioritisation of issues and reactions, and associated prescriptive 
legitimisations, within collective action frames can provoke objections and alternative 
viewpoints from other movement leaders, even within the same belief system. These 
‘counterframes’ can have a serious impact on the resonance of a given set of collective 
action frames as movement leaders are put on the defensive and forced to ‘develop and 
elaborate prognoses more clearly than otherwise might have been the case.’243 With 
respect to militant Islamist movements, the question of where the boundaries lie in terms 
of violent tactics and targeting, and related doctrinal arguments, is a perennial problem 
for the actors involved. The introductory part of this thesis, moreover, discussed some of 
the tensions, schisms and criticisms evident within the higher echelons of Al-Qa’ida and 
its environment that can be understood within this framework. 
On a related point, Wiktorowicz noted the tension created by a movement’s pursuit 
of frame hegemony: 
 
Frequent disagreements and framing contests over meaning encourage competitive pressures 
as various groups produce and disseminate interpretive schemata […] Such competition 
takes place not only between a movement and its adversaries, but within the movement itself 
as well. Intramovement divisions (such as hardliner-softliner, conservative-liberal, young-
old, ideologue-pragmatist) can create internal framing disputes as each faction attempts to 
assert its own frame for movement-wide adoption.244 
 
The framing approach, therefore, provides a useful way in which to understand public 
communiqués disseminated by bin Ladin and Zawahiri on behalf of Al-Qa’ida. The 
success, presence and scope of the movement can, in this context, be traced partly to the 
fulfilment of the core framing tasks. Snow and Byrd, for instance, argue that ‘the success 
of al Qaeda on the global scale may be partly attributable to the ability of its leaders to 
adapt the diagnostic and prognostic components of its master frame to local contexts.’245 
By extension, this focus of analysis can provide wider inferences in relation to the 
‘health’ of the movement and the position of the leadership. 
 It should be stressed at this juncture that the framing model is not being applied 
in the hope of providing any inferences as regards engagement in violent extremism or 
the range of ‘prompters’ that might contribute to such a process of individual 
engagement. Suffice to say, encouraging and legitimising such engagement and 
facilitating greater support for violence within the wider community, as well as 
amplifying the impact of each violent act, is central to the overall objectives of the Al-
Qa’ida leadership. The framing concept provides a point of departure from which to 
understand Al-Qa’ida as a movement seeking to implement its stated agenda, challenge 
the status quo, appeal to the wider populace and intimidate adversaries. It allows for the 
leadership communiqués to be dissected and their impact assessed and contrasted with 
the stated aims of the leadership itself.  
 
3.3.2 Framing and the wider context of Islamist militancy 
 
How does the framing approach correspond with the construction and dissemination of 
Islamist militant propaganda and discourse? Page et al. provide perhaps the best example 
of how the model can be applied to a corpus of Islamist militant texts through their 
analysis of twelve issues of Sada al-Malahim, a newsletter of Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian 
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Peninsula, according to the articulation of collective action frames.246 The authors 
detected specific examples of diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing in the 
publication, designed to encourage collective action, in addition to testing frame 
consistency, empirical credibility and credibility of frame articulators, and experiential 
commensurability.  
The authors found frame consistency to be strong across the issues analysed and 
assessed the credibility of frame articulators as high, based on their knowledge, religious 
prowess and experience. Credibility was also enhanced through the communication of 
relevant tactical advice as part of broader prognostic framing. Additionally, frame 
articulators were seen to place extensive emphasis on retaining empirical credibility, 
whereby Sada al-Malahim editors strove to be ‘responsive to local, regional, and 
international events, highlighting themes that have temporal resonance.’247 
By contrast, Hegghammer’s analysis of the ideological ‘hybridization’ of militant 
Islamist groups suggested the increased variation in content emphases and scope in the 
their message output could be construed as opportunism and perceived as inconsistent by 
potential participants. Interrupted frame consistency, including blurred enemy 
hierarchies, could thus jeopardise the ability of these groups to produce a message that 
resonated and encouraged mobilisation of potential participants.248 
As noted above, successful and effective collective action frames necessarily 
relate directly to the chief preoccupations and major anxieties of potential participants. 
Vergés, for instance, found, in his study of the construction of collective action frames 
by the Front Islamique du Salut, that leaders had reconceptualised socio-economic and 
political realities of Algerian youth within the broader religious narrative of the FIS, thus 
expanding its appeal.’249  
Although not relying on the framing literature specifically, numerous authors 
have sought to understand the narrative components of militant Islamist movements, 
especially Al-Qa’ida. For Bale, the interaction between these normative and ideational 
elements – manifested in a set of ‘delusional, utopian, and non-negotiable goals that 
ultimately derived from a religious and fanatical “fantasy ideology” – and a ‘ruthless 
operational efficiency capable of causing tremendous damage,’ made Al-Qa’ida and 
affiliates such dangerous and formidable adversaries.250 
Others have gone further, making dubious assumptions regarding the processing 
of messages as predictive risk assessment mechanisms. Ciovacco, for instance, 
concluded from his analysis of sixty-four bin Ladin and Zawahiri communiqués (post-
9/11 material only) that ‘in this marketing-focused war of ideas, Al Qaeda’s media 
strategy is the linchpin to unlocking its organizational DNA and deciphering its next 
moves.’251  This assumption suggests however, that calls to arms are generally heeded 
and fails to account for the challenges facing message framers as they seek to mobilise 
potential participants. This notion also fails to recognise the reflective – even reactive – 
nature of much of the narrative, as will be discussed in Part III.  
Furthermore, as the previous discussion illustrates, many have argued Al-
Qa’ida’s organisational capacity has abated in the past years, putting greater pressure on 
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mobilising efforts through public communiqués. Several authors have sought to decipher 
these and to establish an organisational framework designed to capture the essence of 
Al-Qa’ida’s public messaging. Quiggin, for instance, identified eight themes to display 
the contrasting interpretation between Al-Qa’ida leaders and mainstream scholars. These 
were: Jihad; Bayat; Daru Islam; Ummah; Takfir; Shaheed; Al-Wala Wal Bara; and 
Hijrah.252 Although the importance of some of these concepts for the leadership are clear 
(such as jihad and mobilising the ummah) the importance of other supposed core features 
is less clear. Bayat (pledge of allegiance), for instance, does not appear particularly 
important outside the inner circle (primarily towards Mullah Omar and, later, through 
attempts to shore up the leadership of Al-Qa’ida in Iraq/Islamic State of Iraq).253 In 
terms of message content and framing, the issue is not a formal bond of allegiance but 
rather the creation of a self-sustaining movement to bring about desired goals. Indeed, 
when asked of his vision for the future for Al-Qa’ida, Zawahiri noted that ‘even if 
Usama bin Ladin doesn't become ill, he must die one day, whereas Allah's religion will 
remain until Allah inherits the earth and everything on it.'254 
Corman, and Schiefelbein’s study comes closer to capturing the essence of this 
mobilising narrative, closely tied to the definition of ideological belief systems, as 
discussed above:  
 
These texts reveal three strategic goals for communication and media in jihadi operations. 
First they must legitimate their movement by establishing its social and religious viability 
while engaging in violent acts that on their face seem to violate the norms of civilized 
society and the tenets of Islam. This is perhaps the biggest ongoing communication 
challenge they face. Second they aim to propagate their movement by spreading messages to 
sympathetic audiences in areas where they want to expand. […] Third they seek to 
intimidate their opponents. This applies not only to existing enemies but to sympathizers in 
the Muslim world who might think of turning against them.255 
 
Looking at the example of ‘Spain as an object of jihadist propaganda’, Soriano sought to 
‘verify empirically the principal objects of interest of [jihadist] communicative activity 
[providing] solid quantitative information on both the degree of importance given to the 
themes dealt with, as well as the treatment these themes receive within the general 
context of this discourse.’256 
Some have sought to develop computerised and automated ways in which to 
assess these features systematically.257 Pennebaker and Chung, for example, examined 
the ‘linguistic style of Bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri’ and ‘the content-related themes for 
their statements and interviews’ relying on ‘computerized text analysis’ seeking to 
automatically determine ‘the underlying meaning structures in text.’258 
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Although replicable, there is a danger in relying exclusively on automated 
processing tools, as word-specific measurements might fail to detect nuances in the 
narrative, implied meaning, look beyond vague terminology or adequately appreciate the 
importance of context. To this end, the analytical insights of human coders are 
necessary. Pennebaker and Chung, for example, found (through apparent diminished 
usage of specific words) that an ‘increased attention to the West has replaced talk of the 
Middle Eastern holy lands and other Islamic conflicts, which was one of the group’s 
main concerns in statements before 9/11.’259 The current study, however, found no 
meaningful decline in relation to a host of issues concerning the Middle East 
exclusively. If anything, messages referred more to Palestinian issues, for instance, after 
Western troops largely left their bases in Saudi Arabia shortly after 9/11, thus removing 
a principal topic of the pre-9/11 communiqués (especially those disseminated by bin 
Ladin), as will be discussed in Part III.   
The framing approach therefore allows for more nuanced and in-depth analyses 
of the message output under review. Communiqués, according to this interpretation, are 
not mere reflections of stated ambitions. They rationalise movement activities, 
communicate dissatisfaction with the status quo, identify causal actors and factors 
responsible, prescribe solutions, elucidate rewards and, crucially, define the audience of 
potential participants who leaders seek to mobilise. Communiqués, therefore, establish 
the basis for a relationship between movement leaders and potential participants beyond 
face-to-face contact or where physical interaction is impractical or impossible. Hence, 
the importance of communiqués for clandestine or illegal movements such as Al-Qa’ida 
is paramount. 
These messages, moreover, necessarily reflect the core aspects and apply the 
wider vocabulary of the movement’s belief system and culture and draw upon this 
normative environment as a source of identity. For al-Qa’ida, this broader environment 
represents the doctrine of militant Salafi activism. The framing literature also highlights 
the need for movement leaders to address and be sensitive to – through their messages to 
followers, prospective supporters and adversaries – watershed events that are relevant to 
the movement’s goals and the concerns and experiences of potential participants.  In this 
sense, these events and their repercussions need to be presented in a way that supports 
and conforms to the narrative thread, which aggregated communiqués have formed 
throughout the movement’s life-span.  
This relates to the important framing notion of consistency. As mentioned above, 
the framing model provides valuable measurements with which to assess the 
effectiveness of specific attempts to communicate with potential participants and the 
wider environment. Implicitly, in a methodological sense, these theoretical deliberations 
highlight the importance of long-term, systematic and empirical analyses whereby the 
message consistency can be assessed and (by extension) observations can be made 
concerning the credibility of disseminators and message resonance.  
Benford, for example, complained: ‘the bulk of framing studies are either 
synchronic or encompass a relatively brief slice of time. We need studies which examine 
continuities and changes in framing strategies, their forms, and the content of frames 
over the life of a movement, throughout a cycle of protest, or across an historical 
epoch.’260 This study seeks to address precisely this dynamic in the Al-Qa’ida leadership 
narrative. More recently, Snow and Byrd, similarly argued that the ‘homogenizing 
tendency,’ in terms of seeking to identify a single ‘ideology’ of terrorism, was 
                                                
259 Ibid: 14. 
260 Benford (1997): 417. Emphasis added. 
Part II: Theoretical and Methodological Principles 
 60 
‘counterproductive because it glosse[d] over diversity among one’s adversaries, thereby 
limiting understanding of them and indirectly affecting one’s strategies for effectively 
combating and coping with the threats they pose.’261  
Chapter 2 noted how scholars of political violence have identified a need for 
greater emphasis to be placed on sound, systematic and empirical research as well as 
independent data generation. Additionally, there is an acute need to rely on primary 
documents and sources. Wiktorowicz, for example, noted how ‘press reports, 
organizational charts, and secondary material are often insufficient for delineating and 
studying these [Islamic activist] networks and their relationship to contention since 
networks are by their nature embedded in personal interaction and social 
relationships.’262 
In this regard, it is also important to apply holistic data collection, relying on all 
available articles from a particular source (or a significant majority) in order to ensure 
results are meaningful and that they accurately capture any continuities, as well as being 
able to establish in a methodologically sound fashion that a given set of principles 
appear constant over time. There are no guarantees that selective sampling (in this case 
of Al-Qa’ida leadership communiqués) can adequately address this dynamic or 
concretely identify perceived constants as genuine bedrock features. The next chapter 
discusses the methodological process underpinning the longitudinal study of Al-Qa’ida 
leadership communiqués, the results of which are presented in Part III.   
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4 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The longitudinal study discussed in Part III presents the results from the systematic 
reading, viewing and processing of Al-Qa’ida leadership communiqués (authored by bin 
Ladin and Zawahiri) over the course of the past twenty years, or from Al-Qa’ida’s 
earliest engagement through public communiqués. In total, 240 communiqués from bin 
Ladin and Zawahiri were identified and processed. Although it cannot be stated with 
absolute certainty that all communiqués for the period under review (1991-2011) from 
these two leaders have been captured, emphasis has been placed on identifying and 
securing all publically available communiqués within this timeframe. As has been 
argued in this thesis, these public appeals, warnings, criticisms and guidelines constitute 
a central element of Al-Qa’ida as a terrorist entity and are fundamental in highlighting 
how the movement has sought to justify its actions and elucidate its objectives and how 
it approaches identified constituents. Understanding these communiqués is thus central 
to formulating a comprehensive understanding of Al-Qa’ida and its position within the 
Islamist militant milieu more generally. As was argued in the previous chapter, 
moreover, the range of issues addressed by the two Al-Qa’ida leaders, the way in which 
emphases and scope have changed over time and the evolution in attitudes towards 
specific publics through the years, can only be comprehended when as large a corpus of 
Al-Qa’ida leadership communiqués as possible has been dissected and processed using 
some form of qualitative criteria that are applied equally to each article in the dataset. 
Furthermore, through combining messages from both bin Ladin and Zawahiri the study 
has examined the output of Al-Qa’ida’s most prominent leader and figurehead, as well 
as the material from his successor throughout the lifetime of Al-Qa’ida to date and the 
comprehensive set of strategic guidelines and geopolitical positioning that forms such a 
prominent feature in the output of the latter personality. 
 The way in which the data was accumulated and handled is described in detail 
below. In summary, this involved populating entries in the database for each 
communiqué with segments and summaries pertaining to each aspect of the narrative 
under review. This processing was applied both to written transcripts, books and other 
documents as well as video material produced by the Al-Qa’ida leaders. Some articles 
were very short, consisting only of a page or two of written material or five to ten 
minutes of recorded speech. Most articles, however, were more substantial, and some, 
especially those authored by Zawahiri could be very long indeed, from written books to 
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video speeches lasting up to two hours. The sections below describe the nature of the 
dataset that was created for the longitudinal analysis of communiqués, the sources used 
to accumulate data, the qualitative database derived from this corpus, the processing and 
methodological models applied, as well as matters relating to inter-coder reliability and 
research ethics. 
 
 
 
4.2 Dataset 
 
The 240 communiqués under review (the full list, with details for each article is 
presented in Appendix 2) were identified as messages disseminated by Al-Qa’ida and 
authored by Al-Zawahiri or bin Ladin (although few references, particularly before 9/11 
were actually made to ‘Al-Qa’ida’ as such). Overall, emphasis was placed on collecting 
and coding material which was unquestionably on behalf of Al-Qa’ida, although it 
should be recognised that there was a degree of overlap between Zawahiri’s involvement 
with Al-Jihad and his later merger with bin Ladin, at least as relates to the former’s 
output during the early 1990s. The vast majority of articles were dated and coded as 
entire transcripts. Some of the more obscure communiqués, dating from the very early 
years of the movement could not be located in their entirety, either in Arabic or as 
translations and six communiqués could not be dated (see details in Appendix 2). For a 
small number of Zawahiri’s more extensive written works, moreover, the study relied on 
translated excerpts although more important books, such as The Knights under the 
Banner of the Prophet and The Exoneration were read in their entirety.  
Unsurprisingly, the vast majority of the bin Ladin and Zawahiri communiqués 
was originally disseminated in Arabic. Although the author has sufficient competency to 
read and normally understand titles, and compare these to offered translations, Zawahiri 
and bin Ladin convey their messages in rapidly spoken and formal Arabic or complex 
written form designed to resemble the discourse of pious and ancient scholars. Full 
comprehension thus requires high levels of fluency.  
The study therefore relies on translations from established outlets (see below on 
sources and verification) in order to assess message framing. Linguistic studies that 
focus on the more micro level of the meaning of individual words are greatly enhanced, 
and often depend on, transcripts and documents in their original language. This relates, 
for instance, to some automated studies designed to enhance understanding of specific 
facets of Al-Qa’ida leadership messaging through classifying and coding for individual 
words as indicative of more general dispositions.263    
In light of the framing literature and the identified analytical and knowledge 
gaps, however, this thesis is based on a systematic and empirical assessment of content 
themes and message direction which does not rest on the meaning of individual words. It 
is important to understand specific Arabic wording when elucidating detailed nuances of 
the discourse. For example, when religious practices of individuals are being denounced, 
the differences between kafir, murtadd, and mushrik, or even the differences between 
kafir I’tiqadi (‘infidel in matters of belief’) and kafir ‘amali (‘infidel in matters of 
religious practice’)264, need to be understood when the focus of analysis is on the 
theological rationales behind such groupings rather than on identifying the groups that 
are being denounced and the specific causal events cited. For the latter purpose, the 
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English differentiation between unbeliever (as someone who has never been Muslim) 
and apostate (as someone who committed sin as Muslim) and evidence garnered from 
context suffices. The focus is on the given context in the narrative and the patterns 
formed by communiqués over a given period. 
In terms of detecting and analysing message emphases and themes, moreover, it 
is especially important, as noted above, to base assumptions on a substantial volume of 
communiqués and coded data. Additionally, in light of concerns within the literature on 
political violence relating to the incident-driven nature of much of the work on Al-
Qa’ida in particular, this study emphasised collecting articles from the very beginning of 
dissemination of leadership communiqués on behalf of the group up until and beyond the 
seminal events of the 2011 Arab Spring and the death of bin Ladin. The distribution of 
communiqués analysed is given in figure 2, below.265 Each communiqué was given a 
specific identification number referring to the relevant coding log in the database. In 
order to facilitate crosschecking and enable further analysis of specific content details, 
all references in the subsequent longitudinal study of the communiqués under review 
(Part III) provide the unique identification number of each communiqué quoted in the 
analysis, thus linking to the article details annexed to this thesis (see Appendix 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
The first articles documented are some of Zawahiri’s earlier books setting out the 
perceived challenges facing the ummah. These, in turn, informed some of the content 
                                                
265 The graph is based on 236 communiqués. The six communiqués, referred to above, that could not be 
dated were not included, four communiqués coded were issued by Zawahiri and bin Ladin jointly. In the 
interest of comparison between years, moreover, the messages from 2011 were not included as the dataset 
was not complete at the time of writing. Six communiqués from bin Ladin (1) and Zawahiri (5) dating 
from January to May 2011 were coded. Two communiqués included in the graph featured both bin Ladin 
and Zawahiri and were counted as one for each speaker.  
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and emphasis of his later output. During the 1990s, however, and beyond the 11 
September attacks in 2001, Al-Qa’ida leadership output was dominated by bin Ladin’s 
statements and interviews. Many of these featured in Arabic and English language 
newspapers, as a select number of curious journalists secured access to the reclusive 
sponsor of Islamist militant groups (as bin Ladin was recognised at the time).  
Pressures following the August 1998 embassy bombings in East Africa, 
especially resulting from disquiet within the Taliban camp concerning heightened profile 
of the Al-Qa’ida leadership, resulted in a dip in output for a brief period.266 A brief hike 
in disseminated communiqués followed the 9/11 attacks, by contrast, with more 
messages made public on average per month after the attacks than during the preceding 
nine months. The global campaign to oust Al-Qa’ida from Afghanistan and pursue those 
involved in the movement no doubt explains the sharp drop in message output, 
particularly from bin Ladin, from 2002 onwards. It appears, as nascent media production 
capacities were established and improved267 that, out of the two principal leaders, 
Zawahiri took over as chief spokesperson around the mid-2000s, although the gap 
between the two leaders in this respect began to narrow before bin Ladin’s death in May 
2011. The cut-off point of empirical collection and analysis was August 2011, allowing 
for the immediate impact of bin Ladin’s death and the Arab Spring to be assessed. 
 
4.2.1 Data sources and processing 
 
In terms of the organisation of data, information and details regarding each communiqué 
were added into a separate entry within the database management programme ‘Microsoft 
Access’ with each thematic coding area arranged in columns (see Appendix 3). This 
allowed for unproblematic comparison between communiqués as well as error checking 
for individual details (e.g. in terms of dates entered) across the database. The majority 
(over 85 per cent) of the articles coded were secured in electronic format (e.g. .doc, .pdf, 
.wav.) The other 15 per cent were sourced from book compilations (see below).  
A third of the 240 communiqués coded could be secured directly from the 
Islamist extremist websites and forums that now constitute the principal distribution 
network for propaganda material from Al-Qa’ida and other militant groups. These were 
unedited productions disseminated by the Al-Qa’ida affiliates themselves. Most of the 
more recent communiqués could be collected in this way, translated by jihadist ‘media 
sections’ (such as ‘Ansar Al-Mujahideen English Forum’ and the ‘Global Islamic Media 
Front’, as well as As-Sahab). Whenever possible, articles were secured from more than 
one source and in multiple formats in order to triangulate data sources, as discussed 
below. 
 Translated communiqués were primarily sourced from the following 
organisations: 
 
                                                
266 Indeed, the Taliban leadership – which had forbidden bin Ladin from engaging in ‘political matters’ – 
banned media broadcasting as they were nervous about reprisal attacks and suggestions they were not fully 
in control in Afghanistan. Bin Ladin’s cavalier attitude towards these warnings prompted Al-Suri to 
accuse him of catching ‘ the disease of screens, flashes, fans, and applause” and abusing the hospitality of 
his hosts, as mentioned in the previous chapter (quoted in Cullison, 2004: 58).  
267 Although As-Sahab began distributing video CDs as early as 2001, production and dissemination of 
material posted directly online (as opposed to relying on networks such as Al-Jazeera as conduits) only 
began in earnest around 2005-2006 (see next chapter). This undoubtedly enabled more messages from the 
isolated leadership to be published than would otherwise have been possible.  
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• The Combating Terrorism Centre (CTC), at the US military academy in West 
Point [sources included the DoD Harmony database and the Militant Ideology 
Atlas Research Compendium] 
• Other Department of Defense/Defense Intelligence Agency sources 
• The Nine Eleven Finding Answers Foundation [NEFA] (a non-profit research 
foundation) 
• The Foreign Broadcast Information Service (a service providing translations of 
articles for U.S. government agencies) and its successor, the Open Source Centre 
• Chatham House 
• Journalistic organisations (including Al-Jazeera, Pakistani newspaper The Dawn, 
Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, Esquire magazine, The Observer) 
• Archive.org (via links from Islamist websites) 
• YouTube (via links from Islamist websites) 
• ITSTIME (Italian Team for Security, Terroristic Issues & Managing 
Emergencies): research centre at the Catholic University of Milan specialising in 
terrorism research which provided the author with unedited video speeches from 
bin Ladin and Zawahiri 
• Written compilation works with translations of Al-Qa’ida primary documents, 
specifically:  
o Ibrahim, R. (ed.) (2007) Al Qaeda Reader 
o Kepel , G. & Milelli, J.P (2008) (eds.) Al Qaeda in its Own Words 
o IntelCenter (2008) Words of Osama bin Laden Vol. 1 
o IntelCenter (2008) Words of Ayman al-Zawahiri Vol. 1 
• Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) 
• Websites and forums representing or supporting Islamist militant groups 
(including: Ansarnet; Al-Qimmah; Al-Ekhlass; Al-Boraq; Al-Hesbah; Jamia 
Hafsa Forum) 
 
Finally, a handful of communiqués were also sourced from the Middle East Media 
Research Institute, Laura Mansfield and the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. 
The majority of articles were secured from the CTC, NEFA, IntelCenter, FBIS as 
well as Al-Qa’ida originals from Islamist websites. In the latter case, new videos or 
transcripts would be announced on the websites cited with links provided to uploading 
websites or commercial online repositories (such as megaupload.com) or the open-
source and not-for-profit Internet Archive (archive.org) from where the article could be 
secured. Invariably, several different websites and web forums provided the same set of 
links (often a large number of links to ensure the material remained available) using the 
same banner to advertise the material in question. The range of websites linking this 
material thus provides a form of triangulation in its own right. As noted, a third of the 
dataset consisted of original articles translated and disseminated by Al-Qa’ida’s own 
media networks. Where originals could not be secured, therefore, the communiqués were 
sourced from the organisations cited above. Emphasis was placed on accessing 
translations and full transcripts from official bodies such as the CTC and FBIS or 
academic institutions and research centres such as FFI and NEFA. Transcripts produced 
by these organisations have featured in a large number of research reports and academic 
publications, including the Terrorist Perspectives Project, quoted in preceding chapters. 
Additionally, as noted, emphasis was placed on triangulating sources whenever possible.  
 This consisted of securing translations and transcripts from as many sources as 
possible to compare the versions presented. This proved successful for 69 communiqués 
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in the dataset or just over 40 per cent of articles when the Al-Qa’ida originals 
(themselves secured via multiple links) are excluded. The majority of triangulated items 
included material partly sourced from NEFA and IntelCenter. A comparison of separate 
versions of triangulated articles revealed insignificant discrepancies in terms of 
content.268 Different translations did, of course, present variations in interpretations of 
individual words and concepts but this did not alter the overall direction, skew the focus 
or hide the themes addressed in each message. Furthermore, it should be reemphasised 
that the analysis did not depend on the interpretation of a single communiqué. Rather, 
the focus was on a selection of narrative elements detectable over time from a number of 
communiqués secured from multiple sources.  
Prior to coding, details of each communiqué were fed into the relevant file 
record. These related to: (1) date of publication; (2) source origin (from where the 
communiqué – the version and format that was coded – was secured); (3) distributor 
(organisation or network that ensured the communiqué and/or translation became 
publicly available); (4) representative of the Al-Qa’ida leadership (Al-Zawahiri or bin 
Ladin); (5) type of communiqué (e.g. message statement or interview); and finally (6) 
title or description (when exact title was unknown). These specifics for each 
communiqué can be found in the data listings in Appendix 2. The most important part of 
the coding, of course, related to the thematic elements and categories designed to capture 
core aspects of message framing. Before these coding categories were applied to the 
communiqués under investigation, however, the reliability of the coding process had to 
be ensured. The next section details the way in which inter-coder reliability relates to the 
current study and how this was addressed. Section 4.4, below, describes the coding 
categories themselves, how they were arrived at and how they relate to aspects of 
diagnosis, prognosis and motivational message delivery. The final section of this chapter 
discusses aspects relating to research ethics.  
 
 
 
4.3 Inter-Coder Reliability 
 
In addition to capturing the essence of the Al-Qa’ida leadership narrative and adequately 
reflecting the composition of diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing tasks, the 
initial research design focused on matters relating to inter-coder reliability. This 
concerns the need to ensure that others have checked the design of the coding categories 
and the coding template that was ultimately applied to the dataset in question in order to 
ensure that the processing tools and components are appropriate for the material under 
review. In a broader sense, inter-coder reliability also highlights the importance of 
replicability.   
 In terms of inter-coder reliability, this author and his supervisor worked together 
on the drafting of the initial coding sheet in order to reflect the composition and nature 
of Al-Qa’ida leadership communiqués. Reliability was then addressed by selecting a 
representative sample of the dataset in the early stages of the process and coding the 
material according to the categories described in the template, as described above. Once 
the author had completed this work, the supervisor replicated the process and the results 
were compared. When both were satisfied with the way the material was handled and 
                                                
268 The most significant discrepancy between versions was detected when NEFA’s translation of As-
Sahab’s fourth ‘interview’ with Zawahiri (‘A Review of Events’, 16 December 2005) was compared with 
that of IntelCenter where some sections on Al-Qa’ida’s policy towards Iran and regional developments 
had been omitted from the former, presumably due to an editing error. 
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once the coding template had been honed accordingly, the template was finalised. The 
coding template does involve a degree of overlap, as will become apparent in the next 
part of this thesis. This reflects, however, the nature of the Al-Qa’ida communiqués 
themselves, which often convey similar emphases, albeit in different forms of 
presentation, when expressing both diagnostic and prognostic elements of the message. 
It was important that the coding adequately represented this feature of the material under 
review.  
Inter-coder reliability and broader concerns relating to replicability, moreover, 
were addressed through ensuring the processing models and methodology applied 
remained transparent throughout. To this end, the finalised coding template applied to all 
the material in question is, as noted above, annexed to this thesis. Also annexed are 
details of the communiqués coded and where they can be found, as well as the results of 
the coding process – showing how the material was categorised and coded.  
 Finally, it should be noted in relation to inter-coder reliability that this study is 
not designed as a quantitative, systematised content analysis. Rather, the purpose of the 
current analysis is to subject the communiqués under review to a qualitative process that 
is more sensitive to issues relating to context and nuances in the material delivered, as 
noted above. In this regard, a degree of subjectivity is unavoidable (see further in chapter 
8, under ‘limitations of the research’). Indeed, this is also one of the strengths of 
approaching this material through the eyes of a human coder, rather than through 
computerised or automated means, as mentioned above.  
 
 
 
4.4 Content Coding 
 
The coding categories necessarily needed to capture expressions forming the three core 
framing tasks identified above, laying the foundations of an empirical base to understand 
the nature of the Al-Qa’ida leadership communication strategy: the problems the two 
leaders identified, the solutions they presented and the way in which these were 
communicated to various audiences. With prognostic, diagnostic and motivational 
references coded for each communiqué, according to the definitions presented in the 
previous chapter and by applying the same variables and categories for each article, the 
coding was sensitive to changes in the narrative over time. In designing the coding 
template applied to each communiqué (see Appendix 1) emphasis was placed on 
structuring thematic coding categories so as to capture narrative elements that 
constituted the three framing tasks in a comprehensive fashion whilst retaining sufficient 
flexibility to capture nuances and shifting directions in terms of emphasis and scope each 
time.  
The focus was on core cultural and normative facets of the narrative as well as 
more temporal grievances; the range, scope and direction of proposed solutions (short-
term tactics and long-term strategic goals); as well as methods of ‘delivery’ in terms of 
audiences identified and nature of appeals. This produced six general discursive 
categories that thus corresponded with the diagnostic, prognostic and motivational 
frames. These were organised into a total of twenty-five subcategories (see below), 
grouping together the variables and observations that were attached to each narrative 
area. These subcategories would thus highlight references to specific details concerning 
a certain aspect of each communiqué that formed part of either the diagnostic, prognostic 
or motivational frame categories included in each article. Table 1, below, shows how the 
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template was organised with subsequent sections elucidating how the categories were 
arrived at. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.4.1 Diagnostic parameters 
 
1. Societal, cultural and normative issues 
 
The first challenge was to establish ways in which to collect diagnostic references in 
each communiqué and the range of issues cited to justify activism. At their most 
fundamental, these diagnostic elements concerned the perceived socio-cultural and 
normative ills that had allowed corruption to spread and complacency to become 
embedded in the populace, which in turn paved the way for certain aspects of modern 
day society that were seen as abhorrent and sinful. The first diagnostic subcategory was 
thus designed to capture these references to forms of governance that were deemed false 
and impious and prevailing societal and cultural principles and manifestations that were 
identified as contrary to core Islamic doctrines central to the belief system. 
 
Table 1: CODING OF COMMUNIQUÉS 
 
Details of communiqué 
Diagnostic elements 
• Socio-cultural and normative issues 
o Undesirability of existing societies 
• The grievance narrative 
o Past events 
o On-going events 
Prognostic elements 
• Tactics and violence 
o Importance of violence/claims of attack 
o Political tools outside violence 
o Constraints on use of violence 
o Legitimacy of targeting of non-combatants 
• Direction/scope of prognostic solutions 
o Declared enemies 
o Declared friends/allies 
o Regions for support activity 
o Regions for hostile activity 
• Strategic/political vision 
o Lauded past/existing societies 
o Desired way forward and end result 
Motivational elements 
• Message direction/audiences 
o Declared audience 
o Appeals to Muslim audiences 
o Criticism of Muslim audiences 
o Condemnation of Muslim audiences 
o Threats/warnings to non-Muslims 
o Conciliatory approaches towards non-
Muslims 	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2. The grievance narrative 
 
In terms of more tangible and immediate diagnostic references, the coding had to be 
sensitive to the range of grievances cited by the leadership that served to justify the 
establishment of Al-Qa’ida as a force for change. These related to significant events and 
prominent topics used to establish the rationale for action. An initial review of the 
communiqués suggested the grievance debate could be divided into two main 
subcategories: on-going examples of supposed oppression and other current grievances 
as well as past events used to add depth to the grievance narrative.  
 When grievance and opportunity constitute such important elements of 
mobilising efforts as presented by collective action frames, understanding the way in 
which the Al-Qa’ida leadership presented these events and capturing the relevant 
narrative elements is crucial.  
The coding captured historic events presented to reflect practices that needed to 
be addressed, paying particular attention to any temporal patterns. On-going grievances 
(at the time of publication) were coded in terms of references to events, personalities and 
developments utilised to express emotions of victimhood, falsehood and corruption that 
suggested past aggression towards Islam and the ummah was part of a continuous policy. 
Events depicted as underscoring the victim status of Muslim publics would be central to 
wider efforts to mobilise those audiences as well as legitimising the level of violence 
prescribed. This category, therefore, captured important framing tasks, which played a 
crucial role in their own right, as well as informing those addressed through other coding 
categories.  
 
4.4.2 Prognostic parameters 
 
1. Tactics preferences and importance of violence 
 
A description of the dire state of affairs faced by those to whom the Al-Qa’ida leadership 
seeks to appeal is invariably followed by a set of prognostic solutions to these identified 
ills. The most prominent and perhaps the most important prognostic references 
concerned activist responses and especially the use of violence. 
The first subcategory assessing levels of activism prescribed, involved general 
references to the usefulness of violent attacks, encouragement in this regard and any 
specifics in terms of targeting (such as oil infrastructure) and tactics (such as ‘martyrdom 
operations’ or suicide bombings). This focus included any claims of responsibility and 
praise for past attacks when presented as events others were urged to emulate.  
In order to identify the extent to which violent attack featured as one proposed 
option out of a range of potential initiatives, the second subcategory within this grouping 
sought to identify whether tools outside violent attack were prescribed for potential 
participants and the types of initiatives encouraged (e.g. economic boycott). This could 
provide valuable insights regarding any possible changes in terms of violent options 
elucidated over time and whether alternative forms of protest once highlighted became 
gradually side-lined as the campaign of violent activism progressed. 
Al-Qa’ida is often seen as having embraced indiscriminate, limitless and mass-
casualty violence. In order to assess the nature of violence prescribed in detail, therefore, 
the coding paid particular attention to any limitations (religious, moral, contextual, long- 
or short-term, tactical etc.) that were cited in relation to the use of violence. For this 
reason, the third subcategory assessed any constraints mentioned on the use of force. 
Again, this is important in order to establish how more indiscriminate tactics were 
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developed over time, whether any watershed events or catalysts were important in this 
regard and whether any limitations were initially identified but gradually dismissed.  
By extension, the fourth subcategory focused on the perceived legitimacy of 
civilian targeting and the justifications presented for the killing of unarmed groups and 
non-combatants, including any changes in this respect over time. This relates not only to 
any doctrine-based legitimisations but also the list of associations, activities and roles 
cited in relation to justifications for more limitless targeting.  
 
2. Direction and emphasis of prognostic solutions 
 
In addition to the nature of violence and other forms of activism endorsed and limits 
cited thereof, the coding sought to capture other aspects of prognostic framing relating 
specifically to the direction towards which the prescribed solutions should be 
channelled, according to bin Ladin and Zawahiri.  
Al-Qa’ida is widely and popularly recognised as the first major Islamist militant 
platform with a truly transnational agenda. Some of the aspects of this perceived 
emphasis and how the agenda was developed were discussed in the previous chapter. 
Partly due to this (limited) transnational focus, and the extent to which local concerns 
and events still resonated and were used in the narrative, it was necessary to hone the 
coding accordingly, to be sensitive to divergent directions in this regard. This also 
related to which specific groups, communities and actors were deemed hostile and 
legitimate targets and the identification of any regional allies.  
Thus, the subcategories within this group assessed any declared enemies 
(especially those discussed in any detail, beyond ubiquitous rhetorical references for 
instance towards the United States or Israel) and declared friends or temporary allies. 
The latter referred to any groups, leaders, states, governments and other actors that were 
seen as permanent strategic allies and doctrinally sound as well as more fluid, temporary 
and short-term assets, whose assistance could be valued even though their religious 
position was questioned.  
  
3. Strategic and political vision 
 
In terms of prognostic parameters, however, the leaders also made some references to 
more profound solutions to the problems described that alluded to the pious alternative 
presented to replace the status quo in addition to the fundamental steps that needed to be 
made to secure a righteous replacement to the existing state of affairs. 
 Violent extremist framing exercises involve, as noted above, a set of non-
negotiable values and demands that constitute the core principles for which potential 
participants are urged to fight. These consist of central issues affecting constituencies, 
their lives and identity. In short, therefore, this coding category focused on the stated 
goals of the Al-Qa’ida leadership. Although it could be assumed in advance that this 
element remains relatively constant over time for most activist movements, the inclusion 
of this category within the coding template allowed for assessments to be made 
regarding the extent to which this has been the case for the Al-Qa’ida leadership.   
The elements that made up this coding category, therefore, explored: (1) 
references to past or present societal forms that were deemed desirable and in harmony 
with the Islamist extremist belief system (with special attention given to specifics of past 
societies that the leaders wanted to reintroduce in their own vision for the future); and 
(2) descriptions of desired ways forward and end results, relating to the ‘end game’ that 
potential participants were urged to embrace, the societal components this involved and 
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any intermediate objectives cited whereby the movement leaders could claim at least 
partial success once achieved. For these categories, and the last point in particular, the 
extent to which these elements were ignored or described superficially without any detail 
was identified through the coding by leaving the entries blank or noting lack of detail. 
 
4.4.3 Motivational parameters 
 
1. Direction of messaging and audiences 
 
As the framing literature assumes and as noted above, descriptions of the dire state of 
affairs currently being experienced and elucidations of the sort of reaction movement 
leaders see as necessary to address the identified issues do not constitute concrete 
guidelines for potential followers. Something else, at the narrative level alone, is needed 
to move constituents ‘from the balcony to the barricades’ 269, regardless of the host of 
other factors involved in these processes. 
 The coding was thus designed to capture ways in which the message was directed 
at specific audiences in order to provoke specific emotions and reactions. At the most 
basic level, differences in message direction refer to distinctions made between Muslim, 
or in-group, and non-Muslim or out-group audiences. The initial coding focus concerned 
overall message direction and emphasis, and was normally addressed at the end of the 
coding for each article as this was based on assessment of overall tone and direction. 
Five subcategories were designed to capture attitudes towards specific audiences; three 
concerned message content aimed at Muslims whilst two subcategories assessed the 
approach towards non-Muslims.  
Attitudes towards Muslims were assessed according to three levels, depending on 
nature of appeals and level of coercion. The first subcategory assessed positive appeals, 
consisting of benign guidance, elucidating the rewards for choosing the ‘right path.’ 
These appeals saw the Al-Qa’ida leaders fulfilling their roles as leaders of an 
‘enlightened’ vanguard offering help and advice for those ‘unawakened’ or immobilised, 
seeking to motivate them to support the vanguard through any means possible. This 
constitutes the essential framing task designed to mobilise latent supporters and potential 
participants.  
The second subcategory was designed to assess when a more critical tone was 
applied in appeals to fellow Muslims and the more negative features of such outreach. 
This included direct warnings for perceived ‘incorrect’ behaviour and descriptions of 
potential repercussions, be they political and region-specific or linked to doctrine-based 
condemnation of individuals. Finally, the coding assessed direct threats and allegations 
of apostasy whereby Muslims were verbally attacked and excommunicated from the 
Islamic realm. This category captures the takfiri debate discussed above, which is crucial 
to understand as the boundaries between this component and the two previous 
subcategories denote the division between Muslims as potential (albeit sometimes 
unwilling) supporters on the one hand and downright enemies on the other. This has 
obvious implications for targeting justifications too. 
Direction of messaging to non-Muslims was coded according to two 
subcategories. The first was designed to capture threats and warnings to non-Muslims. 
As noted above, one of the principal objectives of public message campaigns by violent 
extremist groups and other activist movements is to intimidate opponents. When 
violence is involved, this part of the narrative is often designed to convey threats and 
                                                
269 Snow & Byrd (2007): 126. 
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demands within the context of past violent attacks so as to compound their impact. The 
second subcategory assessed the extent of more positive appeals, conciliatory 
approaches and promises of truce made towards non-Muslims. For doctrinal reasons, for 
instance, it can be beneficial for Islamist extremist groups to encourage conversions and 
extend invitations to Islam for elements of non-Muslim and even enemy audiences. In 
this sense, ‘alternative’ options to continued exposure to violent attack have been 
offered.  
 
4.4.4 Work processes and longitudinal study 
 
In terms of work processes, after the coding categories had been finalised and inter-
coder reliability addressed, each communiqué was carefully read or viewed, with details 
added to relevant categories in the template. Content areas that were not covered in a 
given communiqué were left empty. This process was repeated for the 240 communiqués 
under review. The systematic nature of the coding allowed for messages to be compared 
over time, revealing how focus on specific issues, such as the Palestinian question, for 
example, evolved over the years. This ensured the longitudinal study was based on 
sound and empirical processing rather than selective sampling and rudimentary coding.  
All of the subcategories detailed above were designed to capture thematic details 
of content, with relevant quotes and summarised excerpts for each communiqué added 
into the specific record within the database. The results of this process are given in 
Appendix 3, arranged chronologically and giving the title and author of the communiqué 
in question as well as a unique identification number for each one of them. The most 
substantial element of this study, therefore, consisted of populating each entry of the 
database according to these criteria, as each of the communiqués was read/viewed and 
assessed. The process generated a rigorous and evidence-based way in which to assess 
and analyse the composition of Al-Qa’ida leadership messages over time. The third part 
of the thesis presents and discusses the results from this comprehensive review. Before 
presenting the results from this analysis, however, it is important to recognise significant 
issues relating to research ethics in the design of the current study. 
 
 
 
4.5 Research Ethics 
 
Al-Qa’ida is universally recognised as a terrorist organisation and its two pivotal leaders, 
bin Ladin and Zawahiri, have been directly involved in the planning of terrorist acts. 
Furthermore, the nature and dissemination of the Al-Qa’ida leadership communiqués, 
under review in the current thesis, is considered illegal in many countries.  
Section 1 (Part 1) of the UK Terrorism Act 2006, for instance, proscribes the 
issuance or dissemination of any ‘statement that is likely to be understood by some or all 
of the members of the public to whom it is published as a direct or indirect 
encouragement or other inducement to them to the commission, preparation or 
instigation of acts of terrorism.’270 Section 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000, meanwhile, 
made it an offense to collect or make a ‘record of information of a kind likely to be 
useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism.’271 Although this relates 
primarily to items providing instructional guidance regarding assembly of explosives or 
                                                
270 UK Terrorism Act 2006: Part 1, Section 1 (1).   
271 UK Terrorism Act 2000: Part VI, Section 58.  
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other hazardous material for use in an attack, the justificatory narrative of Al-Qa’ida is 
clearly relevant in this context too. Furthermore, the condemnation of populations or 
communities due to their race, religion, ethnicity and sexual orientation, is illegal in 
many countries, including the UK.272 As will be discussed in the next part of this thesis, 
this clearly applies to much of the Al-Qa’ida leadership’s narrative, relating to 
condemnation of Jews, homosexuals and other groups of people. 
Issues concerning research ethics thus formed an important part in the initial 
design phase of this study and have been considered throughout this project. Although 
the focus of analysis is not on individuals who are approached through ethnographic or 
observational analyses, the nature of the material in question raises significant ethical 
questions. It is thus important to acknowledge the legal issues mentioned above. 
Additionally, it is important to view the current study as an attempt to dissect the 
communiqués of terrorist leaders seeking to justify and promote the activities of Al-
Qa’ida and associated movements. In this regard, some thoughts on how the study can 
aid policy makers and practitioners tackling Al-Qa’ida are mentioned in the concluding 
chapter.  
The nature of this material as open source communiqués that are openly available 
from commercially produced publications is also significant in relation to ethical 
considerations. The fact is, that this material is openly accessible via legal means and, 
indeed, often reproduced by mainstream media organisations such as the BBC, Al-
Jazeera, Time magazine and others. Furthermore, the Al-Qa’ida leadership communiqués 
(and material from a host of other terrorist leaderships) have formed the focus of 
analysis in numerous research studies and published papers that can provide valuable 
insights into the construction of distribution of messages that add context to the wider 
activity of the terrorist movement in question.273 The need to contribute to such an 
understanding forms the premise of this thesis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
272 See e.g. UK Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 and the Public Order Act 1986 in UK law. 
273 See e.g. Page, M, Challita, L. & Harris, A. (2011) and note 246, above.  
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Introduction to Part III 
 
This part presents results and findings of the longitudinal analysis described in the 
previous chapter. The coding captured the justifications put forward by the Al-Qa’ida 
leaders for the creation of their movement, the problems they identified, the solutions 
they presented, the way in which these were communicated to friend and foe, as well as 
changes in this respect over time. These aspects relate to all the fundamental components 
of the Al-Qa’ida core that can be detected and assessed through the public communiqués 
authored and disseminated by its two principal leaders. This study has developed a 
theoretically informed and empirically rigorous way of understanding these components 
and their significance. Furthermore, as noted above, emphasis was placed on ensuring 
referencing was transparent by attaching a unique identification code to each 
communiqué cited for direct and indirect quotes. Indeed, this constitutes a separate 
objective of the thesis. The range of issues covered by the Al-Qa’ida leaders could thus 
be traced immediately back to the evidence and the collection of communiqués 
supporting each claim.  
 Part III is divided into three chapters. The first is dedicated to diagnostic 
parameters of the coding whereby the leaders expressed their dissatisfaction with the 
prevailing state of affairs and explained why the support of its fighting vanguard was 
necessary. Rather than an exclusive focus on a victim-orientated grievance narrative 
based on specific acts of aggression and treachery, however, the coding revealed the 
importance of value-based concerns and normative diagnosis. The chapter on Diagnostic 
Frames was therefore divided into two sections: the former focusing on internal and 
external value-based concerns with the latter exploring the composition of the grievance 
narrative. The normative and value-based issues featured in some of the earliest 
communiqués analysed and were revisited periodically by the leadership over the course 
of the past two decades. All 240 communiqués under review, however, identified 
specific events and developments seen as harmful to the interests, safety and sanctity of 
the ummah that could be traced to or were blamed on particular belligerents. The list of 
grievances was fairly limited to begin with but began to expand by 1997. The post-9/11 
period, moreover, saw a significant increase in the list of grievances addressed, before 
becoming more focused again when issues such as the 2003 Iraq invasion and rendition 
came to the fore. In terms of identifying the geographic source of malice, however, the 
communiqués suffer from lack of clarity and are inconsistent over time. During a brief 
period, for instance, followers are urged to prioritise variously local sources of grievance 
over external threats or vice versa, whilst some of the latest global appeals (such as bin 
Ladin’s focus on the environment) contradict enemy hierarchies that had been 
consistently publicised in earlier communiqués.  
The second chapter of the longitudinal analysis sets out the prognostic facets of 
the material under investigation, with sections covering ultimate objectives, stages and 
priorities of activism, the nature of violence endorsed, strategy and tactics, as well as 
patterns of amity and enmity. The chapter explores both long-term, holistic, solutions 
and the more immediate forms of activism prescribed for followers. The former relates 
to the ultimate objective, as presented through the communiqués, and the creation of a 
pious society. These references are intended to inspire followers and highlight the noble 
ends that drive activism. In terms of specific responses, the coding revealed – perhaps 
predictably – an overwhelming emphasis on violence, which was presented as defensive 
and an individual obligation of all. The level of violence prescribed has escalated over 
time and its direction depends on the diagnostic focus each time (and as a result is not 
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always consistent). Justifications for this violence rely primarily on notions of revenge or 
reciprocity (‘an eye for an eye’) or the dubious adaptation and reinterpretation of 
medieval juristic accounts citing specific (limited) examples for the permissibility of the 
slaying of non-combatants. Additionally, however, and perhaps in recognition of the 
weakness of these justifications, the Al-Qa’ida leadership has also sought to redefine the 
concept of non-combatant: Western citizens for instance are intimately involved in 
fighting the Muslims since they pay taxes, vote for the civilian leadership of the armed 
forces or recognise their legitimacy. Aside from referring to more medieval rulings, the 
approach to Muslim deaths in Al-Qa’ida (or affiliated) attacks is similar: their status as 
‘Muslim’ is questioned, thus – apparently – undermining their right to life. When 
focusing on stated constraints on the use of violence it becomes clear how problematic 
the deaths of Muslims and other protected people in Al-Qa’ida attacks are for the 
leadership. Many of the caveats voiced in the earlier messages have gradually 
disappeared. The response to past attacks that have resulted in Muslim deaths, moreover, 
ranges from outright denial of responsibility, limited apologies for ‘mistakes’ and 
collateral damage to accusing other militant networks (such as HAMAS) of inflicting 
even more bloodshed than Al-Qa’ida. Paradoxically, more recent communiqués have 
openly appealed to Al-Qa’ida affiliates to tone down their attacks and limit Muslim 
casualties, thus implicitly of course acknowledging that Al-Qa’ida had been linked to 
such atrocities all along. 
The third chapter focuses on motivational frames, identified audiences and 
methods of delivery and is divided into sections according to focus on non-Muslim 
audiences on the one hand and divergent facets of the Muslim population on the other. 
The Al-Qa’ida leaders advocate strict separation between believers and non-believers 
and this, on the surface at least, is noticeable throughout the communiqués under review. 
The vast majority of messages appeal specifically to Muslims, with a few communiqués 
addressing non-Muslims and Al-Qa’ida’s identified enemies. A handful of communiqués 
thus add discursive context to attacks against the West by addressing Western publics 
and leaders directly. Threats are important in this regard, although the current analysis 
found these are mostly issued after a prominent attack, rather than before, thus adding to 
the post-attack justificatory narrative. There appears to be another, implicit, point in 
addressing the West directly: these communiqués serve to present the Al-Qa’ida leaders 
as colossal figures, on par with the political leadership in the West, and capable of 
yielding formidable force in tackling these powers.    
 This aura of superiority is equally visible when the nature of appeals to Muslims 
is analysed. The leadership perceives itself as responsible for ‘instigating the nation’ and 
seeks to convince this audience of the merits of the diagnostic and prognostic parameters 
presented. The nature of the approach towards Muslim audiences could be divided into 
three categories: positive appeals, criticism and denunciation of Muslim publics, and 
excommunication. In terms of the latter, the communiqués revealed a hesitant approach 
towards the concept of takfir, which – although escalating in scope in terms of its 
application – was always qualified in some way. Excommunication was also directly 
linked to on-going events. The most vehement (and frequent) accusations of apostasy, 
for instance, were linked to local developments in Pakistan and Iraq that could threaten 
the position of Al-Qa’ida in these regions. The coding did not uncover a general takfiri 
approach towards Shia Muslims. By contrast, when their religious credentials were 
questioned, this appeared to have more to do with specific developments (particularly 
collaboration with identified adversaries) rather than doctrine. Unless provoked by on-
going developments, therefore, the Shia issue appeared to be largely absent in the 
material coded. The most significant category identified in terms of communicating with 
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Muslim constituents concerned the increasingly irate criticism, even condemnation, of 
Muslim publics. The 9/11 attacks appear to have been something of a watershed in this 
regard. In their aftermath, the Al-Qa’ida leaders (and Zawahiri in particular) began to 
engage in increasingly hard-hitting criticism and denunciation of Muslims themselves, 
who had no affiliation with ‘corruptive’ elites and who, in many cases, had suffered on-
going war and hardship. After 9/11, therefore, a process began whereby the Al-Qa’ida 
leaders appeared to gradually alienate precisely the people they claimed to represent and 
defend. This process, of course, predates by many years the more overt impact of the 
Arab Spring and of excessive civilian targeting that have more recently been presented 
as signs that the Al-Qa’ida leadership is now in deep crisis.  
 The findings discussed in the following three chapters are developed further in 
the fourth, and concluding, part of this thesis, which assesses the impact of these 
messages and their overall effectiveness according to the framing model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   
 
5 
 
DIAGNOSTIC FRAMES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses coding results that expressed diagnostic themes and emphases 
conveyed by the Al-Qa’ida leaders over the twenty-year period under review (these 
results are provided in Appendix 3.1 and 3.2, pages 244-309). The coding captured 
aspects of the narrative that highlight perceived sources of corruption, hardship and 
suffering that bin Ladin and Zawahiri want to defeat. As the account below argues, these 
diagnostic elements involve a multifaceted outlook and worldview that is equally 
informed by political as well as religious-cultural imperatives. The chapter is divided 
into two sections, with the first exploring these value-based diagnostic features and the 
second setting out Al-Qa’ida’s grievance argument and how this has evolved from a 
localised set of ills to a far broader, more confusing and sometimes conflicting list of 
grievances and identified culprits.   
 
 
5.2 Condemnation of Prevailing Societal Forms 
 
Through the course of their efforts to communicate with their wider environment, the 
two Al-Qa’ida leaders were consistent in their condemnation of specific normative 
features and societal facets of contemporary cultures that prevail in Islamic countries and 
elsewhere. All communiqués were coded for references to the undesirability of existing 
societies. This included comments relating to perceptions of what made contemporary 
societies unpalatable and defunct in the eyes of the leadership (for instance as regards 
man-made legislation, the spread of capitalism and democracy). The coding results from 
this process are given in Appendix 3.1 (page 244). Many communiqués made brief 
references to such perceived societal ills. The results revealed, however, that several 
items, especially those authored by Al-Zawahiri, offered more detailed insights into the 
way in which these perceptions were formed. To illustrate how pervasive references to 
undesirable aspects of existing societies are in the Al-Qa’ida leaders’ output, figure 3 
identifies the communiqués where these positions are expressed, with each point on the 
graph illustrating an individual communiqué located on a timeline for the period under 
review.  
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As shown in figure 3, references to the undesirability of prevailing societal forms 
featured throughout the timeframe in question. These references, however, appear to 
have become particularly prominent in the post-9/11 discourse emanating from the Al-
Qa’ida leadership.  
Although Tibi is correct in tracing the uncompromising posture of the Al-Qa’ida 
leaders to (quasi) religious positioning, the coding established that the focus of animosity 
and source of anger was not exclusively based on immediate concerns over self-
determination or infringement of territory by unbelievers. In 1991, for instance, Al-
Zawahiri wrote a book titled The Bitter Harvest, condemning the corruption in the 
organisational and methodological thinking of the Muslim Brotherhood. The 
Brotherhood, Zawahiri argued, was taking part in 'jahiliyya governing’ through its 
acquiescence of democracy, elections and parliaments. Democracy, in the form of the 
‘rule of the people’ was seen as a ‘new religion’ which gave ‘the masses the right to 
legislate without being shackled down to any other [divine] authority.’274 
Zawahiri’s denunciation of democracy is therefore directly tied to his notions of 
tawhid, the oneness of God, and the fundamental impermissibility of idol worship. His 
reasoning was as follows: ‘Democracy is a new religion. In Islam, legislation comes 
from God; in a democracy, this capacity is given to the people. Therefore, this is a new 
religion, based on making the people into gods and giving them God's rights and 
attributes. This is tantamount to associating idols with God and falling into unbelief.’275 
Anyone who embraced or participated in legislative councils or any form of 
majority rule and obeyed authorities selected through such assemblies thus committed 
sin.276 The processing of communiqués found references where the leaders insisted that 
                                                
274 Zawahiri (1991) The Bitter Harvest: The Brotherhood in Sixty Years [46]. See also See Filiu (2009): 
20. See Kepel (1984) for details regarding the Qutb’s delineation of different types of jahiliyya societies: 
47. 
275 Zawahiri (1993) ‘Advice to the Community to Reject the Fatwa of Sheikh Bin Baz Authorizing 
Parliamentary Representation: Published Under the Supervision of Ayman al-Zawahiri,’ in Kepel & 
Milelli (eds.) (2008) [99]. Bin Ladin also tied the concept of man-made law to alleged polytheistic 
practices of modern-day Jews and Christians who embraced such impious principles in: (1995) ‘An Open 
Letter to King Fahd On the Occasion of the Recent Cabinet Reshuffle’  (11 July), Harmony database [62]. 
276 Bin Ladin (2003) ‘Second letter to the Muslims of Iraq,’ in Kepel & Milelli (eds) (2008) [98]; see also 
Zawahiri’s denunciation of ‘accepting secularism and democracy and the spread of the majority's wishes 
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any form of governance or jurisprudence where decisions were embedded in the will of 
the majority equalled subservience to the West,277 was corrupted by capitalism and 
corporations,278 and one of the reasons a political culture of ‘surrender and concessions’ 
had prevailed in Palestine.279 In one communiqué, bin Ladin conceded it was no secret 
‘that the selection of emirs or presidents is the right of the nation. However, this right is 
governed by conditions, whose absence makes participation in the selection of an emir 
prohibited.’280 The main condition was a leadership that would implement shari’ah, 
which no existing government, after the fall of the Taliban regime, had achieved or even 
contemplated, according to bin Ladin. Denunciation of democracy and elections featured 
intermittently throughout the communiqués analysed and the coding did not reveal 
substantial differences in this regard over time in terms of context and terminology. Nor 
was there a significant difference between messages from bin Ladin or Zawahiri, aside 
from their respective geographic bias in a large number of communiqués (the former 
focusing on the Arabian Peninsula, the latter on Egypt and neighbouring regions).  
When the overall trend in this regard since the 1990s was assessed, however, the 
period surrounding the Arab Spring emerged as the most strongly focused on issues 
relating to the fallacy of democratic governance or even un-Islamic forms of popular 
uprising. The revolutions that began in Tunisia and Egypt before spreading to other 
countries in the region appear to have caused anxiety within the Al-Qa’ida leadership 
over the apparent appeal of democratic solutions to Arab masses and the ummah. 
Zawahiri, for example, focused extensively on the matter in his multi-part appeal 
to Arabs (primarily Egyptians) titled ‘A Message of Hope and Glad Tidings,’281 intended 
to address and explain the significance of these watershed events. Arabs were warned 
democracy was necessarily a secular form of governance282 that ‘worships one idol, 
which is the wishes of the majority, without abiding by any religion, standards or 
ethics.’283 Any concessions towards a democratic form of government or consultation in 
this regard are also directly tied to the sacrificing of Islamic cultural prescriptions and 
proliferation of vice and degradation. When references to democracy were considered in 
their immediate narrative context, this revealed that democracy was not, therefore, only 
tied to specific grievances concerning any perceived oppression by the democratic West. 
Its introduction or acquiescence involved a fundamental abrogation of the religious creed 
and abandonment of the hisba, commanding good and forbidding wrong (al-amr bil-
marouf wan-nahee an al-munkar). ‘The truth about democracy,’ Zawahiri argued, is ‘it 
                                                                                                                                           
and the social state,’ Zawahiri (2010) ‘Al-Quds will not be converted to Judaism,’ published by As-Sahab, 
secured from Islamist web forums (19 July) [223]. 
277 Bin Ladin (2004) audio statement (no title) published by As-Sahab (27 December), available in 
IntelCenter (2008) Words of Osama bin Laden Vol. 1 [86]. 
278 Bin Ladin (2007) ‘The Solution: A message from Shaykh Osama bin Laden to the American people’ 
As-Sahab. (September). Secured via links form Islamist web forums [10]. 
279 Zawahiri (2007) ‘Palestine is the concern of all Muslims,’ published by As-Sahab (11 March), secured 
from Islamist web forum (also available in IntelCenter (2008) Words of Ayman al-Zawahiri Vol. 1 (2008), 
Tempest Publishing) [18]. See further references to democracy as a source or contributing factor to the 
plight of Palestinians e.g. Zawahiri (2009) ‘From Kabul to Mogadishu,’ published by As-Sahab (22 
February), secured from Islamist web forums [132]. 
280 Bin Ladin (2004) [86]. 
281 Seven distinct communiqués within this series had been issued at the time of writing. 
282 Zawahiri (2011) ‘A Message of Hope and Glad tidings to our people in Egypt (1),’ published by As-
Sahab (19 February), secured from Islamist web forums [232]. 
283 Zawahiri (2011) ‘A Message of Hope.. (4),’ published by As-Sahab (4 March), secured from Islamist 
web forums [235]. 
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allows everything regardless of it being degrading or contradictory, as long as the 
majority agrees with it.’284 
 
5.2.1 The impious international order and local implications 
 
These bedrock principles, in turn, inform much of the anger that the Al-Qa’ida leaders 
express towards the international community which, again, is not exclusively based on 
allegations of infringement of territory or other more immediate grievances. America’s 
legislative system whereby religion is separated from policymaking is seen as ‘contrary 
to the nature of mankind,’ for example.285 This organisational principle, itself traceable 
to the secular French revolution, has produced a ‘false international legitimacy’286 and a 
‘secular international order’ dominated by the ideals of ‘Anglo-Saxon protestant 
publics,’ according to the Al-Qa’ida leadership.287  
After the grading process was completed and references to the socio, cultural and 
normative undesirability of existing societies were aggregated and reviewed (See results 
in Appendix 3.1), two major manifestations of this ‘corruptive order’ were identified. 
These relate to the perceived chief pillar of this order, the United Nations; and through 
the impact of these ideas (and those who espouse them) on the written constitutions of 
Islamic countries.  
Several specific reasons are cited for the perceived harmful impact of the UN. 
Examples include allegations the organisation prevented Muslims from defending 
themselves in Bosnia and elsewhere (through embargoing arms shipments) and the 
implementation of sanctions in Iraq and beyond. In more fundamental ways, however, 
the extent to which the UN is seen to represent a system that is illegitimate through its 
elevation of ideals that contradict the sovereignty of God remains a constant feature of 
the communiqués analysed. It is ‘an organisation of unbelief,’ according to bin Ladin.288 
Its very charter, warned Zawahiri, ‘challenges the Shari’ah’289 and membership to the 
UN renders governments illegitimate290 and ‘forces’ the recognition of Israel, Russian 
occupation of Chechnya, China’s occupation of East Turkistan and Spain’s occupation 
of Ceuta and Melilla.291 
The second manifestation of the corruptive power of international, secular, legal 
norms, according to the coding results, is the drafting of constitutions in Islamic lands. In 
this respect, the coding process found particular emphasis on the constitutions of Egypt, 
Somalia, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.292 The fact that shari’ah law is not absolute in the 
                                                
284 Zawahiri (2011) ‘A Message of Hope.. (5),’ published by As-Sahab (14 April), secured from Islamist 
web forums [236]. 
285 Bin Ladin (2002) ‘Letter from Usama Bin Muhammad Bin Ladin to the American People,’ first 
published in Waaqiah (26 October), available in FBIS: Compilation of Usama Bin Ladin Statements [212]. 
286 Bin Ladin (2009) ‘Call for Jihad to Stop the Gaza Assault,’ published by As-Sahab (14 January) 
translated by Jihad Media Battalion [122]. See also bin Ladin (2008) ‘A Message to the Muslim Nation,’ 
published by As-Sahab (18 May), secured via Islamist web forums [24]. 
287 Zawahiri (2010) [223]. 
288 Bin Ladin (2006) ‘Oh People of Islam,’ published by As-Sahab (23 April), secured via Islamist web 
forums [90]. 
289 Zawahiri (2006) ‘Realities of the Conflict between Islam and Unbelief,’ published by As-Sahab (22 
December), available from IntelCenter (2008) Words of Ayman al-Zawahiri Vol. 1 [94]. 
290 Zawahiri (2007) “A Review of Events’ - As Sahab publishes fourth interview with Zawahiri,’ 
published by As-Sahab (16 December), via Islamist web forums (also available from IntelCenter (2008)) 
[13] 
291 Zawahiri (2006) [94]; Zawahiri (2009) [132]. 
292 See e.g. bin Ladin (2004) untitled audio statement (16 December), secured from Archive.org (12 
January 2009) via Islamist web forums [84]; Zawahiri (2009) [132]; Zawahiri (2009) ‘The Path of Doom,’ 
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judicial and legislative assemblies described in these written constitutions is blamed 
primarily on the West, mostly the United Kingdom, seen as instrumental in the creation 
of the Egyptian, Pakistani and Saudi constitutions. Zawahiri in particular devoted 
substantial attention to the matter. In 2009 he even published a book dissecting the 
Pakistani constitution, assessing the way in which it departed from crucial tenets of 
Islamic law. The book admonished Pakistanis for tolerating majority rule as the 
benchmark for decision-making and warned that the Pakistani constitution legalised 
fasiq, disobedience from shari’ah, which was in itself kufr.293 
In many of his older communiqués from the early to mid-1990s, bin Ladin too 
focused on the way in which the Saudi legal base failed to correspond with the Qur’an 
and how the ulema and political elite failed to rule according to the code sent down by 
God or the practices of His Prophet. When output from the two leaders was compared in 
this respect over time, subtle differences emerged. Thus, rather than dedicating extensive 
tracts exclusively to this aspect of contemporary societies, as Zawahiri has done, the 
more concise and apt bin Ladin mixed these constitutional concerns within more 
multifaceted criticisms of the established powers.  
Thus, bin Ladin’s early petitions and open letters to Saudi religio-political 
authorities, written on behalf of the Advice and Reform Committee, intertwined 
deviation from shari’ah governance with other socio-economic and political issues that 
were seen as inherently un-Islamic.294 The letters, written between 1994 and 1995, listed 
numerous ‘flaws’ within contemporary Saudi society. These ranged from the corruption 
of man-made laws and usury (riba) to specific grievances, such as the acquiescence of 
non-Islamic political forces, impious alliance structures, economic stagnation and 
polarisation, ‘blasphemous’ regional cooperation platforms and humiliating weakness of 
the armed forces. The culture of idleness, which saw the religious establishment ignoring 
and even endorsing these perceived ills was very much tied to the initial and 
fundamental sin of selective application of shari’ah and elevation of un-divine 
authority.295  
Zawahiri, in his ‘Message of Hope’ to fellow Egyptians, similarly saw the 
dilution or ‘alienation‘ of shari’ah within society as a tipping point leading to the 
spreading of vice and sin throughout the populace, including ‘usury, adultery, insobriety, 
moral dissolution, familial schisms and forms of crimes, [of] which the man-made laws 
add to the increase and spread.’296  
 
 
                                                                                                                                           
published by As-Sahab (26 August), secured from Islamist web forum [142]; Zawahiri (2009) ‘Shaykh Dr. 
Ayman al-Zawahiri: Eulogy for the Role Model of the Youth – The Commander and Shahid Baitullah 
[Mehsud],’ published by As-Sahab (28 September), secured from Islamist web forum [147]; Zawahiri 
(2009) The Morning and the Lamp to be Extinguished: An Analysis of the Claim that the Constitution of 
Pakistan is Islamic, translated by Abu Musa Abdussalam, published by As-Sahab (16 December), secured 
from Archive.org via Islamist web forums [141] 
293 Zawahiri (2009) [141]. Zawahiri, of course, was not alone in pointing to modern written constitutions 
and democracy as a major sign of corruption. In Mohammed al-Maqdisi’s writings, for instance, the 
prevalence of these influences signalled the failure of separating truth from falsehood. Similar notions 
have been tabled by a host of contemporary Wahhabite scholars. 
294 E.g. bin Ladin (1994) ‘Our Invitation to Give Advice and Reform,’ open letter dated 12 April, available 
from Harmony Archive, (AFGP-2002-003345) CTC West Point [36]. 
295 See especially: Bin Ladin (1994) ‘Open Letter for Shaykh Bin Baz on the Invalidity of His Fatwa on 
Peace with the Jews,’ open letter dated 29 December, Harmony Archive (AFGP-2002-003345) [63]; bin 
Ladin (1995) ‘Saudi Arabia Continues its War Against Islam and its Scholars,’ open letter dated 9 March, 
available from Harmony Archive (AFGP-2002-003345) [66]; bin Ladin (1995) [62]. 
296 Zawahiri (2011) [236]. 
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5.2.2 Avoidable sins 
 
Aside from these perceived large-scale and systemic vices, the reading and processing of 
communiqués also uncovered numerous references to more specific condemnation of 
behaviour regarded as offensive according to the puritanical norms the Al-Qa’ida leaders 
represent. This included ‘illicit’ behaviour and novelties such as sex outside wedlock and 
the promotion of sex, usury, alcohol, secularism/atheism, homosexuality, drugs, 
gambling, sexual presentation of women, adultery, disobeying parents, committing 
perjury, desire for wealth and status and ‘a family structure which is not necessarily 
composed of a father, mother and children, but rather grotesque forms of depravity.’297  
Whenever the communiqués reflected upon perceived offensive gestures of the 
West towards Islam, moreover, feelings of animosity were exacerbated by the fact 
Western values mocked the virtuous pillars of Islam whilst promoting heinous vice. How 
could they slander the Prophet Mohammed (through cartoons), for instance, and ban the 
glorification of terrorism and the niqab (in France), whilst tolerating homosexuality and 
banning any debate surrounding the Holocaust?298 The very presence of Westerners was 
thus polluting, due to the potency of their ideas. According to bin Ladin, US tourists 
were ‘spreading filth upon whoever comes into contact with [them]’ and the US, the 
world’s greatest polluter, was also the source of AIDS in the world.’299 Characteristically 
more expansive in scope, Zawahiri similarly denounced the Western civilization of 
‘degeneracy, adultery, freedom from ethics, morals and religion, […] the civilization of 
AIDS:’  
 
That is why, the female veiled Muslim brings out all of these provocations, and she uncovers 
their [Western] usage of women as a product to attract consumers and market supplies, and 
[she] uncovers the degeneracy of their capitalism that adopts the trade [in] obscenity in all its 
kinds and colors […] considered one of the important sources of its income, and she 
uncovers the fakery of their freedom as it is [acceptable] for them that a woman unveils her 
entire body, it is even [acceptable] for her to sell her body, but they cannot withstand a 
veiled Muslim woman.300 
 
The spread of these ideas to the Islamic world is seen as catastrophic and no less an 
existential threat than that posed by the ‘violent oppressors’ of the West. The 
colonisation had ideological facets: bin Ladin warned of the ‘cunning, malevolent media 
and cultural invasion’ orchestrated by Voice of America, the BBC and other 
organisations at the forefront of an ‘ideological invasion’ spreading ‘obscenity and 
depravity’ in Muslim lands.301  
 
                                                
297 Zawahiri (2011) [235]. See for the listing of these ‘vices’ in: Zawahiri (1993) [99]; bin Ladin (2002) 
[purported], ‘Al-Qaeda's Declaration in Response to the Saudi Ulema: It's Best You Prostrate Yourselves 
in Secret’ in Ibrahim (2007) [43]; bin Ladin (2002) [212]; Bin Ladin (2003) [79], bin Ladin (2004) [84]; 
Zawahiri (2005) ‘The Freeing of Humanity and Homelands under the Banner of the Quran,’ posted 11 
February, available from Jihadunspun.com [as of 4 May 2009] [109]; bin Ladin (2009) ‘Fight on, O’ 
Champions of Somalia,’ published by As-Sahab (19 March), secured from Islamist web forum [134]; 
Zawahiri (2009) ‘The Realities of Jihad and Fallacy of Hypocrisy,’ published by As-Sahab (4 August), 
secured from Islamist web forums [140]; Zawahiri (2010) ‘A Victorious Ummah, A Broken Crusade,’ 
published by As-Sahab (15 September), secured via Islamist web forums [226]. 
298 Zawahiri (2006) ‘The Alternative is Da’wa and Jihad,’ published by As-Sahab (4 March), available 
from IntelCenter (2008) [73]. 
299 Bin Ladin (2002) [212]. 
300 Zawahiri (2009) [140]. 
301 Bin Ladin (2006) [90].  
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5.2.3 The importance of values 
 
When the communiqués were coded for diagnostic references, therefore, a strong 
normative element emerged with some of the more specific grievances that form such an 
integral part of communiqués (see below) enveloped in these more profound and holistic 
denunciations of non-Islamic culture. Reidel’s assumption that Zawahiri’s ideology is 
‘not rooted in a hatred for Western culture or values, nor the status of women there, nor 
the alleged decadence of the West’302 does not correspond with the longitudinal coding 
results. Nor is there any evidence suggesting value-focused diagnosis is merely 
rhetorical. In Zawahiri’s aforementioned book The Morning and the Lamp, for instance, 
one of the points cited supposedly exposing the infidelity of the Pakistani constitution 
concerned the fact women were not prohibited from becoming president.303 At the same 
time Western values are seen as hostile to Muslim women as sisters wearing the hijab 
are being ‘persecuted’304 through a ban on face-covers being ‘implemented in order to 
fight the values of Islam and to force our daughters to emulate the West and its 
immorality.’305 
The aggregated coding results thus revealed that Al-Qa’ida’s grievances are not 
merely ‘political’ or specific to the actions of the West. They are to a very substantial 
degree based on values that are informed by the interpretation of creed306. This is 
important. The anger displayed in the actions and words of the Al-Qa’ida leadership is 
not a mere reaction to actions of the West, local leaders or other perceived belligerents. 
Nor do these diagnostic message elements rely on accounts of victimisation and 
suffering exclusively. The anger displayed is based on a firm desire to see through 
specific normative criteria, opposing those that currently appear to prevail. Fundamental 
issues relating to religiosity and cultural norms are mixed with more specific grievances, 
on-going events and the prevailing sense of violation and victimhood due to actions of 
powers outwith the Islamic realm.  
In one of the more unusual public relations initiatives undertaken by the Al-
Qa’ida leadership, Ayman Al-Zawahiri invited the public to send questions via an online 
forum regarding the role and operations of Al-Qa’ida. Zawahiri answered many of the 
questions posted in this ‘Open Meeting’ in extensive audio addresses, issued in two 
batches. The latter was posted on forums in April 2008. One of Zawahiri’s answers 
typically demonstrates the way in which immediate concerns relating to territorial 
integrity and other developments that arouse anger within the potential support base are 
mixed with more long-term normative positioning: 
  
I reject and I am hostile to polytheism; scorn for religion; the establishment of relations 
based on profit, sensual delight, lies, deception, and treachery; usury, alcohol, gambling and 
vile deeds; seizing others' countries and inflicting justice on them based on arrogance and 
mischief; the plundering of their resources; double standards; and immunity to punishment 
for crimes for which others are punished; spreading killing, exploitation, and destruction; 
                                                
302 Riedel (2008): 24. 
303 Zawahiri (2009) [141]. 
304 Zawahiri (2011) ‘A Message of Hope.. (3)’ As-Sahab (27 February), secured via Islamist web forums 
[234]. 
305 Zawahiri (2001) Knights under the Banner of the Prophet, initially published in Al-Sharq al-Awsat (2 
December), available in translation from the Foreign Broadcast Information Service [119], even though 
Zawahiri did not feel women had a choice in wearing the veil, arguing it was ‘the duty of Muslim girls and 
women in the Islamic Maghreb is to face-off those who want to remove their Hijab’ – Zawahiri (2009) 
[140]. 
306 Full list in Appendix 3.1. 
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and the destruction of environment and climate in order to be elated with mighty arrogance 
and for the sake of plundering and looting.307  
 
The spread of vice and sin, therefore, often seen as a by-product of past acts of 
aggression against the Islamic realm, is here intertwined with more immediate cases of 
suffering that are traced back to specific Western actors and their local stooges. 
In order to gauge which diagnostic elements related to the activity of a given set 
of actors that featured in the messages, therefore, the coding assessed references to 
particular events, past and present, emphasised by Zawahiri and bin Ladin. References to 
historic events that victimised Muslims were thus logged in each communiqué 
separately, as were message elements pertaining to on-going suffering and grievance. 
Once all the data had been collected, this latter category proved to be far more 
voluminous and complex. The next section discusses these coding results. Focus on 
events varied across the communiqués analysed and was dependent on the context of the 
communiqué (according to the prominence of a given set of issues within the ummah 
each time), message scope, as well as the occasional geographic bias of bin Ladin and 
Zawahiri as mentioned above.  
 
 
 
5.3 Constructing a Grievance Narrative 
 
Grievances and alleged historical crimes of the West and their treacherous ‘agents’ in the 
Middle East, North Africa and elsewhere set the political and event-specific context of 
the message. Almost all of the communiqués coded referred to grievances and 
developments (long and short term) in order to vilify the West, its allies and supporters, 
and appeal to Muslim audiences with the aim of mobilising them to embrace militancy 
and justify violent methods.308 The leadership’s take on current affairs is communicated 
and specific reasons for the plight and victimisation of Muslims are elucidated through 
an emotional narrative emphasising the individual responsibility of Muslims to react 
against the perceived forces of evil in order to protect the sanctity, cohesion, dignity and 
safety of the ummah.  
The simplistic world vision of Al-Qa’ida is Manichean at its core, pitching the 
US, the West, Western culture and media, local regimes and elites in one camp against 
the sacrosanct world of dar al-Islam. Aside from the normative clashes mentioned 
above, the content highlights the ways in which expansionism, conspiracy, hegemony, 
plunder and subjugation are inherent characteristics of the former camp, thus rendering 
peaceful coexistence impossible. 
  Various examples of penetration into and mistreatment of the perceived Islamic 
world are presented to demonstrate this clash and the need to rise up against it. The 
oppression and hostility displayed by apparent forces of evil against Muslims illustrates 
not only their individual obligation to defend the ummah (by supporting Al-Qa’ida – the 
ummah’s vanguard) but also the right of this vanguard to reciprocate in kind. For the Al-
Qa’ida leadership, these grievances have been used to develop some of the principal 
justifications presented for terrorist violence, within the context of reciprocity.  
                                                
307 Zawahiri (2008) ‘The Open Meeting with Sheikh Ayman al-Zawahiri, Part Two,’ the second part of 
responses to the ‘Open Meeting’, published by As-Sahab (21 April), IntelCenter (2008) [107]. 
308 The coding captured references to past and on-going events that were used to construct the grievance 
narrative. The results from this process are given in Appendix 3.2 (pages 253-309). 
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 In order to map the grievances cited by the leadership, all entries pertaining to 
on-going (column (A) in Appendix 3.2) and historic (column (B) in Appendix 3.2) 
victimisation from the coding were processed with the aim of highlighting the most 
prominent issues identified. Aggregated results from this review are presented in table 2, 
below. 
 
 
 
As demonstrated, alleged subjugation and violent oppression features prominently. 
However, the importance of events, which the Al-Qa’ida leaders interpret as 
Table 2: PRINCIPAL GIEVANCES CITED  
[Issues referred to in more than two communiqués] 
[See source material from coding results in Appendix 3.2 (p. 253)] 
 
 
Presence of occupying forces, corruption, 
creation of local ‘agent regimes’ in Middle 
East, North Africa, Pakistan, Afghanistan and 
elsewhere 
 
Creation of Israel, aggression against 
Palestinians. Corruption of nationalist local 
rulers. Local, regional and international peace 
initiatives (Madrid, Oslo, Camp David, Wey 
River, Sharm El Sheikh, Mecca accords, 
Annapolis etc.) as way to annex/ ‘sell’ Palestine 
 
The ‘oppressive’ and ‘hostile’ campaigns by 
‘Crusader-Zionist aggressors’ and their allies 
in: Afghanistan, Iraq, Algeria, Somalia, Sudan, 
Eritrea, Chechnya, Kashmir, Indonesia, East 
Turkistan (Xinjiang Uyghur in China), 
Philippines, Yemen, Nigeria, Mauritania. 
Attempts to ‘split’ Muslim lands into 
manageable units 
 
Historical legacy of oppression, especially 
through colonialism and the Sykes-Picot 
agreement, Balfour Declaration and more 
modern equivalents–a Zionist and Christian 
Crusade. Usurping lands and stealing resources 
 
Sabra and Shatila massacres 
 
Massacre of Srebrenica and other atrocities of 
Bosnia war blamed on West and UN 
 
Human cost of UN sanctions against Iraq and 
oil-for-food programme 
 
Separating of East Timor from Indonesia and 
collusion of UN 
 
Spanish control over Ceuta, Melilla, and 
Andalusia 
 
Darfur opened as another ‘Crusader front’ 
against Muslims, under guise of protecting 
human rights 
 
Pakistani security forces have become ‘hunting 
dogs’ for the West through collusion of 
Pakistani government 
 
‘Stealing Muslim wealth’, especially oil 
 
2007 siege of Lal-Masjid (Red Mosque) in 
Pakistan 
 
2006 war in Lebanon 
 
2008-2009 war in Gaza 
 
Gaza siege/blockade 
 
UNSC Resolution 1701 on Lebanon ceasefire, 
disarming Hizbullah. Other resolutions which 
‘cut off parts of the lands of Islam’ 
 
Battle of Al-Falujah, Iraq 
 
Support for Muqtada al-Sadr's army, Badr 
Brigades  
 
Incarceration of Muslims in Guantanamo, 
Bagram, Abu Ghraib, and at other undisclosed 
facilities 
 
Mohammed caricatures 
 
People arrested for questioning holocaust but 
not for’insulting’ the prophet 
 
French ban on wearing veils in schools 
 
Hostile undemocratic regimes criticised by 
West but not friendly regimes, such as Saudi 
Arabia and Egypt, despite the torture they 
inflict on Muslims 
 
Muslim countries prohibited from acquiring 
nuclear weapons but not Israel 
 
Respect in the West for human rights alternates 
according to political agenda. Democracy 
celebrated only if outcome is in the interest of 
the US/West, not in e.g. Algeria or Palestine 
 
Alleged desecration of Quran by US troops and 
prison wardens 
 
 
US pressure to hold Wafa'i Qustantin (An 
Egyptian Coptic woman who converted to 
Islam but was then forced to return to 
Christianity and moved to a Coptic monastery) 
in Egyptian ‘torture chambers’ 
 
Collusion between Iran and the US. 
Expansionist Iran 
 
Alleged mistreatment of Muslim immigrants in 
West 
 
Protection of Salman Rushdie and knighthood 
 
Perceived offensive remarks by Pope Benedict  
XVI regarding Islam 
 
Western support for ‘apostate’ rulers of Muslim 
countries, leading to lack of development, 
poverty, unemployment and proliferation of 
distracting ‘vices’ in favour of Islam 
 
Spread of nationalism, particularly in Palestine 
 
‘Tyranny’ of international law 
 
‘Cultural invasion’ of Western media, 
‘permitting disengaging moral behaviour’ 
marginalising the importance of Islam 
 
Global warming blamed on the West, US 
failure to sign Kyoto protocol 
 
Global capitalism and corporations causing 
world poverty 
 
Al Yamamah arms deal between Britain and 
Saudi Arabia 
 
Pakistan collapsing from within due to reduced 
emphasis on Islam 
 
Danger of democracy and secular rule in 
relation to ‘Arab Spring’ 
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blasphemous and contemptuous of the Islamic creed, should not be underestimated. 
Indeed, for effective frames to be generated, as noted in the previous chapter, the Al-
Qa’ida discourse necessarily needs to address contemporary issues that have sparked 
arousal within the Muslim populace and been the focus of public debate and anger, 
media discussion and Friday sermons. Alleged military aggression, occupation and 
economic colonialism are obviously fundamental, but the coding revealed the 
prominence of cultural clashes and remarks or gestures that are seen as insulting, such as 
the publication of Mohammed caricatures in Danish and (later) European newspapers 
and Salman Rushdie’s public profile.309 Examples were found of such issues, ostensibly 
relating to the dignity and pride of the ummah, being equated with events resulting in 
bloodshed and suffering. Zawahiri, for instance, noted how the ‘latest decision by the 
French president to create a law preventing Muslim girls from covering their heads in 
schools is […] consistent with the burning of villages along with their people in 
Afghanistan, demolishing houses over their sleeping residents in Palestine, killing the 
children of Iraq.’310 Bin Ladin even suggested the publication of the Mohammed 
caricatures was a far worse atrocity for Muslims than bombings of innocent Muslim 
women and children.311 
 
5.3.1 Localised focus 
 
When references to harmful events were compared over time, the earliest messages were 
found to be more localised in scope than subsequent output. Bin Ladin was largely 
preoccupied with the Arabian Peninsula and the perceived illegitimacy of Saudi 
authorities. When other regional or global issues were addressed, these were often traced 
back to the inability or unwillingness of the regime in Riyadh to protect the interests of 
Muslims, be that through supporting Yemeni communists or acquiescing UN ‘embargo’ 
over shipment of arms to Bosnian Muslims.312 A letter written by bin Ladin in June 1994 
and sent in the name of the London-based Advice and Reform Committee, however, is 
an early example of a widening diagnostic scope in the messages. The letter discussed 
the ‘global Crusader conspiracy’ and the dismal state of Muslim affairs in Sudan, 
Somalia, Lebanon, Kashmir, Algeria, Yemen, Bosnia, and – of course – the Arabian 
Peninsula and Palestine.313 Just over a year later, bin Ladin penned another letter 
accusing the Saudi regime of seeking to deflect criticism over local issues through 
                                                
309 Numerous references were made to the ‘blasphemous’ Mohammed cartoons, e.g. in Bin Ladin (2006) 
[90]; Zawahiri (2006) ‘American Crimes in Kabul,’ published by As-Sahab (21 June) available from 
IntelCenter (2008) [87]; Zawahiri (2006) ‘Bush, the Vatican's Pope, Darfur and the Crusaders,’ published 
by As-Sahab (29 September), IntelCenter (2008) [89]; bin Ladin (2008) ‘May our Mothers be Bereaved of 
us if we Fail to Help our Prophet. Peace be upon Him),’ published by As-Sahab (19 March), available in 
IntelCenter (2008) [11]; Zawahiri (2009) [140]. Rushdie’s works (and the fact he received a knighthood) 
were discussed in: bin Ladin (1997) ‘Usama Bin Ladin Urges “Befitting Reply” to Horan,’ article with 
comments from bin Ladin, first published in Pakistan Daily (7 August), available in FBIS: Compilation 
[157], Zawahiri (2005) first in a series of interviews with Zawahiri, published by As-Sahab (7 December), 
available in Ibrahim (2007) [49]; Zawahiri (2006) [73]; Bin Ladin (2006) [90]; Zawahiri (2006) [87]; 
Zawahiri (2006) [89]; Zawahiri (2007) ‘Malicious Britain and its Indian Slaves,’ published by As-Sahab 
(10 July), available in IntelCenter (2008) [103]. 
310 Zawahiri (2004) untitled statement aired on Al-Arabiya and Al Jazeera (24 February), see 
Hegghammer, T. (2005) ‘Al-Qaida Statements 2003-2004: A Compilation of Translated Texts by Usama 
bin Ladin and Ayman Al-Zawahiri,’ in FFI Rapport, FFI, Kjeller [58]. 
311 Bin Ladin (2008) [11]. 
312 E.g. bin Ladin (1994) ‘Saudi Arabia Supports the Communists in Yemen,’ open letter dated 7 June, 
available from Harmony Archive [AFGP-2002-003345], CTC West Point [37]. 
313 Ibid.  
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organising debates concerning the plight of Muslims in Bosnia. Although the open letter 
was largely addressed to Muslims in ‘the land of the two holy places,’ bin Ladin warned 
of the way in which the United Nations were being positioned to implement ‘the 
Crusaders’ plan to kill the causes of the nation of Islam and its people.’314 
 Nonetheless, most of the early messages concerned domestic issues relating to 
areas bordering the Red Sea. This is not to suggest condemnation of the ‘distant’ enemy 
was absent. Indeed, most of these local grievances were traced back to the domination of 
the United States and its defence of Israel. Al-Zawahiri, for instance, wrote several 
articles on Abu Mohammed Al-Maqdisi’s website ‘Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l-Jihad’ 
criticising the state of affairs in Egypt, the secular nature of the curriculum and 
constitution (much in the same way as he did in the wake of the 2011 Arab uprising), 
citing the close ties with America and Israel as a principal corrupting influence (as well 
as British colonial legacy).315 
Similarly, issues of importance to Muslims in the Arabian Peninsula, from the 
price of wheat316 and the inability of the regime to cater for pilgrims to Mecca317 to 
economic stagnation and unemployment, were traced to the influence and presence of 
the US, which had coveted the region, according to bin Ladin, since Roosevelt became 
president.318  
 This implicit prioritisation of diagnostic inferences characterised Al-Qa’ida’s 
first public ‘declaration of war’ against its distant enemy and its local affiliates. A wide 
range of issues affecting Muslims from North Africa to the Far East were addressed, but 
the focus was on Saudi Arabia and the presence of US troops in the area, seen as ‘one of 
the worst catastrophes to befall the Muslims since the death of the Prophet.’319  
  Thus, even though the distant enemy had been delineated, and the consequences 
for his presence in the Middle East elaborated, there was some degree of prioritisation 
and limitation of diagnostic scope up until the mid-1990s. Gradually, however, the 
cluster of grievances identified in the longitudinal analysis proliferated exponentially 
and bin Ladin, in particular, began to place more emphasis on the regional or even global 
implications of the events he described.  
 
5.3.2 Holistic, intertwined grievances 
 
The coding thus revealed an escalation in terms of grievances addressed. By August 
1997, American presence in ‘all Muslim lands’ was condemned, not just in the Arabian 
Peninsula.320 The adversary also became more multifaceted, consisting of an 
‘international Christian Crusade’ with Zionist sympathies and agendas.321 To counter 
                                                
314 Bin Ladin (1995) ‘The Bosnia Tragedy and the Deception of the Servant of the Two Mosques,’ open 
letter dated 11 August, from Harmony Archive (AFGP-2002-003345), CTC West Point [69]. 
315 See e.g. Zawahiri (1999) ‘Muslim Egypt between the Whips of the Torturers and the Administration of 
Traitors’ posted in ‘Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l-Jihad’ (14 January) see McCants, Brachman, Felter (2006) 
Militant Ideology Atlas: Research Compendium [116]. 
316 Bin Ladin (1997) ‘Pakistan Interviews Usama Bin Ladin’ article/interview published in Pakistan daily 
(18 March), see FBIS: Compilation. [154]. 
317 Bin Ladin (1997) ‘The Saudi Regime and the Reputed Tragedies of the Pilgrims,’ open letter dated 16 
April, from Harmony Archive (AFGP-2002-003345) [70]. 
318 Bin Ladin (1998) ‘One of Them Bears Witness,’ statement embedded within article published in Al-
Quds Al-Arabi (23 March), available from FBIS: Compilation. [162]. 
319 Bin Ladin (1996) ‘Message from Usama Bin-Muhammad Bin Ladin to His Muslim Brothers ..’, Al-
Islah (2 September, pp. 1-12), published in FBIS: Compilation [5]. 
320 Bin Ladin (1997)  [157], 
321 Bin Ladin (1998) ‘Bin Ladin Condoles with Al-Bashir on Salih's Death,’ statement embedded within 
article published in Al-Quds al-Arabi (16 February), see FBIS: Compilation [160]. 
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this threat a ‘World Islamic Front’ was created which declared war on Zionist Crusaders 
and Americans in February 1998. The declaration set out three major grievances: 
occupation of the Arabian Peninsula; suffering of Iraqi people; and liberation of 
Muslims in Jerusalem and Palestine.322 The World Islamic Front would operate as a 
vanguard for all Muslims in the region for all Arab land ‘has either been occupied or 
there is a conspiracy to occupy it. For the first time since the Prophet’s death atheists are 
occupying [the] Mecca, Medina and al-Aqsa Mosques.’323  
 The communiqués from this period illustrate the increasingly ambitious agenda 
of Al-Qa’ida and attempts to garner broader appeal within and beyond the Arab world. 
Towards the end of the decade, for instance, bin Ladin made several references to the 
conflict in Kashmir, religiosity in Pakistan and the perceived threat from India and 
highlighted the importance of supporting Chechen mujahideen as belligerents prepared 
for the Second Chechen War.324  
This broadening of diagnostic scope that the analysis detected suggests the Al-
Qa’ida leadership was seeking to mobilise a wider set of potential participants. In an 
interview January 1999, for example, bin Ladin congratulated himself on the ‘winds of 
change’ his messages had brought to Muslims across the globe, through highlighting 
their common grievances.325 The pressures following the 9/11 attacks compounded this 
necessity to mobilise as much support from as many regions as possible and the 
messages reflect this need. The US and NATO campaign in Afghanistan was presented 
as an attempt to destroy the only Islamic emirate in the world, rather than a mission to 
capture Al-Qa’ida leaders, and thus part of a larger campaign against Muslims: ‘we are 
being attacked in Palestine, Iraq, Lebanon, Sudan, Somalia, Kashmir, the Philippines and 
everywhere else.’326 ‘This war is fundamentally religious,’ bin Ladin argued. ‘The 
people of the East are Muslims. They sympathize with Muslims against the people of the 
West, who are the crusaders.’ Al-Qa’ida was thus presented as the vanguard for the 
‘victims’ in Palestine, Iraq, Sudan, Chechnya, Somalia, Kashmir, Indonesia, the 
Philippines and elsewhere amid the corruption and infidelity of local leaders and ulema 
who had succumbed to the West.327 
The Afghan invasion was thus not presented as a response to 9/11 (itself a 
necessary response to the described state of affairs) but rather an inevitability, a 
continuation of an existential struggle for Islam and a symptom of the world order 
created by the West and its historic thirst for ever greater territorial expanse and riches. 
‘It has become crystal clear that the West in general, and the US in particular, harbour an 
implacable, incredible Crusader hatred against Islam’, bin Ladin announced shortly after 
                                                
322 Bin Ladin, Zawahiri et al. (1998) ‘Text of World Islamic Front's Statement Urging Jihad Against Jews 
and Crusaders,’ as published in Al-Quds Al-Arabi (23 February), see FBIS: Compilation [161]. 
323 Bin Ladin (1998) ‘United States Admits that Keeping its Troops in the Gulf is Causing Dissatisfaction; 
Bin Ladin Threatens to Launch Attack Soon,’ article in Al-Quds Al-Arabi featuring a statement from bin 
Ladin, see FBIS: Compilation.. [169]. 
324 See e.g. bin Ladin (1998) ‘Bin Ladin Congratulates Pakistan on its Possession of Nuclear Weapons,’ 
article in Al-Quds Al-Arabi (1 June), see FBIS: Compilation... [170]; bin Ladin (1998) ‘In the Way of 
Allah,’ statement in article published in The News (15 June) (Islamabad), available in FBIS: Compilation... 
[171]; bin Ladin (1999) ‘Usama Bin Ladin Pens Letter in Support Of Kashmir Jihad,’ report giving text of 
letter published in Wahdat (Peshawar) (8 June), available in FBIS: Compilation [183]; bin Ladin (1999) 
‘UBL Orders Mujahidin to Shoot US Commandos ‘on Sight’, published in Khabrain (12 September), see 
FBIS: Compilation [186]. 
325 Bin Ladin (1999) ‘Wrath of God: Osama Bin Laden Lashes out against the West’, Time Magazine (11 
January, vol. 153, no. 1) [178]. 
326 Bin Ladin (2001) [130]. 
327 Bin Ladin (2001) untitled statement aired on Al Jazeera (3 November), transcript available in 
Hegghammer, T. (2003) FFI Rapport 1990-2002 [77]. 
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the US and allied invasion of Afghanistan in the wake of 9/11.328 ‘This war [in 
Afghanistan]’, he argued, ‘is similar to the previous crusades, led by Richard the Lion-
Heart, [King Frederick] Barbarossa of Germany and Louis [IX] of France. In the present 
age, they rally behind [president] Bush.’329 
 The above examples show how holistic, intertwined grievances representing a 
cosmic and zero-sum clash between pious and non-pious forces replaced the more 
specific local and limited issues emphasised during the 1990s. The rather precarious 
assumption made, was that the Al-Qa’ida leaders could successfully appeal to a global 
sense of Muslim identity, tie together grievances and channel sympathy for ostensibly 
common causes towards acquiescence and support for the mujahideen vanguard. A 
proliferation of topics addressed, however, risked dilution of overall message potency 
and loss of frame consistency. Fortunately for the Al-Qa’ida leadership, its physical 
flight from Afghanistan and the pressure of coalition efforts (now with partial Pakistani 
support) coincided with a set of issues that proved to be invaluable rallying calls. For 
instance, rendition programmes and prisoner abuse cases were presented as further 
evidence to support the movement.330  
 Furthermore, as has been widely reported in analyses of the Iraq war, the 
decision to invade provided the Al-Qa’ida leaders with a propaganda victory and this 
was clearly evident from the output reviewed from this period. The invasion was 
presented as confirmation of wider hostility and animosity towards Islam, an argument 
that appeared weaker when related to Afghanistan, Chechnya, Kashmir and other 
isolated conflicts alone, and aggressive determination to protect Israel. The invasion was 
portrayed as a ‘scheme of fragmenting and ripping apart this [Muslim] nation, looting its 
resources and wealth, and preparing for the establishment of the greater State of Israel 
after expelling the Palestinians from it.’331 Muslims were urged to detect a pattern, rather 
than a set of isolated events whereby their homelands would inevitably be next in line in 
US and Western-Zionist efforts to colonise the Muslim world. The aim would be to 
divide and plunder the Arabian Peninsula, Egypt, Syria, Sudan and even Iran.332 The aim 
was to create and secure ‘a huge Jewish super state,’ bin Ladin argued at the time.333 
 
5.3.3 Undermining the counter-narrative 
 
In recognition of the damage the Iraq war and detainee abuse have done to the anti-Al-
Qa’ida counterargument and to the reputation of the US and the West, efforts relating to 
the generation of a counter-narrative have since achieved greater prominence in recent 
years. The fact that counter-terrorism policy makers are searching for an attractive and 
effective counter-narrative to be deployed as part of a wider set of policies is in 
recognition of the role ideological material and arguments play in inspiring militant 
                                                
328 Bin Ladin (2001) ‘The facts of the conflict between us and America,’ video statement aired on Al 
Jazeera (13 December), secured from Islamist web forums [129]. 
329 Bin Ladin (2002) untitled video release reported and quoted in The Times (Bin Ladin Film Vows 
Revenge on the UK,’ 19 May), available from FBIS: Compilation [209]. 
330 See e.g. Zawahiri (2002) ‘The Interview of Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri,’ available from IntelCenter (2008) 
[22] for early references. 
331 Bin Ladin (2002) untitled statement distributed by Al-Qal'ah (14 October), available from FBIS: 
Compilation [211]. 
332 Zawahiri (2002) Al Walaa wa al Baraa - Loyalty and Separation: Changing an Article of Faith and 
Losing Sight of Reality, available in Kepel & Milelli (eds.) (2008) [45]; bin Ladin (2003) untitled audio 
statement, unknown distributor (February), available from IntelCenter (2008) [78]; bin Ladin (2003) 
‘Usama Bin Ladin Urges Muslims to Launch Suicide Attacks against US,’ statement embedded within 
article published in Ausaf (Islamabad) (9 April), available from FBIS: Compilation [217]. 
333 Bin Ladin (2003) [78]. 
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activists, potentially fomenting support for the prescribed violent extremist agenda. The 
coding uncovered several examples of attempts by the Al-Qa’ida leadership to nip such 
initiatives in the bud. In addition to discussing specific activities, perceived examples of 
social, political, economic and moral corruption and alleged conspiracies, Zawahiri and 
bin Ladin have also sought to undermine the credibility of Western claims makers by 
accusing those who seek to undermine the Al-Qa’ida discourse of dualism, double 
standards and hypocrisy.  
According to this narrative the US and its allies apply legal codes and standards 
selectively, according to their interests, to serve the Zionist call and in order to harm 
Islam. Democracy is good if the results produce regimes favourable to the United States 
and friendly towards Israel, but not when they are Islamic, such as in Algeria or 
Palestine. Pressure is applied to countries suspected of foul play during electoral 
campaigns, such as Zimbabwe, but not in relation to a series of shambolic Afghan 
elections. The Americans call for democracy, but have a record of embracing tyrants in 
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and elsewhere. Force, coercion and aggression should be 
used to stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but not against Israel or India. Nor 
should the powers that established the United Nations give up their weapons, especially 
not the United States, the only country that has ever used them.  
UN resolutions relating to Lebanon and elsewhere should be enforced, as Israel is 
threatened, but not when Israel itself is condemned. The US pretends to be a vanguard of 
human rights, yet takes part in such abuses against Muslims. It fights offensive wars in 
the name of capturing war criminals, whilst it protects and finances others. The UN and 
international community cry over Darfur, but do nothing when Muslims are being 
massacred.334 Finally, America and its allies invaded Iraq to destroy Al-Qa’ida, but 
‘since when has Iraq been the home of al-Qaeda? It is the land of all Muslims,’ as bin 
Ladin reminded his audiences towards the end of 2004.335 What constitutes the necessary 
fluidity of realpolitik for one side, therefore, can be used to present the international 
order as inherently unjust, by others. In this sense, the Al-Qa’ida leadership moves 
beyond specific grievances relating to perceived Muslim constituencies to a wider 
geopolitical repertoire to display the apparent falsehood and hypocrisy of the West. 
 
5.3.4 Conflicting diagnostic focus 
 
According to the coding results on diagnostic message elements, the post 9/11 messages 
(see pages 266-309 in Appendix 3) generally offered more breadth in terms of diagnosed 
ailments, even though specific developments such as the Iraq war, Gaza wars and 
embargos and the 2006 Lebanon war also dominated. However, matters relating to Saudi 
Arabia and Egypt continued to feature intermittently, for example with bin Ladin’s 
message from December 2004, which he dedicated to developments in Saudi Arabia.336 
Most of Zawahiri’s (admittedly more expansive) messages also addressed the situation 
in Egypt, as noted above, at least to some degree. Additionally, Zawahiri placed 
increasing emphasis on matters relating to Pakistan from around 2005 onwards, as local 
support from within the Al-Qa’ida leadership’s new haven was crucial.337 Association 
                                                
334 Bin Ladin (2002) [212]; Zawahiri (2005) [49]; Zawahiri (2007) [18]. 
335 Bin Ladin (2004) [86]. 
336 E.g. bin Ladin (2004) [84]. 
337 Zawahiri for instance, sought to appeal to ubiquitous anxiety in Pakistan concerning Indian aggression 
and anger over Kashmir, in order to shore up support: ‘Musharraf's recognitions of Israel,’ he argued, was 
‘to psychologically prepare the Pakistanis to recognize a Hindu state in Kashmir': Zawahiri (2006) ‘Letter 
to the People of Pakistan,’ published by As-Sahab (28 April), available from IntelCenter (2008) [81]. 
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with America and the distant enemy was ever present, however. After all, according to 
Zawahiri, Egypt’s dictatorship was ‘imposed on the [Egyptian] people by America.’338  
In terms of diagnosing the source of grievance, however, Zawahiri’s distant and 
near enemy distinctions have often been ambiguous and his prioritisation in this regard is 
nowhere near as clear as that of the late Egyptian jihadist Mohammed Faraj, for 
example, who made a clear distinction between local and immediate adversaries versus 
more distant threats that were to be addressed only after the local enemies had been 
subdued. Many of Zawahiri’s communiqués would, as noted above, target America and 
the West directly and blame them for the situation in Pakistan, Egypt and elsewhere 
whilst in other messages, Zawahiri would trace the causal origins to many of the 
grievances highlighted to domestic developments, rather than external ‘oppression’ or 
‘corruptive influence.’  
Reflecting upon developments in the Middle East in his spring 2011 address, for 
example, Zawahiri asked: ‘who helped the US implement sanctions against Iraq? Who 
helped them invade it? Who helped them invade Afghanistan? Who is implementing the 
sanctions on Gaza? Who are the ones in pursuit of the Mujahideen, arresting, torturing 
and killing them? Aren’t they these corrupt regimes in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, 
Iraq, Jordan, Pakistan and Algeria?’ Muslims had fallen behind technologically due to 
‘political weakness and corruption’ of their elites and ‘preoccupation in the errors in 
dialectics, Sufism, and superstitions which have made us neglect the natural sciences’, 
Zawahiri insisted, adding almost as an afterthought that ‘another cause is the West’s 
control over us and our resources.’339 The chief catalyst, according to this message, was 
the local leadership in the Middle East, not the Western regimes that were the focus of so 
many earlier messages. This ambiguity, or what Hegghammer termed ‘hybridization,’340 
has been a feature of much of Zawahiri’s output since he ventured beyond an exclusive 
focus on violent extremism in Egypt.  
 Although a shifting diagnostic focus over time is not surprising and not 
necessarily problematic in terms of overall consistency, the impact of the diagnostic 
message appears more compromised when, as in the case of Zawahiri’s collection of 
communiqués especially, the same dire state of affairs is traced back to a variety of 
potential causes – external and domestic – with shifting priorities in terms of the 
supposed primary causes. Compounding the conflicting diagnostic emphasis in the 
aggregate narrative, the inclusion in recent years of a host of new global issues unrelated 
or only indirectly related to the more tangible cases of Muslim suffering appears to blur 
and confuse the overall message even further. The most baffling of these was bin 
Ladin’s most recent obsession with environmental issues, climate change, natural 
disasters (which killed more people than wars, according to bin Ladin) and relief 
work.341 One of the more recent communiqués on this issue even included tacit 
recognition of the efforts of the hated UN to address this threat and criticism of Arab 
elites for failing to realise their duty in this respect.342 
                                                
338 Zawahiri (2006) [73]. 
339 Zawahiri (2011) ‘A Message of Hope and Glad Tidings […](2),’ published by As-Sahab (24 February), 
secured from Islamist websites [233]. 
340 Hegghammer, (2009-A). 
341 Bin Ladin (2010) ‘The Way to Save the Earth,’ published by As-Sahab (19 February), secured from 
Islamist Website [149]; bin Ladin (2010) ‘Some Points Regarding the Method of Relief Work,’ published 
by As-Sahab (October), secured from Islamist web forums [227]; bin Ladin (2010) ‘Help your Brothers in 
Pakistan,’ published by As-Sahab (13 October), secured from Islamist web forums [228]. 
342 Bin Ladin talked of how the UN Secretary General travelled to areas affected by vast floods in Pakistan 
in 2010 ‘as part of his job’ whereas Arab leaders never ventured there despite being much closer. See bin 
Ladin (2010) [228]. 
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5.4 Conclusions 
 
The longitudinal study revealed how diagnostic iterations in the Al-Qa’ida leadership 
communiqués escalated gradually in scope from the early 1990s onwards. At the 
beginning the communiqués analysed focused on local grievances in the Arabian 
Peninsula and across the Red Sea in Egypt and the humiliation and hardship inflicted by 
the United States and its proxies and allies on the local population. Concurrently, 
significant issues relating to cultural norms and behavioural prescriptions and 
proscriptions based on interpreted doctrine feature consistently throughout (if more 
prominently of late). Through a series of internal developments and watershed events a 
more ambitious agenda has been constructed that also has sought to make sense of a 
growing range of issues of potential importance to possible movement participants and 
supporters.  
This proliferation of issues and widening of scope has, at times, appeared 
confusing, even paradoxical, with potential implications for frame consistency, as will 
be discussed in the concluding part of this thesis. Fundamentally, this aspect of the 
narrative exists, as the framing concept assumes, to justify the establishment and 
existence of the movement by identifying present and past issues that demand a 
response, wrongs that need to be made right. The next chapter explores what solutions 
have been presented in the communiqués analysed to these identified problems.   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   
 
6 
 
PROGNOSTIC FRAMES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Al-Qa’ida was established as an activist movement. Presented as a vanguard, it seeks to 
guide the ummah through a revolutionary process that removes the shackles of the status 
quo. Prognosis therefore constitutes a vital part of overall message framing. This 
concerns the delineation of alternatives, description of end goals as well as the 
development of a framework for action, designed to incite participants to respond to 
diagnosed ailments and move towards recognition of end goals. The Al-Qa’ida 
leadership communiqués are designed to inspire and mobilise support for the solutions 
offered. This chapter analyses these prognostic elements in the messages of Zawahiri 
and bin Ladin.  
 As with the analysis of diagnostic framing above, this chapter compiles 
prognostic aspects of coding concerning both constant features of content – core issues 
that have not changed in terms of substance or scope since the early 1990s – and the 
more dynamic features of prognostic framing. The latter refer primarily to changes in 
terms of targeting and approaches to violence (including any stated limitations in this 
respect), which are crucial for understanding Al-Qa’ida as a violent extremist movement. 
This chapter divides the prognostic aspect of the Al-Qa’ida leadership narrative 
as it emerged from the coding results into six major sections (see corresponding data in 
Appendices 3.3a, 3.3b, 3.4a, 3.4b, 3.5 and 3.6). The first explores the (probably 
deliberately) ambiguous descriptions of the desired end-results that were captured as 
communiqués were coded for references to the desired way forward and envisaged end-
state. These references highlight and underscore the pure and noble objectives that drive 
and inform the prescribed activism and centre on the establishment of a pious society 
governed by interpretations of religious law and consultative councils. The second 
section assesses stages and priorities of activism and the way in which the coding 
revealed how Al-Qa’ida’s strategic agenda has grown ever more ambitious over the 
course of the past two decades and more holistic in scope, even though intermittent 
preoccupation with domestic concerns (especially Zawahiri’s obsession with Egypt) 
persisted throughout the period under review.  
The scale, level and nature of violence that the Al-Qa’ida leaders have endorsed 
over time are explored in the third section. This combines coding results concerning 
references to the importance of violence, the nature of violent tactics endorsed and their 
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direction, scope and narrative context. Most importantly, this relates to the justifications 
put forward for the killing of civilians and the problematic issue of Muslim casualties 
inflicted through Al-Qa’ida-sponsored campaigns of violence. The coding showed how 
these justifications were primarily based on the adaptation of medieval juristic rulings 
concerning accidental or unavoidable deaths during combat. The fourth section focuses 
on the limited tactical and strategic detail presented in the communiqués, as detected by 
the review of the dataset, which rests primarily on core tenets of asymmetric warfare 
against an enemy who is seen as structurally weak and prone to overreaction. This 
section also discusses results from the coding that examined possible methods the Al-
Qa’ida leaders have tabled as alternatives to violence. The coding revealed these 
involved primarily the use of economic boycott.  
The fifth section analyses any limitations or caveats and regrets detected 
throughout the dataset, that were voiced in relation to Muslim and non-Muslim deaths, in 
order to identify communiqués illustrating any tension caused by the scale and nature of 
violence pioneered and endorsed by the Al-Qa’ida leadership. The coding of the 
communiqués uncovered how Zawahiri in particular sought initially to dismiss 
suggestions that Al-Qa’ida could be linked to Muslims deaths, whilst later seeking to 
rein in those forces loyal to the leadership, which he recognised had carried out attacks 
targeting Muslims and resulting in Muslim casualties. The final section of this chapter 
discusses patterns of amity and enmity, highlighting societies and actors that the al-
Qa’ida leadership argues should be targeted, as well as any friends or temporary allies 
detected in the dataset under review.  
 
 
 
6.2 Ultimate Objectives 
 
At their most fundamental, the solutions the Al-Qa’ida leaders presented to their 
audiences and potential followers consisted of alternative societal and cultural 
constructions based on a shift in the balance of power from secular or impious forces to 
righteous communities that would operate in accordance with religious doctrine and law. 
Although desire for rule according to shari’ah as a consistent feature of the 
communiqués was to be expected, the coding revealed substantial shifts in geographic 
reach in these references. This was normally in accordance with the gradual expansion 
of the diagnostic emphases elaborated above. However, some variation and ambiguity in 
terms of strategic guidance and prioritisation can also be detected in the communiqués, 
particularly in Zawahiri’s output. 
 
6.2.1 A pious society 
 
References to societal ideal types and suggested steps to achieve that goal from the 
material under review are captured in Appendix 3.3a and analysed below. Although the 
longitudinal comparison revealed these references to the ultimate objective were 
substantively consistent, they generally lacked detail and any meaningful deliberations 
concerning practical implementation. The ‘solution’ generally consists of: (1) ridding the 
Islamic world of alien, ‘occupying, robbing’ non-Islamic influences, separating the pious 
and non-pious and (2) ensuring Muslims have freedom to rule their lands according to 
the Shari’ah, control their own resources, and promote virtue (of ‘tawheed, morals, 
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chastity, fairness’) and prevent vice.343 This process would ultimately culminate in the 
creation of a new and pious society. The answer to all administrative and judicial 
conundrums would be ‘Islam’ in its purest form. In 2004, for instance, bin Ladin issued 
the following statement:  
 
The religion of Islam encompasses all the affairs of life, including the religious and the 
worldly, such as economic, military, and political affairs, as well as the scales by which we 
weigh the actions of men−rulers, ulema, and others−and how to deal with the ruler in line 
with the rules set by God for him and which the ruler should not violate. Therefore, it 
becomes clear to us that the solution lies in adhering to the religion of God, by which God 
granted us pride in the past centuries, and installing a strong and faithful leadership that 
applies the Koran among us and raises the true banner of jihad.344 
 
Thus, full and unhindered implementation of doctrine in its purest form would be the 
organising principle of all facets of society. ‘Islam is one unit that cannot be divided 
[…]. If someone believes in a part of it and rejects another part, then he becomes an 
infidel and his prayers and fasting will be to no avail.’345 The Islamic government would, 
therefore, abide by the ‘heavenly’ creed, relying on shura (consultation), whereby the 
ummah refers to the Shari’ah to judge the rulers, who are also selected and held to 
account by them.346 The role of the scholar would thus be central. A just scholar, 
according to bin Ladin, would be a ‘role model’ for his ummah, ensure fatawa were 
sound, avoid temptations, have the courage to speak out against that which is offensive, 
and stay away from impious rulers.347 
Society would be inclusive (at least for men), according to the Al-Qa’ida leaders, 
where ‘everyone judges by the Quran and Sunnah.’348 ‘We are not calling for a 
dictatorship or despotism or tyranny in the name of religion,’ argued Zawahiri. ‘We are 
only calling the ummah to return to ruling by shura; justice; non-partisanship and 
elimination of discrimination between people except on the basis of taqwa [fear of 
Allah]; righteous deeds; enjoining the good and forbidding the evil; servitude […] to the 
Shari’ah, without any discrimination or division; that the ummah elect its ruler and be 
able to hold him to account, just as was witnessed in the time of the khilafah.’349 Public 
participation in decision-making would thus not be prohibited, if conducted in the proper 
manner. ‘We Muslims’, according to bin Ladin, ‘believe it is the nation’s right to elect 
its president and we believe in Shura, however we believe that the Western democracy 
[is] illegitimate heresy from the Islamic point of view.’350 Zawahiri similarly argued 
elections under Islamic constitutions should be welcomed.351 The ‘proper and just’ 
government Al-Qa’ida was seeking to install would allow ‘the Ummah to participate in 
the selection of its rulers and holds them to account,’ Zawahiri argued in 2011. The 
                                                
343 Zawahiri (2005) unknown title, video statement published by As-Sahab (17 June), available from 
IntelCenter (2008) [72]; Zawahiri (2009) [140]. 
344 Bin Ladin (2004)’Resist the New Rome,’ audio statement aired on Al-Jazeera (4 January), transcript 
also published in The Observer, (4 January) and FBIS: Compilation [111]. 
345 Bin Ladin (2004) [86]. 
346 Zawahiri (2011) [232]. 
347 Bin Ladin (1995) ‘Scholars are the Prophet's Successors,’ open letter dated 6 May, available from 
Harmony Archive (AFGP-2002-003345) [67].  
348 As-Sahab (2002) ‘The Wills of the Martyrs of the New York and Washington Battles: The Will of the 
Martyr Abdulaziz Alomari,’ published 19 April, secured from Islamist web forums [108]. 
349 Zawahiri (2009) [141]. 
350 Bin Ladin (2009)[122]. 
351 Zawahiri (2007) ‘The Empire of Evil is about to End, and a New Dawn is about to break over 
Mankind,’ published by As-Sahab (5 May), IntelCenter (2008) [23]. 
Part III: The Al-Qa’ida Leadership Communiqués 
 100 
ummah’s representatives would be inclusive and ‘just in distributing the wealth of the 
Ummah, preventing its theft, prohibiting depravity and immorality.’ These rulers would 
confront ‘Western hegemony over our lands, and [help] to free all oppressed people 
from injustice.’352 Under this form of governance, non-Muslims would, according to a 
handful of the communiqués analysed, be allowed to practice their faith under the 
protection of shari’ah, so long as they respected the Islamic authority (the dhimmi 
contract).353 Indeed, had the Holocaust been planned closer to Muslim lands Jews could 
have sought protection there, according to bin Ladin.354 Although strict separation 
according to the principle of al Wala’ wal Bara’ would be in force, a small number of 
references were found suggesting isolation would not be absolute. Oil could perhaps be 
sold abroad, as long as the price was determined by Muslims. After all: ‘we are not 
going to drink it,’ bin Ladin once remarked.355 
Regardless of any partial pluralism of the described ideal types, all elaborations 
of the nature of this envisaged society, however, are exclusive, rigid and tyrannical: ‘one 
must demand that it be the Shari’ah that rules […] rather than it itself being ruled over 
by other systems. That its authority not be in need of any referendum and not open to 
cancellation, not have to compete with alternatives as an equal and not be subject to 
amendments and substitutions.’356 ‘Muslims must be aware of the facts, and the most 
important is the aqeedah of tawheed, which must be the ruling authority in all 
systems.’357 The leader of the faithful will be the Imam of the caliphate state, which 
‘every faithful Muslim seeks to establish.’358 A Caliphate could be created once the 
‘existing’ emirates in Afghanistan and Iraq had been consolidated and others established. 
Hudud (shari’ah punishment) would, Zawahiri insisted, be implemented immediately,359 
but compliance would not be a problem as, according to bin Ladin, ‘a guilty man would 
only be happy if he was justly punished.’360 As mentioned, these descriptions of the 
desired end-state are, perhaps deliberately, ambiguous. When the objective is to inspire 
and mobilise, it seems, general descriptions of a better future with vague delineations of 
the ultimate system that will replace the status quo, are thought to suffice. There would 
be holistic, legislative, political and social reforms,361 economic and social justice, with 
no taxes, apart from the 2.5 per cent Zakat.362 More detailed accounts could expose this 
part of the argument to criticism from more qualified Islamic scholars or prompt 
potential participants to doubt the attractiveness of the desired end-goal. Desperate to 
present an alternative to any pro-democratic voices that were greeted with so much 
enthusiasm in the Western media during the Arab Spring in Egypt and elsewhere, 
Zawahiri simply reiterated the basic features of an envisaged pious society that had been 
communicated before. He insisted the path forged by Al-Qa’ida promised: 
 
                                                
352 Zawahiri (2011) [235]. 
353 Zawahiri (unknown date) ‘The Forbidden Word,’ excerpts published in McCants, Brachman, Felter 
(2006) Militant Ideology Atlas: Research Compendium [113]. 
354 Bin Ladin (2007) [10]. 
355 Bin Ladin (1996) interview with ‘Abd al-Bari Atwan, published in Al-Quds Al-Arabi (as 'Bin Ladin 
Interviewed on Jihad Against US,’ 27 November), available from FBIS: Compilation [150]. 
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359 Zawahiri (n.d.) [113]. 
360 Bin Ladin (1996) interview with Robert Fisk published in The Independent (10 June, 14), available 
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361 Zawahiri (2011) [236]. 
362 Bin Ladin (2007) [10]. 
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to fulfil the hopes of the Muslim Ummah of the establishment of a free Muslim nation in the 
Islamic world, which governs with the Shariah, promotes justice, implements Shura, 
liberates the Muslim lands, ends the blockade of Gaza, guards morality, destroys the nation 
of ignobility and corruption, establishes a Shura system in which the Ummah chooses its 
rulers without domination, forgery or rigging, holds them to account, enjoining them with 
good and forbidding them from evil, and guards Muslim resources from domestic thieves 
and their international masters who loot the treasures of our lands.363  
 
6.2.2 The Taliban, Iraq and a Global Islamic State 
 
To gauge more concrete examples of the Al-Qa’ida leadership’s tolerance for oppressive 
and totalitarian regimes the coding examined support for contemporary or established 
forms of ruling (see results in Appendix 3.3b), which (predictably) highlighted its overt 
support and promotion of Taliban rule in Afghanistan. This was perceived as a genuine 
emirate, an embryonic Islamic state that signalled the desired form of governance for 
Muslim societies. The Islamic State of Iraq was seen as another legitimate emirate 
within its area of control, at least according to its representation in the communiqués 
analysed.364 
 Public endorsement of the Taliban regime might initially have been partially 
tactical. The first such recognition identified in the dataset was made by bin Ladin in 
November 1996,365 shortly after he travelled to Afghanistan with his close allies and 
family after being forced to leave Sudan. By that time the Taliban had only just 
consolidated their control over most Afghan provinces. Early public endorsements were, 
though, relatively cautious and infrequent, especially prior to the 1998 East Africa 
bombings (and US counter-attacks), after which point the Taliban-Al-Qa’ida alliance 
became more solidified and the support of the former more important for bin Ladin and 
Zawahiri. Bin Ladin claimed in March 1997 that he believed the Taliban to be ‘sincere 
in their attempts to enforce Islamic religious law. […] We saw the situation here before 
[they took over]’, he continued, ‘and after, we have seen an obvious improvement,’366 
claiming reports of Taliban authorities banning girls from receiving an education were 
untrue.367 Just over a year later, any caveats or limitations had been removed. The 
Taliban were celebrated for having ‘established the system of God on God’s land’ by 
enforcing shari’ah.368 They were unquestionably a legitimate force that had secured 
‘peace and restored the confidence in the public.’369 Zawahiri dismissed suggestions the 
Taliban were in any way an oppressive or tyrannical force. The people of Afghanistan 
‘supported and accepted the Islamic Emirate’ he insisted, as it replaced the ‘deterioration 
and damage’ of the previous era. That Taliban rule was welcomed could be seen in the 
ways in which ‘citizens in the various provinces and districts have welcomed and incited 
the Taliban to come to them to purge their areas of those who spread mischief;’ from the 
                                                
363 Zawahiri (2011) [234]. 
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fact that ‘two thousand scholars at the Qandahar conference pledged allegiance to leader 
of the faithful, Mullah Mohammad Omar;’ that ‘the Islamic Emirate took control over 
large parts of Afghanistan;’ and the extent to which other jihadist groups had also 
stressed these factors.370 In any case, their implementation of divine protocol rendered 
questioning their authority impermissible. For this reason it was ‘compulsory upon all 
the Muslims all over the world to help Afghanistan and to make hijra to this land, 
because it is from this land that we will dispatch our armies all over the world to smash 
the kuffar all over the world.’371  
Taliban rule over Afghanistan (and to a far lesser extent, the Islamic State of 
Iraq’s ‘reign’ in several Iraqi districts) was thus endorsed as an intermediate, partial 
success in the establishment of a caliphate, even though some endorsements might have 
had as much to do with strategic expediency as they did doctrinal recognition. The 
ultimate goal, as an inspirational target and consistent undercurrent throughout the 
material under review, was, however, more ambitious and expansive. Aside from 
Zawahiri’s aspirational prescriptions in his messages of ‘Hope and Glad Tidings’ in 
response to the Arab Spring and other similar communiqués emphasising the ‘virtuous’ 
alternative, one of the clearer prognostic elaborations of the ultimate end goal found in 
the dataset was presented in an open letter, ‘Calling for a Global Islamic State,’ written 
by bin Ladin in early 2001. Addressing the ‘sons and daughters of Islam,’ bin Ladin 
concluded: 
 
Today, every member of the Muslim world agrees that all the Muslim countries of the world 
having geographical boundaries on the basis of nationality, geography, religious discord, 
color and race, should be merged into one Muslim state, where men do not rule men. There 
should be one caliph for the whole state whose capital should be Mecca. There should be 
one currency and defense for this state and the Holy Koran should be its constitution. The 
name that has been proposed for this vast state is Global Muslim State. I want to 
congratulate you that by the grace of God, from today, we have begun the task of achieving 
a highly important and strong target of domination of Islam over all other religions.372 
 
Although the coding established that desired societal, cultural and organisational 
components remained constant over time (pages 309-319 of Appendix 3) – irrespective 
of author – the scope, geographic focus and extent of application did not remain stable. 
A comparison between bin Ladin and Zawahiri in this respect revealed that neither was 
there always a comfortable match between the two leaders’ output. In the same year bin 
Ladin published his letter calling for a ‘Global Islamic State’ with its capital in Mecca, 
for instance, Zawahiri’s Knights under the Banner of the Prophet became available 
predicting an ‘earth-shattering event’ which would signal the ‘establishment of an 
Islamic caliphate [centred] in Egypt.’ ‘If God wills it, such a state in Egypt, with all its 
weight in the heart of the Islamic world, could lead the Islamic world in a jihad against 
the West.’373 Although essentially notional and abstract, this author argues that 
descriptions of the desired end goal play an important part in the communication of the 
Al-Qa’ida leaders’ message as they highlight the noble justifications behind mobilisation 
and activism. These messages remind audiences of the promised ultimate reward and the 
collective benefits that the ummah will reap if the vanguard is adequately supported. 
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Variation in terms of delineated stages and manifestations of the end reward, however, 
was detected over time, depending on geographic ambitions and emphases. 
 
 
 
6.3 Stages and Priorities of Activism 
 
Shortly after 9/11, bin Ladin published a set of ‘Methodological Guidelines’ on 
Maqdisi’s ‘Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l-Jihad.’ These identified six criteria for ‘restoring’ 
Islam to its true form, the ultimate goal of the ummah and its vanguard. These were: (1) 
love for God; (2) compassion for fellow believers; (3) counselling each other to 
goodness and obedience to God's commands; (4) hurting unbelievers; (5) jihad in the 
cause of God; and (6) fearlessness in the face of critics.374 The coding revealed how the 
scale of the ultimate objective these methods were intended to achieve, was relatively 
limited at first (See Appendix 3.3a, page 309).  
Bin Ladin spoke initially of the need to ‘expel’ the ‘unbelievers from the Arabian 
Peninsula,’375 for the US to remove its forces and end material support for Jews in 
Palestine.376 At this early stage, as the previous chapter discussed, the US presence in 
Saudi Arabia was seen as the ‘root of all problems’ preventing (alongside the Al-Saud 
family) the establishment of a ‘pious Caliphate’ on the Peninsula. The struggle would 
continue until Americans and their allies had been expelled from all the holy sites of 
Islam and shari’ah had been established in their wake.377 Prognostic elements of the 
communiqués from this early stage, therefore, were limited in scope and reach. Towards 
the end of the decade, however, additional parameters were being added. Ridding the 
Arabian Peninsula of American presence was merely the ‘first’ objective, according to 
bin Ladin’s interview with John Miller in February 1999.378 In a joint statement with 
Zawahiri issued in September 2000, the two leaders pledged to ‘do all we can to support 
our religion, to establish the shari'ah of Islam in the land of Islam, to expel the Jews and 
the Christians from the sacred places, and to endeavour to release our ulema from the 
United States, from Egypt, from Riyadh, and from all Muslim lands.’379 Post-9/11 
communiqués promised to revive the Caliphate, as it was at the height of its power, 
throughout the Middle East and North Africa (and into Europe) ‘as predicted by the 
Prophet,’380 even if it took ‘several generations to achieve.’381 ‘The banner of the 
Caliphate’ would thus ‘flutter nobly after a long absence’ from Al-Andalus to East 
Turkistan, Muslim lands would be liberated and God’s way on earth implemented.382 
                                                
374 Bin Ladin (unknown date) ‘Methodological Guidelines: According to the Guidelines of Bin Ladin…’ 
published online on ‘Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l-Jihad.’ See McCants, Brachman, Felter (2006) Militant 
Ideology Atlas: Research Compendium [112]. 
375 Bin Ladin (1994) ‘The Banishment of Communism from the Arabian Peninsula: The Episode and the 
Proof,’ open letter dated 7 July, available from Harmony Archive (AFGP-2002-003345) [38]. 
376 Bin Ladin (1996) [150]. 
377 Bin Ladin (1998) [175]. 
378 Bin Ladin (1999) interview with John Miller and Esquire Magazine (February), interview conducted in 
1998, later aired on ABC News (18 September), available from Esquire Magazine and FBIS: Compilation 
[179]. 
379 Bin Ladin & Zawahiri (2000) statement regarding Muslim prisoners aired on Al Jazeera (21 
Setepmber), available from FBIS: Compilation [191]. 
380 E.g. Bin Ladin (2001) [130]. 
381 Zawahiri (2001) [119]. 
382 Zawahiri (2007) [102]; Zawahiri (2007) [103]; Zawahiri (2007) ‘Annapolis: The Betrayal,’ published 
by As-Sahab (14 December), available in IntelCenter (2008) [12]. 
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Some articles even suggested a more expansionist approach, ensuring ‘the word 
of Allah becomes dominant and the word of the disbelievers becomes abased,’383 
‘propelling this battle toward its desired aim and intended objective of spreading Allah's 
religion in the world and applying His shari’ah.’384 Other articles, meanwhile, focused on 
more immediate objectives, especially progress in Iraq and Afghanistan, from where the 
mujahideen could spread the rule of Allah to neighbouring regions.385 In this sense, the 
emotional appeal of the Palestinian cause as a rallying cry for further support was 
utilised to highlight the importance of completing these more limited objectives 
successfully. Iraq would thus become the ‘fortress of Islam,’386 which could launch 
operations against Israel, once secured.387 Message elements linking on-going 
developments and preoccupations of Al-Qa’ida in the region, especially in Iraq, with the 
plight of Palestinians, became especially prominent in the dataset under review 
following the upheaval caused by the 2006 Lebanon war and, later, in the wake of 
Israel’s ‘Operation Cast Lead’ (December 2008 – January 2009) in Gaza. 
 
6.3.1 Target prioritisation and resource mobilisation: conflicting emphases 
 
This regional, or even global, focus appears to clash, at times, with Zawahiri’s sporadic 
preoccupation with Egypt, as noted above. In an article published in 1995, shortly after 
taking part in the bombing of the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad on behalf of Al-Jihad, 
Zawahiri famously asserted, ‘the way to Jerusalem passes through Cairo,’ implying local 
activism and incremental changes preceded more ambitious gains (in addition to using 
the emotive Palestinian issue to shore up support of Al-Jihad in Egypt, as he did later for 
the Islamic State of Iraq).388 The way in which Zawahiri merged Al-Jihad with bin 
Ladin’s operations and focused on the ‘distant’ enemy was addressed in the first chapter 
and has been the focus of numerous papers and books.389 The communiqués under 
review for the current study, however, suggest Zawahiri never fully abandoned Egypt as 
the intended focal point of prognosis in terms of the range of activist solutions discussed 
and as ultimate objective of militancy.  
In January 2008, for instance, Zawahiri emphasised the need to ‘establish a 
mujahidin Islamic state in Egypt that will seek to liberate Palestine and every Muslim 
land, eliminate corruption, establish justice and restore Egypt’s historical role of 
defending Islam and the Muslim people’ (adding ‘this benefit is greater than the loss 
represented by the shedding of some innocent blood’).390 The primary objective was to 
                                                
383 Bin Ladin (2001) [129]. 
384 Bin Ladin (2002) [211]. 
385 Zawahiri (2006) ‘Hot Issues with Shaykh Ayman Al-Zawahiri,’ published by As-Sahab (11 
September), secured from Islamist web forums, also available from IntelCenter (2008) [21]. 
386 Zawahiri (2007) ‘Shaykh Ayman Al-Zawahiri: On the fifth anniversary of the invasion and torture of 
Iraq,’ published by As-Sahab (17 April), secured from Islamist web forums, also available from 
IntelCenter (2008) [7]. 
387 Zawahiri (2007) ‘Lessons, Examples and Great Events in the Year 1427,’ published by As-Sahab (13 
February), available from IntelCenter (2008) [97]. 
388 Quoted in Burke, J. (2004-A): 154. Paradoxically, Zawahiri later insisted in his book Knights under the 
Banner of the Prophet, that the intention had been to target the US or European embassies in Islamabad, 
but they had proven too secure, suggesting, rather unconvincingly, that the target had always been the 
‘distant’ enemy: Zawahiri (2001) [119]. 
389 E.g. Gerges (2005). 
390 Zawahiri (2008) Exoneration: A Letter Exonerating the Ummah of the Pen and the Sword from the 
Unjust Allegation of Feebleness and Weakness, advertised by As-Sahab early in 2008, Open Source 
Center [20]. 
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consolidate the Islamic state in Egypt prior to launching operations in support of 
Palestinians.  
As noted above, the prioritisation conveyed through some of Zawahiri’s 
messages also appears contradictory in terms of the ‘distant’ and ‘near’ enemy 
dichotomy. This relates not only to the focus of the diagnostic narrative, identifying the 
most pressing problems facing the ummah but also, and by extension, to conflicting 
expressions regarding the focus of activism and resources. 
 In December 2005, for instance, Zawahiri argued there was no way of achieving 
reform ‘except by uprooting these corrupt and corrupting [local] regimes, and by 
establishing a Muslim government that will protect rights, defend sanctities, institute 
justice, spread consultation, raise the banner of jihad, and confront the invaders, the foes 
of Islam.’391 A video statement issued a year later emphasised similar priorities: It is the 
duty of the Ummah’s vanguard to strive for change, because getting rid of these puppets 
is the doorway to deliverance and the beginning of the serious Jihadi challenge to the 
Crusader invasion.’392 Much as Mohammed Abd Al-Salam Faraj would argue, therefore, 
the emphasis of activism was on local ills, prior to attacking the distant enemy. In one of 
his ‘interviews’ with As-Sahab published three months later, however, Zawahiri 
appeared to swap these priorities, arguing: 
 
The road to reform, and Allah knows best, requires, in the Arabian Peninsula and the other 
Islamic lands, work on two plans. The first is in the near term, and seeks to strike Crusader 
and Zionist interests so that the ground erupts in flames under the feet of the Zionists and 
Crusaders in our countries and theirs and everywhere we are able to strike their interests 
until they leave our countries and stop their continuous and increasing interference in our 
affairs. And the second plan is for the longer term, and depends on two pillars: the first is 
preparation for the confrontation, by going forth to arenas of battle like Iraq, Afghanistan 
and Somalia, and the second pillar is diligent work to change the corrupt and corruptive 
regimes through invitation, incitement, mobilization and planning, and to persevere in that 
however much time it takes or sacrifice it requires.393 
 
Zawahiri’s apparent inconsistency in this regard will be analysed in more detail in the 
section on geographic scope below. As can be seen, however, confused prioritisation of 
diagnostic principles has an immediate impact on the consistency of the prognostic 
element in the narrative, as the nature and target of suggested solutions to the problems 
identified become more muddled. Thus, even though his output was normally far more 
concise and consistent according to the current longitudinal study, bin Ladin’s recent 
environmental agenda appears to have added some confusion to the traditional form of 
prognosis, as noted above. 
  Whereas the basic normative components and grounding of the desired 
alternative have remained relatively consistent in the communiqués analysed over time 
the coding revealed how implementation and procedural emphasis has varied in the 
communiqués in terms of geographic scope and topical focus with potential implications 
for frame effectiveness (details on how geographic scope developed are provided in 
Appendix 3.10, page 436). 
The diagnostic (normative and grievance) frames, together with these more 
fundamental elements of prognosis serve to rationalise the specific course of action Al-
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392 Zawahiri (2006) [94]. Emphasis added 
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Qa’ida pioneers and urges followers to adopt. In terms of the solutions presented to 
address and amend the status quo this relates primarily to the use of violence. 
 
 
 
6.4 Approaching Violence 
 
The Al-Qa’ida leadership has strongly advocated a strategy of increasingly 
indiscriminate violence in pursuit of its long- and short-term goals. Al-Qa’ida has 
implemented this strategy on several occasions through planning and executing dramatic 
mass-casualty terrorist attacks and through supporting and encouraging affiliates and 
followers to do the same. Approaches towards violence in the discourse under review 
and any limitations considered in this regard have evolved over the course of the past 
two decades as the Al-Qa’ida leaders have sought to convince potential participants of 
the forms of engagement and violent activism deemed acceptable, commendable and 
effective. The coding found that tactical and strategic recommendations, moreover, do 
not rely on violent solutions exclusively, although these have become ever more 
prominent in recent years.  
The current analysis suggests the essence of the pro-violent narrative is a 
fundamental belief in the utility of violence and terrorist attacks, intertwined with 
evolving debates concerning the legitimacy of a given set of targets and methods in a 
moral and doctrinal context. The fight is invariably presented as defensive394 and, 
building upon Azzam’s thesis of jihad as an individual duty (fardh al-ayn), it is seen as 
the responsibility of each true Muslim to ensure the mujahideen are successful, their 
ranks filled with new recruits and the vanguard well-funded and supplied. The 
alternative, collective obligation (fardh al-kifaya) only demands a response from a 
selection of the population (normally in geographical proximity) and does not apply 
when the ummah is facing an existential crisis.395 
 
6.4.1 Contextual and strategic imperatives 
 
Coding results concerning the importance of violent attack, as well as contextual and 
strategic imperatives, are provided in Appendix 3.4a (page 321). The processing of this 
material showed how in early communiqués, details relating to violent attacks were scant 
and preceding attacks were celebrated cautiously (mainly by bin Ladin, as Zawahiri was 
more explicit in his support from an early stage). Early public communiqués would only 
endorse attacks attributed to Al-Qa’ida and not claim responsibility. Bin Ladin stated 
that the principal role of the leadership was to instigate militant operations, not 
orchestrate attacks.396 This included attacks for which Al-Qa’ida would later proudly 
                                                
394 See e.g. bin Ladin (2001) ‘Letter to the Pakistani People,’ aired on Al Jazeera (24 September), available 
from FBIS: Compilation [201] on defensive jihad. 
395 Azzam, A. (2003). See references to jihad as an individual duty: (Zawahiri (unknown date) ‘Response 
to a Grave Uncertainty from Shaykh al-Albani Regarding Silence in the Face of Apostate Rulers,’ 
distributed online through ‘Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l-Jihad,’ excerpts in McCants, Brachman, Felter (2006) 
[117]) and the ‘sixth undeclared element of Islam’ (bin Ladin (2001) ‘The US should search attackers 
within itself,’ interview with Ummat (Karachi) (28 September), available from FBIS: Compilation [202]), 
a ‘priority over seeking knowledge or marriage because it is an individual duty’ (Zawahiri (2008) [107]).  
396 See e.g:  bin Ladin (1999) interview with bin Ladin titled ‘Usama Bin Ladin, the Destruction of the 
Base’ aired on Al Jazeera (10 June), full-length version aired on Al-Jazeera (20 September 2001), 
transcript available from FBIS: Compilation [184]; bin Ladin (1998) interview with The News 
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claim responsibility. The reason for this attempted detachment from violent operations 
appears linked to the conditions set by the Taliban hosts who tried to rein in their guest 
by asking bin Ladin to avoid engaging in ‘political matters.’397 On-going frustration 
between Al-Qa’ida and the Taliban resulted in some considerable friction within the 
leadership of both and open criticism of the latter by bin Ladin as evident in interviews 
with Pakistani newspapers in the summer of 2001.398 Initial reluctance to claim credit for 
the 11 September 2001 attacks can in all likelihood be traced back to this need to protect 
the Afghan sanctuary and the alliance with the Taliban. Arguing in an interview with a 
Pakistani newspaper bin Ladin proclaimed: 
 
I have already said that I am not involved in the 11 September attacks in the United States. 
As a Muslim, I try my best to avoid telling a lie. Neither [have] I had any knowledge of 
these attacks nor [did] I consider the killing of innocent women, children, and other humans 
as an appreciable act. Islam strictly forbids causing harm to innocent women, children, and 
other people. Such a practice is forbidden even in the course of a battle. […] I have already 
said that we are against the American system, not against its people. 399 
 
Other interviews and announcements in the immediate aftermath of the attacks also 
aimed to distance Al-Qa’ida from the 9/11 attacks, variously claiming no knowledge of 
the attacks or blaming a US-Jewish conspiracy.400 Context would suggest these were 
tactical denials, perhaps to buy time and facilitate preparations prior to inevitable US 
reprisals, rather than sincere doubts regarding the merits of mass-casualty attacks. The 
coding revealed that bin Ladin denied involvement in the 1998 East Africa embassy 
bombings in their immediate aftermath but began to at least endorse and welcome them 
when the limited impact of the lacklustre US response became clear.401  
By contrast, as soon as the extent of US and coalition efforts to target the Taliban 
and Al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan became known, removing the former from power, the Al-
Qa’ida leadership began praising the 9/11 attacks and claiming responsibility for them. 
By that time, it can be argued, they had nothing to lose and everything to gain by 
claiming credit for such spectacular attacks against the United States and its allies. The 
‘martyrdom’ of the hijackers was celebrated, their actions presented as examples for 
others to follow and those who criticised the nature of the attacks were condemned as 
American stooges.402 Later messages provided more detail of how the attacks were 
                                                                                                                                           
(Islamabad/Peshawar) reported in AFP (21 August) as ‘Bin Ladin Calls For “Jihad” Against Jews, 
Americans,’ available in FBIS: Compilation [172]; bin Ladin (1998) [170]. 
397 See note 261, above 
398 See e.g. Bin Ladin (2001) letter from bin Ladin published in The Dawn (Karachi) (3 April) titled 
‘Usama regrets curbs by Taliban,’ available in FBIS: Compilation [195]; bin Ladin (2001) statement 
published in Pakistani newspaper (17 May) in article titled ‘If Taleban allow, I can make US life 
miserable: Usama,’ available in FBIS: Compilation [198].    
399 Bin Ladin (2001) [202] 
400 See e.g. bin Ladin (2001) statement reported by the Afghan Press Agency (16 September), available in 
FBIS: Compilation [200]. 
401 Bin Ladin (1998) [172]. In a statement reported in December 1998, bin Ladin claimed not to be 
responsible for the bombings, even though he did welcome them. Subsequent messages followed this 
trend: bin Ladin (1998) statement distributed by Afghan Islamic Press, reported in AFP (24 December) 
titled ‘Bin Ladin Denies Role in Bombings of US Missions,’ available in FBIS: Compilation [176]. 
402 Countless examples of praise for the 9/11 attacks feature in the discourse. Zawahiri and bin Ladin 
featured together in a sophisticated video production six months after the attacks took place titled ‘The 
Wills of the Martyrs of the New York and Washington Battles,’ which also featured excerpts from the last 
testimonies of the hijackers themselves: As-Sahab (2002) ‘The Wills of the Martyrs of the New York and 
Washington Battles: The Will of the Martyr Ibn ul Jarah Al-Ghamidee Ahmed al-Haznawi,’ published 18 
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supposedly organised and what had inspired the specific tactics displayed.403 The coding 
revealed how post-9/11 communiqués presented attacks generally attributed to 
sympathisers and affiliates as part of Al-Qa’ida’s grand strategy. The 2002 Bali 
bombings were tied to warnings against Australian involvement in East Timor and 
presented as a reciprocal response to ‘crusader aggression.’404 The Madrid bombings 
were discussed in a similar way405 and whilst investigators and analysts were still 
assessing the level of the Al-Qa’ida core’s involvement in the 2005 London bombings, 
Zawahiri declared ‘The blessed London raid is one of the raids that the Qaedat al-Jihad 
organization had the honour of carrying out against the British Crusader arrogance.’406 
The communiqués from this period show how the Al-Qa’ida core was focused on 
disseminating material showing it was in direct control. 
Aside from such contextual and strategic imperatives, the longitudinal study 
demonstrated how substantive justifications for violence have changed considerably over 
time. Justifications for the targeting of non-combatants (Muslim and non-Muslim) were 
coded separately and the findings are shown in Appendix 3.4b, page 345.  
 
6.4.2 Disappearing caveats 
 
This study found that bin Ladin rarely alluded to the importance of violent attack as a 
vaild activist method in his early public messages. Although his open letters to Saudi 
leaders would declare the need for regime change in Saudi Arabia, acts of violence –
especially those targeting non-combatants or Muslims – were not discussed. Towards the 
latter half of the 1990s, however, bin Ladin began publicly to endorse a violent uprising 
against US troops based in the Arabian Peninsula. Early communiqués called for the 
‘expulsion’ of civilian contractors from the area, rather than murder.407 Nonetheless, bin 
Ladin celebrated the 1996 Al-Khobar bombings, noting that ‘only Americans were 
killed,’ rather than Saudi citizens,408 adding ‘if liberating my land is called terrorism, this 
is a great honour for me.’409 The Khobar bombings, and similar attacks, constituted 
‘praiseworthy terrorism’ against ‘thieves:’ a defensive response to the ‘blameworthy 
terrorism’ of America and its allies and the kind committed by ‘thieves against 
nations.’410 Terror, according to bin Ladin, could be a force for good, similar to when a 
                                                                                                                                           
April, secured from Islamist web forums [207]. Early examples of denunciation of those criticising the 
attacks as ‘agents of America’ featured in: bin Ladin (2001) [129]. 
403 Bin Ladin discusses how he selected the hijackers, for example, in: bin Ladin (2006) ‘A Testimony to 
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September 2001: Zawahiri (2006) ‘The Zionist Crusader's Aggression on Gaza and Lebanon,’ published 
by As-Sahab (27 June), available from IntelCenter (2008) [88]. 
404 Bin Ladin (2002) untitled statement aired on Al Jazeera (12 November), available from IntelCenter 
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IntelCenter (2008) [80]. 
406 Zawahiri (2005) [49]. 
407 See e.g. bin Ladin (1997) interview with ‘Dispatches’ aired on Channel Four Television (20 February), 
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police used force to contain a criminal. This was the terrorism of Al-Qa’ida: ‘we practice 
the good terrorism which stops them [the Americans and Israelis] from killing our 
children in Palestine and elsewhere.’411 This is related to Al-Suri’s notions of irhab 
mahmud, ‘terrorism by the righteous who have been unjustly treated.’412 
When coding results for approaches to violence (see Appendix 3.4b) were 
analysed, it emerged that distinctions between soldier and civilian, however vague, 
began to disappear with the 1998 declaration of war from the ‘World Islamic Front’, 
where US and allied soldiers and civilians ‘wherever they can be found’ were equally 
legitimate targets.413 Bin Ladin reiterated these calls in subsequent interviews and 
statements, although some variation persisted with messages issued a month after the 
declaration variously calling for the ‘expulsion’ of the American ‘invaders’414 or the 
total ‘annihilation’ of America.415 Corresponding with an expanded geographical scope, 
as mentioned above, bin Ladin’s messages towards the end of the decade suggested 
more expansive fields of jihad against India and other identified enemies,416 as well as 
jihad in ‘every street’ of the US417 or even a world-wide campaign in order to ‘smash the 
kuffar all over the world.’418 Bin Ladin claimed, in a 1999 interview with John Miller, 
that Al-Qa’ida would not ‘differentiate between those dressed in military uniforms and 
civilians; they are all targets.’419 ‘All Americans are our enemies, not just the ones who 
fight us directly but also the ones who pay their taxes’, bin Ladin argued in a statement 
issued in January 1999, practically incriminating all law-abiding American adults.420 
‘The man is a fighter,’ bin Ladin elaborated further in an interview later that year, 
‘whether he carries arms or helps kill us by paying taxes and by gathering information.’ 
Furthermore, he pointed out, ‘almost three quarters of the US people support [President] 
Clinton’s strikes against Iraq [Operation Desert Fox]. They are people who increase their 
support for their president when he commits cardinal sins. They are a lowly people who 
do not at all understand the meaning of values.’421  
 
6.4.3 Killing civilians  
 
This transition in terms of public endorsement for more indiscriminate violence is 
interesting. One possible reason is the increased influence of Zawahiri and his fellow 
Egyptian members of Al-Qa’ida, although Scheuer dismisses the notion as Saudi 
propaganda.422 For the Egyptians, however, the debate surrounding the possible targeting 
of civilians had been on-going for some time. In the wake of the aforementioned 1995 
attack on the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad, for instance, Zawahiri penned an article in 
a local newspaper insisting embassy workers had become legitimate targets since they 
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perceived government loyalty superior to divine loyalty.423 Later the Egyptian Al-Jihad 
Majlis-ash-Shura issued a lengthy treatise justifying civilian targeting. Noting how the 
Prophet’s armies had used catapults in the 7th century (CE) siege of Ta’if, it argued 
indiscriminate attacks under contemporary circumstances could thus be legitimised. 
Although recognising that reading of the Hadith offered no concrete justification of 
killing ‘protected people’, the authors opined that killing non-combatants would be 
justifiable ‘as long as there is a need or an obligation for Muslims to do so, or if not 
striking leads to a delay to jihad. As for blood money and atonement, these are to be 
judged individually.’ The nature of asymmetric warfare, target hardening of security 
installations and enhanced protection of political figures, and the success of mujahideen 
operations demonstrated the need to engage in such attacks. Nonetheless, Muslims 
would have to be warned not to be close to potential targets of ‘tyrants’ and were they to 
be killed, apologies were in order and, funds permitting, financial compensation.424  
In an interview with a sympathetic reporter of a Pakistani daily in October 2001, 
bin Ladin conceded the Prophet had banned the killing of women and children but 
argued this was not absolute. Citing part of a verse from the An-Nahl (sixteenth) Surah 
on the right to retaliate in kind against disbelievers, bin Ladin sought to justify the stance 
which has been prominent in the Al-Qa’ida rhetoric ever since: that killing of women 
and children is permissible since ‘infidels purposely kill [Muslim] women and 
children.’425 Seeking to further strengthen his argument, bin Ladin mentioned scholars 
who supported these views, ignoring subsequent verses in the section of the Quran he 
quoted, which emphasised instead patience and endurance and encouraged those who do 
good. Nevertheless, the interview still fell short of full endorsement of indiscriminate 
targeting, justifying 9/11 as strikes against economic and military installations, rather 
than civilian targets. After all, the World Trade Centre was not a ‘children’s school.’426 
Even so, ‘if a child is above thirteen and wields a weapon against Muslims,’ bin Ladin 
argued in another interview two months later, ‘then it is permitted to kill him.’427 This 
applied to Americans in particular who were all seen as ‘active members’ in the ‘crimes’ 
committed against Muslims.428 
Reciprocity featured prominently in the coding of references concerning the use 
of violence and was found to be central to the Al-Qa’ida leadership’s justification for the 
killing of non-combatants. Several communiqués sought to add to these claims of 
counter-aggression and defensive responses an aura of fairness with the aim of 
convincing the Muslim audience that such claims were religiously sound given the 
multiple warnings made and the alternatives offered to adversaries.429 In his 
aforementioned interview with John Miller, for instance, bin Ladin warned: ‘the only 
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way for us to fend off these [American] assaults is to use similar means.’430 Americans 
‘only understand the language of attacks and killings. Just as they’re killing us, we have 
to kill them so that there will be a balance of terror.’431 The 9/11 attacks were thus only a 
‘reaction to the continuous injustice and oppression being practiced against our sons in 
Palestine and Iraq and in Somalia and Southern Sudan and in other places.’432 This was 
‘equal treatment.’433 How could ‘defending oneself and punishing the aggressor in kind, 
[be] objectionable terrorism? If it is such, then it is unavoidable for us.’434 Warnings of 
supposedly reciprocal treatment thus featured prominently in threats communicated to 
the kuffar enemy: As you kill, you will be killed, and as you capture, you will be 
captured, and as you ruin our security, we will ruin your security, and the one who 
started it has done the greater injustice.’435  
Behind the scenes, the Al-Qa’ida leaders continued to struggle with formulating 
jurisprudential justifications for the level and nature of the violence displayed on 11 
September. Ramzi bin al-Shibh, one of the attack’s organisers, drafted an internal memo 
titled ‘The truth about the new crusade: a ruling on the killing of women and children of 
the non-believers’ declaring: ‘The sanctity of women, children, and the elderly, is not 
absolute.’ Four scenarios would render killing ‘infidel’ civilians legal according to his 
interpretation: (1) if the enemy had targeted Muslim civilians; (2) if Muslim regions 
were being invaded; (3) if non-combatants were supporting attacks on Muslims, 
‘whether in action, word, or any other type of assistance’; or (4) if the enemy attacked 
with indiscriminate weaponry which did not differentiate between combatants and non-
combatants.436 
If murdering women and children posed doctrinal challenges for the leadership, 
justifying the deaths of Muslims would prove even more problematic and became a 
source of a great deal of criticism of Al-Qa’ida from within the Islamist community. 
This tension was also discernable from the analysis of the coding categories on violence. 
Bin Ladin insisted, in an interview in 1999, that risk of inflicting Muslim deaths should 
not prevent attacks from being orchestrated, so long as the targets were legitimate.437 
When asked about Muslim deaths on 9/11 in an interview in November 2001, bin Ladin 
largely ignored the issue of killing Muslims arguing simply that the death of Muslims 
could be justified if the enemy was hiding behind a ‘human shield’ of innocents.438. In 
this sense, legitimisations of Muslim deaths were similar to those used by conventional 
forces and Western coalitions when explaining the inevitability of ‘collateral damage.’ 
Any further attempts to justify the killing of Muslims were not offered at this stage and 
the issue has remained the most contentious and potentially damaging for Al-Qa’ida 
Meanwhile, justifications for civilian non-Muslim deaths continued to be based 
on alleged crimes of the West and the core values and deeds of the citizenry in 
designated ‘hostile’ societies. In addition to voting and paying taxes, the public is 
chastised for tolerating ‘immoral behaviour,’ as noted in the section on diagnostic 
framing, acquiescing Jewish takeover of the banking system, permitting arms 
                                                
430 Bin Ladin (1999) [179]. 
431 Bin Ladin (2001) [130]. 
432 Bin Ladin (2001) [129]. 
433 Bin Ladin (2002) [76]. 
434 Bin Ladin (2004) [83]. 
435 Bin Ladin (2010) ‘Message from Shaykh Usama bin Ladin to the People of France,’ published by As-
Sahab (7 November), translated and distributed by Ansar Al Mujahideen English Forum, secured from 
Islamist web forums [230]. 
436 Cullison (2004): 11 
437 Bin Ladin (1999) [178]. 
438 Bin Ladin (2001) [125]. 
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manufacturers to operate, joining or supporting the armed forces and other alleged acts 
of hostility which made the general public an accomplice in the imagined conspiracy 
against Muslims.439 Further justifications and excuses were made in the wake of the 
2005 London bombings, whereby ordinary civilians were classified as ‘combatants’, 
simply for respecting British judicial norms and the legitimacy of democratic 
institutions, regardless of opinion on foreign or domestic policy: in December 2005 
Zawahiri claimed that the fact Britons had failed to ‘depose’ their government 
demonstrated they had no qualms with its policy output.440 A year later he stated: ‘even 
those who oppose the policies [of the West], still consider the governments legitimate. 
Also, all the political parties in the West supported the creation of Israel.’441  
 
6.4.4 Justifications for killing Muslims 
 
Thus mere recognition of the legitimacy of the democratic political process suffices, 
according to the communiqués, to apply the combatant label to the general public and 
hence justify wanton killing of non-Muslims, including tourists in Muslim lands.442 This 
does not constitute a radical rethink of religious protocols, nor is the debate sophisticated 
or original in any doctrinal sense. Rudimentary jurisprudential guidelines from religious 
texts on the killing of certain groups of people still broadly apply. All the leadership has 
tried to do is to gradually widen this category and include ever more people as legitimate 
targets for attack, citing increasingly vague and all-encompassing allegations of 
complicity. Although more problematic, the leadership has sought to justify an increase 
in violence against Muslim publics in much the same way. Rather than engaging in 
difficult doctrinal debates about the subject, for which the leadership lacks religious 
qualifications, this study found that Zawahiri and bin Ladin have instead sought to 
redefine the concept of ‘Muslim’ through their messages.  
Again, much of the groundwork had already been done by the Egyptians, who 
needed to justify killing embassy employees and the targeting of government officials as 
mentioned above. Since the Qur’an strictly forbids the shedding of Muslim blood, the 
obvious way to do this was to try and convince followers and a wider audience of the 
discourse that the deceased had committed such grave sins that they were no longer 
Muslims. This is the essence of the takfiri narrative. Various sections of the Muslim 
population are in this way branded ‘apostates’ and legitimate enemies and targets, since 
they have strayed away from the true creed. Although attitude towards violence varies 
slightly, the communiqués consistently identify ‘treacherous’ Muslims who can be 
targeted. Initially, and more notably throughout, the subjects in question are leaders of 
Muslim countries and their closest associates in the military and intelligence services, 
who have allied with the West. The way in which these categories are constituted and 
communicated will be analysed in the next chapter when discussing the issue of 
designing motivational appeals. The most prominent example found in the dataset of 
justifications for Muslim deaths based on takfiri allegations – aside from the political 
elite – relates to Iraqis who cooperated with the coalition or the government in Baghdad 
or those who generally failed to embrace the sectarian chaos fomented by the violent 
extremists in the country.  
Bin Ladin warned his ‘brothers in Iraq’ at the dawn of the conflict that those who 
supported the Crusaders, even just with words, were ‘apostates and outside the 
                                                
439  Bin Ladin (2002) [212]. 
440 Zawahiri (2005) [49]. 
441 Zawahiri (2007) [101]. 
442 See on the killing of Western tourists in Zawahiri (2008) [20] 
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community of Muslims’ rendering it ‘permissible to spill their blood and take their 
property.’443 The killing of members of the government, army, security agencies and 
National Guard was sanctioned, as ‘they are infidels’444 and they should be ‘killed, 
regardless of their sect or tribe.’445 Al-Qa’ida loyalists in Iraq did not hesitate to 
implement this strategy going to such excesses that the central leadership became 
concerned over the resulting damage to its image (see further below). Zawahiri proudly 
announced in a 2006 video statement that ‘the group Qaida al-Jihad in the Land of Two 
Rivers alone has carried out 800 martyrdom operations in 3 years, besides the sacrifices 
of the other Mujahideen, and this is what has broken the back of America in Iraq.’446 
Yet, according to Riedel, more than three-fourths of Al-Qa’ida affiliated attacks in Iraq 
targeted Muslims, mostly (but not exclusively) the Shia.447 One of the poignant 
questions posed to Zawahiri for his ‘Open Meeting’ initiative addressed precisely this 
record of violence against Muslims:  
 
Who is it who is killing with Your Excellency’s blessing the innocents in Baghdad, 
Morocco and Algeria? Do you consider the killing of women and children to be jihad? I 
challenge you and your organization to do that in Tel Aviv. Why have you – to this day – 
not carried out any strike in Israel? Or is it easier to kill Muslims in the markets? Maybe it is 
necessary [for you] to take some geography lessons, because your maps only show the 
Muslims’ states.448 
 
Even Hamas criticised the excessive use of violence displayed by Al-Qa’ida-endorsed 
elements in Iraq and beyond, such as Zarqawi’s Amman bombings in November 2005, 
arguing:  
 
The [Muslim] people loved al-Qa’ida because it declared war on the American enemy who 
supports the occupation of Palestine and is the occupier of Iraq and Afghanistan; however 
this love was taken out of people’s chest when they hit the innocent. The victims of the 
Amman wedding and their families, of who we see and console them even today, are proof 
of the blind use of weapons which tainted al-Zawahiri and his group.449 
 
Rather feebly, the Al-Qa’ida leaders have responded arguing that those stirring up ethnic 
hatred and fomenting civil war are forces loyal to the regime that want America to stay 
in Iraq.450 
The most earnest attempt at engaging with more complex theological debates in 
order to justify killing of civilians and Muslims that was detected in the dataset, was put 
forward in Zawahiri’s book The Exoneration: A Letter Exonerating the Ummah of Pen 
and Sword from Unjust Allegations of Feebleness and Weakness, which he completed in 
early spring 2008. The book was a response to a series of allegations made by his former 
associate, ‘Abd al-Qadir (more commonly known as Sayyid Imam al-Sharif or ‘Dr 
Fadl’) and other criticism from former extremists and radicals in Egypt and elsewhere 
                                                
443 Bin Ladin (2003) [79]. 
444 Bin Ladin (2004) [86]. 
445 Bin Ladin (2006) ‘Elegizing the Ummah's Martyr and Emir of the Martyrs, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,’ 
published by As-Sahab (29 June), available in IntelCenter (2008) [92]. 
446 Zawahiri (2006) [81]. 
447 Reidel (2008): 101. 
448 In Page et al. (2011): 162. 
449 Cragin (2009) ‘Al Qaeda Confronts Hamas: Divisions in the Sunni Jihadist Movement and its 
Implications for U.S. Policy’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, (32: 7, pp.  576-590). 
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who were uncomfortable with the level of violence displayed by Al-Qa’ida and 
affiliates. Primarily based on reported deeds of the Prophet (Ahadith) and anecdotes and 
rulings of medieval jurists rather than the Qur’an, and weaved into assumptions 
concerning contemporary manifestations of religious protocols, The Exoneration set out 
a series of justifications for killing Muslims, children, women, the elderly, the infirm, 
and other people protected according to Qur’anic verses.  
Three major justifications were cited for shedding Muslim blood: (1) Muslim 
deaths in and amongst other legitimate targets are justifiable since the Prophet allowed 
night raids as they were necessary to achieve victory.451 This means that attacks which 
do not distinguish between enemies within a confined space must also be allowed; (2) 
the 7th century Muslim conquest used catapults, therefore indiscriminate weaponry and 
bombs must be justifiable even where Muslims live; (3) ‘captive’ Muslims being held by 
enemy forces may be killed since this falls under the category of ‘persisting in combat’ 
even if the enemy uses Muslims as ‘human shields’ (a concept referred to as Mas'alatut 
at-Tatarrus). Zawahiri often cites interpretations by Ibn Taymiyyah, a 13th-14th century 
Sunni traditionalist jurist, implying that such deaths would not be illegal, and attempts to 
apply these to current events in order to justify Al-Qa’ida’s tactics. These medieval 
jurisprudential justifications are applied, without question, to the contemporary scene 
and used to legitimise attacks where unarmed Muslim bystanders constitute most or all 
of the casualties. The only rationalisations for civilian targeting offered emphasise the 
extent to which regular leadership targets have become harder to strike, the specific 
nature of the emergency facing the ummah, and the need for asymmetric tactics against a 
conventionally stronger enemy. The Exoneration utilises a similar concoction of 
medieval ulema (scholarly) rulings and accounts of specific events and tactics employed 
centuries ago during battle to justify civilian, non-Muslim deaths through Al-Qa’ida 
attacks and those of its affiliates. Extra-contextual interpretations derived from such 
readings are applied to modern-day scenarios and situations for which the medieval 
teachings were never intended, to make the increase in indiscriminate violence seem 
right and religiously justified. Civilians can be killed, according to the communiqués, if 
they are adjacent to a legitimate target, or simply part of a hostile society. As for Jews, 
they can all be targeted since ‘all Jews support Israel’ and thus are in fact Zionists, 
according to Zawahiri’s treatise.452 
 The development of these justifications for civilian deaths and ‘collateral’ 
damage served the purpose of legitimising, glorifying and elevating a violent strategy 
and set of tactical preferences that ultimately were seen as highly effective. Although, as 
Hegghammer notes and the current study confirms, the Al-Qa’ida leadership messages 
rarely provide detailed strategic or tactical advice, the overall message from the 
communiqués coded (see Appendix 3.4a on tactical preferences) underlines the 
importance of terrorist attack and especially suicide (‘martyrdom’) bombings as 
prognostic tools to achieve the desired results.453   
 
 
 
                                                
451 Zawahiri bases this assumption mostly on the rulings of Ibn-Qudamah and Ibn Rajab al-Hanbali, 
influential medieval scholars. 
452 Zawahiri (2008) [20].  See further on the development of Taymiyyah’s thoughts, e.g. in Esposito 
(2002): 45-46. 
453 Hegghammer, T. (2006) ‘Global Jihadism after the Iraq War,’ in Middle East Journal (vol. 60: no. 1, 
winter): 15. Indeed the development of detailed strategic doctrine and delineation of specific objectives 
would generally not take place in open forums or be communicated through public messages. 
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6.5 Strategy and Tactics 
 
The strategic vision set out in the communiqués can be summarised as follows: A 
vanguard has to be created, preferably in a region which provides the proper base to 
create a movement strong enough to tackle enemy forces – foreign and domestic.454 The 
vanguard is made up of mujahideen who attack the enemy but should rely on the support 
of the ummah and on the fatawa of righteous, independent ulema who have not been 
corrupted by government institutions or ‘agents’ of the Zionist-Crusader West. Young 
men from their mid-teens up to their mid-twenties provide the mainstay of the 
mujahideen vanguard455 whilst other members of the ummah should support them and 
supplement their operations through public protest, raising funds, working against 
‘apostate’ local regimes or Western governments, supporting radical Islamist 
publications and so on. The vanguard’s success is inevitable due to its closeness to God, 
dedication, and willingness to embrace martyrdom. Once a small region is secured, an 
Islamic emirate which implements the Shari’ah will be created. This will be used as a 
base for further operations, which will not cease until all Muslim land has been freed of 
Zionist-Crusader-‘apostate’ influence and all its inhabitants start living under the 
strictest interpretations of Shari’ah law. 
 When strategic references were viewed in the wider narrative context that can be 
seen in Appendix 3.4a, it appears that existing experiences of violent jihad, especially 
from Afghanistan, and observed reactions of the enemy have informed many of Al-
Qa’ida’s core strategic preferences. In Knights under the Banner of the Prophet, one of 
the more comprehensive communiqués discussing strategy and methods of organising 
violent uprising, Zawahiri emphasised how lessons from Afghanistan demonstrated to 
the leadership the importance of establishing a base, ‘an arena that would act like an 
incubator where its seeds would grow and where it can acquire practical experience in 
combat, politics, and organizational matters.’456 Other important ingredients of a 
successful violent resistance movement, according to Zawahiri, included perseverance, 
patience and an ‘organization and leadership leading change.’457 A degree of structure 
and top-down guidance was thus essential, rather than the fluid, autonomous cells 
favoured by Al-Suri. Nothing would be achieved, however, without the ‘mobilization of 
popular support.’458 ‘Striving to achieve popular sympathy for the Islamic Mujahid 
movement for change’ was paramount, Zawahiri argued.459 As a result alienation of the 
general support base, due to excessive use of force, would be catastrophic, as would the 
failure to ensure the message resonated with identified constituents.    
 Some of the strategic references uncovered concerned ways in which Al-Qa’ida 
could utilise specific weaknesses of adversaries and learn from the historic follies of 
                                                
454 Such strategic preferences strongly resemble those of 20th Century communist revolutionaries.  Cf. 
Stout et al. (2008). 
455 Over the years, however, the sense of urgency has served to enlarge the group deemed eligible for 
mujahideen operations. In 1998, for instance, bin Ladin explained that those doing most of the fighting 
would be between fifteen and twenty-five years of age, since younger people would not fully comprehend 
the nature of the battle and older men would have family obligations. Ten years later, however, Zawahiri 
stressed that ‘Going to jihad is a priority over seeking knowledge or marriage because it is an individual 
duty.’ Women do not have an operational role. See bin Ladin (1999) [184]; Zawahiri (2008) [107]. 
456 Zawahiri (2001) [119]. Zawahiri reiterated the importance of creating a secure base in: Zawahiri (2008) 
‘The Open Meeting .., Part One,’ [105]. 
457 Zawahiri (2002) [22]; Zawahiri (2007) [102]. 
458 Zawahiri (2008) [105]. 
459 Zawahiri (2007) [102]. 
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others. In addition to an unflinching belief in the ability of Al-Qa’ida to force through 
change, the leaders claim to understand the weak points of their principal foe, the United 
States. Afghanistan is, again, the source of inspiration. The withdrawal of Soviet forces 
and subsequent and rapid implosion of the Soviet Union itself ‘cleared from Muslim 
minds the myth of superpowers’, bin Ladin insisted,460 a point which Zawahiri reiterated 
in Knights.461 This experience would inform the struggle against the US. The abrupt 
withdrawal of US forces from Somalia following the ‘Black Hawk Down’ incident 
convinced, at least according to public messages, that America was a ‘paper tiger.’462 It 
would not be able to suffer long term casualties, military or civilian, due to the resulting 
political pressures domestically. In addition to provoking such a reaction in their own 
right, therefore, attacks could lure the US into protracted wars of attrition that would 
cause immense political, psychological and economic damage. In the first in a series of 
staged ‘interviews’ for As-Sahab, Zawahiri noted (a year into the Afghan campaign and 
six months before the start of hostilities in Iraq) that: ‘the continual attacks on the 
American system, [have] finally pulled the Biggest Satan to the arena of Jihad [...] Once 
in the arena of war, it will start feeling its own losses.’463 Bin Ladin also recognised the 
importance of provocation in undermining the enemy: ‘all that we have to do is send two 
mujahideen to the furthest point East to raise a piece of cloth on which is written al-
Qaeda, in order to make the generals race there to cause America to suffer human, 
economic, and political losses.’464 Indeed, American failure in Iraq would be comparable 
to the debacle it suffered in Vietnam.465 In terms of strategic focus, moreover, the current 
study found that early messages to potential participants suggested a degree of pragmatic 
selectivity, whereby bin Ladin urged followers not to consider Muslim disagreements 
with China, but rather focus on the US, especially as animosity between the two powers 
could be beneficial for Al-Qa’ida.466  
 
6.5.1 Methods alternative to violence 
 
In addition to references underscoring the use of violence as a solution, the coding mined 
the dataset for examples and inferences regarding potential political tools for change 
beyond violent attack. These are collated in Appendix 3.5, page 350. This process 
revealed that not all of the tactics advocated by the Al-Qa’ida leadership involved 
violent methods, with some emphasis placed on securing collective support, through the 
strength of a united ummah, for economic sanctioning, thus striking at the very heart of 
the capitalist system.  
Even as early as the mid-1980s, when the US-supported campaign against the 
Soviet Union in Afghanistan was still being fought, bin Ladin used his family mosque in 
Jeddah to distribute leaflets and give speeches protesting against US support for Israel 
and calling for boycott of US goods.467 On several subsequent occasions, the Al-Qa’ida 
leaders have suggested economic boycott as a tool against enemy powers and urged a 
pan-Islamic embrace of such methods. Figure 4, below, highlights these relevant 
                                                
460 Bin Ladin (1999) [179]. 
461 See Zawahiri’s fourth point on the ‘Lessons from Afghanistan’ Zawahiri (2001) [119]. 
462 Bin Ladin (1999) [179]. 
463 Zawahiri (2002) [22]. 
464 Bin Ladin (2004) [83]. 
465 ‘The claim that the Americans are depriving the mujahideen of ground shows that they are either lying 
or have learned nothing from the attack-and-retreat-war in Iraq or Vietnam:’ Zawahiri (2007) [13]. 
466 Bin Ladin (1998) [171]. Such sentiments did not last long, however, as solidarity was expressed with 
fellow Muslims in ‘East Turkistan.’ 
467 Bergen (2001); Riedel (2008); Wright (2006-A)  
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communiqués, which are arranged in chronological order along a timeline that shows 
when these references were made. 
 
 
 
 
Although initially seen as a specific response against alleged US infringement of the 
sanctity of the Peninsula and Arab Islamic interests, the advocacy of such methods 
quickly became supportive of a wider campaign of militancy and terrorism. The first 
declaration of war against America in 1996 asserted that ‘if the economic boycott is 
coupled with the mujahidin's military strikes, then the enemy’s defeat is imminent’ and 
added that women would be expected to take part in this as well.468  Both Zawahiri and 
bin Ladin have consistently reiterated such calls; stressing the need to boycott Western 
goods in tandem with planning and supporting acts of violence. Such calls were 
particularly prominent during the widespread Muslim outrage following the publication 
of Muhammad caricatures in Danish and Norwegian newspapers, although boycotts had 
already been widely planned by the time Al-Qa’ida urged its audience to embrace such 
measures. In a June 2007 statement distributed by As-Sahab, moreover, Zawahiri called 
for universal boycott of British goods in response to British colonial ‘crimes’.469  
Even though all Muslims may not all be able to partake in violent operations 
against the external or local enemy for physical or societal reasons, they are nonetheless 
expected to contribute to the fight through boycotting US, Israeli, and Western goods as 
well as preventing ‘Muslim resources’, especially oil, from being sold to the West at a 
reduced price. In an interview with a Pakistani newspaper in the aftermath of the 11 
September attacks, bin Ladin laid out the prerequisites, stressing that ‘Western products 
could only be boycotted when the Muslim fraternity is fully awakened and organized’ 
and when ‘economic self-sufficiency is attained and substitute products are brought 
out.’470  
 
6.5.2 The virtue of violent attack 
 
Ultimately, when the dataset was reviewed for references to effective tools suggested to 
undermine the status quo, the tactics emphasised by Zawahiri and bin Ladin and those 
seen as the most likely in bringing about the desired changes, relied on forms of violent 
attack. The essence of this justificatory narrative and specific tactical preferences are 
captured in Appendix 3.4a.  
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469 Zawahiri (2007) [103]. 
470 Bin Ladin (2001) [202]. 
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In an extensive audio recording posted online in February 2003, bin Ladin 
detailed the impact of terrorist attacks against the US through the years. The 1982 Beirut 
truck bombing against US marines – bin Ladin reminded his audience – resulted in the 
prompt withdrawal of US forces from Lebanon. Then the mujahideen confronted 
America and ‘rubbed her arrogance into the dust’ in Somalia, after which ‘America and 
her allies fled into the darkness of the night.’ At the same time the US was targeted in 
Aden and again, ‘the cowardly Americans ran away and fled the country in less than 24 
hours.’ US forces were struck in Riyadh and in Al-Khobar in 1995 prompting them ‘to 
move their bases from the cities to the desert.’ Refusing to heed the repeated warnings of 
the mujahideen, America was ‘smashed’ twice in East Africa, and again in Aden with 
another martyrdom operation. ‘Denying reality and proclaiming that we (the 
Mujahideen) were striking them because we were jealous of them (the Americans), 
whereas the reality is that we are striking them because of their evil and injustice in the 
whole of the Islamic World,’ Al-Qa’ida struck the very ‘idols of America’ on ‘the 
blessed Tuesday 11 September 2001,’ which destroyed the ‘Great American Dream and 
legend of Democracy,’ revealing the ‘true characteristics of the Crusade.’471  
 The 9/11 attacks, according to the communiqués, were an unquestionable success 
and members were urged to replicate the scale of the attacks in the future. In his first 
interview after the attacks, with a Karachi-based newspaper, bin Ladin argued that 
subsequent calls that were made by the US president and British prime minister, in the 
wake of the attacks, for the creation of a Palestinian state, demonstrated their success.472 
The political impact of the attacks was compounded by the immense economic damage 
they caused, the collapse of shares in the stock exchange, the damage to the airline 
industry, as well as the wider ‘psychological shock.’473 Similarly, Zawahiri argued the 
British government set a date for withdrawal from Iraq a day after the London bombings 
in July 2005.474 
Unsurprisingly, having observed the impact of suicide bombings in Lebanon and 
elsewhere and having embraced the tactic for its own efforts, the Al-Qa’ida leadership 
strongly endorses the use of ‘martyrdom operations.’ Force, according to Zawahiri, was 
the only language understood by the enemy, and in this regard inflicting ‘maximum 
causalities’ was paramount. Martyrdom operations were the ‘most successful way’ of 
inflicting such damage and the ‘least costly to the mujahidin in terms of casualties.’475 In 
this way a ‘small group in numbers and equipment’ could inflict ‘immense slaughter’ on 
the enemy.476 Aside from these asymmetric qualities, the coding unveiled how 
psychological impact and differences that separated belligerents were seen as 
fundamental. The mujahideen possess what others cannot, Zawahiri proclaimed: ‘the 
love of death in the path of Allah.’477 As a result, a barrage of continuous suicide attacks 
would force even the strongest enemy to retreat.478 
This was the advice communicated to affiliates in Somalia, Iraq and elsewhere 
where suicide attacks could be a decisive weapon deployed by insurgents, in addition to 
                                                
471 Bin Ladin (2003) [78]. 
472 Bin Ladin (2001) [202]. 
473 Bin Ladin (2002) statement aired on MBC Television (London) (17 April), transcript available in FBIS: 
Compilation [206]; Bin Ladin (2003) [98]. 
474 Zawahiri (2005), ‘Obstacles to Jihad,’ published by As-Sahab (10 December), available in IntelCenter 
(2008) [25]. 
475 Zawahiri (2001) [119]. 
476 Zawahiri (2002) [22]. 
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ambushes and clandestine operations.479 ‘Out of area’ suicide operations would need to 
be well planned. Zawahiri complained that too many initiatives within the jihad 
movement were haphazard.480 Well-orchestrated martyrdom operations against oil 
installations, supply lines, corporations and other ‘economic targets’ would be 
particularly useful in undermining the enemy, causing a ripple effect throughout the 
military, political and economic infrastructure.481 ‘Strike at the economic base that forms 
the foundation of the military establishment,’ bin Ladin advised in a video statement 
posted on Al-Jazeera in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.482 
 One of the virtues of suicide bombings, as far as the Al-Qa’ida leaders are 
concerned, lies in the simplicity of the attacks whereby high-impact strikes can be based 
on relatively rudimentary planning where perpetrators use simple devices that can often 
be assembled by non-experts using household chemicals. By contrast, the counter-
terrorism community, media and other observers have focused considerable attention on 
the possibility of the Al-Qa’ida leadership being involved in planning of attacks on the 
opposite side of the sophistication spectrum, namely through using nuclear, biological, 
chemical or radiological weapons. 
 
6.5.3 Weapons of mass destruction 
 
Despite the attention received, this study found that only relatively few articles reviewed 
discussed using CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear) devices and those 
that did were vague and often approached the matter geopolitically, rather than 
suggesting tactical applications (see Appendix 3.4a). To highlight the infrequency of 
references to possession or usage of CBRN weapons, figure 5, below, illustrates the 
handful of communiqués where these issues were discussed.  
 
 
 
                                                
479 Zawahiri (2007) ‘Rise and Support our Brothers in Somalia,’ statement published by As-Sahab (May), 
available in IntelCenter (2008) [96]; Bin Ladin (2003) [79]. 
480 Zawahiri (2001) [119]. 
481 Zawahiri (2006) [89]; Zawahiri (2006) [21]. 
482 Bin Ladin (2001) [129]. 
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For comparison, these references are shown together with the aggregated number of 
communiqués issued by bin Ladin and Zawahiri for each year. As the figure shows, 
therefore, references to CBRN weapons were rare and insignificant when compared to 
the overall output. 
Generally speaking, acquiring CBRN weapons was certainly seen as a right, even 
a duty, of Muslims and not beyond their means. In a letter to Mullah Omar, the leader of 
the Taliban ‘Islamic Emirate,’ bin Ladin noted that ‘It is a fact that the Islamic 
Republic’s region is rich with significant scientific experiences in conventional and non-
conventional military industries, which will have a great role in future Jihad against the 
enemies of Islam.’483 In an open interview, he argued Muslims ‘should not be lax in 
possessing nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons’ and follow the example of 
Pakistan in this regard,484 which was urged to secure nuclear weapons of a ‘better 
quality’ than those of India.485  
When discussing scenarios whereby deployment of CBRN weapons would be 
permissible, the coding found the terminology resembles Cold War rhetoric of 
deterrence through mutually assured destruction, implicitly elevating Al-Qa’ida to 
superpower status, rather than that of the clandestine, ‘light and agile’ forces that the Al-
Qa’ida leaders instead embrace for operational purposes.486 ‘If I seek to acquire these 
weapons,’ bin Ladin claimed in an interview with Time Magazine, ‘I am carrying out a 
duty. It would be a sin for Muslims not to try to possess the weapons that would prevent 
the infidels from inflicting harm on Muslims.’487 ‘Muslim’ nuclear weapons would deter 
against Israeli and ‘Christian’ nuclear weapons.488 Thus bin Ladin declared: ‘that if 
America used chemical or nuclear weapons against us, then we may retort with chemical 
and nuclear weapons. We have the weapons as deterrent.’489 
 
6.5.4 Resonance and impact of strategic and tactical guidance 
 
Although it is difficult to assess the resonance and impact of the limited strategic and 
tactical guidance conveyed through the communiqués under review, by analysing the 
communiqués alone, the contrast between the advice and prescriptions emphasised by 
Zawahiri in the years and months leading to the Arab Spring of 2011 and the actual 
course of events in Egypt and elsewhere, is revealing. Consistent throughout the 
prognostic framing of the messages under review is the assertion that jihad is the only 
force for change. Any other forms of activism would ultimately be like ‘treating cancer 
with an aspirin.’490 As regards Egypt, in particular, Zawahiri argued in the 
aforementioned book Exoneration, published in 2008, that there was no peaceful 
solution to the problems of Egypt, especially after the authorities banned public protests 
after the Al-Azhar demonstrations in 2007.491 Muslims had to focus on carefully planned 
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attacks, seek funding and weapons in order to orchestrate coordinated strikes and prepare 
martyrdom operations. Mere public protests were useless.492 ‘Protests do no good in the 
face of bombs; Muslims must take “effective steps.”493 Authoritarianism dictated jihad 
and terrorism was the only solution: ‘the system in Egypt and in most of the Arabic and 
Islamic countries cannot be removed except by force.’494 
Again, however, and as demonstrated through these series of appeals, nothing 
could be achieved without popular support and respect for the vanguard. As mentioned, 
the excessive use of violence displayed by Al-Qa’ida loyalists and affiliates (and often 
endorsed by the central leadership) threatened to damage the impact of the leaders’ 
message. There are obvious tactical implications in this regard as well. For instance, US 
intelligence operatives recovered an Islamist manual on guerrilla warfare from 1996 
following the collapse of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and flight of Al-Qa’ida 
elements from the country. This warned against the ‘negative effects’ of attacks on 
civilians, pointing in particular to the way in which groups in Algeria and Egypt became 
isolated after excessive targeting of non-combatants. The manual cautioned there was a 
‘lack of legal agreement’ on action involving civilian deaths and that such a strategy 
could result in ‘political splits and disputes.’495 
Recognising the sensitivity of civilian, particularly Muslim, targeting or killing, 
the Al-Qa’ida leadership has not offered limitless or fully indiscriminate justifications 
for the use of violence. As discussed above, moreover, approaches towards the use of 
violence have evolved substantially over time. In order to identify nuances in the 
arguments used to justify civilian deaths the coding captured any mentioned constraints 
on the use of force and references to regrettable deaths or impermissible targeting. The 
longitudinal study thus isolated arguments limiting the scale of prescribed violence. This 
process allowed for a more rigorous understanding of the levels of violence that the Al-
Qa’ida leaders nonetheless sanction and prescribe for their followers. The analytical 
results are discussed in the next section and corresponding coding details can be found in 
Appendix 3.6, page 354. 
 
 
6.6 Constraints on the Use of Violence 
 
The perceived moral superiority of the Al-Qa’ida leadership, as opposed to that of the 
adversaries, is central to the diagnostic and prognostic framing of the leaders’ output. 
The violence prescribed relates directly to the injustices suffered and to the values that 
need to be promoted and protected, according to the diagnostic message frames, as well 
as the defensive, holistic and righteous set of solutions and methods presented to 
potential participants within the prognostic arguments. Through presenting itself as a 
pioneering vanguard of a righteous uprising against secularism and infidelity and a 
defensive force fighting to retain the dignity and sanctity of the ummah, the Al-Qa’ida 
leadership thus frames its violence as a noble and just form of activism. As noted above, 
moreover, the justifications put forward for the violent tactics employed rest to a 
substantial degree on notions of supposed reciprocity with attacks legitimised as just 
forms of retaliation. Regardless of the perceived right to ‘respond’ through violent 
means, however, references to limitations and constraints on the use of violence were 
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found in 41 of the communiqués under review (17 per cent – see full list in Appendix 
3.6). Most of the details in this regard appear in messages from Zawahiri, rather than 
from bin Ladin which, together, offer a complex and increasingly contradictory set of 
conditions limiting the use and targeting of violence in the name of religion. 
In a few early texts, Zawahiri stressed the need to post warnings in advance when 
attacking areas which Muslims frequented in order to avoid harming them.496 As regards 
non-Muslim deaths, Zawahiri also confirmed that women and children (boys under 13 
years of age) ought to be spared. Non-Muslims in general could not be targeted if they 
had been awarded dhimmi status (pledge of protection for non-Muslims living in 
Shari’ah states who pay tax, jizya, to the state), although it was stressed that non-
Muslims currently living in Egypt did not qualify.497  
 
6.6.1 Avoiding Muslim deaths 
 
In Knights under the Banner of the Prophet, Zawahiri remembered the shock and 
remorse felt when an attempted attack on the Egyptian Prime Minister’s motorcade 
resulted in the death of Shayma Abdel Halim, an eleven-year-old schoolgirl. The death 
resulted in public outcry against Egyptian Al-Jihad and served as a reminder of the way 
in which Muslim deaths could result in rapid evaporation of public support. More than a 
decade later, Zawahiri would seek to remind his chief ally in Iraq, Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi, of this danger in his letter made public by the US Director of National 
Intelligence. Ignoring this advice, Zarqawi went on to orchestrate coordinated attacks in 
Jordan resulting in sixty deaths, the majority of whom were Muslims. In the aftermath, 
popular support for Al-Qa’ida in Jordan, which had until then been substantial, 
plummeted.498 
Recognising the death of Shayma as a ‘mistake’, Zawahiri emphasised the need 
to pay blood money to relatives, funds permitting, when such ‘mistakes’ were made. The 
death of Shayma and deaths of Muslims in general is revisited much later in Zawahiri’s 
Exoneration. Here the author admitted that mistakes were unavoidable and that Muslims 
might sometimes be victims of mujahideen ‘operations,’ even though deliberate 
targeting of innocent Muslims remained strictly forbidden. ‘As in any other human 
activity’, Zawahiri conceded, ‘mistakes have been and will be made in jihad. For every 
mistake, there is accountability according to Shari’ah.’ Ultimately, however, ‘jihad must 
continue.’499 The extent to which Al-Qa’ida leaders intend to take responsibility is not 
explained and neither is the fact that many attacks endorsed by leadership take place in 
crowded Muslim neighbourhoods. Indeed, in an attempt to admonish those who planned 
the 1993 attack that killed Shayma, Zawahiri stressed how Muslims need to avoid being 
in areas where attacks against leadership targets may take place, regardless of the fact 
that the bomb was placed next to a girls’ school.  
Although he largely stays away from the issue, bin Ladin similarly expressed his 
regret over Muslim deaths in mujahideen ‘operations’, and emphasised how those 
responsible must repent or face punishment.500 Although killing innocents was 
sometimes unavoidable, the mujahideen must take care to fight ‘without going to 
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excess,’ bin Ladin argued in a statement issued in December 2004.501 In a more recent 
statement, bin Ladin argued that fighters ‘must be very cautious during operations 
targeting army garrisons, which are located near Muslims,’ implying Al-Qa’ida and 
affiliates did indeed themselves limit their attacks to such military targets.502 
A month after publishing Exoneration, As-Sahab announced the release of the 
first batch of responses to questions sent in for Zawahiri’s consideration, in the 
aforementioned ‘Open Meeting.’ As noted above, many respondents questioned 
operations and tactics that had resulted in large numbers of Muslim deaths. In his retort, 
Zawahiri insisted ‘we have not killed the innocents [Muslims], not in Baghdad, nor in 
Morocco, not in Algeria, nor anywhere else.’ As before the killing of Muslims was said 
to be forbidden, but sometimes unavoidable in order to ensure that the battle against the 
infidels and apostates continued unabated. Muslim deaths were explained either as a 
‘mistake’, or ‘out of necessity in cases of al-Tatarrus’ (the ‘human shield’ debate). 
Zawahiri went on to defend the tactics of affiliates in North Africa saying they targeted 
only the UN and government security forces (regardless of the fact that the bombs kill 
mostly Muslim non-combatants or young conscripts). Finally, he tried to deflect some of 
the criticism on Al-Qa’ida onto the Hamas Qassam Brigades, since they employed 
indiscriminate rocket attacks against Israeli population centres.503 Such arguments 
appear inherently weak and fly in the face of the actual target emphasis of Al-Qa’ida and 
its affiliates. Aside from the empirical mismatch between the rhetoric relating to the 
targeting of affiliates in Iraq, North Africa and elsewhere, moreover, fundamental 
questions remain concerning the structure and depth of the arguments put forward. How, 
for instance, does the citing of century-old juristic opinion pieces designed for medieval 
hostage and siege situations apply to Al-Qa’ida’s continued desire for and endorsement 
of attacks in open spaces frequented by Muslim non-combatants?  
The overt denial of any wrongdoing (which applies primarily to Muslim deaths) 
is unconvincing, as are the promises of addressing all shortcomings according to 
protocol. In 2007 Zawahiri talked about allegations against the Islamic State of Iraq 
which, he argued: 
 
Only kills spies and traitors, and declares its innocence of any inviolable blood which one of 
its soldiers might spill, and not just that, but its Amir announces his readiness to appear 
before a judicial council in any complaint and that he is prepared to have the right taken 
from him personally if the legal ruling is issued against him.504 
 
In the same statement Zawahiri argued that killing of Fatah members by Hamas militia 
must cause far greater jurisprudential controversy than actions of the ISI, even though 
numerous Al-Qa’ida communiqués make no distinction between Fatah and its leaders on 
the one hand and Israeli intelligence services or other ‘primary targets’ on the other.  
Rather than engaging in a deeper debate about possible contemporary scenarios 
where Muslim deaths are justifiable or seeking to design a strategy, which will fall 
within doctrinal guidelines, the current study suggests that the leadership, unsurprisingly, 
prefers to deny accusations of shedding Muslim blood, given the clear doctrinal 
impermissibility of such actions and the danger of being labelled khawarij, or isolated 
takfiri extremists who ejected themselves from the true creed. Indeed, such a label was 
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belatedly applied to the Algerian GIA.505 In one of his ‘interviews’ with As-Sahab, 
Zawahiri argued allegations of inflicting Muslim casualties in Al-Qa’ida sponsored 
operations were simply part of hostile ‘media campaigns’ against the movement.506 Such 
inability and unwillingness to address the issue of Muslim deaths indicates how 
flammable the issue is within militant Islamist circles and how damaging it is for Al-
Qa’ida.   
 
6.6.2 ‘The property or life of a non-believer’ 
 
The coding references examining limitations on the use of violence demonstrated far less 
regret expressed over the killing of non-Muslim civilians. As explained in the section 
above, targeting in this respect has become so broad and indiscriminate so as to justify 
practically any degree of violence against a non-Muslim population. Nevertheless, the 
communiqués do, on occasions, reveal some limitations on the use of violence in this 
regard too. In order to reinforce the ‘grievance’ argument, the leadership points 
intermittently to states that do not have to fear Al-Qa’ida attacks, since they have not 
harmed ‘Muslim interests’ in any way. Sweden was mentioned in this regard on a few 
occasions, as were Vietnam and Switzerland. It would be wrong to think, however, that 
foreign policy neutrality or other features of government policy would in any way 
guarantee freedom from Al-Qa’ida’s wrath.  
Chapter 5 discussed diagnostics and grievances, demonstrating how an 
increasingly wide range of alleged ‘crimes’ is used to portray a vision of global 
conspiracy against Muslims. Additionally, as emphasised above, diagnosed ailments 
relate not only to cases involving human suffering which can, in some instances, be 
traced to the actions of specific governments but also to alleged insults and moral 
depravity that are beyond the control of any governments. In this sense, for instance, the 
Danish Mohammed caricatures (subsequently reprinted elsewhere) added a host of 
targets to the list of identified enemies even though no physical harm had been inflicted 
and the developments were largely beyond the control of state governments. Every 
indication is given, therefore, that states or communities singled out as ‘lesser enemies’ 
might not remain immune from Al-Qa’ida attacks for long.  
As mentioned before, the study found how Zawahiri has attempted to set out 
guidelines whereby non-Muslim civilians should not be killed. Invariably, this applies to 
their status within the desired Islamic Shari’ah empire. In Exoneration he wrote: ‘as I 
said previously, the property or life of a non-believer are protected only by peace treaty 
[al-sulh], status as a protected alien [al-dhimmah], or safe-conduct [al-aman]. If none of 
these things is confirmed, matters remain in their original state.’507 Zawahiri recognises 
that some Christians may be true to their religion’s prophet and seek to amend relations 
with Muslims and claims not to desire open confrontation with Copts living in Egypt, 
even though their ‘alliance’ with the Mubarak regime was condemned. The fiercely anti-
Semitic discourse is far less tolerant towards Jews, even though some indication is given 
that they would be allowed to reside within the Muslim state, as they are in Morocco and 
elsewhere, provided they comply with Islamic regulations on taxation and other 
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demands.508 In one of his more recent communiqués, Zawahiri reiterated these 
sentiments, arguing shari’ah law and Islamic governance, as envisaged by the Al-Qa’ida 
leadership, would not be opposed to living in ‘coexistence with the nation’s partners of 
Christians and non-Muslims.’509 
 
6.6.3 Reining in the affiliates 
 
These conciliatory utterances constituted interesting caveats in Zawahiri’s otherwise 
uncompromising messages of ‘glad tidings’ during the Arab Spring. These presented a 
clear and rather desperate message to those affiliates and followers of Al-Qa’ida that had 
engaged in levels of violence that the leadership ultimately came to see as unproductive. 
‘There are some operations which are ascribed to the Mujahideen,’ Zawahiri admitted, 
‘some by due right and others otherwise, in which transgressions occur against Muslims 
in their mosques, their markets, and other gathering places. About this,’ Zawahiri 
continued, ‘I say the following:  Regardless of whether the ascription of these acts to the 
Mujahideen are correct or incorrect, my brothers and I in Al-Qaedah declare to Allah 
that we are innocent from these attacks, and that we object to them, whether those who 
carry them are the Mujahideen or others.’ Al-Qa’ida followers should ‘try their utmost,’ 
Zawahiri argued, to avoid killing those ‘whose blood is prohibited’ when planning 
‘operations.’ This included both Muslims and certain non-Muslims, although he insisted 
mistakes could still be made and that killing Muslims embedded within the ranks of the 
enemy would be inevitable (the Mas'alatut at-Tatarrus argument referred to above).510 
Later during this period, Zawahiri urged the mujahideen to ‘stay away from any 
operation that exposes [Muslims] to danger in the markets, mosques, or crowded areas,’ 
in his message confirming the death of bin Ladin.511 
  Put in the wider context, however, these discussions on limiting violence against 
non-Muslims should be seen as anomalous. Overall, the coding showed that prognostic 
framing is based on encouragement and praise for indiscriminate violence against non-
Muslims, even if this contradicts Islamic juristic codes and places scant emphasis on 
regretting or justifying the murder of women, children, and the elderly. Muslim deaths 
are clearly more problematic, given that these can reduce sympathy within militant 
Islamist circles. Levels of discrimination, however, are also determined by overall 
message direction and the identification of enemies. This element has important 
prognostic implications in its own right, however, through delineating specific 
geographic and political sources of grievance, geographic focus of hostility or support 
building, as well as assets and allies that can aid the ummah in undermining the 
identified foes and adversaries. The next section, therefore, focuses on the ways in which 
the communiqués channel and direct the activist prescriptions, guidelines and 
benchmarks elaborated above.   
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6.7 Patterns of Amity and Enmity 
 
In line with shifting political emphases and expressed local or global grievances, all the 
messages reviewed identified actors that were accused of bringing about the dismal state 
of affairs described. Many communiqués also specified the radical Islamist alliance 
tasked with combating these foes. Some actors were consistently identified as enemies, 
especially the United States, the UN, and Israel or Jews in general. Domestic 
adversaries, such as the Egyptian government, were also targeted throughout, as 
mentioned above.  
 
6.7.1 Perceived sources of humiliation, vice and suffering 
 
Prognostic framing necessarily relies on the identification of specific adversaries that 
provide the more tangible targets of aggression and hostility. This channels the anger 
derived from the diagnostic framing and propels the given set of tools prescribed by the 
movement leaders towards perceived sources of humiliation, vice and suffering. 
Unsurprisingly, the delineation of specific adversaries in the Al-Qa’ida leadership 
communiqués corresponds with an expanding and more ambitious geographic scope, as 
mentioned above. Whereas the primary targets were consistently charged with hostility 
against Muslims and immorality throughout the period under review, numerous articles 
from the late 1990s onwards began to introduce a list of ‘secondary’ targets: individuals, 
countries, regions and entities that had not been the focus of anger before, urging the 
ummah to be aware of and counter the threat these enemies posed. As a result, when 
cited references to enemies in all the 240 communiqués under review are aggregated, the 
breadth of animosity in these communiqués becomes clear. Table 3, below, shows the 
principal enemies identified by Zawahiri and bin Ladin according to the articles coded. 
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6.7.2 Allies and friends 
 
In terms of identified Muslim allies, few surprises emerged during the coding 
(recognised friends, loyalties and temporary allies found in the communiqués are 
detailed in Appendix 3.11, page 446). Taliban leaders and other militant Islamist 
commanders fighting in Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya, North Africa, Horn of Africa, the 
Levant and elsewhere were praised as fellow ‘lions of Islam’. Suicide bombers, 
including those who struck London in 2005, were also praised in the communiqués as 
martyrs. New additions to the Al-Qa’ida umbrella organisation are announced through 
explicit statements. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was proclaimed leader of Al-Qa’ida 
operations in Iraq in 2004, and both leaders paid tribute to their fallen comrade in 
‘eulogies’ issued in June 2006. Following Zarqawi’s death, declarations of support for 
‘allied commanders’ in Iraq subsided not least due to leadership struggles and disputes in 
the upper echelons of Al-Qa’ida-endorsed terrorism in Iraq. Nonetheless, in July 2006 
bin Ladin declared (indirectly) that Abu-Hamzah al-Mujahir was to take over from 
Zarqawi and urged him to empower the consultative Mujahideen Shura Council.512 A 
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Table 3: PRINCIPAL ENEMIES AND TARGETS IDENTIFIED 
Most commonly identified enemies 
 
America  - in general, or more 
specifically, e.g. US media, corporations, 
Hollywood, US politicians 
 
The West/ Zionist-Crusader alliance 
 
Israel/Jews 
 
Christians 
 
Hindus/India 
 
The UN  
 
Corrupt or ‘apostate’ regimes in Muslim 
countries, their supporters, the 
government bureaucracy, army, and 
support mechanism – in general, but 
especially Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, 
Algeria, Tunisia, Pakistan (especially 
after beginning of campaign in 
Afghanistan), Iraq (especially after 
January 2005 elections), Afghanistan 
(after collapse of Taliban regime), Libya, 
Sudan, Yemen, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Turkey 
 
Palestinian Authority, Fatah  
 
Iraqi police, military, National Guard, 
government supporters, ‘Awakening 
Councils’ – after invasion of 2003 
 
Other prominent enemies cited 
 
Britain – especially for fighting in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, closeness to US, role in 
establishing Israel and colonial past, detaining 
radical preachers, protecting Salman Rushdie, 
and other issues (see text). Significant rise in 
dedicated focus on the UK after 7/7 attacks 
 
France – especially in relation to prevention of 
wearing veil (and other conspicuous religious 
symbols in schools), presence of troops in 
Afghanistan, publication of Muhammad 
cartoons 
 
Russia – especially for fighting in Chechnya 
 
Spain – mainly for possession of Ceuta and 
Melilla. Fighting in Iraq, Afghanistan 
 
International media and news organisations – 
both for spreading ‘anti-Muslim propaganda’ 
and ‘immoral’ material 
 
International relief agencies 
 
Multinational corporations 
 
International communications companies 
 
Denmark, Norway (and to a lesser extent: 
Germany, France, European and America 
publics) – for publication of Muhammad 
cartoons 
 
Australia – for taking part in 
operations in Afghanistan, and 
for its role in separation of East 
Timor from Indonesia 
 
NATO and Canada, Germany, 
Italy, Norway, Denmark – 
chiefly for sending troops to 
Afghanistan and/or Iraq 
 
Northern Alliance – and other 
militants fighting the Taliban  
 
Pope Benedict XVI – as leader of 
Catholics and for alleged anti-
Islamic remarks  
 
Ethiopia  – for invading Somalia 
 
Japan – for providing funds for 
Iraq war and other military 
operations 
 
Iran – especially for supporting 
Shia militias in Iraq, working 
with coalition in Afghanistan, 
and for discrediting 9/11 attacks 
(particularly prominent from late 
2007 and into 2008) 
 
Serbia – (early communications 
from bin Ladin) 
 
Yemeni Socialist Party – (early 
communications from bin Ladin) 
Part III: The Al-Qa’ida Leadership Communiqués 
 128 
few months later, however, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) under leadership of Abu Umar 
al-Baghdadi was declared principal ally and affiliate of Al-Qa’ida in Iraq, and this has 
remained fairly consistent ever since. Other groups, especially Ansar al-Sunnah, were 
urged to join the ISI to form a united front and the group continues to be praised in the 
communiqués, despite its reluctance to merge with ISI.  
The other principal allies of Al-Qa’ida proclaimed in the communiqués are the 
Al-Qa’ida movement in the Islamic Maghreb (formerly Salafist Group for Preaching and 
Combat, GSPC) based in Algeria and the Islamic Fighting Group of Libya (IFG), 
although Zawahiri later had to qualify the relationship with the latter saying a ‘group of 
the notables’ from the IFG had pledged allegiance to Al-Qa’ida proper.513 The Lebanese 
Fatah al-Islam was praised, but not declared part of Al-Qa’ida or indeed alluded to more 
than a few times. Scholars who were thought to embrace and extol the merits of militant 
Islam, however, were endorsed in communiqués coded, including those belonging to the 
‘bright side’ of Cairo’s Al-Azhar alumni (as opposed to the ‘dark side’ of the pro-regime 
mainstream) who have supported confrontation with the Egyptian regime.514 
  Allusions to potential non-Muslim supporters are more haphazard and often 
appear paradoxical. Much appears to be down to strategic and pragmatic selectivity, as 
noted above. In an interview with a Pakistani newspaper in 1998 for instance, bin Ladin 
emphasised the extent to which China too was being manipulated and abused by the 
American hegemon and urged the People’s Republic to ‘be more careful of the US and 
the West’, adding: ‘China must use its force against the United States and Israel and 
should be friendly towards Muslims.’515 The sincerity of such appeals is obviously 
questionable given the numerous pledges to ‘liberate’ areas in western China with 
substantial Muslim communities.516  
Several recent communiqués have sought to appeal to disenfranchised non-
Muslims in order to secure their support.  In his third ‘interview’ with As-Sahab, for 
instance, published in May 2007, Zawahiri expressed his dismay at the fact that black 
soldiers were fighting in the US Army, given their protracted civil rights struggle in 
America. In a wider appeal he announced: 
  
I want blacks in America, people of color, American Indians, Hispanics, and all the weak 
and oppressed in North and South America, in Africa and Asia, and all over the world, to 
know that when we wage Jihad in Allah’s path, we aren’t waging Jihad to lift oppression 
from the Muslims only, we are waging Jihad to lift oppression from all of mankind, because 
Allah has ordered us never to accept oppression, whatever it may be.517 
 
A year later, in his second reply to the internet-based ‘open meeting’ appeal, Zawahiri 
sought to elaborate this point further by stressing the way in which Al-Qa’ida was 
providing a ‘great service to the human community’ in protecting ‘mankind’ from the 
oppressive West, its immoral desires, and treacherous allies.518 Al-Qa’ida, according to 
Zawahiri, ‘seeks to lift injustice from Muslims and all the victims of the system of the 
Western-Crusader-Zionist injustice.’519 Opportunistic as this attempt to broaden the 
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support base may be, it is nevertheless important to recognise that the Al-Qa’ida 
leadership is seeking to convince non-Western non-Muslims of the merits of its cause 
through its public statements. Bin Ladin’s environmental appeals, referred to above, 
have a similarly broad scope. Discrediting and undermining such attempts should be 
straight forward, given the indiscriminate nature of Al-Qa’ida’s violence and attacks, 
such as those that hit East Africa in August 1998 killing over two hundred mostly poor, 
non-white Africans and injuring thousands.  
 
6.7.3 Near and distant enemies 
 
As discussed above, when analysing the communiqués, evident discrepancies emerged 
in terms of the hierarchy of enemies constructed by the Al-Qa’ida leadership. Zawahiri, 
again, provides the best examples in this regard. This relates primarily to the ‘near’ and 
‘distant’ enemy dichotomy. By joining bin Ladin in the World Islamic Front, Zawahiri 
signed up to a strategy that emphasised the distant enemy of the United States over 
impious local regimes and domestic sources of corruption. However, Zawahiri’s own 
messages in this respect were unclear in their prioritisation. 
As noted, Zawahiri never fully abandoned local causes and domestic enemies 
that prompted him to embrace militant Islamism in the first place. In terms of 
communicating enemy targets to followers, much of Zawahiri’s work, therefore, focused 
on both near and distant enemies. In what is arguably his clearest strategic treatise, 
Knights under the Banner of the Prophet, Zawahiri ‘re-emphasised’ and ‘reiterated’ that 
focusing on the domestic enemy alone will not be feasible at this stage.’ It was thus 
necessary, ‘at this stage,’ to target the distant enemy too.520 Jihad was to be waged 
against these ‘original infidels’ in addition to apostate rulers in the lands of Islam, those 
who failed to rule according to shari’ah and befriended Christians and Jews.521 Although 
not dismissing the distant enemy, therefore, Zawahiri refused to differentiate between 
foreign invaders and their ‘domestic agents’ in terms of prioritisation.522 This contrasts 
much of bin Ladin’s core argument when it comes to defining enemies, although this 
narrative too has suffered a degree of ‘hybridization’ of late. By contrast (and in an 
apparent contradiction with the remainder of the message in question), Zawahiri’s ‘glad 
tidings’ to Egyptians, Tunisians and Libyan’s during the Arab Spring called for the 
targeting of the distant enemy of the Zionist-American allies first and foremost. Only 
when this ‘invading enemy breaks, then, by Allah’s permission, their agents and others, 
who seek their help and emboldening, will also break. So let us focus our efforts on this 
Zio-American invading enemy and its agents.’523 The timing of this shift in emphasis 
towards the far enemy during the Arab Spring in particular, the pivotal event of 
resistance against local rulers in the region, seems baffling and far removed from the 
course of events as they transpired on the ground. 
 Subtle as these differences may be, shifting enemy hierarchies and competing 
trajectories in public messages could impact upon the overall effectiveness and clarity of 
these appeals. Indeed there are some tensions between different target emphases and 
shifting priorities of enmity. The current analysis also reveals a problematic relationship 
with the use of violence and a seemingly uncontrollable proliferation of grievances that 
                                                
520 Zawahiri (2001) [119]. Emphasis added. 
521 Zawahiri (2002) [45]. 
522 Zawahiri (2006) ‘Congratulations on the Eid to the Ummah of Tawhid,’ published by As-Sahab (30 
December), IntelCenter (2008) [95]. 
523 Zawahiri (2011) [233]. 
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fit uncomfortably with the limited and often stagnant range of solutions and alternatives 
presented.  
This can impact upon the ability of the leadership to appeal to target audiences. 
Both leaders expressed through their messages; (1) their desire to guide the ummah to 
what they envisage to be the correct path and (2) their confident determination that they 
can both represent the ummah and identify workable solutions addressing the major 
challenges it faces. Although occasional regional imperatives channel the messages 
towards specific national or regional audiences the vast majority of messages coded 
appealed to the ummah as a whole and carried judgements for all Muslims, and 
occasionally non-Muslims too. An essential common element in the construction and 
dissemination of these messages concerns the way in which the Al-Qa’ida leadership 
communicates with its audience and shapes these ‘motivational’ frames. This relates to 
the development of what Snow and Byrd termed ‘rationale for engaging in ameliorative 
or corrective action,’ tying together diagnosed ailments and prognostic responses with an 
elaborated call to arms in communicative tracts that are aimed at and designed for 
specific audiences.524As always for the Al-Qa’ida leadership the construction of these 
frames also relies on a clear delineation of behaviour and positions deemed abhorrent 
that serves to clarify the distinction between righteousness and infidelity, in order to act 
as further ‘prods to action.’525 The final chapter of Part III presents results from the 
coding demonstrating how these motivational appeals are generated and communicated. 
 
 
                                                
524 Snow & Byrd (2007): 126. 
525 Ibid. 
	   
7 
 
MOTIVATIONAL FRAMES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Central to the motivational frames of the Al-Qa’ida communiqués is the distinction 
between in-group and out-group audiences whereby the former provide constituents and 
the latter constitute immoral and hostile entities that threaten the cohesion and sanctity of 
the ummah. This is related to the principle of al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ or loyalty and 
separation. The principle was shaped in part by Sulayman Ibn Abdallah, grandson of 
Abd al-Wahhab, during on-going clashes between Wahhabi forces in the Arabian 
Peninsula and Mohammed Ali Pasha in the early 19th Century.526 This interpretation of 
wala’ wa-l-bara’, which Meijer sees as Wahhabism’s principal contribution to Salafism, 
perceives open enmity towards ‘idolaters’, apostates and non-believers as the clearest 
demonstration of true faith, loyalty and dedication to Islam.527 The distinction between 
believer and non-believer (both in a physical and ideological sense) was prominent 
throughout the material coded.  
Al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ for instance informed Zawahiri’s criticism of the Muslim 
Brotherhood and the composition of semi-secular constitutions in Islamic countries. In 
2002, moreover, Zawahiri published a book titled Loyalty and Separation: Changing an 
Article of Faith and Losing Sight of Reality. Here, Zawahiri warned the ummah that the 
enemy had ‘launched a campaign of intellectual and doctrinal deception in tandem with 
their militaristic, Crusading campaign.’ Their goal was to sustain corrupt leaders in 
Muslim lands, prevent the uptake of shari’ah and make Muslim lands vulnerable to 
conquest. In this context, deviating from the doctrine that prohibited befriending infidels 
was thus the greatest threat to Islam. Zawahiri, therefore, called on the ummah, in ‘all its 
factions, classes and groups’ to join the caravan of jihad, adding that infidels and 
apostates ‘should not be shown affection, they should be hated and their love 
renounced.’528 
 As the Al-Qa’ida leadership details and communicates the prognostic and 
diagnostic elements of its collective action frames, several distinct actors and audiences 
are thus identified through this prism of loyalty and separation. The most obvious 
distinction to make is that of believers (Muslims) and non-believers (non-Muslims). 
                                                
526 Kepel & Milelli (2008) (eds.): 168. 
527 Meijer (ed.) (2009): 10. 
528 Zawahiri (2002) [45]. 
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Although takfiri elements of the communiqués effectively place allegedly ‘treacherous’ 
Muslims outside the realm of Islam, these were included in the coding under the 
category ‘approaches towards Muslims’ in order to highlight perceptions towards 
different groups of Muslims and isolate the takfiri debate. In doing so, the study found 
that although substantial effort was placed on excommunicating a predictable set of 
actors and elites, these declarations of apostasy failed to capture the variation in attitudes 
towards people who were born Muslim but have failed to live up to the aspirations 
elaborated by the Al-Qa’ida leadership. These communities and publics are admonished 
and criticised but not declared apostates, a far more problematic and risky allegation 
which the leadership used cautiously. For doctrinal, tactical and strategic purposes, 
moreover, the communiqués under review occasionally targeted non-Muslims in specific 
appeals and warnings. As the above debate concerning expressions of sympathy for 
supposedly disenfranchised non-Muslims demonstrates, however, these communicative 
initiatives also have divergent manifestations. 
The first part of this chapter presents results form the coding of communiqués 
that collected all threats and warnings communicated towards non-Muslim audiences 
(these were found in 58 out of the 240 communiqués under review) as well as more 
conciliatory approaches. Appendix 3.7a (page 361) shows message elements concerning 
threats and warnings towards non-Muslims, whereas conciliatory appeals are collated in 
Appendix 3.7b (page 368). This data is analysed below. 
The second part details the results of the coding that shows the nature of bin 
Ladin’s and Zawahiri’s discursive approach to Muslims. This review presents findings 
from the probing of the three coding categories focusing on the Al-Qa’ida leadership’s 
approach towards Muslims. The first category examined positive appeals aimed towards 
specific Muslim audiences in given geographic concentrations as well as the Muslim 
population globally (see results in Appendix 3.8a, page 373). The second coding 
category traced the leadership’s cautious, limited and strictly qualified approach to 
takfiri notions of excommunication (Appendix 3.8b, page 406). The third category 
focused on critical approaches towards Muslims (collated in Appendix 3.9, page 417). 
This element of coding uncovered evidence suggesting that the leadership has become 
increasingly critical of specific groups of Muslims as well as Muslim publics generally, 
admonishing and even denouncing and condemning those very constituents it purports to 
defend through the Al-Qa’ida vanguard.  
    
 
 
7.2 Approaching Non-Muslims 
 
By addressing the United States, the US president or British prime minister directly in 
public communiqués, Zawahiri and bin Ladin elevate themselves and their Al-Qa’ida 
vanguard to a position equal in power, authority and legitimacy to the adversaries they 
target. Furthermore, it could be argued that communicating with the enemy may fulfil 
doctrinal obligations, which prescribe warning targets prior to attack and providing them 
with an opportunity to mend their ways. This is in line with what Scheuer refers to as the 
need for ‘clear warnings of an intention to attack.’529. Consistent with Scheuer’s 
observations, the coding established that bin Ladin issued a warning in advance of the 
1998 East Africa Embassy bombings in a statement reported in Nawa-i-Waqt, a 
Rawalpindi-based newspaper, in November 1997. According to the report, bin Ladin 
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advised the American people to force their government to stop ‘international acts of 
terrorism’ against the Muslims or else there would not be ‘any guarantee for the safety of 
American interests and its citizens in any part of the world.’530  
 The processing of material in Appendix 3.7a revealed, however, that most of the 
direct warnings towards Americans came after these attacks took place and in the wake 
of the US reprisal operation codenamed ‘Infinite Reach.’ In a statement published 
shortly after the attacks, bin Ladin warned that the ‘battle’ had ‘not yet started’ and that 
the ‘answer’ would be what the Americans could ‘see, not what [they could] hear.’531 
Subsequent messages reiterated these sentiments and warnings issued in the February 
1998 declaration of war, claiming that the ‘war’ had now just begun, that Muslim 
responses would be ‘proportionate’ to the suffering they had experienced and that all 
Americans everywhere would be a target.532 Similarly, the current study found that the 
Al-Qa’ida leaders issued warnings to other identified adversaries, such as the UK and 
Australia, only after significant attacks against these populations had been carried out in 
Al-Qa’ida’s name. Figure 6, below, illustrates these findings.  
 
                                                
530 Bin Ladin (1997) statement published in Nawa-i-Waqt (Rawalpindi) (27 November), available from 
FBIS: Compilation [158]. 
531 Bin Ladin (1998) statement published in Al-Quds Al-Arabi (23 August), available in FBIS: Compilation 
[173]. 
532 Bin Ladin (1999) interview with Rahimullah Yusufzai, published in The News (Islamabad) (6 January), 
available in FBIS: Compilation [177]; Bin Ladin (1999) [178]; Bin Ladin (1999) [180]. 
Figure 6: CLEAR/DIRECT THREATS OF ATTACK ISSUED IN COMMUNIQUÉS 
WITH DATE OF SUCCESSFUL (AQ LEADERSHIP) ATTACK 
Towards US: 	  
	  
Towards UK and Australia:	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The graphs in figure 6 place communiqués that presented clear and direct threats of 
attacks against US, UK and Australian populations or targets on a timeline, which also 
pinpoints significant attacks against these targets.533 As shown, most of the direct 
warnings (all in the case of Australia and the UK) were issued only after major attacks 
had taken place. This discrepancy presents a significant departure from the perceived 
principle of offering direct warnings of attacks prior to these being carried out.	  
 
7.2.1 Imbalance in bloodletting 
 
With the exception of a brief reference in the spring of 2001, where bin Ladin promised 
to ‘make life miserable’ for America,534 the current study found that most specific 
warnings and threats surrounding the 9/11 attacks were communicated after 11 
September 2001. Relying on justifications for targeting based on notions of reciprocity, 
as mentioned above, bin Ladin warned that ‘neither the United States nor he who lives in 
the United States will enjoy security before we can see it as a reality in Palestine and 
before all the infidel armies leave the land of Muhammad.’535 These ‘conditions’ for 
safety and stability in the US and what became known as the ‘oath’ of bin Ladin536 were 
subsequently reiterated and referred to in numerous messages from both Zawahiri and 
bin Ladin and featured prominently in Zawahiri’s eulogy of the latter in June 2011. 
‘America will not be able to dream, not even in their sleep, of living in peace and 
security, as long as we don’t live in real peace in Palestine, in the Land of the Two Holy 
Mosques, and throughout the Islamic world,’ bin Ladin declared in As-Sahab’s 
celebration of the 9/11 attacks, ‘The Wills of the Martyrs.’537 Such representations of 
just, even restrained, quid pro quo in the leadership messages portray Al-Qa’ida as a 
heroic and righteous defender of the ummah: ‘just as you kill, you will be killed. And 
just like you bombarded, you will be bombarded. Be prepared to receive the glad tidings 
of what will be bad for you.’538 ‘The time has come for us to be equal.’539 
 By extension, therefore, there was an imbalance in bloodletting that had to be 
rectified. Al-Qa’ida, according to the communiqués coded, had every right to redouble 
efforts to harm the US and its allies on a greater scale than had been witnessed before. 
This was the central narrative context to threats issued to the West in the material under 
review. The 9/11 attacks and other past attacks constituted mere ‘skirmishes’ whereas 
the real battle had not yet begun.540 ‘Bush,’ Zawahiri warned, ‘fortify your targets, 
tighten your defence, intensify your security measures, because the fighting Islamic 
community – which sent you the New York and Washington battalions – has decided to 
                                                
533 Only major attacks are shown, for illustrative purposes. Less significant attacks and failed plots are not 
shown. 
534 Bin Ladin (2001) [198].    
535 Bin Ladin (2001) statement aired on Al Jazeera (7 November), transcript available from FBIS: 
Compilation [203]. 
536 See e.g. Zawahiri (2009) [121]. 
537 As-Sahab (2002) [207]. 
538 Bin Ladin (2002) [76]. 
539 Bin Ladin (2002) ‘Statement from Abdallah Usama Bin Ladin to the Peoples of Countries Allied to 
Tyrannical US Government,’ distributed by Alneda (21 November), available in FBIS: Compilation [214]. 
540 Zawahiri (2003) untitled statement aired on Al-Arabiya (3 August), available in IntelCenter (2008) and 
Hegghammer, T. (2005) ‘Al-Qaida Statements 2003-2004’ [55]; bin Ladin & Zawahiri (2003) audio 
statement aired on Al Jazeera (10 September), available from FBIS: Compilation [110]. 
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send you one battalion after the other, carrying death and seeking heaven.’541 The same 
message was directed towards the people of the UK: ‘Blair has brought destruction upon 
you, to the center of London, and he will have more of it, Allah willing.’542 ‘We address 
them [the British] in the only language they understand; and if they do not understand it 
this time around, we will repeat it until they understand it completely.543 These warnings 
towards the UK, which again were issued after the London bombings, threatened the 
general population rather than specific leaders or elites. 
 Indeed, several references identified through the coding placed particular 
emphasis on threatening general populations in line with allegations of complicity and 
collective responsibility for aggression against Muslims as detailed above (see Appendix 
3.7a, pages 361-368). As long as the people of the Crusader nations failed to ‘interact 
with the Muslim Ummah on the basis of respect and mutual understanding,’ Zawahiri 
argued, they would ‘continue to move from one disaster to the next.’544 At the same 
time, however, the public were warned that their leaders were fighting Muslims in order 
to secure their own personal financial gain, but had tricked the wider population into 
becoming involved in a struggle that could not possibly be won.545 The majority of 
threats to the West from this period, however, targeted the wider public rather than 
specific elites. People of the West had given the mujahideen ‘every legal justification for 
attacking them,’ Zawahiri argued.546 All Americans, for instance, were on the side of 
‘tyranny, criminality and failure’ for voting for hostile regimes547 and all had to ‘pay the 
price for their choice.’548 In an ironically twisted interpretation of Western democratic 
and inclusive societies, therefore, and as a crucial justification for civilian targeting, the 
Al-Qa’ida leaders direct their threats and warnings to ‘normal’ members of the public. 
This not only implies that they are responsible and generally at fault but also suggests 
the general public can immediately alter any existing policies and the current state of 
affairs. ‘Most of you don’t recognise the language of religion, morals and principles, and 
instead understand the language of running after pillage, and plunder,’ Zawahiri claimed, 
whilst addressing the general population in the West, adding: ‘you must honestly try to 
reach a mutual understanding with the Muslims for then, and only then, you might enjoy 
security.’549 Inclusive societies implied collective participation and thus joint 
responsibility, calling for a spontaneous and unified corrective response. ‘Normal 
Americans claim to be innocent,’ bin Ladin reflected, ‘and yet they failed to bring the 
leaders responsible for the Vietnam War to justice. And elected Bush twice and gave 
him continued mandate to wage war […]. This innocence of yours is like my innocence 
of the blood of your sons on [September] the 11th.’550 
                                                
541 Zawahiri (2004) [58]. 
542 Zawahiri (2005) interview with Al-Zawahiri aired on Al-Jazeera (4 August), see MEMRI clips no. 799 
& 791 [128]. 
543 Zawahiri (2005) [49]. 
544 Zawahiri (2005) ‘The Victory of the Islamic Religion in Iraq,’ published by As-Sahab (6 December), 
available from IntelCenter (2008) [26]. 
545 Bin Ladin (2004) untitled statement published by As-Sahab (29 October), secured via link from 
Islamist web forums [31]; Zawahiri (2006) ‘Bajawr Massacre and the Lies of the Crusaders,’ published by 
As-Sahab (21 January), available in Ibrahim (2007) and IntelCenter (2008) [51]. 
546 Zawahiri (2006) [21]. 
547 Zawahiri (2007) [97]. 
548 Zawahiri (2007) [23]. 
549 Zawahiri (2008) ‘The Correct Equation,’ published by As-Sahab (22 January), available from 
IntelCenter (2008), also available as a collection of clips posted on YouTube [28]. 
550 Bin Ladin (2007) [10]. Similar tone and direction is applied to other non-Muslim audiences, addressed 
as holistic entities rather than multifaceted societies with a range of opinions, e.g. towards the French in 
some of bin Ladin’s last communiqués (see: bin Ladin (2011) ‘From al-Sheikh Osama bin Mohammed bin 
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7.2.2 Softer appeals 
 
An alternative version of these messages directed towards non-Muslim publics at large 
present the Al-Qa’ida leadership as a fair operator. These ‘softer’ appeals and 
conciliatory approaches also place the onus for implementing change squarely on the 
public, thus implicitly underscoring justifications for violence when the general 
population ‘fails’ to react to appeals from the leadership. The coding found 29 
communiqués containing examples of these ‘softer’ approaches in the dataset (see items 
in Appendix 3.7b). Bin Ladin, for instance, made several appeals to the ‘American 
people,’ urging them to select a ‘serious’ government that looked out for their interests 
rather than their own material gain.551 After all, Americans had ‘risen against their 
government’s war in Vietnam’ and were thus urged to do the same today in order to 
‘stop the massacre of Muslims by their government.’552 Bin Ladin recognised that both 
sides had suffered during this war, arguing that the US government’s ‘hands are stained 
with the blood of all those killed from both sides, all for the sake of oil and keeping their 
private companies in business. The American public that voted for those in power thus 
held the key to ending hostilities: ‘your security is in your own hands.’553 In order to do 
this, all Americans had to free themselves from the ‘ideological terrorism’ of the 
neoconservatives and the Israel lobby and were urged to ‘work with’ the Al-Qa’ida 
leadership to amend US foreign policy.554 
 Any collective ‘failure’ to recognise such initiatives thus implied common guilt. 
As mentioned above, moreover, both leaders extended several invitations to Islam, in 
order to underline the position of the leadership as a ‘true’ vanguard. This ensured the 
people of the West had been presented with options and alternatives to insecurity and 
potential targeting by the Al-Qa’ida leadership.555 Traditional proselytising, however, 
also featured, as the ‘weak and oppressed’ of the world and all victims of America were 
invited to Islam in order to benefit from the strikes of the mujahideen.556 Further 
‘options’ were presented through offers of cease-fires and peace treaties, in response to 
‘positive reactions’ in the West where members of the public displayed their opposition 
towards war in opinion polls and through public protests.557 Again, however, the 
responsibility of securing a pledge declaring that the West would not ‘attack Muslims or 
interfere in their business’ and ensuring the ‘departure of its last soldier from our land’ 
lay squarely with the ambiguously-defined ‘people’ to whom the messages were 
                                                                                                                                           
laden to... The French people,’ published by As-Sahab (22 January), secured via Islamist web forums 
[231]). 
551 Zawahiri (1993) [99]. 
552 Bin Ladin (2001) [125]. 
553 Bin Ladin (2004) [83]. 
554 Bin Ladin (2009) ‘A Statement to the American People,’ published by As-Sahab (13 September), 
translated and distributed by the Global Islamic Media Front, secured via Islamist web forums [144]. 
555 Numerous invitations to Islam were communicated through the messages, with Islam presented as an 
alternative to insecurity, capitalism and immoral materialism. See: bin Ladin (2002) ‘A Message 
Addressed to the American People,’ message aired on Al Jazeera (6 October), IntelCenter (2008) [75]; Bin 
Ladin (2002) [212]; Zawahiri (2005); Zawahiri & Gadahn (2006) ‘An Invitation to Islam,’ video message 
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556 Zawahiri (2006) [21]; Zawahiri (2007) [23]. 
557 Bin Ladin (2004) statement offering peace treaty to Europeans, audiotape distributed to media networks 
(14 April), transcript available in Ibrahim (2007) [52]; bin Ladin (2004) [80]; bin Ladin (2006) message to 
Americans, audiotape distributed to media networks (19 January), transcript available from Ibrahim (2007) 
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directed.558 This study suggests, therefore, that the Al-Qa’ida leadership demonstrates its 
confidence and conviction of both the validity of its message and its ability to represent 
Muslims in its statements directed towards holistic non-Muslim audiences. Even more 
vital for the leadership, however, is the way in which Zawahiri and bin Ladin hone their 
messages through addressing Muslim audiences directly.  
  
 
 
7.3 Approaching Muslims 
 
Through directing the content of the message towards specific Muslim audiences, 
linkages are formed between diagnostic and prognostic message elements. This happens 
through explicit appeals for specific action and general mobilisation of the ummah and 
the elaboration of consequences for those who fail to heed such calls and identification 
of ‘false prophets’ and treacherous leaders. Thus, the coding measured the nature of 
appeals to Muslim audiences, criticism of Muslims and takfiri elements declaring 
apostasy in order to assess the construction and composition of this element of the 
motivational frames. The ability of the leadership to communicate the diagnostic and 
prognostic components that lie at the heart of the Al-Qa’ida movement depends on the 
quality and nature of the rapport with their ‘constituents.’ 
 For the Al-Qa’ida leadership the communiqués provide an essential vehicle 
allowing Zawahiri and bin Ladin to address ‘constituents’ and potential supporters. 
Thus, almost every communiqué analysed contained specific messages, advice and 
appeals to the ‘Islamic nation’ or individual Muslim communities. ‘On our path to 
reform’, bin Ladin wrote in an open letter to the people of Saudi Arabia in 1995, ‘we are 
tasked with bringing the regime’s dangers to the attention of the people.’559 The 
communiqués are designed to prod the wider Muslim population to act. The ummah 
must ‘wake up from their sleep’560 and mobilise. ‘The situation that Muslims are living 
in today requires the mobilization of everyone who belongs to this religion and the 
utilization of his resources.’561 By extension, Muslims must recognise their individual 
obligation to respond to the situation that affects them all collectively: ‘It is obligatory 
upon the Ummah with all its groups and sections and its men and women, young and 
old, to provide themselves, their wealth, their expertise, and all types of moral and 
material support what suffices to carry on the Jihad in the fields of Jihad.’562 
 
7.3.1 Motivational appeals 
 
Motivational appeals towards Muslims convey a sense of superiority and perceived 
experience and knowledge that the Al-Qa’ida leaders seek to communicate to their 
audiences.  This element formed a very prominent part of the discursive approach 
towards Muslims throughout the period under review (see Appendix 3.8a). The 
communiqués present advice on how to be a good Muslim and how to support the jihad, 
enabling bin Ladin and Zawahiri to ‘motivate the nation to support its mujahideen sons 
                                                
558 Bin Ladin (2004) [52]. 
559 Bin Ladin (1995) ‘Prince Sultan and the Air Aviation Commissions’, Committee for Advice and 
Reform (11 July), Harmony Archive (AFGP-2002-003345), Department of Defense [68]. 
560 Bin Ladin (2001) [129]. 
561 Bin Ladin (2003) statement reported and published in Al-Sharq al-Awsat (19 January), available in 
FBIS: Compilation [216]. 
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financially and morally’ with ‘men, money, equipment and expertise.’563 Muslims are 
reminded of their duties, responsibilities and obligations that reflect the leadership’s 
geographic ambition at the given moment and are based on the diagnostic elements of 
the communiqués and the specific prognostic elaborations provided.  
The coding found that the leaders seek to incite believers and encourage them to 
act according to these principles, promising them that ‘victory is imminent.’564 ‘We seek 
to instigate the nation,’ bin Ladin remarked, ‘to get up and liberate its land, to fight for 
the sake of God, and to make the Islamic law the highest law, and the word of God the 
highest word of all […] people must do all they can to rouse the nation with all the 
means in their power; with their tongues, pens, and persons.’565 In this way, emotional 
appeals introduce and justify the desired course of action: ‘O nation of Islam,’ bin Ladin 
implored, ‘rise against injustice and tyranny, oppression and aggression, and humiliation 
and degradation. Bread is not more dear to us than our religion, nor is money more 
precious than our honor, or death more difficult than our sense of humiliation and 
degradation.’ As a response, the ummah should: ‘stage public demonstrations and 
exercise civil disobedience until the overthrow of the traitorous governments;’ ‘disown 
the leaders of disbelief and hypocrisy;’ ‘[strike] at US interests in the world in general 
and on the land of our Arab and Islamic nation in particular;’ ‘[boycott] US and Jewish 
goods;’ ‘[kill] Americans and Jews with a bullet, a knife, or a stone;’ and ‘[back] the 
mujahidin and [give] them every encouragement and support.’566 
 This message is underscored with a clear delineation of correct behaviour and 
consequences for collective failure: ‘if we sacrifice the rule of sharia and bestow 
legitimacy on those who sell nations and sign the surrender agreements [...] we will lose 
both religion and the present life and the land will remain occupied, injustice present, 
and sanctities violated.’567 By extension, such divisions between righteousness and 
infidelity eliminate the possibility for Muslims to be passive observers. They have only 
two choices: ‘do you belong in the party of America, Israel, France, Russia and their 
allies among the apostate rulers of our countries, their assistants, their soldiers, their 
journalists, their judges, and their clerics who spread confusion, pledge allegiance to 
them, and call them the care takers of the Muslims’ affairs?’ Zawahiri asked. ‘Or, do you 
belong in the party of the monotheistic, Salafi Mujahideen?’568 
Muslims were warned in the communiqués analysed not to be deceived by false 
initiatives but to follow the vanguard and the limited number of scholars and leaders 
who have set a good example (identified in the same communiqués). Muslims are asked 
to remain steadfast despite the challenges they face and recognise the power they can 
wield if properly guided. The ummah is the ‘greatest human power on the face of the 
Earth [but] only if it establishes Islam properly.’569 The key to success, according to the 
material coded, is unity. ‘Have full trust in the victory of Allah,’ Zawahiri urged his 
audience, ‘and know that America has no power against you, if you unite as one body in 
its face.’570 ‘Unity is mercy and division is torture.’571 This was not about allegiance to a 
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566 Bin Ladin (2002) statement published in Al-Quds Al-Arabi (28 March) also distributed through 
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particular group, but to the collective objective (as interpreted by Al-Qa’ida) of the 
entire ummah. The battle ‘is not of a group or organization, but is the battle of the entire 
Ummah.’572 
Aside from the inevitability of success if unity is achieved, other, softer, appeals 
were detected that were designed to raise the morale of the ‘nation’ and foment feelings 
of collective belonging. These include messages of condolence for communities that 
have suffered natural or man-made disasters and empathy for those experiencing long-
term turmoil such as in Palestine. Those who suffered are assured they are not alone 
whilst others are urged to do what they can to help. The ummah was also occasionally 
thanked, in the material coded for its support and praised for its resilience in the face of 
hostilities. Increasingly, however, criticism has become a more common feature of the 
communiqués than gratitude, as will be discussed in detail below. 
When the messages did not convey collective appeals, specific communities and 
regions were identified whose support and attention was perceived as particularly 
important. The groups identified included: scholars and other members of the (righteous) 
religio-political elite; members of the security forces; traders, merchants and wealthy 
Muslims; the men of the (jihadi) media; Muslim women (whose role is seen as passive); 
writers; tribes and clans; prisoners and, in particular; young Muslims. 
The coding revealed the Muslim youth was especially significant in this fight 
since ‘Mohammed’s companions were young men.’573 The younger generation is key in 
toppling ‘apostate’ regimes and establishing a Shari’ah state as it constitutes the 
mainstay of the mujahideen forces. Convincing young men of this duty is therefore 
crucial: ‘although Jihad in person is obligatory upon the entire Ummah, then it is even 
more obligatory upon the youths in the prime of their lives than upon the old.’574 Their 
dedication to the Shari’ah cause has to be absolute and all conventional aspirations of 
young people wanting to gain a skill, become educated and secure a good job must take 
second place. Muslims must not ‘go astray’ and aspire to become ‘a minister, an 
ambassador, a director, a wealthy person, a notable, a distinguished writer, a skilful 
physician, a successful engineer or a prosperous businessman, [in this case] we will lose 
the afterlife and we will be defeated in this world.’575 The Islamic elite is also seen as 
having a particular role in this universal uprising: 
 
I call upon the Muslim clerics, the writers, the thinkers, the tradesmen, the merchants, and 
the officers to convene and deliberate on the ways to get rid of these corrupt and corrupting 
regimes that burden our nation. I call upon them to start preparing for a change, however 
much time and effort it takes, and to spread the call for change throughout the nation. They 
must know that victory comes at a price, since a dark destiny awaits us unless we resist.576 
 
In the communiqués analysed, Muslims are urged to appreciate their individual 
obligation in rising up against secularism and perceived occupation and recognise the 
need to unify the entire ummah under this single cause, supporting the Al-Qa’ida 
vanguard to ensure its victory, as well as allies such as the Taliban. Zawahiri dedicated 
his memoirs, Knights under the Banner of the Prophet, largely to this cause: ‘This book 
was written in an attempt to revive the Muslim nation's awareness of its role and duty, its 
importance, and the duties that it needs to perform.’577 Contrasting the majority of his 
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output, Zawahiri’s book emphasised the obligations of Al-Qa’ida and its affiliates, rather 
than just those of ordinary Muslims: 
 
The jihad movement must come closer to the masses, defend their honour, fend off 
injustice, and lead them to the path of guidance and victory. […] We must win the people's 
confidence, respect, and affection. The people will not love us unless they felt that we love 
them, care about them, and are ready to defend them. […] We must not blame the nation for 
not responding or not living up to the task. Instead, we must blame ourselves for failing to 
deliver the message, show compassion, and sacrifice.578 
 
As Al-Qa’ida was forced to flee its sanctuary in Afghanistan and the Taliban regime was 
toppled, this study found that appeals to Muslims for support became more desperate. In 
2002, Zawahiri wrote a book imploring Muslims to realise their duty in uniting against 
the global front of infidelity and its secular ‘agents’: ‘We call the Ummah - on all its 
factions, classes, and groups - to join the caravan of jihad', which consists of: ‘staying 
clear of idolatrous tyrants, warfare against infidels, loyalty to the believers, and jihad in 
the path of Allah.’579  
In order to fulfil this obligation, Muslims will have to abandon their attachment to 
earthly pleasures and ambitions. They must ‘shun a life of play, amusement, 
extravagance and fun, and prepare [themselves] for the real life of killing, fighting, 
striking, and damaging.’580 Reflecting on the ‘Obstacles to Jihad’, Zawahiri argued: 
 
The first battle Muslims need to win is with themselves - that is the key to beating the 
Crusaders. This battle is with weakness, hesitation, attachment to the earth, inability, fear, 
position, standing, family, children and wealth. The enemies are victorious against the 
Muslims for two reasons only: fear and hesitation of the Ummah and ignorance of warfare 
and fighting.581 
 
The communiqués coded demonstrated that, in the eyes of Al-Qa’ida, failure to mobilise 
would have drastic consequences. ‘If you leave Baghdad today’, bin Ladin warned in a 
2006 statement to Muslims, ‘then you will leave Damascus, Amman, the Gulf, and 
Riyadh tomorrow.’ Muslims were urged to ‘be cautious of the consequences of 
procrastination.’582 ‘It is a duty of Muslims to pledge allegiance to the “most sincere” 
[i.e. Al-Qaida and its affiliates] and follow them in the establishment of the Islamic 
state’, bin Ladin argued. Having described the problem and presented the solution, the 
Al-Qa’ida leadership thus had to inspire the ummah to go forth and support the jihad: 
‘Stop playing around, listen, understand, wake up and pay attention [...] rush forward 
and do your duty [...] today Baghdad, and tomorrow Damascus, Amman, and Riyadh.’583 
 Regional emphases in the appeals are directed towards geographic concentrations 
deemed essential to the successful completion of specific tasks. Several messages thus 
impress on Kurds, Iraqis, Pakistanis, Lebanese, Somalis, Turks and others to rise up 
against their secular and treacherous leaders and fight those who cooperate with 
coalition forces and their allies. Concerned over the appeal of local groups in the West 
Bank and Gaza, moreover, bin Ladin and Zawahiri both address Palestinians directly, 
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seeking to direct them from being deceived by ‘political solutions and regional deals’584 
and demanding instead that Palestinians declare that ‘they will take action to support the 
cause of establishing the Caliphate and fight until Allah's word reigns supreme.’585 The 
coding, therefore, established how wide ranging appeals seek to unite the Islamic world 
under the leadership of Al-Qa’ida and the mujahideen. They also appear, on occasions, 
to include references to Shia Muslims, or at least the followers of the first three Imams, 
Ali bin Abi Talib, al-Hasan and al-Husayn.586  
The crucial organising principle is the implementation of God’s law. Overthrow 
of tyrants or other more immediate goals do not suffice: the struggle must continue, 
according to the communiqués. Indeed, Zawahiri called on those who had successfully 
toppled the Tunisian and Egyptian regimes to continue fighting until shari’ah was 
established.587 The reason is that ruling classes and elites in the Arab and Islamic world, 
as well as the security establishment and intelligentsia, have become polluted by ideas 
and individuals who seek to undermine the establishment of God’s law in favour of 
pursuing materialistic ambitions and secular principles. Were Mubarak, for instance, to 
be replaced with Muhammad El-Baradei, who, according to Zawahiri, ‘lives in Vienna’ 
and visits Egypt ‘in his free time,’ nothing would change.588 This is based on the 
assumption that some who claim to be Muslim have in fact committed such grave sins 
that they have ‘nullified’ their creed and left the fold of Islam. This principle of takfir, 
which Meijer described as ‘a monster mainstream Salafism desperately tries to keep in 
its cage while other currents within the movement have done their best to let it escape,’ 
thus has important implications for targeting, as noted above.589 
 
7.3.2 Apostasy 
 
This study found that Takfirism in the Al-Qa’ida communiqués analysed, however, is not 
applied limitlessly or without caution. Initially, moreover, the focus of these accusations 
was primarily on elites, presented as abnormal as well as immoral, and their immediate 
support networks. Early references also relied more on context and ‘implicit 
excommunication’ which stopped short of declaring apostasy in favour of describing 
behaviour and supposed consequences. A degree of escalation, therefore, or at least 
elaboration, was detected in the coding, for instance, in bin Ladin’s criticism of Saudi 
authorities.  
 Early messages and ‘open letters’ thus focused on the record of the Saudi 
leadership and the damage these inflicted, in terms of spreading disunity, worsening the 
economy and strengthening the enemy.590 There was no doubt that this involved a 
betrayal of Islam, however, as these actions would bring the Saudi authorities ‘shame in 
this world and torture in hell.’591 Rather than being a guardian of the holiest places, the 
royal family was driving people away from Islam, acted out of hatred of Islam and its 
‘true’ preachers and strove to fight against it.592 Although bin Ladin’s early 
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communiqués focused in some detail on economic plight, insecurity and lack of social 
justice within the Arabian Peninsula, he was quick to emphasise these were merely 
symptoms of far more profound crimes orchestrated by the Saudi regime. ‘Our 
differences with the Saudi Regime surpass important incidental matters like economic 
collapse, administrative corruption, oppressing the people and confiscating their legal 
rights,’ bin Ladin argued in July 1995. ‘These differences become more important, 
greater, and deep-rooted matters [when concerning] the basic matter of the requirements 
of monotheism.’ The Saudi regime had ‘abandoned these concepts, and thus […] 
completely lost its legitimacy.’593 Rather than being only politically or economically 
inept, the regime had declared ‘war against Islam and those calling for an 
implementation of its teachings.’594 'Whoever permits himself or others to follow a 
positive or man-made law is transgressing God’s Law and therefore is an infidel and an 
apostate who no longer belongs to our religious community,’ bin Ladin declared in 
another open letter to the Saudi regime in August 1995. It was clear that the Saudi King 
had ‘committed the forbidden things in Islam which nullify its validity before God. The 
devastating failure and the dishonourable corruption which have been proven against 
your regime,’ bin Ladin continued, ‘are enough reasons to overthrow it.’595 The regime 
had ‘deviated from Islam and […] committed apostasy.’596 It is important to note, 
however, that the focus of these declarations and denunciations was on the regime as a 
whole and its track record. Arguing its actions went against the core tenets of Islam was 
crucial in order to justify any action against it. Misdeeds and corruption alone did not 
suffice to justify the overthrow of a regime, however unrepresentative, or question its 
legitimacy. This could only be done when it had been demonstrated that the regime was 
hostile to the interests of Islam.597  
Similar labels could thus be attached to other regimes in the region. Aside from 
the side-lining of Islamic jurisprudence and legal codes (according to the leadership’s 
interpretation), domestic association and cooperation with the great infidel forces of the 
West would provide further evidence of the apostasy and illegitimacy of such regimes. 
The coding of message elements given in Appendix 3.8b found references presenting 
political elites in the Islamic world as ‘agents’ of the West, traitors, ‘rulers of 
debauchery’ and ‘stooges,’ even as governments created by the Americans to begin with 
as ‘treacherous puppet regimes,’ such as those in power in Afghanistan, Iraq and the 
Palestinian territories.598 More significantly, however, the coding found condemnation of 
political elites frequently involved the excommunication of anyone involved in the wider 
decision-making process who aids or legitimises secular governance and cooperation 
with the West. Zawahiri spoke of the ‘huge armies of traitors consisting of soldiers, 
writers, teachers, artists, judges, legislators, journalists and media people’ that supported 
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these regimes ‘against the Muslims and their Jihadist vanguard,’ ‘[selling] Islam in 
exchange for benefits and security.’599 Worst of all, however, were the ulema, members 
of the religious establishment qualified in Islamic teachings and law, who could 
seriously undermine and question the quality of Al-Qa’ida’s, and especially Zawahiri’s, 
anti-secular message. Scholars and the religiously ordained were thus especially 
chastised in the material coded for uttering support for impious systems of governance 
and secular leaders who were seen to rely on these ‘religious scholars of beggary, the 
ulema of flattery and the philosophers of defeat’ to legitimise their actions.600 These 
scholars ‘sold’ their fatawa as ‘commodities’ in exchange for power and influence in 
order to please the heretic ruling class.601 ‘The long beards, huge turbans, majestic titles, 
purported lineages and popular myths,’ Zawahiri argued, ‘are no substitute for the truth 
and cannot conceal the crimes of cooperation with the Crusaders, loyalty to the infidel 
invaders and killing of the Muslims in Iraq and Afghanistan.’602  
Another crucial and powerful source of influence upon which the political elites 
and foreign ‘Zionist-Crusaders’ relied was the military. The embedding and popularity 
of the armed forces in the Middle East and beyond, however, would render it 
problematic to declare large swathes of its rank and file apostates. Additionally, of 
course the army, especially the Egyptian Army, had produced fine recruits for the jihad, 
including Anwar Sadat’s assassins. Nevertheless, if soldiers followed corrupt rulers or 
military leaders they would be seen as complicit, Zawahiri warned in his first set of 
responses to the ‘Open meeting,’ adding, however, that he would not recommend the 
declaring of whole armies as apostate, as there were certain ‘particulars’ involved.603 
Indeed, during the ‘Arab Spring,’ when the Egyptian Army became the most powerful 
(and popular) political organisation in the country, Zawahiri noted that although the 
generals were ‘in the pockets of the Americans and Israel’ there certainly were 
honourable people within its ranks.604 In relation to the Pakistani military the immediate 
stakes have been higher, however, and anxiety over on-going operations against Taliban 
and Al-Qa’ida loyalists by the Afghan border greater. As a result, the communiqués have 
declared soldiers in the Pakistani army ‘enemies of Islam’ and ‘hunting dogs’ of the 
Zionist-Crusader alliance whose eternal abode in the hereafter will be hellfire, unless 
they mend their ways and recant.605 The significance of such holistic declarations of 
apostasy is clear in light of the high ratio of terrorist attacks in Pakistan targeting 
members and recruits of the army and security apparatus. Another watershed in the 
widening of takfiri rhetoric in the Al-Qa’ida leadership communiqués was the Iraq 
insurgency and the perceived need to foment chaos and derail US- and coalition-
sponsored attempts by the government in Baghdad to increase stability.   
 Within the context of the Iraq war, bin Ladin reminded Muslims that ‘supporting 
the infidels against Muslims is one of the ten things that nullify Islam, as stipulated by 
scholars.’606 Those who assisted the occupying forces, the government in Baghdad or 
embraced any institution derived from these illegitimate entities had therefore committed 
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major sin and left ‘the community of Muslims.’ As a result it would be permissible to 
‘spill their blood and take their property’ and their marriages would be annulled.607 Jihad 
had come to Iraq and failing to support and participate in holy war against foreign 
invaders and their local ‘agents’ would not be a ‘forgivable stumble’608 but a ‘cardinal 
sin.’609 Furthermore, any Iraqis or other Muslims who expressed discomfort with the 
levels of violence displayed by jihadis, which often targeted normal Iraqi citizens, and 
acknowledged the legitimacy of the post-invasion ruling order ‘by hand, tongue or pen’ 
had ‘no right to live.’610 
 The longitudinal study found that these notions of what can be termed ‘apostasy 
by thought,’ which can apply to any member of society, appear to have evolved 
considerably from the earlier communiqués that focused on and traced in detail the 
actions of unrepresentative leaders in the Arabian Peninsula. The coding revealed that 
Zawahiri, however, appears to have accepted such wide-ranging takfiri rhetoric much 
earlier, during his time with Al-Jihad. A document issued on behalf of the group in 1993, 
for instance, which was authored or commissioned by Zawahiri, warned that ‘someone 
who claims to be a Muslim and cites a democratic or socialist thinker becomes an 
unbeliever and an apostate.’611 This issue of nationalism, socialism and democracy or 
secularism as an alternative belief system to (violent extremist) Islam that, by extension, 
rendered anyone involved in such movements an apostate, featured prominently in 
Zawahiri’s output later as he condemned supporters of Turkish secularism, the 
Palestinian Authority, Palestinian nationalist movements and similar platforms. Even 
Hamas was accused of taking a ‘ride with the American devil and his Saudi 
representative,’612 although Zawahiri later pledged solidarity with the movement if it 
corrected its ‘march.’613 Fundamentally, however, the study found there would be no 
respite for those who claimed to be ‘democratic Muslims’ or support participation in 
democratic societies. This would be no different from saying ‘I am a “Jewish Muslim”, 
or I am a “Christian Muslim:” they are ‘apostate infidel[s],’ Zawahiri argued in his book 
on the Muslim Brothers, The Bitter Harvest.614 Any dilution of the creed, as interpreted 
by Al-Qa’ida, was tantamount to abrogation of all of its tenets and the creation of a ‘new 
religion,’ a ‘fairy tale’ that the Americans and apostates called ‘enlightened 
moderation.’615  
 
7.3.3 The Shia  
 
When it comes to questioning and judging the sincerity of a Muslim’s faith, 
conventional wisdom would suggest Shia Muslims would be particular targets of angry 
condemnation in the communiqués for alleged deviation from the ‘true’ path. Much of 
the diagnostic and prognostic narrative is based on puritanical interpretations of Islamist 
doctrine and a nostalgic aspiration to revive the spirit that prevailed during the time of 
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the Prophet Mohammed and his companions. As Fradkin notes, Salafist glorification of 
the Salaf as-Salih brings to the forefront: 
 
The historical circumstances that eventually led to the division of Sunnis and Shiites, and 
the original quarrels which energized the hostility between them. Since Shiites detest and 
even publicly revile the first three caliphs, as well as others of the Salaf, the general 
orientation of modern Sunni Islamism was bound to deepen the already potent divide 
between it and Shiism, including Shiite Islamism.616 
 
Based on this logic and the policy of Al-Qa’ida’s affiliates in Iraq, Riedel argued that 
‘the anti-Shia violence promoted by al Qaeda’s leader in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, 
was not an aberration but a reflection of fundamental jihadist and al Qaeda thinking.’ 
Fomenting sectarian war and violence, targeting Shia populations in particular, was part 
of the overall Al-Qa’ida strategy and any misgivings over the level of violence displayed 
by Zarqawi were not aired publically, according to Riedel.617 Indeed, when asked about 
the Sunni-Shia hostilities in Iraq and how to stop them, Zawahiri seemed to suggest the 
Shia were the belligerents and that aggression was primarily aimed at Sunni districts: 
‘don't ask the one under attack not to defend himself,’ he demanded.618 Kepel and 
Milleli, meanwhile, take an alternative view, arguing anti-Shiism was not part of 
Zawahiri’s ‘stock in trade.’619 Kepel suggests that, on the issue of Iraq especially, 
Zawahiri tried to find common ground between Sunni and Shia populations. He points 
out that Zawahiri did not deride prime minister Nuri Al-Maliki as a Shia, but rather for 
his collaborative stance with the Americans, and appeared to make respectful references 
to Imams Ali and Husayn.620 The current analysis supports this latter observation. 
The coding process did reveal that some communiqués decried the alleged 
doctrinal deviation of Shiites. An early statement attributed to Zawahiri, for example, 
condemned the ‘heresy’ committed by (Twelver) Shiites in the way in which they 
‘distort[ed] […] the Quran and the image of the Islamic Caliphate.’621 Much later, the 
Shia were warned in the communiqués against collaborating with the government in 
Baghdad and accused of double standards, since they fought in Lebanon but not in 
Iraq.622 They were seen as being led by ‘unjust rulers’ and ‘religion traders’ who strove 
to collaborate with the invading forces. ‘We haven't heard even one Fatwa from one 
Shiite authority, whether in Iran or elsewhere, calling for Jihad against the Americans in 
Iraq and Afghanistan,’ Zawahiri complained in an ‘interview’ with As-Sahab published 
in December 2007.623 Indeed, the Shiite religious authorities had issued fatawa 
prohibiting fighting against the Americans in Iraq.624 The ‘Safavids,’ therefore, were 
‘stabbing the Ummah in the back in Afghanistan and Iraq,’ just as they had done when 
the Ottoman empire was about to conquer Austria.625 In relation to Iraq, the coding 
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revealed Shia Muslims were warned against attempting to fulfil any territorial ambitions 
through ‘severing’ southern Iraq and reminded that any collaboration with Americans or 
other external forces amounted to apostasy.626 Although he mostly avoided discussing 
sectarian issues in Iraq and the need to target Shiites, Zawahiri argued in the ‘open 
meeting’ that Sunnis were in fact a majority in Iraq if the Kurdish and Turkomen 
populations were aggregated and added to the number of Sunni Muslims in Baghdad and 
elsewhere.627 
This study suggests that much of the more recent animosity towards Shia 
Muslims, therefore, is based on concerns over the ability of the (Shia-dominated) 
government in Iraq to assert its control over the country. Sectarian division and doctrine-
based hatred towards Shia Muslims does not feature in the material under review in the 
same way it dominated much of Zarqawi’s output and some contemporary militant 
Islamist propaganda.628 The necessity of focusing on the common, far and distant, enemy 
impressed a degree of doctrinal flexibility and pragmatism that many more avowedly 
sectarian and Salafist activists would not find palatable. The coding found that this was 
particularly the case for bin Ladin, who argued in a 1997 interview: ‘The United States 
is the common enemy of both Iran and the Taleban. One day, relations between Iran and 
Afghanistan will improve […] If Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and China get united, the 
United States and India will become ineffective.’629 
The communiqués analysed clearly did not place primary emphasis on targeting 
Shia Muslims and they were not presented as targets for doctrinal reasons. The 
communiqués did encourage attacks against those who allow the state system to 
function, contribute to its security services, or collaborate with coalition forces. Indeed, 
even if those involved are Muslims, they can be targeted, as the above discussion 
demonstrates. Shiites may be in a majority position since the politics of Iraq work more 
in their favour, but in principal the culprits can be both Shia and Sunni, according to the 
material coded.  
In a 2004 statement bin Ladin explained: ‘The Iraqi who joins the renegade 
government to fight against the Mujahidin [...] is considered a renegade and one of the 
infidels, even if he were an Arab from the Rabi'ah or Mudar tribes.’630 Targeting 
justifications, according to the current study, therefore, are based on deeds and loyalties 
rather than strictly on creed, as they were for Zarqawi. The communiqués reveal that 
violence should be focused on coalition forces and on their domestic collaborators. 
Indeed attempts by Zarqawi and others to alter this target emphasis by focusing more on 
Shiites was met with cautionary advice from the Al-Qa’ida leadership, for example in 
Zawahiri’s letter to Zarqawi as mentioned above. A statement issued by Zawahiri shortly 
before Zarqawi’s death also appeared to contain veiled criticism:  ‘God knows better his 
[Zarqawi’s] hidden intents, which I hope are better than his public ones. O Abu Musab: 
Be patient, stand fast, and rely only on God.’631 Even bin Ladin’s ‘eulogy’ message for 
Zarqawi reemphasised that ‘whoever insisted on fighting along with the Crusaders 
against Muslims should be killed, regardless of their sect or tribe.’632 
This study found that criticism of Shia Muslims, as it appeared in the 
communiqués, was also occasionally tied to appeals relating to notions of Islamic 
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solidarity and even the Shiite legacy itself and feelings of historical pride. Zawahiri, for 
example, issued the following appeal to Shia Muslims in a video message from 
December 2006:  
 
And I call on [Shiites] to ask [themselves] a courageous and brave question: were Imam 
Ali [...] or our chief Hasan [...] or our chief Husayn [The first three Imams] present 
today in Iraq or Afghanistan, would they have colluded with the Crusaders in the 
invasion of the lands of Islam, and then cooperate with them and fight the Mujahideen in 
defence of them? […] Or would they have declared Jihad against them and those who 
help them?633 
 
Shiites were reminded that ‘the Mujahideen are the supporters of al-Husayn [...] and are 
his allies and soldiers.’634 ‘You obey al-Husayn [...] by obeying America?! And you 
raise the banner of al-Husayn [...] under the cross of America?!,’ Zawahiri lamented in a 
video statement issued in July 2007.635 The animosity expressed thus appeared to be 
linked to current affairs and alleged treachery of those who cooperated with the local 
government and coalition forces, rather than on doctrinal differences or foundational 
origins. In June 2011, Zawahiri even compared the ‘martyrdom’ of bin Ladin to the 
assassination of Al-Husayn in Karbala.636 When asked to explain his position regarding 
doctrinal issues vis-á-vis the Shia, Zawahiri retorted: ‘my stance towards the Shii'ite laity 
is [...] that they are excused through their ignorance.’ To those Shia Muslims who 
refrained from assisting the ‘Crusade,’ Zawahiri commented: ‘our way with them is 
invitation and displaying of facts, and clarifying the extent of the crimes committed by 
their leaders against Islam.’637  
The results form the coding thus show that the attitude towards Shia Muslims is 
far from congenial, but still far less hostile than that expressed by the likes of al-
Zarqawi. When Shiites are admonished in the communiqués the focus is on ‘corrupt’ 
leaders, and other actors, such as Iran, that shore up the ‘treacherous’ regime in 
Baghdad, risking to scuttle Al-Qa’ida’s plans in the region. Animosity is therefore 
qualified in this way, and often linked to specific actors. What is perhaps most striking 
from the longitudinal analysis in this regard, is the extent to which the issue of Shia 
mobilisation, the consolidation of Iranian influence in the region and other issues 
relating to power balances and militant groups in the Middle East and beyond are largely 
absent in the material coded. At the same time other developments have forced these 
issues onto the agenda of other Sunni groups and individuals prominent in the region. 
One potential source of tension is turmoil allegedly being generated by Sunni 
conversions to Shia Islam due to Iranian missionary work and region-wide admiration 
for Hezbollah (following the thirty-three day war between Lebanon and Israel in the 
summer of 2006) potentially undermining popular support for Sunni militant groups. 
Even Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, for example, who earlier had sought to alleviate tensions 
between Sunni and Shia sects, became more hostile towards the latter in his rhetoric.638 
This lack of attention in the Al-Qa’ida communiqués largely comes down to a question 
of emphasis. The Shia are certainly not potential allies or, necessarily even participants, 
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634 Zawahiri (2007) [102]. 
635 Zawahiri (2007) [102]. 
636 Zawahiri (2011) [239].  
637 Zawahiri (2008) [105]. 
638 Elad-Altman, I. (2007) ‘The Sunni-Shi’a Conversion Controversy,’ in Current Trends in Islamist 
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but their targeting is not prioritised. Arguably, both leaders have had plenty of 
opportunities to launch into elaborate juristic and theological attacks on Shiism but have, 
as the coding established, very rarely, if ever, chosen to do so. The leaders have instead 
decided to focus their statements and books on the alleged shortcomings of (those who 
claim to be) Sunni Muslims and the danger posed by foreign infidels. 
 Although targeting of enemies, adversaries and members of the wider ‘out-
group’ is an ever-present feature of the communiqués, these audiences do not constitute, 
what Wiktorowicz termed, ‘potential participants and broader publics.’639 Although 
multifaceted, multi-layered and geographically dispersed, this base consists of those 
communities and individuals whom the Al-Qa’ida leadership considers ‘true Muslims,’ 
as opposed to apostates and those who have ‘deviated’ from the true path to such an 
extent that they can no longer be seen as Muslims, according to the leadership. The 
nature of the connection between this corpus on the one hand and the Al-Qa’ida 
leadership on the other is thus crucial for the overall effectiveness of the collective 
action frames and, ultimately, the success and survivability of Al-Qa’ida. If normal 
Muslim publics are alienated and their concerns ignored, the leadership will fail to 
present Al-Qa’ida as the pious vanguard dedicated to the physical and moral defence of 
the ummah that it purports to represent.  
The coding and analysis of the communiqués under review, however, found that 
distinctions between apostates and ‘true’ Muslims failed to capture a dynamic and 
potentially damaging feature of the leadership’s communication towards the Muslim 
realm which relates to the extent to which criticism, condemnation and disdain have 
come to dominate significant proportions of this relationship. The last section of this 
chapter assesses the way in which this dynamic has evolved over the years. 
 
 
 
7.4 Criticising Muslims 
 
In a statement published by As-Sahab in March 2008, bin Ladin defined three ‘factions’ 
of Muslims. First were the mujahideen and their immediate supporters. These were the 
most heroic and righteous of all Muslims; the fighters who were prepared to sacrifice 
everything in order to replicate the spirit, practices and achievements of the Prophet and 
his companions. The second category referred to apathetic Muslims, those who had 
failed to support the mujahideen as they fought infidelity and injustice. Finally, the third 
faction of Muslims consisted of advocates of ‘Christian-Zionist’ intervention in Islamic 
affairs who were seen as apostates who had sinned and left the fold of Islam.640 The 
members of this last category were discussed in the section above on takfiri elements in 
the communiqués. The current section explores the extent to which other Muslims are 
placed within the two remaining categories, of supporters or bystanders, and the 
consequences of this selection.  
 Although not without controversy, the takfiri label that the Al-Qa’ida leadership 
attached to specific groups of Muslim leaders and other members of the elite, as well as 
corrupted and polluting ideational strands and movements, was relatively 
straightforward and echoed – and in some cases was more measured than – output from 
other militant Islamist groups. Criticism of Muslims that stopped short of 
                                                
639 Wiktorowicz (2004): 15. This refers to the base with which the messages are intended to resonate and 
the popular support that the leadership is trying to mobilise. 
640 Bin Ladin (2008) ‘A way for the salvation of Palestine,’ published by As-Sahab (20 March), secured 
via link from Islamist websites, transcript also available from the NEFA foundation [6]. 
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excommunication, however, was more complex. Broadly speaking, the analysis of 
coding results found that approaches towards the Muslim community in this regard can 
be divided into two main categories, depending on the intended audience: the elite and 
the wider public. The results of this aspect of coding are detailed in Appendix 3.9 and 
this material is analysed in the subsequent sections. Figure 7 places the aggregated 
communiqués described in Appendix 3.9 on a timeline covering the total period under 
review for the current study. Three distinct groupings are detected in the graphs 
presented: criticism of religio-political elites, together with the wider ummah; criticism 
of elites only and criticism that is directed primarily against the wider Islamic public. 
The 9/11 attacks are placed on the timeline in relation to these communiqués for 
illustrative purposes. As shown in the figure, criticism directed primarily against elites 
has been fairly consistent throughout the period under review. Denunciation of Muslim 
publics, however, is a more recent phenomenon. Although these sentiments were 
expressed prior to the 9/11 attacks, they appear to have been a particular feature of the 
post-9/11 discourse.  
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7.4.1 The religious elite 
 
Numerous communiqués throughout the period under review criticised and admonished 
specific members of the religious, political and activist elite. Indeed, in early 
communiqués this was a chief preoccupation of the leadership and was reflected in their 
output. Although mainstream politicians were quickly considered outside the realm of 
Islam, declaring ulema, or Islamic scholars, and leaders of Muslim groups apostates 
would have been much more problematic and beyond the classification deemed 
appropriate at the time.  
 The coding revealed how early communiqués focused criticism on individual 
scholars or movements following their alleged drift away from the ‘true’ interpretation 
of the faith. Such allegations, however, are distinct from those levied at ‘apostate’ rulers 
or their collaborators and allies. Many of the figures in question are religiously ordained 
and respected and cannot be easily challenged. Even when responding to the scathing 
criticism of Sayyid Imam al-Sharif, Zawahiri attempted to separate the ‘words’ from the 
person for whom he still claimed to have great respect,641 even though he later implied 
‘Dr Fadl’ had always been a marginal figure within Al-Jihad.642 
Nonetheless, those who advocate peaceful religious alternatives to the path 
described by Al-Qa’ida or legitimise semi-secular government systems, pose a 
considerable threat to militant Islamists as their ostensibly legitimate options undermine 
the notion that jihad is the only way to respond. This anxiety contributed to Zawahiri’s 
publication of Bitter Harvest and many subsequent works643 and bin Ladin’s letters to 
the Saudi grand mufti Ibn Baz. Other scholars were also warned such support for 
governments that failed to implement the Shari’ah would be ‘viewed as a disgrace [...] 
on the day of judgement.’644 
The current analysis revealed steadily escalating and irate denunciations of 
members of the ulema and Islamic organisations. Initial communiqués talked of ‘errors’ 
being made and expressed disbelief over some of the stances and declarations that were 
being disseminated, offering ‘polite advice’ to those who had erred.645 Later, in order to 
isolate those who issued fatawa that contradicted Al-Qa’ida’s public stance, bin Ladin 
sought to divide the ulema into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ scholars,646 noting the immense gulf 
that separated ‘scholars who act and the scholars who compromise.’647 This precluded 
the more problematic, potentially khawaarij, stance of condemning all ulema.  Scholars 
belonging to the latter category were chastised for their materialistic ambitions, 
closeness to secular leaders, acquiescence of foreign infiltration and other perceived ills. 
Failure to condemn the presence of foreign troops in Muslim countries or support for 
local leaders, provoked outrage within the Al-Qa’ida leadership, which accused ‘the 
scholars of evil and hired writers [of changing] their attitude to best suit the ruler.’648 
These ‘sellers of religion’ and ‘scholars of beggary’ needed to be isolated and fought 
wherever they could be found, as noted above.649 
                                                
641 Zawahiri (2008) [20]. 
642 Zawahiri (2008) [105]. 
643 See for example extensive criticism of the Brotherhood in Zawahiri (2008)  [107]. 
644 Bin Ladin (1994) [40]. 
645 E.g. Zawahiri (1993) [99]; bin Ladin (1994) [47]; bin Ladin (1994) [63]. 
646 Bin Ladin (1995) [67]. 
647 Bin Ladin (2003) [78]. 
648 Bin Ladin (2004) [84]; 
649 Zawahiri (2005) ‘Wills of the Knights of the London Raid,’ published by As-Sahab (15 November), 
transcript available in Ibrahim (2007) [53]. 
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7.4.2 Islamist militants 
 
The coding detected several examples of the Al-Qa’ida leadership lashing out against 
former colleagues and fellow militants. Former militants who have spoken out against 
the use of violence against unarmed civilians and Muslims in particular are potentially 
very problematic for the leadership, even though the extent of damage inflicted by such 
comments, especially considering several of the key figures involved were incarcerated 
when they published their criticisms, is contested. In addition to Sayyid Imam’s 
criticism, denunciations of militancy by other Egyptians, formerly prominent on the 
violent extremist scene, have prompted angry responses from Zawahiri in particular. One 
of the more embarrassing retractions involved members of Zawahiri’s own Al-Jihad, 
including Abu Yasir, who signed the February 1998 declaration in support of the 
establishment of the World Islamic Front against Jews and Crusaders. Less than a year 
later he and other members of Al-Jihad had renounced violence. In response, Zawahiri 
wrote a private letter warning Yasir and others that they would lose ‘both in this world in 
the thereafter’ as a result of the decision.650  
In relation to the Afghan jihad, moreover, the leadership was keen to emphasise 
that anything that detracted from the continuation and expansion of hostilities against 
infidels and their allies would put any military gains in jeopardy. This was no less 
important in relation to on-going operations in Afghanistan against NATO and the 
government in Kabul. Militant leaders including Burhanuddin Rabbani, Ahmed Shah 
Masud (who was assassinated by Al-Qa’ida operatives) and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (who 
since became a potent adversary of coalition forces in Afghanistan) were thus accused of 
fomenting discord among the mujahideen following Soviet withdrawal in Afghanistan, 
failing to support the Taliban government and liaising with the United Nations.651 
Ironically, as already mentioned, bin Ladin also criticised his Taliban hosts for the 
restrictions they imposed upon him even when ‘the United States is free to do whatever 
it feels like.’652 
More recently, other militant groups that have become more measured than Al-
Qa’ida in their approach towards violence have been the focus of criticism in the 
communiqués. This relates, in particular, to Hamas and Hezbollah, both likely rivals for 
public support, sympathy and attention in the Levant and beyond. Hamas, as mentioned, 
was accused of abandoning government by shari’ah, betraying Muslims in the Caucasus, 
of sacrificing ‘four-fifths’ of Palestine, and of other alleged shortcomings in increasingly 
angry outbursts from the Al-Qa’ida leadership. According to the coded material, 
Zawahiri was especially preoccupied with what he saw as a gradual abandonment of 
non-negotiable red lines that Al-Qa’ida was supposedly prepared to defend: ‘I took a 
gradual approach with HAMAS,’ Zawahiri argued, ‘from support to repeated advice to 
warning to general criticism.’653 Hamas had thus been something of a last bastion of 
hope for indigenous Palestinian groups to respond correctly to the challenges presented 
as other groups in the territories had, according to Zawahiri, ‘allied themselves with the 
devil, but lost Palestine.’654 Another reason for increased animosity towards the Hamas 
                                                
650 Zawahiri (1999), letter to Abu Yasir, published in Al-Shafey, M. ‘Al-Qaeda's Secret Emails’ in Al-
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651 Bin Ladin (1997) [154]; bin Ladin (1998) statement published in Islamabad-based newspaper (17 
January), available in FBIS: Compilation [159]. 
652 Bin Ladin (2001) [195]. 
653 Zawahiri (2008) [105]. 
654 Zawahiri (2001) [119]. 
Part III: The Al-Qa’ida Leadership Communiqués 
 152 
leadership of course, aside from ideological roots in the Muslim Brotherhood, was the 
group’s success in purging Gaza of Al-Qa’ida affiliates and loyalists.655  
In terms of references to Hezbollah from the coding, substantive and doctrinal 
reasons were also prominent in bin Ladin’s and Zawahiri’s critique of the group and 
Hassan Nasrallah, its Secretary-General, even though more immediate concerns over 
competition for public support no doubt played a prominent role. Indeed, the coding 
revealed that both bin Ladin and Zawahiri became more vocal in their criticism of 
Hezbollah after the 2006 war with Israel when, as mentioned above, Hezbollah managed 
to generate widespread support and admiration in the region. Hezbollah was presented in 
the communiqués as a largely secular organisation that had diluted any religious 
elements in its charter through cooperating and compromising with apostates and 
infidels and taking part in the party political process. The Al-Qa’ida leaders accused the 
group of failing to ‘liberate Palestine’ when opportunities permitted, of being reluctant to 
attack Israel and of ignoring the people of Gaza completely. Nasrallah was seen as a 
hypocrite who secretly liaised with the UN and other non-pious elements in the region in 
order to maximise his power and influence. Zawahiri even compared Nasrallah to his 
archenemy, Hosni Mubarak.656 Bin Ladin drew parallels between Hezbollah and the 
hated regimes of Anwar Sadat and king Hussein of Jordan.657 Interestingly, however, the 
coding found that Hezbollah’s Shia credentials were rarely the focus of criticism.  
 As the perceived pinnacle of a vanguard, it is hardly surprising that the Al-Qa’ida 
leadership admonishes Islamic elites and activist networks that purport to provide 
alternative prognosis, even when problem diagnosis is often similar and even when both 
compete for much the same grass root support in order to retain legitimacy and 
relevancy. Much more significant is the way in which the leadership approaches this 
grass root support and any evidence suggesting the general public is seen to have failed 
Al-Qa’ida and, by extension, the legacy of the Prophet. 
 
7.4.3 ‘The nation has failed to support us’ 
 
The processing of communiqués found that prior to the 9/11 attacks very few references 
were made that were critical of the general Muslim population. The ummah was warned 
in this material that ‘whoever denies even a minor tenet of our religion, commits the 
gravest sin in Islam.’ However, the coding established that most of the content from the 
1990s traced responsibility squarely back to elites and decision makers.658 The 
authorities and members of the ulema were accused of seeking to ‘anesthetise’ the 
Muslim population with alternative versions of Islam that appeared to have had some 
impact on the youth and others who did not know better.659 The general population in 
this sense is seen as gullible and susceptible to such impious forces unless lead by a 
vanguard of righteous mujahideen to whom the ummah owes loyalty. This provides 
context and a sense of purpose to the diagnostic and prognostic findings presented in the 
communiqués.  
 In a statement issued together with bin Ladin and aired on Al Jazeera a year 
before the 9/11 attacks, the traditionally more scathing Zawahiri complained that 
Muslims had spoken much but done little to fight the ‘tyrannical’ and infidel enemies 
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that were damaging the interests of Muslims.660 In his introduction to a new jihadi 
magazine published in Egypt during this period, Zawahiri warned that a new Islamic 
generation had grown up that had adopted Western-influenced norms and practices that 
were far removed from the traditional ‘Islamic manners and behaviours.’661 To address 
this deviation, it was essential for the Al-Qa’ida vanguard to guide the ummah to the 
correct path through the dissemination of communiqués directed towards the general 
public. Warnings and criticisms of Muslims, especially during the late 1990s when bin 
Ladin still dominated output, were still infrequent in the communiqués, however, and 
often qualified and limited in important ways. Thus the coding revealed references from 
several communiqués leading up to the 9/11 attacks where wealthy Muslims were 
warned especially of their obligation to support the mujahideen and to be aware of the 
distractions caused by the accumulation of wealth. In a statement published online in 
May 2005, bin Ladin condemned all Muslims who sought to secure worldly gains rather 
than live by the tenets of the faith.662 ‘We live in a world where the majority of the 
people constantly worry about accumulating wealth,’ bin Ladin complained a year later, 
asking: ‘how should I correct those who sell themselves for a few pennies?’663 For 
Muslims, this was a particularly important moral question, given the extent of suffering 
that affected so many, especially in Palestine: ‘how can the wealthy hold on to their 
riches when the Palestinians are defending themselves without arms?’664 
 The aftermath of the 9/11 attacks brought unprecedented pressures on the Al-
Qa’ida leadership, which was forced to flee its haven in Afghanistan and abandon the 
support networks that had been established in the country. The impact of this pressure 
and the need to secure support from the wider Muslim population to compensate for the 
loss of Taliban protection was reflected in the communiqués analysed. In one of his first 
statements after the attacks, bin Ladin warned Muslims that those who failed to support 
the new jihad in Afghanistan and Pakistan against America, its local allies and coalition 
forces, would face the wrath of God on the Day of Judgement.665 Although hailed as a 
huge success for Al-Qa’ida and for the interests the leadership purported to represent, 
the current study found – based on coding of messages directed towards Muslim 
audiences – that the attacks mark the beginning of a shift in addresses towards normal 
Muslims. After the 9/11 attacks, the messages gradually became increasingly irate, and 
criticism – even condemnation  – of the general population, the ummah that Al-Qa’ida 
claims to represent, became a prominent feature of the discourse. A central theme, 
according to the coding, was the perceived need for Muslims to realise that aid and 
support for Al-Qa’ida and the mujahideen fighting in Afghanistan and Pakistan was the 
duty of all Muslims irrespective of where they lived. A month after the commencement 
of hostilities in Afghanistan, bin Ladin released a statement to Al Jazeera warning that 
‘anyone who lines up behind Bush in this campaign has committed one of the ten actions 
that sully one’s Islam.’ Strikes against the Taliban in Afghanistan were merely part of a 
wider conspiracy against Muslims who all needed to unite under one banner.666 Muslims 
were lying in slumber, failing to realise their duty and living in a world of ‘laziness and 
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discontent’ that was causing an acute crisis for defenders of the creed. 667 ‘For how long 
will real men be in short supply?’ bin Ladin asked in a poem posted online in June 
2002.668 A year after the US and its allies invaded Afghanistan in response to 9/11, bin 
Ladin reflected upon the developments over the past twelve months and the wider 
implications for the current state of the Islamic nation, lamenting the absence of popular 
support: 
 
My mujahidin brothers and I were grieved when we saw our nation in the east and west 
watching the United States, the head of unbelief, afflicting the worst of torment on the 
oppressed men, women, and children while the nation watched the painful scene as if it 
was watching an entertainment movie. […] If every Muslim asks himself why has our 
nation reached this state of humiliation and defeat, then his obvious answer is because it 
rushed madly for the comforts of life and discarded the Book of Allah behind its 
back.[…] Today, the nation has failed to support us and support the loyal ones from the 
students of religion who established the first Islamic state in Afghanistan that applied 
Allah's shari'ah.669 
 
If Muslims continued to fail to rise up against these forces of infidelity, ‘then everybody 
will be sinful’670 and remain sinful until the ummah ‘produces her sons, her wealth and 
her power to the extent of being able to wage Jihad and defend against the evil of the 
disbelievers.’671 At a time of great volatility for the leadership, therefore, the onus was 
very much on the Muslim general public to come to its aid. When coding results for the 
two leaders were compared, it emerged that for the past decade, however, criticism of 
Muslims has been far more vocal, hard-hitting and general in Zawahiri’s output who 
blames normal Muslims, rather than himself or Al-Qa’ida, for the lack of mobilisation 
achieved in the face of on-going hostilities in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere.  
This difference between the two leaders could become significant in terms of the 
future ability of the Al-Qa’ida leadership to reach out to normal Muslims, particularly 
now that Zawahiri has become leader of the core movement following the death of bin 
Ladin. Indeed, the latter’s final communiqué illustrated his general approach to the 
ummah in the majority of his messages. The ummah was seen as numb and unresponsive 
despite the injustices it was facing primarily because the rulers had ‘sabotaged the minds 
of the Ummah’ through their control of the media and ‘religious governmental 
institutions.’672 The role of the Prophet Mohammed (and many other prophets before 
him) as a shepherd guiding and protecting his flock, provides a powerful metaphor 
which bin Ladin embraced. Muslims need guidance and direction in order to respond to 
the challenges they face in an effective and correct manner. 
  
7.4.4 Alienating the grass roots 
 
Zawahiri’s initial warnings towards the ummah, as identified in the dataset, also 
concerned the apparent ‘defeatism’ that was preventing proper mobilisation in support of 
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Al-Qa’ida and the Taliban in Afghanistan and beyond.673 In subsequent communiqués 
from 2005 onwards, however, Zawahiri began to focus increasingly on the alleged 
failure of the general Muslim population to recognise and fulfil its religious and moral 
responsibility in the face of local and foreign adversaries and corrupting ideas. Local, 
secular regimes were thus ‘winning over the mujahideen,’ not because there was 
anything wrong with the tactics and ideology of Al-Qa’ida but because the ummah was 
too afraid of its individual safety and of family members. So many Muslims had 
contracted this ‘malignant illness’ leaving little hope for victory. The Muslim ummah 
had become paralysed by ‘subjugation, ignorance, fear and resignation.’674 As opposed 
to earlier messages in the 1990s, when bin Ladin blamed lacklustre opposition against 
local ‘tyrants’ on the smothering power of these elites themselves, Zawahiri saw the 
general public as responsible. ‘How? O Ummah, have you kept silent about this 
corruption in order for it to reach this degree of despotism?’ – Zawahiri asked as he 
sought to rationalise the continued domination of Saudi politics and society by the House 
of Saud.675 According to the material coded, even if the ummah did respond in some way 
to the oppression it witnessed, the force of its resolve paled in comparison to the strength 
of the opposition and extent of the crimes committed. Protests, screams and shouts 
would lead nowhere, Zawahiri argued, except to defeat.676 The repercussions of this 
lacklustre response would be severe for the ummah. In his ‘Open Meeting’ initiative, 
which was intended as a public relations exercise to mobilise popular support in favour 
of Al-Qa’ida and to ensure that the movement did not become marginalised amid the 
turmoil, Zawahiri instead employed harsh rhetoric condemning the general Muslim 
population worldwide for its failings: 
 
I call on the Islamic nation to fear the day when God will ask it why it failed to back its 
mujahideen brothers […] The Islamic world has not only failed to support the Islamic 
Emirate in Afghanistan, but a propaganda campaign was launched against it by the rulers’ 
scholars, Iran’s agents, and groups affiliated with Islam in support of their colleagues who 
were in control of five per cent of Afghanistan. […] Muslims should repent to God for 
failing to support [the] Taliban, and they should know that God will ask them about their 
failure to support [the Taliban].677 
 
The coding of Zawahiri’s communicative efforts towards Muslims shows that in his 
view, therefore, Muslims were essentially cowards. They lacked the fighting spirit and 
resolve to tackle the domestic end external enemies that they faced and their only 
possible salvation was to follow the example of Al-Qa’ida and accept the diagnostic and 
prognostic solutions its leadership presented. The Muslims’ most fundamental enemy, 
therefore, was ‘this defeatist spirit, hesitation, and attachment to safety which motivates 
us to backtrack whenever the tyrants attack us and to plead with them.’678 This ‘shame’ 
could ultimately be the downfall of the ummah. Muslims had for too long favoured 
safety and allowed Jews and America to become embedded in Palestine. Muslims had a 
‘tendency to be enslaved’, which explained why they had failed for so long to liberate 
Palestine and repel the threat posed by their enemies, far and near.679  
                                                
673 Zawahiri (2002) [45]. 
674 Zawahiri (2005) [25]. 
675 Zawahiri (2006) ‘Support for Palestinians,’ published by As-Sahab (9 June), transcript available in 
IntelCenter (2008) [85]. 
676 Zawahiri (2008) ‘A Call to Help Our People in Gaza,’ published by As-Sahab (23 March), transcripts 
available from IntelCenter (2008) and the NEFA Foundation [17]. 
677 Zawahiri (2008) [107]. 
678 As-Sahab (2002) [108]. 
679 Zawahiri (2009) [147]; Zawahiri (2010) [223]. 
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 The coding results for motivational framing of the communiqués under review, 
therefore, show how this message includes significant levels of coercion and hostility 
towards the very people presented as Al-Qa’ida’s potential participants and supporters 
and the pool from which the movement draws recruits. These general, often abstract and 
holistic references to the consequences of inaction and responsibility for failure, shift the 
blame for disappointing stated objectives onto the general public and circumvent any 
reassessment of diagnostic and prognostic positions and the benchmarks of success. The 
current analysis found that criticism and denunciation of Muslim publics was even more 
potent when stated geographic concentrations and nationalities were addressed, 
admonished and threatened for specific reasons.  
 
7.4.5 Denunciation of specific constituents 
 
The coding showed this criticism was directed primarily towards those living in areas of 
on-going conflict where there are opportunities for compromise, peace making and 
reconciliation with external forces and domestic agitators. The criticism also reflected 
the anger of the Al-Qa’ida leadership towards those who failed to embrace the belief 
system of Islamist violent extremism when they had the option of doing so. The 
aggregated coding results showed that this anger was directed primarily towards the 
people of Pakistan, Iraq, the Palestinian territories, and Egypt. Even though the publics 
involved often endure considerable hardships the language used was often stark and 
unforgiving and more direct than that of appeals towards those living in more stable and 
prosperous regions.  
 Despite decades of conflict in the Palestinian territories, for example, Zawahiri 
expressed his disappointment with ‘people who have collapsed and are still collapsing’ 
in Palestine and those who accepted UN resolutions and other peace initiatives. The only 
option available to the Palestinians was violent jihad. Indeed, as they were on the front 
line in the battle with infidelity this was an individual obligation. It was imperative for 
Palestinians to multiply their rocket attacks, martyrdom operations and ambushes against 
the Israelis regardless of the consequences. Anything else amounted to defeat.680  
The strongest criticism emerging from the coding results, however, was reserved 
for Iraqis and Pakistanis; Muslims who had also suffered some of the most gruesome 
and sustained campaigns of violence by Al-Qa’ida affiliates and associates. As 
mentioned above, Iraqis of all sects and tribes were warned not to cooperate with the 
government in Baghdad or participate in elections. Those who embraced the party 
political model were condemned as ‘charlatans’ and blamed for the chaos the country 
had endured.681 Perhaps the stakes were even higher in Pakistan, the adopted home of 
bin Ladin and Zawahiri, and numerous messages from both leaders addressed alleged 
hesitation, even betrayal, of the Pakistani population.  
 The people of Pakistan were asked how they could allow local and foreign 
security forces to ‘hurt’ their ‘brothers’, the Taliban, when it was an individual 
obligation to support them.682 The only other option aside from jihad was idleness, 
                                                
680 Zawahiri (2008) ‘On the Anniversary of the Naksa... Break the Siege of Gaza,’ published by As-Sahab 
(4 June), transcript secured from the Open Source Center [15]. This is in spite of the fact that a few months 
prior to Zawahiri’s declaration, Al-Qa’ida had been severely criticised in the ‘Open Meeting’ initiative for 
failing to invest sufficient energy and resources in the Palestinian campaign, a charge that put the 
leadership on the defensive in justifying the need to focus on Iraq. 
681 Se e.g. Bin Ladin (2004) [86]; bin Ladin (2006) [93]; Zawahiri (2006) [21]. 
682 Zawahiri (2004) statement aired on Al Jazeera (25 March), transcript available from Hegghammer, T. 
(2005) ‘Al-Qaida Statements 2003-2004’ [59]. 
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which was the way of the disobedient ones.683 ‘Rigged elections’ and politics were not 
the way to salvation, only jihad was. As a result, the people of Pakistan were duty-bound 
to ‘back the Mujahideen in Afghanistan with [their] persons, wealth, opinion and 
expertise.’684 If Pakistanis stood by passively without offering support to the mujahideen 
they would contribute to the destruction of both Pakistan and Afghanistan and would 
deserve the painful punishment they would receive from Allah.685 Indeed, the chaotic 
state of affairs in Pakistan was largely the fault of the general population itself and the 
fact that people had ‘abandoned the obligation of enjoining good and forbidding evil.’686 
Their silence in the face of corruption and collation with the enemy, moreover, had 
rendered the state incapable of responding to natural disasters and catastrophes that had 
befallen Pakistan. There were ‘deviations from Islam’ among ‘many of the people of 
Pakistan.’ Zawahiri warned. Many were either secularists or would take part in Islamic 
traditions only as a ritual which was meaningless beyond the walls of the mosques and 
many would accept innovation.687 ‘Aren’t there any honorable ones in Pakistan?’ 
Zawahiri asked in his ‘Open Meeting’ appeal, ‘isn’t there anyone who prefers the 
hereafter to the life of this world?’688 The people of Pakistan had become a ‘people 
without honor, without sanctity, without pride [and] without any worth.’689 Their only 
hope was to repent and re-enter Islam.690 
 Amid such remarkable and exasperated denunciations of normal Muslims on the 
front line of a bloody Islamist-inspired campaign for the operational freedom of 
extremist groups and against perceived sources of vice, the position of the Al-Qa’ida 
leadership appears increasingly isolated. This alienation of large segments of potential 
participants is distinct from the reputational problems incurred by excessive targeting of 
innocents and Muslims. In addition to the impact of actions and behaviour, therefore, 
this author argues that a more abstract gap appears to have formed between the Al-
Qa’ida leadership and normal Muslims. This is manifested in the way in which the 
former addresses the latter in public communiqués, as captured by the current 
longitudinal study.  
 Isolation could be compounded by irrelevance. In terms of the latter, Zawahiri’s 
criticism of the people of Egypt, to which he devoted the majority of his career in jihad, 
provides the best examples. Zawahiri traced the ‘primary cause of the humiliation and 
disgrace we have reached in Egypt and the other countries of the Muslims’ to the 
‘Muslims’ tardiness in resisting oppression, enjoining good and forbidding evil, fear, 
hesitation, clinging to life’s crumbs, the culture of withdrawal, the methodology of 
defeatism.’ These were ‘the most important reasons for Egypt being transformed from a 
fortress for the defence of Islam into a helper, aide and partner in the American-Zionist 
Crusade assault.’ The only way out, again, was in the form of jihad, but specifically 
through a campaign lead by a ‘believing vanguard’ over which Zawahiri presided.691 For 
Zawahiri, the people of Egypt were largely apathetic and incapable or unwilling to 
                                                
683 Bin Ladin (2007) ‘Come to Jihad: a Speech to the People of Pakistan,’ statement published by As-
Sahab (20 September), transcript available from NEFA Foundation and IntelCenter (2008) [14]. 
684 Zawahiri (2007) [104]. 
685 Zawahiri (2009) [139]. 
686 Zawahiri (2009) [142]. 
687 Zawahiri (2010) [226]. 
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topple the tyrannical system that prevailed in the country. They would be unable to 
change anything or organise any form of uprising without the stern, righteous leadership 
of an Islamist vanguard and unsuccessful so long as they thought protests and 
demonstrations would be a vehicle for change rather than violent jihad.692 The events of 
the Arab Spring of course surprised many commentators and experts and the fact that 
Zawahiri failed to predict how they unfolded is not necessarily a major weakness in and 
of itself. More interesting is the way in which Zawahiri communicated, through his 
messages to the people of Egypt and the wider Muslim population, his lack of 
confidence in the strength of their resolve and bravery. It is almost as if Zawahiri in 
particular had dismissed the activist potential of precisely the people he was seeking to 
mobilise in support of his movement. 
 
 
7.5 Conclusions 
 
Ideas expressed through public communiqués do not necessarily have a limited shelf life. 
Even if the figure involved is deceased, his ideas can live on and often reach even more 
people and achieve greater prominence than before. Abdullah Azzam, for instance, still 
appears to be popular more than two decades after his death, at least if the republication 
and distribution of his works is anything to go by.693 As, of course, are many medieval 
figures and scholars, including Ibn Taymiyyah.  
There is little doubt that both Zawahiri and bin Ladin wished to secure such a 
legacy through the messages they published on behalf of their movement. The extent to 
which their words will live on, however, and the degree to which the model they created 
and sustained over the years will resonate with the wider community of potential 
participants, depends on the effectiveness of the narrative frames constructed by the two 
leaders and the nature of the communiqués they distributed. This thesis concludes with 
an evaluation of these factors, according to the framing approach, and a reflection on the 
holistic composition and durability of Zawahiri’s and bin Ladin’s communiqués over the 
past two decades.  
                                                
692 See e.g. Zawahiri (2007) [7]. 
693 Azzam is, for example, one of the most prominent and celebrated authors of books on the English-
language Islamic media repository Kalamullah.com (see <http://kalamullah.com/azzam.html> [as of 16 
March 2012]. 
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FRAME EFFECTIVENESS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8.1 Summary of findings 
 
The legacy of the two Al-Qa’ida leaders and the resonance of their material will, to a 
substantial degree, depend on the way in which Al-Qa’ida itself develops and on the 
nature of its eventual demise. Ten years after the 9/11 attacks, many observers see Al-
Qa’ida as a movement in crisis, even in its death throes.  
Cronin, for instance, identified five principal developments contributing to the 
perceived demise and marginalisation of the Al-Qa’ida core leadership. First, the 
excessive targeting of Muslims has, as mentioned above, caused tremendous damage to 
the credibility of the leadership. Second, the end-goals of the Al-Qa’ida core leadership 
and those of its disparate affiliates have become increasingly separated. Third, and on a 
related point, events surrounding the Arab Spring underscore the historical irrelevance of 
Al-Qa’ida. Fourth, and again related to the on-going developments surrounding the Arab 
Spring and its aftermath, the leadership has failed to mobilise public opinion in the ways 
in which had initially been envisaged. Finally, the core of the Al-Qa’ida movement had 
been greatly weakened by the slaying of many of its principal leaders; foremost among 
them was bin Ladin himself.694  
Although the long-term impact of the current turmoil in the Middle East and 
North Africa on Al-Qa’ida remains to be established – disappointment with the new 
order, political or cultural tension, civil wars, ethnic strife or conflict with Israel might, 
for instance, present new opportunities – the immediate impact has, as was discussed in 
the previous chapter, been very negative, especially for Zawahiri. The capacity for the 
Al-Qa’ida leadership – which has been famously adaptable in the past – to replace fallen 
leaders and regain the initiative in the upper echelons of the movement also remains to 
be seen. In terms of the long-term future of Al-Qa’ida however, the current analysis has 
unveiled a deeper and more profound weaknesses that the leadership has failed to 
address. These have been identified through the systematic and longitudinal coding and 
analysis of Al-Qa’ida leadership communiqués, the results of which were presented in 
Part III of this thesis. This author has dissected and scrutinised output from bin Ladin 
and Zawahiri, produced and disseminated over the past two decades, revealing failed 
aspirations, alienated constituents and frustrated promises. 
                                                
694 Cronin, A. (2011) ‘9/11: How and why do terrorist campaigns end?’ British Academy and University 
of St Andrews symposium: ‘9/11: Ten Years On’, held at the British Academy, London (2 September). 
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 The case was made for approaching these two leaders as constants, a core within 
a wider array of actors, followers and adversaries, throughout the fluid and tumultuous 
life span of Al-Qa’ida from its inception until the death of bin Ladin and the 
emancipatory revolutions of the Arab Spring. The case was also made for looking 
beyond organisational models to the ideology of Al-Qa’ida, as a social production of a 
dynamic set of beliefs and principles guiding behaviour, dispositions and defining goals 
and rationales of action. In terms of developing understanding into these ideational 
elements, two fundamental approaches were elucidated and applied. Firstly, the analysis 
relied upon rigorous empirical research into primary documents in order to provide 
sound grounding for analytical observations and generate a comprehensive corpus of 
independent data. Secondly, upon exploring theoretical approaches and alternatives, the 
thesis applied lessons from message framing and the construction of collective action 
frames and structured the analysis according to the composition of these interactive 
framing tasks.  
 This approach formed the basis of the data processing and subsequent analysis. 
The Al-Qa’ida leadership communiqués, and the ways in which they seek to fathom and 
impact the core’s wider environment, were thus understood in terms of diagnostic, 
prognostic and motivational frames. The diagnostic frames consisted of Al-Qa’ida’s 
disassociation with prevailing societal norms and the elucidation of an evolving set of 
local and global grievances. Although often tangible and with broad resonance, the 
current study found a core feature of these diagnostic facets based on values and 
normative principles, rather than exclusively focused on a sense of victimhood. In some 
cases, anger over corruptive values was woven together with allegations of more 
conventional forms of violation of rights and sovereignty. This study showed how in 
recent years, the grievance narrative has become more complex with a host of different 
sources of grievance cited that, in the case of bin Ladin’s final communiqués, even 
began to depart from an exclusive focus on the harmful practices and influences of 
Israel, the US, the West and their local and regional allies.  
 The coding of prognostic message elements identified the solutions that the Al-
Qa’ida leaders presented to potential followers. The results of the coding revealed how 
these were encased in promises of a society governed by religious law and limited 
consultation where divine justice would prevail. Any detail of how this would work was 
notably absent, perhaps deliberately, even though these references remained constant 
over time. They served as a reminder, it was argued, of the pious nature of the activism 
prescribed, which – by extension – would thus render a host of violent responses 
permissible according to the leaders’ interpretation of religious doctrine and precedent. 
Although the coding found that violence formed, predictably, a central feature of 
prognosis, the study discovered substantial variation in terms of the levels of violence 
endorsed and the nature of desired targeting. This was partly down to tactical reasons, 
but also as a result of a genuine escalation that appeared to get out of hand, as the belated 
and rather desperate attempts in more recent communiqués to rein in sympathetic forces 
illustrate.  
 The coding established that the Al-Qa’ida leaders have resorted to three major 
justifications for the violent tactics they celebrate and endorse. These consist of: (1) 
reciprocity; (2) redefining the concept of combatant, making the general public complicit 
and (3) stretching and twisting medieval doctrinal justifications for specific tactics (such 
as night raids and catapult or siege warfare) in order to justify indiscriminate deaths and 
unintended casualties. The coding results established that as far as Muslim deaths are 
concerned, this latter approach features prominently, as does outright denial of 
involvement, especially in those cases where questioning the devotion of those Muslims 
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who died seems inadvisable. Given the indiscriminate nature of the violence endorsed 
and (belated and contradictory) recognition of the damage caused by the widespread 
slaughter perpetrated by affiliates, attempts to appeal to the ‘global oppressed’ seem 
rather desperate and unlikely to succeed. As will be discussed below, the longitudinal 
study found that the prognostic element is undermined further by inconsistent and 
ambiguous prioritisation of target emphasis.  
 Motivational frames related to the conveyance of diagnostic and prognostic 
message elements, effectively tying together the preceding framing categories. For the 
Al-Qa’ida leadership, the study found that the in-group, out-group dichotomy remained 
important as an element of discourse, although the coding established that some factions, 
especially the Shia, remained elusive and were not placed consistently within either 
group. Nor did the excommunication of Muslims constitute a central theme – the 
approach to takfir was shown to be cautious and qualified (even though it escalated over 
time) with its direction dictated to a large extent by strategic priorities and the need to 
legitimise the targeting of those who threatened the interests of Al-Qa’ida in Pakistan 
and Iraq. A far more significant finding of the longitudinal study was the gradual 
dismissal and disavowal of vast swathes of normal Muslim publics, to whom the two 
leaders attempted to appeal and whose voices they purported to elevate and represent. 
 Initially, the coding revealed that criticism for inaction was levied primarily 
against specific and identified communities – elites in particular as well as the wealthy. 
As late as 2001, for instance, Zawahiri clearly stated that were the ummah to fail to 
respond to Al-Qa’ida’s call the leaders ought to blame only themselves and their failure 
to appeal to their constituents. A few years later this rhetoric had changed completely 
with Zawahiri in particular denouncing the ‘nation’ that had ‘failed’ to support its 
vanguard. This gradual alienation of target constituents undermines the image of a just 
and representative vanguard that the Al-Qa’ida leaders have tried so hard to construct 
over the years. One component of this constructed image, uncovered in the dataset, is the 
notion that the leadership is in a position to table demands and conditions set on behalf 
of the ummah in messages directed towards Western leaders. Chronologically, however, 
the current study found that the list of demands and corresponding threats of coercive 
action were predominantly issued after attacks took place, rather than before, 
challenging the assumption that the Al-Qa’ida leadership is acting according to religious 
protocol in issuing warnings and offering alternatives to bloodshed (for instance through 
conversion to Islam) prior to attacks. 
 This gradual alienation of potential participants through the communiqués, in 
terms of ignoring potential assets and followers, side-lining some principal concerns and 
denouncing those pursuing any alternative dispositions, has served to blunt the overall 
message effectiveness of the leadership output, as this concluding chapter will argue. 
This discursive isolationism has added more pressure on the core group already reeling 
from event-driven marginalisation and a backlash due to excessive targeting. As this 
thesis has argued, however, constraints imposed by the wider environment are 
fundamentally different from the weaknesses exposed by the current longitudinal 
analysis of Al-Qa’ida leadership communiqués. Although elements of targeting 
emphases and the channelling of violence have traditionally been within the control of 
the Al-Qa’ida leadership, this has not always been the case and there are a number of 
prominent examples whereby affiliates, groups and fans operate beyond the control of 
the Al-Qa’ida core and contrary to its desire. Other regional, or even global, elements 
have also been outside the leadership’s control.  
 Alienation through message dissemination, however, not only represents a 
process over which the Al-Qa’ida has retained sole and full control, but also a process 
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whereby the variables at play are quantifiable. This thesis has highlighted this distinction 
and analysed the content in question. Furthermore, although the Al-Qa’ida leadership 
has in the past proven logistically adaptable and operationally flexible, the doctrinal 
intransigence and ideational stagnation observed through the current analysis present a 
new element in the equation where change and reform may not be an option. Brachman 
wrote that the ‘Jihadist movement […] has been able to sustain its momentum in the face 
of global counter-terrorism efforts […] because it has mastered the art of the social 
movement: transforming consumers of its ideas to producers of them.’ 695 This study has 
demonstrated how this rapport – between Al-Qa’ida’s leadership and its potential 
followers – can, in itself, constitute a weakness. 
 The Al-Qa’ida leadership did not invent, nor does it retain exclusive ownership 
over, the discourse of contemporary violent Islamist activism. Throughout the period 
under review in this thesis, however, Al-Qa’ida has exerted tremendous influence on the 
construction and direction of this form of activism, as well as its impact worldwide. 
Whatever pathways dictate the evolution of Islamist violent extremism in the future, 
therefore, and however groups might consolidate in the coming years, capturing the 
ways in which the Al-Qa’ida leadership constructed its message frames will provide 
important tools to understand potential future trends and how these reflect or depart from 
the past. The extent to which – as this thesis has shown – cracks in this discursive 
foundation became discernable years before the impact of external developments on the 
Al-Qa’ida leadership were being observed and discussed, moreover, could also inform 
future work on the continued evolution of the Al-Qa’ida movement and other strands of 
Islamist militant activism. The case has been made here for systematic and empirical 
research into the dynamics of ideological material. The next sections explore the 
significance of these weaknesses according to the framing literature and discuss how 
these were identified in the corpus under review.  
As noted in Chapter 3, the three criteria, which the framing literature identifies as 
undermining message impact and effectiveness, concern narrative fidelity, experiential 
commensurability and empirical credibility. In terms of the first criteria, this thesis 
argues that the narrative fidelity of the discourse under review appears to be strong as it 
applies and refers to relevant cultural myths, doctrinal elements and language that are 
central to the belief system of constituents. The coding results established that 
experiential commensurability, however, is undermined in three significant ways: 
through the problematic approach to the question of Palestine (chiefly in Zawahiri’s 
messages), the dismissal of Muslim Diasporas in Muslim-minority countries and through 
the lacklustre response to the prognostic principles suggested. Empirical credibility, 
moreover, is weakened mainly by inconsistencies in Zawahiri’s (more comprehensive) 
output as regards the hierarchy of enemies and the killing of Muslims.  
 
 
 
8.2 Message Impact 
 
Just over a month after bin Ladin was killed at his compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, 
Ayman Al-Zawahiri, now the official leader of Al-Qa’ida, issued a statement honouring 
the ‘noble knight.’ Zawahiri insisted that bin Ladin had achieved what he desired. Rather 
than any operational accomplishments, Zawahiri chose to focus on bin Ladin’s desire to 
‘incite the Ummah to jihad.’ Bin Ladin’s message had ‘reached from East to West and 
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all over the world. The Muslims answered it’, Zawahiri argued, ‘as did all the oppressed 
on the face of the earth. And today, all praise be to Allah, America does not face an 
individual, group, or sect. No, it faces a rising Ummah that has awoken from its slumber 
in a Jihadi awakening that challenges it wherever it is.’696 Aside from Zawahiri’s 
predictable celebration of bin Ladin’s supposed accomplishments, the communiqué is 
revealing in the extent to which the dissemination of messages and mobilisation of the 
ummah are presented as the leadership’s main priority and hallmark of success, rather 
than any operational or activist achievements. 
 This thesis has thus made the case that any assessment of the role and impact of 
Al-Qa’ida necessarily relies on an evaluation of the messages disseminated and their 
effectiveness and appeal. The approach adopted in this thesis sees the Al-Qa’ida central 
leadership at the core of a movement seeking to mobilise, sustain and direct the 
attention, force and aspirations of potential participants towards prescribed channels. 
Zawahiri and bin Ladin thus constitute what Wiktorowicz termed ‘signifying agents 
engaged in the social construction of meaning,’ as explained in Part II of this thesis. As 
movement leaders they strive to ‘articulate and disseminate frameworks of 
understanding that resonate with potential participants and broader publics to elicit 
collective action.’697 A central feature of these efforts involves outlining and 
communicating specific forms of collective action. Failure to construct, communicate 
and deliver these messages risks derailing the militant revolutionary momentum that is 
central to the movement’s survival. As has been demonstrated, Zawahiri and bin Ladin 
do not act as passive transmitters of stagnant or predetermined beliefs and ideas. They 
are, as Benford and Snow’s framing concept assumes ‘actively engaged in the 
production of meaning for participants, antagonists and observers.’ They interpret 
relevant events and conditions in an effort to ‘mobilise potential adherents and 
constituents, to garner bystander support and to demobilize antagonists.’698 The previous 
part demonstrated how the two leaders have engaged in this interpretive and 
communicative work through drafting diagnostic, prognostic and motivational appeals in 
order to inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of Al-Qa’ida. 
This part concludes by considering the impact of these appeals and elaborating 
any factors that could blunt their effectiveness, according to the framing literature.  As 
noted in Part II of this thesis, the mobilising potency of collective action frames can, 
according to Benford and Snow, be affected and undermined by what they called the 
‘phenomenological life world of the targets of mobilization’ and the interplay between 
these experiences and the ideational facets and activists framework presented by the 
movement leaders. 699 Simply put, the message needs to be relevant to the life situations 
of potential participants and supporters and resonate with this key audience. 
Prescriptions would have to be plausible and acceptable and proscriptions perceived as 
just. The core issues communicated would similarly need to be central to their concerns 
and the message disseminators need to be perceived as credible actors.  
These issues all concern three interrelated constraints identified in the framing 
literature as: empirical credibility; experiential commensurability; and narrative fidelity. 
The first refers to the match between the messages and the life experience of potential 
participants and the extent to which the discourse is believable within this context. In 
order to generate empirically credible messages, the disseminators need to be consistent 
in their frame construction and articulation and avoid significant contradictions over 
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time or across topics addressed. This is not to suggest elements of the discourse cannot 
change over time. Indeed the framing process is, as discussed throughout this thesis, an 
inherently dynamic one. Message construction is, as Benford and Snow note, affected by 
a number of elements of the socio-cultural context in which movement leaders operate. 
700 It is when this variation becomes perceived as illogical or appears contradictory that 
empirical credibility is affected. This can be exacerbated if the credibility of the message 
disseminators themselves is also challenged. 
The second constraint, experiential commensurability, relates to the centrality of 
the issues covered by message disseminators for potential participants and the extent to 
which these address and provide solutions for the day to day concerns of this wider 
public. A crucial question in this regard is, therefore: does the material highlight the 
same issues that are of main concern to the public to whom it is designed to appeal and 
are the solutions presented accepted? 
Finally, the impact of collective action frames can be blunted by factors 
undermining their narrative fidelity. This constraint rests upon harmony with the cultural 
myths and heritage of the wider belief system, which constitutes the ideational 
environment in which the movement and its potential supporters exist. Questions 
concerning narrative fidelity would thus probe whether message disseminators paid 
adequate tribute to and depended upon these broader cultural ideas and myths. This 
chapter concludes the thesis by drawing together findings from the longitudinal study of 
Al-Qa’ida communiqués to determine weaknesses in terms of overall message 
effectiveness according to these criteria. 
 
8.2.1 Assessing frame effectiveness 
 
Afghan War veteran Abu’l-Walid warned in 1993 that ‘a movement that is isolated from 
its masses, that is suspicious of its people, and whose people are suspicious of it, can 
achieve nothing but destroy itself.’701 Marginalisation and isolation has become an 
increasingly acute danger for the Al-Qa’ida leadership in recent years. Physical isolation 
of the leadership following the flight from Afghanistan after the Taliban regime 
collapsed raised questions about the leadership’s ability to exert control over groups and 
individuals operating in Al-Qa’ida’s name. The sheer volume of the bloodshed inflicted 
by these affiliates and derivatives, moreover, presented new challenges as the Al-Qa’ida 
leadership risked becoming so unpopular in the Muslim world and its pool of recruits 
and resources so diminished that it faced a similar demise to that of the ostracised 
Algerian GIA. On-going developments in the Middle East and elsewhere have 
undermined the reach and credibility of the Al-Qa’ida leadership even further as the 
hated Arab tyrants so despised in Al-Qa’ida leadership communiqués have been toppled 
by popular, predominantly secular and often relatively peaceful, revolt rather than a 
religiously fervent campaign of jihad, which – as the chapter on Prognostic Frames 
shows – is what the leadership had in mind.  
Numerous observers have sought to assess the isolation of Al-Qa’ida through 
conducting or analysing public opinion polls and surveys. The Pew Research Centre has, 
for example, conducted numerous surveys measuring the appeal of Al-Qa’ida. On the 
surface, the results would appear to indicate the leadership is losing support from 
potential participants. By the time of his death, expressed confidence in bin Ladin had 
largely plummeted in the Muslim world from figures as high as 70 per cent in the 
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Palestinian territories to less than 30 per cent, with much less confidence expressed in 
the other Muslim countries surveyed. Around 20 to 30 per cent of respondents claimed 
to view Al-Qa’ida favourably in the Palestinian Territories, Jordan, Egypt, Indonesia and 
Pakistan between 2010 and 2011, although far fewer expressed support in Lebanon and 
Turkey (with greater support, in turn, measured in Nigeria).702  
Opinion polls often give mixed, ambiguous and sometimes contradictory results, 
and their outcome can be dependent on the way in which the question is phrased and the 
size and reliability of the sample. Surveys of Muslim public opinion, for example, have 
shown strong support for both the role of Islam in society, as well as greater 
democracy.703 These of course are not mutually exclusive forces but, as demonstrated in 
this thesis, in the Al-Qa’ida communiqués they could not be further apart. Furthermore, 
even though polls show Al-Qa’ida’s popularity is slipping, many of the points set forth 
in its public messages would appear to resonate, at least as far as sources of grievance 
are concerned. Vast majorities of Muslims for instance were angered by the Iraq 
invasion, despised the proposed peace process between Israel and Palestine and were 
concerned over the impact of Israel in the region.704 More recently, the majority of 
Muslim publics polled blamed US and Western policies for lack of prosperity in Muslim 
nations over other potential causes and vast majorities in all Muslim countries surveyed, 
except Indonesia, viewed US and European policies in their regions as hostile towards 
Muslims.705    
Opinion polls therefore give a mixed picture when it comes to assessing the 
impact and resonance of Al-Qa’ida, its actions and discourse. This author argues that an 
alternative approach to measuring this impact is through studying the communiqués 
themselves. This extensive corpus of material provides, as this thesis has demonstrated, a 
sound empirical base which allows for systematic and longitudinal evaluations to be 
made in order to assess the position of Al-Qa’ida within its environment. This rich but 
untapped source can provide valuable indicators concerning the relationship between the 
Al-Qa’ida leadership and the wider world of potential participants, adversaries and 
observers.  
Ciovacco argues that targeting of Muslim innocents by Al-Qa’ida affiliates has 
been so damaging for the leadership that their ‘moral case for war [has become] 
problematic, and many of its key ideological assertions are considerably weakened.’706 
Indeed, the preceding part showed how Zawahiri’s most recent communiqués carried 
increasingly desperate appeals to Islamist militants to cease their targeting of mosques, 
markets and other indiscriminate Muslim targets. As is the case with opinion poll results, 
however, the reality may be more complex. Montasser Al-Zayyat, Zawahiri’s former 
lawyer, for instance noted in his book that ‘almost all Muslims agree that the prophetic 
traditions clearly forbid attacks against civilians under any circumstances.’ However, 
there was, according to Al-Zayyat, broad consensus in the Muslim world with the issues 
Al-Qa’ida frequently mentioned, including US hegemony, lack of freedom and the 
Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories.707 Ciovacco argues that bin Ladin was adept 
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in ‘understanding what Muslims want to hear and when they want to hear it,’708 but even 
in his concise and relatively coherent set of messages some inconsistencies can, over 
time, be detected. The three framing constraints; empirical credibility; experiential 
commensurability; and narrative fidelity therefore provide a sound framework through 
which to assess the impact of the leadership’s message, and by extension, the position of 
the Al-Qa’ida core within the wider environment. 
 
 
 
8.3 Weaknesses in the Al-Qa’ida Message 
 
In terms of narrative fidelity, this study found that, considerable and consistent emphasis 
throughout is placed on basing assertions, language and terminology on the religio-
cultural myths that are seen to prevail within the ideational environment to which the Al-
Qa’ida leaders direct their appeals. Although the categorisation of civilians as legitimate 
targets and the leadership’s interpretation of the Prophet’s deeds and words for Islamist 
activists today is of course highly contested, these assertions nonetheless refer to core 
Islamic principles. Although the Al-Qa’ida leadership is no conventional Salafist 
fundamentalist organisation the overt traditionalist and literalist approach that forms 
such a prominent feature of its message underscores the narrative fidelity of this output 
within the context of radical Islamist activism. Within this context, other revolutionary 
movements, much more influenced by Western ideas, such as nationalism, would face 
stronger opposition and accusations of innovation (bid’ah) than the Al-Qa’ida 
leadership, which – as demonstrated in Chapter 7 – was also careful not to rely too much 
on excommunication (takfir), which could lead to them being denounced as khawaarij, 
or extremist outsiders. Within an environment where, again according to opinion polls, 
people place greater emphasis on the religion of Islam rather than nationality as a source 
of identity709 the narrative fidelity of Al-Qa’ida leadership communiqués would appear 
to be strong. 
 What about experiential commensurability? As mentioned, numerous elements of 
the diagnostic framing of the Al-Qa’ida leadership communiqués analysed appear to 
resonate with potential participants. Core grievance issues, such as the Iraq war and 
Palestine are common features of the communiqués, which are based on collective 
feelings of injustice as a source of identity. The longitudinal study revealed, however, 
that there are three major shortcomings in the leadership message that appear to blunt the 
effectiveness of the communiqués and limit experiential commensurability. These are:  
 
• The issue of Palestine; demonstrably central to the emotions provoking anger in 
the Muslim populace but something the Al-Qa’ida leadership has arguable failed 
to address convincingly, putting Zawahiri for instance on the defensive during 
his ‘Open Meeting’ initiative. 
• The role of Diasporas; which constitute an important and growing proportion of 
potential participants and an essential group of extremist activists who have 
carried out terrorist attacks in the name of Al-Qa’ida, but whose existence is 
largely ignored in the communiqués, aside from a few dismissive references; 
                                                
708 Ciovacco (2009): 855. 
709  Pew Global Attitudes Project (2011-B): 28. 
Part IV: Conclusions 
 169 
• The prognostic solutions presented; centred on isolationism, violent uprising and 
a culture of martyrdom that has failed to generate the support and mobilisation 
demanded and envisaged by the Al-Qa’ida leadership over the past two decades.  
 
Finally, aspects of empirical credibility appear problematic when it comes to overall 
message impact. This study showed that the Al-Qa’ida leadership communiqués contain 
few references to operational guidelines or tactical details that are remotely relevant to 
contemporary scenarios. Indeed, aside from glorifying martyrdom operations – used 
extensively by affiliates in Iraq and elsewhere – bin Ladin’s operational advice to 
followers at the dawn of the Iraq war was limited to extolling the virtues of camouflage 
and trenches.710 The practical utility of this advice is perhaps questionable but that does 
not necessarily undermine the credibility of bin Ladin or Zawahiri and fellow Al-Qa’ida 
leaders as frame articulators. They have a proven track record of involvement in 
militancy and use their communiqués to convey messages that are central to the 
movement over which they preside. Other outlets, such as the Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian 
Peninsula publications, provide the tactical guidelines – further sharpening the core 
message of the Al-Qa’ida leadership – whilst the Al-Qa’ida leaders themselves frame 
these tactical references according to the parameters analysed in the preceding chapters. 
Trenches and camouflage, for example, may have less to do with practical advice and 
more with reminding Muslims of the Prophet’s glorious victory over the Quraish, as he 
protected Medina against overwhelming force by digging a trench that rendered their 
cavalry useless. 
 Based on the longitudinal study it emerges that the empirical credibility of the 
Al-Qa’ida communiqués, however, is undermined by inconsistencies and contradictions 
in terms of message direction, emphases and scope that present a mixed and ambiguous 
messages to potential participants and risk diminishing the overall mobilising impact of 
the message. Zawahiri’s messages – which invariably convey more detail and are far 
more extensive than bin Ladin’s output – are particularly problematic in this respect. The 
absence of bin Ladin’s presence, providing concise grievance points and a jihadi 
narrative in ‘sound-bite’ form, may therefore prove damaging for Al-Qa’ida’s future 
mobilising potential. 
 
8.3.1 Challenges to experiential commensurability 
 
A. The Israeli question 
 
It has often been argued that one of the greatest source of anger and grievance in the 
Middle East and among Muslims is the plight of Palestinians living under Israeli 
occupation and the relations between the latter and other countries in the region. Alleged 
Israeli acts of aggression against neighbouring countries and, in particular, Palestinian 
enclaves and unarmed citizens have provoked outrage for decades. In his attempt to 
understand the ‘roots of Islamic militancy,’ Munson found that, according to a series of 
opinion polls, ‘the issue that arouses the most hostility in the Middle East toward the 
United States is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and what Muslims perceive as US 
responsibility for the suffering of the Palestinians.’711 The way in which the Al-Qa’ida 
leadership approaches the issue is thus essential in terms of matching the narrative with 
the concerns of potential participants. 
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 Crucial as the issue may be, analysts and observers do not appear to be in 
agreement when it comes to assessing the approach of Al-Qa’ida leaders to the question 
of Israel and Palestinians. Randal, for instance, argued that ‘Osama was a latecomer to 
the Palestinian cause [but] came to appreciate it as the single most effective unifying 
force not just for Arabs, but for Muslims from Morocco to the Philippines.’712 For 
Scheuer the Palestinian issue was central to Al-Qa’ida, which supposedly was 
increasingly prominent operationally in the region through an ambiguous set of apparent 
affiliates.713 Riedel dismisses commentators who argue the Al-Qa’ida leadership was late 
in focusing on Palestine and maintains that ‘the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the central 
all-consuming issue for al Qaeda’ and the cause that ‘infuses every aspect of al Qaeda’s 
thinking and activities and has become the rallying cry used to convince the ummah of 
the righteousness of al Qaeda’s cause.’714 This assertion, however, is problematic. 
Firstly, Islamist militant sympathisers themselves have accused the leadership of placing 
insufficient attention on the Palestinian issue.  As shown in the previous part, for 
example, the Al-Qa’ida leadership was forced to defend its position on the Israeli 
question in Zawahiri’s ‘open meeting’ initiative after being accused of diverting 
attention away from the issue to focus on Iraq and other developments. The 
aforementioned ‘Dr Fadl’, Zawahiri’s former colleague, moreover, fumed that Al-Qa’ida 
‘did not offer Palestine anything except words.’715 
 Secondly, the longitudinal study of Al-Qa’ida leadership communiqués, 
presented in the preceding chapters, reveals that matters relating to Israel and 
Palestinians have not always received top priority. Greater emphasis was clearly placed 
on other issues during the bulk of the 1990s in the public communiqués, prompting 
Gaza-born journalist Abdel Bari Atwan, for instance, to challenge bin Ladin to respond 
to criticism that he and his organisation had sidelined the Palestinian cause in favour of 
other ‘Islamic issues.’ Bin Ladin responded, rather ambiguously, that ‘interest in issues 
is determined by their closeness to the people’s life and their sequence.’716 According to 
bin Ladin’s interpretation at this time, this meant the primary emphasis would be on 
Afghanistan and the Arabian Peninsula for the time being, and not Palestine. This is not 
to suggest that the issue was ignored, or even that the Al-Qa’ida leaders, bin Ladin 
especially, were not themselves concerned with developments in Palestine. Bin Ladin, 
for example, reportedly told his childhood friend, years before he became a renowned 
terrorist leader, that ‘unless, we, the new generation, change and become stronger and 
more educated and more dedicated we will never reclaim Palestine.’717 Indeed the issue 
of alleged Israeli aggression was one of three core grievances mentioned for the 
establishment of the ‘World Islamic Front’ in February 1998, following matters relating 
to perceived violation of the Arabian Peninsula and the suffering of Iraqis.718 The point 
is that the prioritisation of grievances presented in the Al-Qa’ida leadership 
communiqués at this time did not appear to match that of the majority of Muslims.   
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The mobilising potential of the Israeli question, however, was not lost on the 
leadership. In a remarkably frank clause in his book Knights under the Banner of the 
Prophet, Zawahiri explained how the conflict was of central importance to the Muslim 
community and key in their mobilisation: ‘the fact that must be acknowledged is that the 
issue of Palestine is the cause that has been firing up the feelings of the Muslim nation 
from Morocco to Indonesia for the past 50 years. In addition, it is a rallying point for all 
the Arabs, be they believers or non-believers, good or evil.’719 As the geographic scope 
of the grievance narrative expanded towards the end of the 1990s, therefore, the role of 
Israel became more prominent. Bin Ladin was asked to explain this apparent shift in 
emphasis from the Arabian Peninsula to matters relating to Israel in a sympathetic 
interview conducted shortly after the 9/11 attacks. His response was that sometimes the 
Al-Qa’ida leaders ‘find the right elements to push for one cause more than the other,’ 
with the second Intifada providing the perfect opportunity to refocus on developments in 
the occupied territories.720  
 However, the coding unveiled how Al-Qa’ida leaders, in an attempt to re-write 
their own history, engaged in several attempts to convince potential participants that the 
Israeli question and the Palestinian population had indeed always been the main priority 
of the leadership and the chief inspiration behind its activities, contrary to what older 
messages had stated. In a communiqué issued in December 2001, bin Ladin decried the 
‘deliberate murder of children’ in Palestine – for instance that of Mohammad al-Durra, 
whose death was caught on camera – and noted how America, the target of the 9/11 
attacks a few months earlier, was the principal backer of the ‘attackers of ours sons in 
Palestine.’721 In October 2004, again reflecting upon the 9/11 attacks, bin Ladin insisted 
that the inspiration behind these strikes was US support for Israel and the 1982 Israeli 
invasion of Lebanon, feasible only because ‘the US permitted the Israelis to invade.’ Bin 
Ladin reflected: ‘I still remember those moving scenes: blood, torn limbs, and dead 
women and children; ruined homes everywhere; and high-rises being demolished on top 
of their residents; bombs raining down mercilessly on our homes. […] As I was looking 
at those destroyed towers in Lebanon,’ bin Ladin continued, ‘I was struck by the idea of 
punishing the oppressor in the same manner and destroying towers in the U.S.’722 
 As he commemorated the 60th anniversary of the Israeli occupation, bin Ladin 
emphasised how the question of Israel was a basic issue for the entire ummah and 
something that had motivated him to become an activist since childhood.723 Bin Ladin’s 
concern over the Palestinian issue was undoubtedly genuine, even if attempts to 
rearrange the hierarchy of grievances retrospectively may be due to the need to 
maximise mobilising appeal of the message. Zawahiri’s approach to the Israeli question, 
however, might have caused much greater damage to the experiential commensurability 
of the Al-Qa’ida leadership communiqués. 
 As noted in Chapter 6 on Prognostic Frames, in 1995 Zawahiri famously 
proclaimed, following the Al-Jihad bombing of the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad, that 
‘the way to Jerusalem passes through Cairo.’724 The coding revealed that this way of 
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highlighting the Israeli question by proxy, through emphasising the need to address other 
more immediate concerns first as a means towards the ultimate goal of liberating 
Jerusalem when conceivable, again became a prominent feature of Zawahiri’s 
communiqués almost a decade later. The processing of communiqués showed that as Al-
Qa’ida became increasingly embroiled and desperate in a bloody and 
indiscriminate⎯and progressively unpopular⎯insurgency in Iraq, Zawahiri began to 
frame its efforts in the country as essential to the successful liberation of Palestine. As he 
paid tribute to the disastrous Al-Qa’ida commander in Iraq, Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, 
Zawahiri emphasised the need to focus on Iraq in order to establish an Islamic emirate 
that could subsequently launch operations against Israel, regardless of how long this 
would take to accomplish.725 Iraq would become a ‘fortress of Islam’ from where 
assaults on Israel will be conducted.726 In his appeals for support for the Al-Qa’ida 
operatives in Iraq who, despite Zawahiri’s triumphant hyperbole, were engaged in an 
increasingly stagnant and sectarian struggle against Muslims in the country, the Al-
Qa’ida leader equated a solution to the Israeli dilemma with such lofty and ambiguous 
aims as the ‘reestablishment of the Caliphate state which the Crusaders and their helpers 
toppled.’727 
 Thus, ten years down the line, the way to Jerusalem now passed through 
Baghdad. As with the Islamabad bombings, internal objectives not only trumped 
potential external goals, they formed the conduits through which the latter could be 
achieved. This, interestingly, was precisely the argument put forward by Zawahiri’s 
colleague, Mohammed Salam Faraj on the need to target the near enemy and establish 
Islamic governance on a solid footing before engaging in other more ambitious 
activities, an argument that Zawahiri dismissed as misguided. It is as if, therefore, 
Zawahiri has come full circle. Judging by the ‘open meeting’ venture (which has never 
been repeated since) and other factors, it would appear that Zawahiri’s prioritisation of 
Iraq and utilisation of Palestinian suffering to rally support for Al-Qa’ida in Iraq through 
his communiqués is far removed from the concerns of the vast majority of potential 
participants and Muslims in the region. What about the relationship with Muslims living 
in the West?  
 
B. Failure to recognise the Muslim Diaspora  
 
The Al-Qa’ida leaders are often seen as presiding over a ‘global brand’ that draws 
supporters from all corners of the globe, including an increasingly active, enthusiastic 
and comparatively rich proportion of Islamist militant sympathisers living in the West. 
Several of the most dramatic attacks linked to or inspired by Al-Qa’ida were carried out 
or attempted by Islamist extremists who had lived in the West for years or had been born 
there. Numerous individuals living in specific Diaspora communities in Europe and 
North America have also sought to join and support insurgency campaigns run by Al-
Qa’ida affiliates and allies in East Africa, Central Asia and elsewhere. Additionally, of 
course, the community identified in the Al-Qa’ida communiqués does not recognise 
modern borders and purportedly represents Muslims globally, regardless of geographic 
concentration. As this study has shown, moreover, the grievance narrative often refers to 
developments that: are specific to Muslims living in the West, such as the French ban on 
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religious symbols; originate in the West, such as the cartoon controversy; or are 
inherently global, such as bin Ladin’s more recent environmental agenda. 
 Paradoxically, however – according to the current study – the Al-Qa’ida 
leadership appears to have failed to relate to Muslims living outside predominantly 
Muslim regions, especially those living in the West. Remarkably, given the volume of 
communiqués and extent of the period involved, the current analysis found hardly any 
appeals directed towards Muslims living in the West. Although the French niqab ban 
was alluded to in several communiqués, as noted, the point was to collate policies that 
supposedly exposed the overt hostility of Western regimes towards Muslims in general 
and portrayed this initiative as part of a wider campaign of aggression in the Middle East 
and elsewhere that started with the Crusades. In the very few cases where the Al-Qa’ida 
leadership acknowledged the existence of Muslims in the West this was usually 
prompted by a question. The answer given, in turn, was dismissive. Bin Ladin, for 
instance, told Abdel Bari Atwan (who has lived in London since 1979) that he ‘would 
rather die than live in any European state.’728 Later, in an interview with Pakistani 
English-language newspaper The Dawn, bin Ladin warned that ‘the Islamic Shariat says 
Muslims should not live in the land of the infidel for long.’729 Aside from these 
references, the coding found that bin Ladin largely ignored the Islamic Diasporas and 
never addressed the issue on his own initiative. 
Zawahiri also remained largely silent on the issue of Muslims living in the West 
throughout the material coded, making a few limited references when, again, the issue 
was prompted by a question. Numerous participants in the ‘open meeting,’ for instance, 
wanted to know about their position as Muslims living in the West, even as supporters of 
many of the causes for which Al-Qa’ida claimed to fight. Zawahiri’s response was 
equally scornful, warning Muslims that ‘permanent residence in the countries of 
infidelity is only allowed when necessary […] because this means that [a Muslim] 
accepts their laws to be applied to him.’730 In several other messages, Zawahiri 
condemned those who ‘take pride in their British citizenship, or ‘beg for residency 
permits’ outside Muslim lands.731 At the same time, of course, those who had carried out 
attacks in the name of Al-Qa’ida, such as the 2005 London bombers, were praised, 
regardless of the fact that they too had never left the West, despite ample opportunities 
to do so. 
 The Al-Qa’ida leadership’s reluctance to recognise or even acknowledge the 
existence of the millions of Muslims living in the West is perhaps informed partly by, 
what Meijer terms, ‘xenophobic Wahhabism.’ This school of thought posits that a true 
believer ‘could only express his belief and the sincerity of his faith by demonstrating 
open enmity towards “idolaters.” This forbids the befriending of infidels and prohibits 
true Muslims from travelling to the land of idolaters (bilad al-mushrikin). Indeed, the 
Quranic verse that Zawahiri quotes in his communiqués more than any other is verse 51 
of the fifth Sura: ‘O you who have believed, do not take the Jews and the Christians as 
allies. They are [in fact] allies of one another. And whoever is an ally to them among 
you - then indeed, he is [one] of them. Indeed, Allah guides not the wrongdoing 
people.’732 
 By occasionally admonishing, but largely ignoring, the millions of Muslims who 
live in the West or have positive relations with non-Muslims the Al-Qa’ida leaders have 
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therefore failed to relate to the experiences of a vast proportion of Muslims worldwide. 
The life led by the Al-Qa’ida leaders and the isolationist vision they convey is simply 
unthinkable for the majority of potential participants whom they seek to court. The 
leadership’s detachment from the wider experiences of the Muslim population is perhaps 
best illustrated, though, by the fact the prognostic vision of bin Ladin and Zawahiri has 
failed to materialise. The tension this has caused is palpable in the communiqués 
analysed. 
 
C. Rejection of prognostic vision 
 
The formulation of prognostic criteria is meaningless unless this element of the message 
is successfully conveyed to potential participants who, at least to some extent, become 
convinced of the need to mobilise according to the given prescriptions. Diagnostic and 
prognostic assertions, as noted, thus need to be delivered effectively in ways that 
provoke message recipients to become activists. ‘Constituents,’ As Snow and Byrd 
noted, ‘have to be moved from the balcony to the barricades.’733 A very significant 
challenge to the experiential commensurability of the Al-Qa’ida leadership 
communiqués thus lies in the fact that constituents or potential participants largely have 
not, over the course of the past two decades, responded to perceived grievances and 
societal ills in the ways in which the Al-Qa’ida leadership demanded and envisaged. 
 As the current longitudinal analysis established, there are a number of problems 
with the ways in which the Al-Qa’ida leadership constructs and delivers its prognostic 
prescriptions in the communiqués. As with many other militant revolutionary 
movements, the leadership has offered scant details concerning the envisaged end goal 
or how such a society might function in practice, aside from reiterating core aspirations 
of Salafi jihadists. References to the desired end goal are nonetheless consistent over 
time and serve, to a degree, as a motivational frame to empress the need to address more 
immediate goals. Although the communiqués sometimes appear contradictory over time 
in relation to justifications set forth for violence, the coding showed that references in 
this regard appear to escalate in a relatively consistent manner, with communiqués, 
broadly speaking, becoming more indiscriminate over time. A notable exception, 
however, is Zawahiri’s more recent attempt to distance himself from Al-Qa’ida affiliates 
that target Muslims in mosques and market squares in Iraq, Pakistan and elsewhere, 
regardless of the fact that he had earlier sought to present justifications for precisely this 
form of targeting. Further work on future communiqués would be needed to establish 
whether this tension persists. 
The most profound problem for Al-Qa’ida in this respect, however, is the 
demonstrable failure of its leadership to convince constituents of the virtue of the form 
of prognosis it has presented. There is, of course, tangible evidence that the plan for 
action presented in the communiqués has not provoked the envisaged results. Some 
might argue that the threshold for action has become so high, with the leadership 
demanding that followers embrace martyrdom and indiscriminate violence, thus limiting 
participation. As this study has shown, however, bin Ladin initially limited his 
prognostic requirements to economic embargo and boycotting of Western and US goods. 
It is notable, therefore, that the vast majority of Muslim publics continue to trade with 
the West or purchase Western goods, regardless of the Al-Qa’ida leadership’s consistent 
calls for the boycotting of Western products for over twenty years. When popular 
boycott did become widespread, in the wake of the cartoon controversy, the role of Al-
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Qa’ida in this uprising was widely perceived as marginal, belated and ineffective.734 
There exists an even wider gap between the leadership’s notions of legitimate and 
necessary violent action and the form of resistance the vast majority of potential 
participants have been prepared to undertake.  
 Al-Qa’ida’s calls for popular support for mass casualty terrorism and affiliated or 
allied groups that carry out attacks in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, East and North Africa, 
as well as the West and beyond have generally not been heeded. This lack of response 
concerns the prognostic solutions presented rather than many of the diagnostic elements 
of the collective action frames, which often are shared among a greater proportion of the 
population. In terms of the patterns revealed in the coding of the Al-Qa’ida 
communiqués, however, the most significant development is the way in which the 
failure of the leadership to see through the envisaged behavioural changes in the ummah 
has resulted in targeted condemnation of precisely this audience and a gradual but 
significant alienation of those publics that would constitute potential constituents and 
participants. As noted above, this is distinct from takfiri denunciations, which – the 
coding showed – are more specific and limited in reach. The lack of prognostic appeal of 
the message and, particularly, Zawahiri’s insistence that the onus for change and 
reflection should be on the ummah rather than the Al-Qa’ida leadership, has 
compounded the isolation that the latter began to experience with its support for mass-
casualty attacks and Muslim targeting in the first place. This detachment from the 
experiences and desires of the vast majority of the ummah is best demonstrated through 
understanding the leadership communiqués themselves.  
 The differences that exist in terms of forms of prognosis between the general 
Muslim population and the Al-Qa’ida leadership became obvious to all during the ‘Arab 
Spring.’ Zawahiri had, as discussed in Part III, mocked and criticised those who took to 
the streets in protest against government oppression rather than joining the ranks of the 
mujahideen, bemoaning the ‘Muslim’s tardiness in resisting oppression’ through any 
meaningful ways.735 The ‘Arab Spring’, therefore, highlighted the irrelevance of 
Zawahiri’s prognosis even though his own frustration with the lack of mobilisation of 
the Muslim public according to his prescribed ways became palpable in the material 
coded at least six years before the 2011 uprising.  
The effectiveness and mobilising potential of the Al-Qa’ida leadership 
communiqués thus appears to be limited by the extent to which this narrative fails to 
address and match some of the chief concerns and experiences of vast swathes of the 
global Muslim population as well as the extent to which the presented prognosis appears 
to have been rejected by most message recipients. The way in which the leadership, and 
Zawahiri in particular, have reacted to these challenges points to its increased 
marginalisation in the last few years. Through a longitudinal study of Zawahiri and bin 
Ladin communiqués, moreover, light can be shed on the extent to which Al-Qa’ida’s 
overall message lacks empirical credibility. The next section explores this aspect in 
detail. 
 
8.3.2 Challenges to empirical credibility: frame consistency 
 
Chapter 3 discussed how inconsistencies and contradictions that are detectable in a 
narrative over time could weaken message effectiveness and mobilising potential 
through conveying contrasting collective action frames that render the central message 
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or specific activist guidelines ambiguous. As mentioned above, much of the material 
under review is inherently dynamic. The Al-Qa’ida leadership has confronted a wide set 
of challenges, reassessed the prognostic parameters deemed appropriate and reacted to 
watershed events which are framed within the existing dominating context of defensive 
jihad and collective identity based on common injustices. This variation is not 
necessarily problematic, so long as this fits within and enhances the overall discursive 
framework that the leadership has constructed over time. The preceding pages have also 
shown, moreover, that there are a number of obvious differences when Zawahiri’s and 
bin Ladin’s output is compared. In the early years of Al-Qa’ida, for example, Zawahiri’s 
group and efforts were not fully in line with those of bin Ladin. Both fought to reinstate 
the Caliphate, but for the former its heart would be in Cairo whereas bin Ladin insisted 
upon the primacy of Mecca and the Land of the Two Holy Places.736 
 Following this transitional phase many argue that the scope of enmity and the 
focus of the communiqués became more coherent, with a clear delineation between far 
and near enemy for example, as discussed above, before becoming more fluid in recent 
years as the repertoire of issues expanded. Hegghammer, for instance, argued that 
traditionally rigid ranking of enemies according to prioritisation in the discourse of Al-
Qa’ida and its affiliates during the 1990s to early 2000s has now morphed into a fluid 
hybrid whereby group leaders seek to widen their support and recruitment base by 
covering more issues, mixing local and external belligerents.737 Others, most notably 
Gerges, have emphasised the hypotheses that Al-Qa’ida saw an external, distant enemy 
in the United States and its Western allies and became convinced, and tried to convince 
others, of the merits of targeting this entity.738 This begs the question, however, to what 
extent was a clear dichotomy of enemy hierarchies ever tangible in the Al-Qa’ida 
leadership communiqués? For Scheuer, for example, bin Ladin always perceived and 
presented the US both as a near and as a far enemy – providing external assistance to 
local tyrants and Israel whilst being physically present in the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq and 
elsewhere. Bin Laden, according to this account, therefore, blurred the distinction 
between near and far enemies, but not necessarily in an incoherent way as he traced the 
traditional set of local adversaries and tyrannical regimes to the core threat of the United 
States and its allies, wherever they could be found.739 
 This study showed that early threats to frame consistency, in the aftermath of the 
9/11 attacks, were largely dispelled by the global outrage caused by the Iraq war, 
rendition programmes and accounts of detainee torture that proved a comfortable fit with 
the core elements of the Al-Qa’ida messages to date. There exists, however, an 
underlying tension in terms of scope and origins of grievance that could pose a challenge 
to empirical credibility in the long term. Part III showed how Zawahiri in particular 
variously traced the root cause of the grievances described, to the presence of America 
and the West in the Islamic world and to the overall corrupting influence of the ideas 
represented by these adversaries or to the traditional set of local tyrants and embedded 
elites. The result is a conflicting narrative with an ambiguous focus and set of targeting 
prescriptions that leaves many questions regarding the direction of activism and 
prioritisation of mobilisation unanswered. This apparent incongruity is no less acute in 
Zawahiri’s more recent output. Nor does this change in scope appear to follow any 
logical or linear progressions with some communiqués emphasising the global, or US-
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focused, aspects of the struggle whilst others revert back to matters relating to Egypt and 
neighbouring regions, which are prioritised over other developments. Rather than 
dismissing this haphazard prioritisation as periodic nostalgia, the conflicting scope in 
Zawahiri’s communiqués, that have always been far more expansive than those of bin 
Ladin, should be seen as a clear weakness in the overall empirical credibility of the Al-
Qa’ida leadership communiqués. 
 Empirical credibility is also undermined by inconsistencies in prognostic 
framing, especially in relation to justifications for violence and the reach of militant 
activism. Again, this is primarily a problem in Zawahiri’s output. Bin Ladin’s shorter 
and simpler communiqués generally offer far less detail than those of Zawahiri, limiting 
justifications for violence to notions of reciprocity and concepts, which would be 
familiar in the West, such as the fundamentals of ‘just war.’740 Zawahiri’s material is 
richer in content but, no doubt partly for this reason, also less consistent when it comes 
to deliberating the utility, prescribed form and consequences of violence. The coding 
showed how early accounts insisted upon the necessity of informing Muslims prior to 
attacks being carried out in their immediate vicinity, advice which Al-Qa’ida’s affiliates 
appear not to have heeded. Later, the families of Muslims who were nonetheless killed 
were promised blood money, something which also appears to have failed to materialise. 
Zawahiri sometimes spoke of his profound regret for Muslim deaths in Al-Qa’ida-linked 
attacks, promising to make those responsible accountable before the shari’ah courts.  
At the same time, Zawahiri developed a doctrine for Al-Qa’ida that legitimised 
killing Muslims, not only as collaborators (and thus as legitimate targets and traitors) but 
also innocent bystanders who were unlucky enough to be close to an explosive device 
when it went off, equating such events to medieval sieges and night rides during the time 
of the Prophet’s immediate successors. As this study has established, Zawahiri initially 
claimed Al-Qa’ida’s affiliates in North Africa, Iraq and elsewhere simply had not 
targeted innocent Muslims, contrary to accusations (but rather had targeted police or 
military assets only), whilst later seeking to rein in, in his most recent output, these very 
allies and affiliates that were targeting Muslims in markets and mosques. Zawahiri even 
tried to deflect some of the criticism aimed at Al-Qa’ida onto Hamas (which he derided 
for alleged weaknesses) through questioning their targeting of Fatah activists in 
comparison with the targeting of Al-Qa’ida affiliates of Iraq, regardless of the fact that 
numerous Zawahiri communiqués called for the killing of these very same Fatah 
activists and leaders. 
 Much has also been made of the links between targeting of non-Muslims and the 
grievances, or diagnostic frames, presented in the communiqués. The coding of 
communiqués reveals that target legitimisation in this regard, however, has moved far 
beyond discriminate or selective targeting of military, police, or even financial and 
governmental targets to include all those who pay taxes, participate in society at large 
and perceive the pillars of Western governance to be legitimate, regardless of whether or 
not the current politics and policies are supported. Although the principles of reciprocity 
still apply, in addition to those of asymmetry – rendering softer targets more attractive – 
                                                
740 Bin Ladin’s nascent environmental agenda was, of course, cut short. In the long term, perhaps, this 
could have challenged empirical credibility as many strands of these messages were not specific to 
Muslims and included as victims those who suffered the consequences of hurricane Katrina (i.e. U.S. 
citizens), with implicit recognition of the humanitarian role of the United Nations. This might have been 
part of a more elaborate strategy designed to make sense of a growing range of global issues affecting the 
world. Zawahiri also had a brief spell seeking to appeal to the oppressed all over the world, regardless of 
creed, presenting Al-Qa’ida as a fair, legitimate and pertinent actor on the global stage. 
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any notions of moral superiority appear undermined when the scope and reach of 
permitted violence has expanded so demonstrably. 
 
 
8.3.3 Weaknesses in the message 
 
Zawahiri announced, as he responded to questions posted through online forums during 
his 2008 ‘open meeting’ and as mentioned in Chapter 4, that ‘even if Usama bin Ladin 
doesn’t become ill, he must die one day, whereas Allah’s religion will remain until Allah 
inherits the earth and everything on it.’741 Three years later, in May 2011, Al-Qa’ida 
announced the ‘martyrdom’ of bin Ladin and that Zawahiri would take over as leader 
and principal spokesperson. Of all the tasks that now become his primary responsibility, 
maintaining and communicating the collective action frames of the movement that are 
intended to attract followers and inspire and mobilise existing participants, is perhaps the 
most important. As this chapter illustrates, however, the impact and effectiveness of 
these framing tasks appear to have been undermined by the inability of the frame 
articulators to reflect core aspirations and experiences of perceived constituents and 
through generating a narrative that is, at times, incongruous and ambiguous.  
It is particularly significant for the future of Al-Qa’ida that these constraints are 
primarily to be found in Zawahiri’s voluminous output, as the leader will, at least in the 
near future, be the most prominent representative of the Al-Qa’ida core. Rather than 
declaring vast swathes of Muslims apostates, moreover, the nature of this 
communication is characterised primarily by Zawahiri’s bitter denunciation of vast 
swathes of the Muslim population, dismissal of those living in the West and frustration 
with the very same people Al-Qa’ida claims to represent and protect. These findings are 
of clear significance for counter-terrorism practitioners in the West and elsewhere who 
are tasked with undermining the impact of Al-Qa’ida and its affiliates. The next section 
thus explores some of the policy recommendations that can be derived from the current 
study. 
 
 
 
8.4 Policy Recommendations 
 
In June 2011 the British government approved an amended version of the previous 
government’s ‘Prevent’ strategy, designed to ‘prevent radicalisation and stop would-be 
terrorists from committing mass murder.’742 At the heart of the revamped programme 
was a desire to ‘respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat from 
those who promote it.’743 These efforts would primarily target Al-Qa’ida and its 
affiliates, viewed as the most potent terrorist threat to the UK. As explored in chapter 1 
of this thesis, moreover, a similar emphasis on understanding and undermining the 
ideology of Al-Qa’ida has been recognised in US policy papers and by the wider 
counter-terrorist community.  
 In this context, the policy relevance of the current study is obvious. An 
appreciation of how terrorist groups construct and convey ideological principles to 
potential followers, however, necessarily relies on a comprehensive understanding of the 
                                                
741 Zawahiri (2008) [105]. 
742 HM Government (2011) Prevent Strategy. Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for the 
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way in which these ideas have formed and how they have developed over time. This 
thesis has cautioned against relying on selective sampling of Al-Qa’ida communiqués as 
they may not be representative for the whole and fail to capture narrative dynamics and 
ways in which arguments have developed over time. An initial objective for policy 
makers and relevant practitioners, seeking to prevent the spread and undermine the 
message of Al-Qa’ida’s ideology, would thus be to develop a systematic and rigorous 
understanding of this material, as this thesis has attempted to display. On a related point, 
as will be discussed further below, this will also be the only way to detect potentially 
exploitable weaknesses and inconsistencies that emerge over time. As the framing 
literature assumes, and as discussed in chapter 3, such empirical inconsistencies only 
emerge when the material in question is subjected to a long-term and systematic 
analysis. Furthermore, it is important to recognise that the dissemination of 
communiqués conveying the ideology of Al-Qa’ida is not only acknowledged as an 
important element of the ‘threat’ within policy circles, but also, as this thesis has shown, 
considered a fundamental benchmark of success by the Al-Qa’ida leaders themselves. 
Indeed, through some of this interpretive work, the Al-Qa’ida leaders have themselves 
sought to highlight and exploit inconsistencies in Western policies, as explored in 
chapter 5, above.  
 Three distinct policy recommendations relating to Al-Qa’ida and its ideology can 
therefore be derived from the current thesis: (1) the identification of metrics to provide a 
deeper understanding of Al-Qa’ida; (2) the identification of potentially exploitable 
weaknesses from the Al-Qa’ida leadership narrative; (3) an appreciation for the way in 
which the Al-Qa’ida leadership seeks to exploit inconsistencies in Western policy 
making in order to strengthen its diagnostic messaging.  
 
1. Deeper understanding  
 
Any policy designed to undermine the impact of Al-Qa’ida and its ability to inspire and 
incite potential supporters to aid or join militant activism necessarily depends on a 
rigorous understanding of the phenomenon in question and how it has evolved. This 
relates to the issues the Al-Qa’ida leadership has prioritised over the years, the nature of 
its problem diagnosis, its intricate and complex relationship with notions of violence as 
well as the leadership’s multifaceted efforts to communicate and convey the core 
message to different audience groups. Given the ambiguity and fluidity of the Al-Qa’ida 
concept, as discussed in the first chapter of this thesis, such a comprehensive 
understanding of the phenomenon in question is important in order to differentiate 
between the core leadership and affiliates or any local promoters of Al-Qa’ida. Indeed, 
the ideological disposition and the diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing of 
the latter may differ from the core leadership.  
 Based on observations made in this thesis, policy makers would also need to 
understand and be prepared for the ways in which the Al-Qa’ida leadership interprets 
and uses a host of issues to promote violent extremism that are not always related to 
grievances connected to war fighting and loss of territory. As this thesis has shown, a far 
greater range of issues is used in the Al-Qa’ida narrative as part of problem diagnosis to 
justify violence.  
 
2. Exploitable weaknesses 
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Much of the policy work focused on terrorist ideologies centres on efforts to ‘counter the 
terrorist narrative.’744 This relates to attempts to undermine the credibility of the message 
or exploit other weaknesses that can blunt its impact within the relevant target 
communities, as well as seeking to promote and communicate alternative positions and 
interpretations to those expressed by extremist and terrorist groups and leaderships.  
 Counter-narrative work is likely to be particularly strong when it is based on 
inconsistencies and tensions that emerge through the processing of the terrorist 
communiqués themselves. In this sense, the current thesis suggests that efforts to counter 
and undermine the narrative of the Al-Qa’ida leadership should focus in particular on 
highlighting the ways in which the message has become inconsistent in terms of scope. 
This relates to the failure of the Al-Qa’ida leadership, argued above, to present a 
consistent prognostic message to potential followers in terms of hierarchies of enmity 
and target prioritisation.  
 Furthermore, the tensions identified in the current analysis, relating to the use of 
violence, could be exploited. This relates to the highlighting of the Al-Qa’ida 
leadership’s efforts to offer justifications for evermore limitless targeting of Muslims 
and non-Muslims and its endorsement of groups and affiliates that carry out attacks 
killing Muslims and non-Muslim civilians. These aggregated messages, in turn, could be 
compared with the leadership’s (especially Zawahiri’s) much more recent criticism of 
Al-Qa’ida affiliates that have been responsible for this bloodshed. In addition, as argued 
in this thesis, the leadership’s recognition that Al-Qa’ida affiliates and loyalists have 
indeed targeted Muslim publics and innocent civilians could be contrasted with the 
leadership’s earlier insistence that these groups had nothing to do with Al-Qa’ida.  
 As discussed in this chapter, moreover, the Al-Qa’ida leadership communiqués 
also reveal, according to the framing literature, shortcomings in terms of experiential 
commensurability. These could potentially be exploited by policy makers for counter-
narrative purposes. For Western policy makers and practitioners, for example, the fact 
that the Al-Qa’ida leadership has made such scant efforts to address (or even recognise 
the validity) of problems faced by Muslims living the West would be of clear relevance 
in terms of efforts to undermine the reach and impact of this message. 
  
3. Al-Qa’ida’s usage of policy inconsistencies  
 
Section 5.3.3, above, discussed how the Al-Qa’ida leadership has sought to engage in its 
own counter-narrative work of sorts, seeking to emphasise inconsistencies in Western 
policy making in order to highlight alleged double-standards. This has primarily focused 
on policies towards democracy, mistreatment of detainees, selective endorsement of 
tyrants and unconditional support for Israel. This discourse was certainly not invented by 
the Al-Qa’ida leadership but it is important to recognise that bin Ladin and Zawahiri 
have sought to use these policy inconsistencies as part of their portrayal of the West in 
the diagnostic element of their communiqués.  
 It could be argued, therefore, that it is particularly important for Western policy 
makers to convey a consistent message, which corresponds with their stated core values 
as any diversion from these emphases are exploited by Al-Qa’ida. Whenever changes in 
policies are unavoidable or the universal implementation of a particular set of values is 
unfeasible, it is important that policy makers address these inconsistencies through 
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targeted public diplomacy that dismantles and pre-empts Al-Qa’ida’s efforts to portray 
the West as unfair or un-Islamic.  
 In exploring potential policy implications that can be derived from this thesis, 
however, it should not be assumed that understanding communiqués and constructing 
effective counter-terrorism measures through adopting this perspective offers anything 
akin a panacea in terms of tackling Al-Qa’ida and undermining its impact. The next 
section discusses important limitations of the current research and highlights issues of 
importance and relevance that are beyond the scope of the current thesis.  
 
 
 
8.5 Limitations of the Research 
 
The focus of this analysis has been on the composition and dissemination of Al-Qa’ida 
leadership communiqués, which have been presented as the most measurable component 
available to study Al-Qa’ida as a movement and the way in which it has evolved. The 
case was made that studying these communiqués is important not only as it displays the 
construction of Al-Qa’ida’s justificatory narrative over the years but also since the 
dissemination of this material is seen as an important benchmark of success by the Al-
Qa’ida leadership itself, as noted above.  
 Communiqués, therefore, have been presented as a yardstick for success with 
which to assess the way in which the Al-Qa’ida leadership has portrayed the movement 
and responded to the challenges it has faced over the years. The way in which this 
material was navigated and notions of success, effectiveness and credibility were 
approached rested on the criteria set out in the literature on collective action frames. 
Different comparative studies, however, may produce alternative perspectives in terms 
of Al-Qa’ida’s perceived success and failure. If the leadership’s efforts to impact 
Western policymaking were to be assessed and contrasted with that of other terrorist 
leaderships or networks, for instance, the verdict – at least in the short term – would no 
doubt be that the Al-Qa’ida leadership has been quite successful. This is particularly the 
case when its material weakness is considered in relation to the vast wealth and power of 
its adversaries. Indeed, bin Ladin recognised this phenomenal impact of Al-Qa’ida, as 
noted in chapter 6: ‘all that we have to do is send two mujahideen to the furthest point 
East to raise a piece of cloth on which is written al-Qaeda, in order to make the generals 
race there to cause America to suffer human, economic, and political losses.’745  
 However, this thesis has not measured the Al-Qa’ida leadership’s success against 
its stated goals and ultimate objectives as expressed through the prognostic part of its 
communiqués. These relate to the establishment of a global religious state and realisation 
of coordinated mass Islamist revolutions against foreign and domestic adversaries. Many 
of these long-term prognostic references, as emphasised in chapter 6, serve an 
inspirational purpose and are deliberately ambiguous. Rather, this thesis has assessed the 
effectiveness and strength of the communiqués in terms of the ability of the Al-Qa’ida 
leadership to convey a coherent, consistent message that addresses the concerns and 
realities of those to whom the leadership seeks to appeal.  
 In this regard concepts such as ‘mobilisation’, ‘engagement’ and ‘participation’ 
become central. With these concepts, the focus is not on the content of communiqués but 
on behaviour. It should thus be clearly stated (as was addressed in chapter 3) that this 
thesis does not provide any clear indicators concerning the likelihood that individuals 
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might seek to implement Al-Qa’ida’s message. Just as the Al-Qa’ida leadership is free to 
interpret events in different ways and convey that interpretation to its audiences, 
individuals are also capable of interpreting their wider environment – and Al-Qa’ida’s 
message – in countless different ways. A host of external and internal factors, contextual 
and psychosocial issues affect this interpretation and the complex process that might 
lead an individual to become engaged in violent extremism. An equally complex set of 
circumstances may also contribute to an activist’s disillusionment and eventual departure 
from violent extremist activity. Dissatisfaction or disappointment with Al-Qa’ida’s 
message may play a role in some cases, but will never be an exclusive factor.  
In this sense, it is important to acknowledge that the Al-Qa’ida leadership 
message contains several weaknesses in terms of the construction of a coherent and 
effective message. Any further deliberations concerning the propensity of individuals to 
become engaged (or disengaged) cannot be derived from this thesis. Indeed, the focus 
has not been on the individual in this study. Aspects potentially contributing to 
participation, engagement and related behaviour, moreover, have not provided the 
variables or metrics that have been analysed in this thesis. Furthermore, the prism of the 
social movement literature – through the adoption of a framework on the generation of 
collective action frames by movement leaders – was not applied in order to make any 
inferences regarding elements that are regarded as likely to attract ‘potential participants’ 
to become engaged in physical activism. The concept of motivational framing, for 
instance, which is designed to move people from ‘balconies to the barricades’, focuses 
on the attempts by movement leaders to fulfil this framing task, rather than implying that 
this process is inevitable or in any way straightforward.  
 The current study, therefore, focuses on the intended impact of the Al-Qa’ida 
leadership communiqués, measured against the criteria set in these messages, and 
analyses potential issues that might blunt its impact, based on a literature defining the 
effective generation of messages designed to affect and mobilise wider audiences 
(regardless of the extent to which such mobilisation takes place or not).  
  Finally, it is important to consider another fundamental limitation of this study, 
which relates to its qualitative nature. Although this thesis adopted a longitudinal 
perspective, analysing 240 Al-Qa’ida leadership communiqués using a coding template 
that was applied to the entire dataset in a systematic way, a degree of subjectivity in the 
processing of this material cannot be avoided. There is a difference between 
systematised, automated and computerised content analyses that code transcripts 
according to specific criteria relating to certain words and concepts and the more in-
depth, nuanced perspective adopted for the current study. The shortcomings of 
computerised studies intended to process Al-Qa’ida leadership communiqués were 
addressed in chapter 3. In terms of addressing the limitations of qualitative studies, inter-
coder reliability was addressed by honing the coding template on a sample of the dataset 
and replicating these work processes together with the supervisor (see further in chapter 
4). Furthermore, emphasis was placed on ensuring the processing of the communiqués 
was transparent and the methodologies applied accessible and replicable. To this end, the 
coding template itself is annexed to this thesis, together with details of the material 
coded and the coding results themselves.   
A discussion of limitations of the current study leads logically to the 
identification of further potential research that can be developed from or informed by the 
current project. 
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8.6 Further Research 
 
The findings of this thesis, the methodology applied and the data accumulated could 
form the basis for a number of related comparative studies that would broaden the scope 
of analysis and provide opportunities to understand the development of Al-Qa’ida 
leadership communiqués in the wider context. The use of, what Cetina terms, ‘scopic’ 
systems of media746 or the issuance of communiqués is not uniquely a preoccupation of 
the Al-Qa’ida leadership. The leaders of numerous Islamist militant groups (often 
affiliated with Al-Qa’ida), from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, Iraq, the Arabian 
Peninsula and elsewhere disseminate ideological and propaganda material presenting the 
relevant justificatory narrative and elucidating problem diagnosis and prognosis in a 
message designed to encourage a particular response from target audiences. 
 It would thus be particularly informative to apply similar work processes and 
methodologies (including a standardised template similar to that adopted here) in order 
to assess ways in which the discourse of these movements has evolved, how these jihadi 
leaders have approached different forms of prognosis (particularly violence) and how 
they have constructed targeted appeals through motivational framing. A comparative 
analysis with such an evolutionary perspective would, for example, address whether the 
identified shortcomings of the Al-Qa’ida leadership communiqués feature similarly in 
other datasets and whether there are parallels between the Al-Qa’ida leadership’s 
approach to the use of violence and that of other jihadi leaders. Such a comparative 
analysis could also view the doctrinal approach adopted by bin Ladin and Zawahiri in 
relation to the position adopted by other Al-Qa’ida or Islamist militant leaders. In this 
context, it would be especially important to establish whether bin Ladin’s and Zawahiri’s 
relatively flexible approach to some core facets of puritanical Salafi thought was 
reflected in the communiqués of other leaders. Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, as mentioned, 
adopted a far more critical and hostile approach towards Shia Muslims than did bin 
Ladin and Zawahiri. It would be worthy of further research to establish whether these 
doctrinal tensions persist in relation to other prominent leaders associated with Al-
Qa’ida and its affiliates. A discrepancy between two approaches could help explain the 
fact that some Al-Qa’ida affiliates carry out attacks against Muslim populations (such as 
Shia and Sufi communities) even though they are not target priorities in bin Ladin’s and 
Zawahiri’s communiqués.  
It would, furthermore, be equally valuable to compare the current analysis with a 
similar study of communiqués from groups beyond the Islamist extremist cohort 
specifically. A comparative study involving the Provisional Irish Republican Army 
leadership, for example, could offer opportunities to contrast the construction of 
diagnostic and prognostic frames in a completely different cultural and political context.  
 Moving beyond the framing approach, the current study can also be viewed in 
terms of its analysis of evolving leadership strategies. In this regard, a wider perspective 
that looks at the communication strategy of other Al-Qa’ida leaders (such as Abu Yahia 
al-Libi) could highlight different leadership styles and help develop hypotheses 
concerning the way in which the Al-Qa’ida might evolve (or, retrospectively and 
hypothetically, how it might have evolved) with different leaders at the helm.  
 The wider theological, cultural and discursive context of the Al-Qa’ida 
leadership communiqués has largely been beyond the scope of the current thesis. This 
area of study, however, offers numerous opportunities for further research in order to 
assess the impact of the Al-Qa’ida communiqués more broadly. Indeed, the religio-
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political positioning of the Al-Qa’ida leadership, as described in this thesis, may present 
further challenges beyond the shortcomings identified above and distinct from criticism 
levied at the leadership for excessive targeting.  
 In a doctrinal sense, therefore, the expression of active religio-political ambitions 
may encourage debate and criticism from quietists and discrete or pacifist activist 
strands of Salafism, which would be worthy of further analysis.747 The combination of 
the religious and the political in the Al-Qa’ida leadership’s narrative, moreover, could be 
examined further in light of the controversy such an approach provokes within several 
schools of Islamic thought.  Eickelman and Piscatori, for example, note how some 
Islamic movements ‘believe that too great an involvement with politics may mislead or 
corrupt the believers. For example, the Tablighi Jama’at, a significant movement of 
reform that originated on South Asia but now has worldwide influence, believes that the 
separation of religion and politics is necessary in the short term.’748 ‘As God’s 
vicegerent (khalifa)’, the authors argue, ‘men are given the earth to govern but are not 
worthy to do so until they can govern themselves. In effect, therefore, they must eschew 
politics until they prove themselves worthy of being political.’749  
 On a related point, Zawahiri’s anti-democratic stance and his insistence that 
politics and religious rule (where concepts of power, authority and religiosity are 
intertwined) are dictated by the monotheistic principle of tawhid is, of course, by no 
means universal. As Esposito notes, for example, advocates of Islamic democracy have 
used alternative interpretations of tawhid to reach conclusions concerning correct form 
of legitimate governance that are in stark contrast to Zawahiri’s position. Abdelwahab 
El-Affendi, for instance, argued that correct implementation of tawhid required the 
implementation of some form of democratic rule. ‘No Muslim questions the sovereignty 
of God,’ El-Affendi, argued, ‘or the rule of Shariah, Islamic Law. However, most 
Muslims do (and did) have misgivings about any claims by one person that he is 
sovereign. The sovereignty of one man contradicts the sovereignty of God, for all men 
are equal in front of God.’750 
 Numerous theological and religious juridical strands could, therefore, be 
considered as part of further research to shed light on the impact of the Al-Qa’ida 
leadership communiqués and the controversial nature of the leaders’ religious 
interpretations.  
 Furthermore, when considering the actual impact these communiqués might have 
on individuals, it would be essential to conduct ethnographic research and interviews 
with relevant target audiences. Such an approach would add valuable detail regarding the 
way in which individuals might interpret the material under review, which – as noted in 
the previous section – has been beyond the scope of the current study. 
 Finally, in terms of pursuing further questions regarding the potential impact of 
Al-Qa’ida’s message, future work could focus on elements of competition where 
movements and groupings have emerged that may seek to attract much of the same 
audience, which the Al-Qa’ida leadership targets in its message, but that offer a radically 
different form of prognosis. Baker, for instance, talked of the emergence, during the late 
1990s, of ‘prophetic minorities’ in the Islamic world: social movements focused on 
creative, non-violent actions committed to the ‘peaceful remaking of their own 
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societies.’751 In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, moreover, a range of Islamist groups 
and other movements in the Islamic world can now operate with far more freedom than 
before in order to design and implement a prognostic agenda that is alternative to – and 
undermines – the set of solutions presented by the Al-Qa’ida leadership.   
 
 
 
8.7 Conclusion: Sustaining the Dream 
 
This thesis began by posing three questions that informed and structured subsequent 
chapters. The first question concerned the importance of understanding the Al-Qa’ida 
leadership communiqués. For an organisation that has become increasingly fractioned 
and diffuse since its inception in the wake of the Afghan-Soviet war, the ideational 
elements that underpin this movement were presented as a concrete and testable measure 
of analysis. Indeed, communiqués – understood here as the building blocks that make up 
the narrative of Al-Qa’ida – thus convey metrics that can be more tangible than 
organisational variables. The case was therefore made to study this material in a 
structured manner, using standardised coding tools and a longitudinal perspective that 
would be sensitive to the dynamic and variable nature of this ideational discourse. This 
responds to calls from scholars studying Al-Qa’ida and militant Islamism for a more 
structured approach to understanding the ideology of the movement as well as a desire 
within the wider academic community focusing on political violence for more grounded, 
systematic, empirical and evidence-based analyses. Lastly, as became evident in the 
longitudinal study of Al-Qa’ida communiqués, the leadership itself has recognised the 
importance of generating a narrative that appeals to identified constituents, effectively 
conveying its desires, prescriptions and frustrations. Revealingly, bin Ladin’s impact on 
Al-Qa’ida’s audiences via disseminated communiqués was central to Zawahiri’s 
assessment of the late leader’s legacy and the benchmark he used to celebrate bin 
Ladin’s perceived success as a pioneer of the contemporary jihad.    
 The second question concerned the construction of these messages and the way 
in which they have evolved. This was approached by designing the coding according to 
the construction of collective action frames – understood as the diagnostic, prognostic 
and motivational message elements conveyed through each communiqué. The results of 
this study were analysed in Part III. This review illustrated how the messages from the 
two Al-Qa’ida leaders evolved from localised tracts to more expansive and ambitious 
media initiatives that coincided with the leadership’s campaign of violence, culminating 
in a narrative that appears confused, at times contradictory in terms of prioritisation, 
struggling with the consequences of the violence it has presented as legitimate and out of 
kilter with the desires and experiences of vast proportions of supposed constituents.  
 This relates to the third fundamental question that structured this dissertation, 
relating to the effectiveness of the message conveyed and elements that can blunt its 
impact. Chapter 3 explored how the framing literature identifies shortfalls in message 
dissemination and this chapter has discussed how this applies to the Al-Qa’ida 
leadership communiqués based on the results of the longitudinal analysis. The 
abundance of grievances, which can be utilised to present and frame activist messages 
and the two leaders’ sophisticated grasp of key religio-cultural concepts and 
terminology, constitute the ingredients of a poignant and potentially effective narrative. 
                                                
751 Baker, R. W. (1997) ‘Invidious Comparisons: Realism, Postmodern Globalism, and Centrist Islamic 
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Aside from the impact of external developments, the impression of this narrative, 
however, appears to have been blunted by the leadership’s own shortcomings in terms of 
presenting coherent or acceptable solutions and in terms of addressing the experiences 
and emotions of perceived constituents and potential sympathisers. The leadership has 
not necessarily lost sight of, what Wilkinson termed ‘the revolutionary promise of the 
advent of an age of bliss, abundance and perfect justice’ as conveyed by religious and 
millenarian social movements (see Chapter 1). It does, however, appear to have lost 
confidence in the ability of constituents to form a mass movement that will follow the 
example of the Al-Qa’ida vanguard in fighting for this promised ‘age of bliss.’ As this 
thesis has shown, the leadership’s message over the period in question has become 
inconsistent and ambiguous; its frustration with the publics it purports to protect and 
represent too vocal and prominent; and, its dismissal of realities faced by scores of 
Muslims living in Diaspora communities in the West too stark. The ummat al-mu’minin 
– the Islamic nation – has rejected Al-Qa’ida’s set of prognostic solutions (from ever 
more indiscriminate forms of violence to economic boycott and other prescribed forms 
of uprising) and appears to have moved out of reach of Al-Qa’ida’s self-described 
vanguard. 
 This dissertation opened with a description of press reaction to the death of 
Usama bin Ladin. At the time, The Economist implied that the battle with Al-Qa’ida 
would not be over with the demise of its pivotal leader. It would still be necessary to 
‘kill his dream.’752 The preceding chapters have illustrated that although constructing 
and communicating this dream was an essential preoccupation of the Al-Qa’ida 
leadership, this vision has been blunted and weakened by the nature, direction and scope 
that bin Ladin and (especially) Zawahiri chose to adopt in their own communicative 
efforts. This, in turn, could contribute to an undermined status of this core within the 
wider Islamist militant milieu and should be a point of focus for future research. 
 Al-Qa’ida was formed as the result of a debate on the future directions of jihad in 
the wake of the perceived triumph of the mujahideen against Soviet forces in 
Afghanistan. Now, more than ten years after the 9/11 attacks and war in Afghanistan, 
after the death of bin Ladin and amid the turmoil of the Arab Spring, a new generation of 
Islamist militants is again faced with the challenge of shaping the future directions of 
jihad. The strength of their effort and size of their movement will to some degree depend 
on the extent to which this new generation of Islamist activists will appreciate – and 
learn from – the shortcomings of the Al-Qa’ida leadership. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
752 The Economist (2011) (7 May). 
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APPENDIX 1. Coding Template 
 
 
DETAILS OF COMMUNIQUE 
 
ID number  
Filename Unique filename to locate document in database 
Date released Release date of document by AQ on the Internet, or date of interview, or 
date communiqué was received by media organization. If these dates are 
unavailable date of publication by media reports will be given in stead, with 
explanation in square brackets. 
Location The book, website, report, newspaper article, etc. where the communiqué 
can be found or database from which it was taken 
Distributor The carrier which distributes the communiqués, e.g. As Sahab, Al Jazeera, 
As-Sharq Al-Awsat 
AQ representative The author of statement or letter or subject of interview or other documents 
from the Al-Qaeda core: AAZ=Ayman al-Zawahiri;UBL=Usama bin Ladin 
Type I.e. letter or internal memo, external statement, interview, article/news item 
Description/Title Title, if one is available, in inverted commas, otherwise short description 
 
DIAGNOSTIC 
 
Societal/cultural/normative 
 
 
 
Constructing a grievance narrative: significant events and prominent topics 
 
References to past important events References to specific events such as the 1948 war in the Middle 
East and older events /more vague e.g. colonialism. Also to more 
recent events demonstrating victim status and/or need for action. 
References to ongoing political events and 
crises 
References to events demonstrating alleged victim status, e.g. 
Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan. Also events such as publications of 
Muhammed drawings in Denmark, Norway and elsewhere 
 
 
PROGNOSTIC 
 
Tactics preferences and importance of violence 
 
Importance of violent attack, claims of attack References to the importance of attacks, including desired targets 
(e.g. oil infrastructure), specific tactics (e.g. suicide bombings) 
Identified important political tools outside 
violent attack 
For instance economic boycott 
Mentioned constraints on the use of violence Particularly any references to groups of people who should not be 
targeted, e.g. women and children. 
Perceived legitimacy of civilian targeting This includes justifications for civilian targeting, e.g. that those who 
vote for Western leaders should be targeted 
 
Direction and emphasis of prognostic solutions 
 
References to undesirability of 
existing societies 
This refers to comments explaining how features of existing societies need to be 
replaced, such as man-made laws, democracy and capitalism. And how these 
systems are defunct 
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Declared enemies  
Declared friends and 
temporary allies 
References to groups, leaders, countries which are close allies (such as the Taliban) 
or more short-term assets 
Identified regions for support 
building 
Areas of focus for gathering support, e.g. Pakistan, Europe etc. 
Identified regions for hostile 
actions 
Areas where most attacks and other operations should be focused, e.g. Arabian 
peninsula, Iraq, Egypt, Europe, the West, globally. 
 
Strategic/political vision 
 
References to desirable past or 
existing societies 
E.g. to Taliban Afghanistan or the 'golden age' during the reign of the Prophet 
Mohammed and his immediate successors. Especially attention to the specifics 
of those societies which should be re-introduced 
Descriptions of desired way 
forward and end result 
What components need to be in the new society, and descriptions of more 
immediate (interim) objectives 
 
 
MOTIVATIONAL 
 
Direction of messaging and audiences  
 
Declared audience Direction of message 
 
Appeal to Muslim audience  Guidance to Muslims, and appeal for their support through 
emphasising benign factors and rewards 
Criticism of Muslims and warnings Criticism of lack of support of Muslims, references to those 
who neglect to support the leaders' cause. Warnings against 
incorrect behaviour. 
Threats, allegations of apostasy of Muslims Verbal attack on Muslims, declarations of apostasy, threats 
of action. 
 
Threats and warnings to non-Muslims  
Appeals & conciliatory approaches, 
promises of truce 
 
 
 
NOTES 
Free text area/notes 
 
Free text Covering aspects not caught in items above 
Notes  On authenticity of text and other technical aspects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ADDRESSING 
MUSLIMS 
ADDRESSING 
NON-MUSLIMS 
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APPENDIX 2: Details of Articles  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Six communiqués could not be dated, these were: 
 
• Zawahiri (article) 'Response to a Grave Uncertainty from Shaykh al-Albani 
Regarding Silence in the Face of Apostate Rulers'753 
• Zawahiri (article) 'The Forbidden Word'754 
• Zawahiri (article) Introduction for new journal - Characteristics of Jihad755 
• Zawahiri (purported) (treatise) ‘Jihad, Martyrdom, and the Killing of 
Innocents’756 
• Bin Ladin (purported) (compiled lecture series) 'Methodological Guidelines 
According to the Guidelines of Bin Ladin: We Proceed in the Way of Manhattan 
in Order to Defy America and Put an End to Their Controlling Evil'757 
• Bin Ladin (letter) ‘Letter from Usama bin Ladin to Mullah Omar’758 
 
Of these six communiqués, only Zawahiri’s introduction to Characteristics of Jihad and 
bin Ladin’s letter to Mullah Omar could be secured in their entirety. The others are 
excerpts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
753 Combating Terrorism Center [CTC] (2006) Militant Ideology Atlas: Compendium (November). 
Originally published in Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l-Jihad. 
754 Ibid.  
755 CTC (Harmony Archive): Document no. AFGP-2002-600142. See 
<http://ctc.usma.edu/harmony/harmony_docs.asp> [as of 30 April 2011]. 
756 Ibrahim, R. (2007)  
757 Combating Terrorism Center (2006). 
758 CTC (Harmony Archive): Document no. AFGP-2002-600321. As noted, the database compiled and 
used for this study focuses on communiqués intended for public dissemination, it is not clear, however, 
whether bin Ladin intended his letter to Taliban ‘emir’ Mullah Omar to become public, but the message 
does contain valuable clues for instance as relates to the perceived importance of the media. 
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N [ID] Filename Date released Location Distributor AQ rep. Type Description/title 
1 117 Militant Ideology 
Atlas - Research 
Compendium 
N/A Militant 
Ideology Atlas 
Research 
Compendium 
November 2006 
Minbar al-
Tawhid 
wa'l-Jihad 
AAZ Article 'Response to a 
Grave 
Uncertainty from 
Shaykh al-Albani 
Regarding Silence 
in the Face of 
Apostate Rulers' 
2 112 Militant Ideology 
Atlas - Research 
Compendium 
N/A Militant 
Ideology Atlas 
Research 
Compendium 
November 2006 
Minbar al-
Tawhid 
wa'l-Jihad 
UBL Series of 
articles/le
ctures 
'Methodological 
Guidelines (1) 
According to the 
Guidelines of Bin 
Ladin: We 
Proceed in the 
Way of 
Manhattan in 
Order to Defy 
America and Put 
an End to Their 
Controlling Evil'; 
(2); (3) 
3 113 Militant Ideology 
Atlas - Research 
Compendium 
N/A Militant 
Ideology Atlas 
Research 
Compendium 
November 2006 
unknown AAZ Article, 
interview 
'The Forbidden 
Word' 
4 61 nefaublmullahomar N/A NEFA + DoD N/A UBL Letter Letter from UBL 
to Mullah Omar 
5 35 Characteristics of 
Jihad Magazine 
N/A CTC-Harmony Egyptian 
Islamic 
Jihad 
AAZ Article Introduction in 
new journal - 
Characteristics of 
Jihad 
6 48 [no filename, 
document from 
book] 
N/A Ibrahim, 
Raymond 
(2007). Al 
Qaeda Reader. 
Broadway 
Books. 
N/A Purporte
d AAZ - 
Ibrahim 
claims 
docume
nt states 
it was 
'oversee
n' by 
AAZ 
Treatise 'Jihad, 
Martyrdom, and 
the Killing of 
Innocents' 
7 46 [no filename, 
document from 
book] 
01-Jan-91 Ibrahim, 
Raymond 
(2007). Al 
Qaeda Reader. 
Broadway 
Books + Kepel 
& Milelli (ed.) 
Al Qaeda in its 
Own Words 
(2008). Harvard 
U. Press. 
N/A AAZ Book 'The Bitter 
Harvest: The 
Brotherhood in 
Sixty Years' 
8 114 Militant Ideology 
Atlas - Research 
Compendium 
01-Jan-92 Militant 
Ideology Atlas 
Research 
Compendium 
November 2006 
Minbar al-
Tawhid 
wa'l-Jihad 
AAZ Book 'The Black Book: 
An Account of 
the Torture of 
Muslims in the 
Time of Husni 
Mubarak' 
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9 99 [no filename, 
document from 
book] 
01-Jan-93 Kepel & Milelli 
(eds) (2008). 
N/A AAZ / 
Islamic 
Jihad 
Speech, or 
statement 
'Advice to the 
Community to 
Reject the Fatwa 
of Sheikh Bin Baz 
Authorizing 
Parliamentary 
Representation: 
Published Under 
the Supervision of 
Ayman al-
Zawahiri' 
10 1 FBIS1 09-Mar-
94 
FBIS 
Compilation of 
Usama Bin 
Ladin 
Statements 1994 
- January 2004 
Al-Quds Al-
Arabi 
UBL Interview Usama Bin Ladin 
Denies 
`Terrorism' Link 
London AL-
QUDS AL-
'ARABI in Arabic 
9 Mar 94 p 4 
11 36 Letter from Bin 
Laden 1 
12-Apr-94 CTC-Harmony N/A UBL Letter/Stat
ement 
'Our Invitation to 
Give Advice and 
Reform' 
12 37 Letter from Bin 
Laden 1 
07-Jun-94 CTC-Harmony N/A UBL Letter/Stat
ement 
'Saudi Arabi 
Supports the 
Communists in 
Yemen' 
13 38 Letter from Bin 
Laden 1 
11-Jul-94 CTC-Harmony N/A UBL Letter/Stat
ement 
'The Banishment 
of Communism 
from the Arabian 
Peninsula: The 
Episode and the 
Proof'. 
14 39 Letter from Bin 
Laden 1 
19-Jul-94 CTC-Harmony N/A UBL Letter/Stat
ement 
'Quran Scholars in 
the Face of 
Despotism' 
15 2 FBIS3 08-Aug-
94 
FBIS 
Compilation of 
Usama Bin 
Ladin 
Statements 1994 
- January 2004 
Al-Quds Al-
Arabi 
UBL Article Saudi Islamic 
Opposition Opens 
London Office 
London AL-
QUDS AL-
'ARABI in Arabic 
8 Aug 94 p 1 
16 40 Letter from Bin 
Laden 1 
12-Sep-94 CTC-Harmony N/A UBL Letter/Stat
ement 
'Saudi Arabia 
Unveils its War 
Against Islam and 
its Scholars' 
17 42 Letter from Bin 
Laden 1 
16-Sep-94 CTC/Harmony N/A UBL Letter 'Urgent Letter to 
Security Officials' 
18 47 Letter from Bin 
Laden 2 
15-Oct-94 CTC-Harmony N/A UBL Letter 'Higher 
Committee for 
Harm!!' 
19 63 Letter from Bin 
Laden 2 
29-Dec-94 CTC/Harmony N/A UBL Letter 'Open Letter for 
Shaykh Bin Baz 
on the Invalidity 
of His Fatwa on 
Peace with the 
Jews' 
20 64 Letter from Bin 
Laden 2 
29-Jan-95 CTC/Harmony N/A UBL Letter Second letter to 
Shaykh Abd Al 
Aziz Bin Baz 
from the Reform 
and Advice 
Foundation 
21 65 Letter from Bin 
Laden 2 + Letter 
from Bin Laden 3 
12-Feb-95 CTC/Harmony N/A UBL Letter 'Prince Salman 
and Ramadan 
Alms' 
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22 66 Letter from Bin 
Laden 3 
09-Mar-
95 
CTC/Harmony N/A UBL Letter 'Saudi Arabia 
Continues its War 
Against Islam and 
its Scholars' 
23 115 Militant Ideology 
Atlas - Research 
Compendium 
01-Apr-95 Militant 
Ideology Atlas 
Research 
Compendium 
November 2006 
Nashrat al-
Ansar 
AAZ statement 'Our Stance 
Towards Iran: 
Response to the 
Accusation of 
Cooperation 
Between the 
Salafi Jihadi 
Movement and 
Renegade Iran' 
24 67 Letter from Bin 
Laden 3 
06-May-
95 
CTC/Harmony N/A UBL Letter 'Scholars are the 
Prophet's 
Successors' 
25 68 Letter from Bin 
Laden 4 
11-Jul-95 CTC/Harmony N/A UBL Letter 'Prince Sultan and 
the Air Aviation 
Commissions' 
26 62 nefaublletterkindfah
d 
03-Aug-
95 
NEFA [+ see 
also other 
sources, e.g. 
FFI] 
N/A UBL Letter 'An Open Letter 
to King Fahd On 
the Occasion of 
the Recent 
Cabinet 
Reshuffle' 
27 69 Letter from Bin 
Laden 5 
11-Aug-
95 
CTC/Harmony N/A UBL Letter 'The Bosnia 
Tragedy and the 
Deception of the 
Servant of the 
Two Mosques' 
28 118 Militant Ideology 
Atlas - Research 
Compendium + Al-
Qaeda - terrorists-
hypocrites-
fundamentalists + 
AQ ideology 
2003_Chatham 
house 
01-Jan-96 Militant 
Ideology Atlas 
Research 
Compendium 
November 2006 
+ Hellmich, 
Christina 
(2005). 'Al-
Qaeda - 
Terrorists, 
hypocrites, 
fundamentalists.
.' in Third 
World 
Quarterly. + Al-
Qaeda: the  
misunderstood 
Wahhabi 
connection... 
Feb 03. 
Minbar al-
Tawhid 
wa'l-Jihad 
AAZ Article 'Healing the 
Hearts of 
Believers: On 
Some Concepts of 
Jihad in the 
Islamabad 
Operation' 
29 3 FBIS4 17-Jun-96 FBIS 
Compilation of 
Usama Bin 
Ladin 
Statements 1994 
- January 2004 
Rose Al-
Yusuf + 
Fayizah Sa'd 
UBL Interview Usama Bin Ladin 
Reportedly 
Interviewed in 
London Cairo 
ROSE AL-
YUSUF in Arabic 
on 17 June 1996 
on pp 25-27 
30 4 FBIS11 10-Jul-96 FBIS 
Compilation of 
Usama Bin 
Ladin 
Statements 1994 
- January 2004 
Robert Fisk, 
The 
Independent 
UBL Interview Interview With 
Saudi Dissident 
Bin Ladin 
London 
INDEPENDENT 
in English, 10 Jul 
96 p 14 
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31 5 FBIS13 02-Sep-96 FBIS 
Compilation of 
Usama Bin 
Ladin 
Statements 1994 
- January 2004 
Al-Islah UBL Statement Bin Ladin 
Declares Jihad on 
Americans 
London AL-
ISLAH in Arabic, 
2 Sep 96. 
['Message From 
Usama Bin-
Muhammad Bin 
Ladin to His 
Muslim Brothers 
in the Whole 
World and 
Especially in the 
Arabian 
Peninsula: 
Declaration of 
Jihad Against the 
Americans 
Occupying  
32 150 FBIS Bin Laden 
1994-2004.pdf 
27-Nov-
96 
FBIS 
Compilation of 
Usama Bin 
Ladin 
Statements 
1994 - January 
2004 
Al-Quds al-
Arabi - 
interview 
with 'Abd 
al-Bari 
'Atwan 
UBL Article/int
erview 
'Bin Ladin 
Interviewed on 
Jihad Against US' 
33 151 FBIS Bin Laden 
1994-2004.pdf 
20-Feb-97 FBIS Channel 
4/Gwyn 
Robert 
UBL Interview 'Correspondent 
Meets With 
Opposition 
Leader Bin Ladin' 
34 152 FBIS Bin Laden.. 03-Mar-
97 
FBIS Al-Islah 
(London) 
UBL Article 'Bin Ladin Cited 
on Prince Sultan's 
US Visit' 
35 153 FBIS Bin Laden.. 15-Mar-
97 
FBIS The Muslim 
(Islamabad) 
UBL Article 'Bin Ladin 
Charges US 
Involvement in 
China Bombings' 
36 154 FBIS Bin Laden.. 18-Mar-
97 
FBIS Pakistan 
(Islamabad) 
Hamid Mir 
UBL Article 'Pakistan 
Interviews Usama 
Bin Ladin' 
37 155 FBIS… 22-Mar-
97 
FBIS Report The 
Independent 
UBL Interview/
report 
'Interview with 
Usama bin Ladin' 
38 70 Letter from Bin 
Laden 5 
16-Apr-97 CTC/Harmony N/A UBL Letter 'The Saudi 
Regime and the 
Reputed 
Tragedies of the 
Pilgrims' 
39 156 FBIS… 06-Jun-97 FBIS Report Daily 
Pakistan/Ha
mid Mir 
UBL Report of 
interview 
'Usama Bin Ladin 
Dares US 
Commandos To 
Come to 
Afghanistan' 
40 157 FBIS.. 07-Aug-
97 
FBIS Report Pakistan 
Daily 
UBL Report on 
press 
statement 
'Usama Bin Ladin 
Urges 'Befitting 
Reply' to Horan' 
41 158 FBIS Bin Laden.. 27-Nov-
97 
Nawa-i-Waqt 
(Rawalpindi) 
FBIS UBL Article 'Daily Reports 
Usama Bin 
Ladin's Threat 
Against 
Americans' 
42 159 FBIS Bin Laden … 17-Jan-98 FBIS Pakistan 
newspaper 
(Islamabad) 
UBL Article 'Bin Ladin Claims 
Foiling of UN's 
Afghan 
'Conspiracy'' 
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43 160 FBIS Bin Laden… 16-Feb-98 FBIS Al-Quds al-
Arabi 
UBL Article 
based on 
letter 
'Bin Ladin 
Condoles With 
Al-Bashir on 
Salih's Death' 
44 161 FBIS Bin Laden… 23-Feb-98 FBIS Al-Quds Al-
Arabi 
UBL, 
AAZ [as 
amir of 
the 
Jihad 
Group, 
Egypt] 
plus 
Abu 
Yasir 
Taha, 
Mir 
Hamzah 
and 
Fazlul 
Rahman
. 
statement 'Text of Fatwa 
Urging Jihad 
Against 
Americans'  and 
'Text of World 
Islamic Front's 
Statement Urging 
Jihad Against 
Jews and 
Crusaders' 
45 162 FBIS Bin Laden .. 23-Mar-
98 
FBIS Al-Quds Al-
Arabi 
UBL Article 
based on 
statement 
'Bin Ladin Urges 
Expulsion of 
'Invaders'' 
statement titled 
'One of Them 
Bears Witness' 
46 163 FBIS Bin Laden .. 31-Mar-
98 
Al-Akhbar 
(Urdu, 
Islamabad)` 
FBIS UBL Report of 
interview 
'Interview With 
Usama Bin Ladin 
Reported' 
47 164 FBIS Bin Laden… 15-Apr-98 FBIS Al-Quds Al-
Arabi 
UBL Report on 
Statement 
'Bin Ladin Warns 
Against 
Richardson 
Mission to 
Afghanistan' 
48 71 Letter from Bin 
Laden 5 
07-May-
98 
CTC/Harmony N/A UBL Letter 'Supporting the 
Fatwa of the 
Afghani Religious 
Scholars of 
Ejecting the 
American Forces 
from the Land of 
the Two Holy 
Mosques' 
49 165 FBIS Bin Laden .. 14-May-
98 
FBIS Al-Quds Al-
Arabi 
UBL Article on 
statement 
received 
'Clerics in 
Afghanistan Issue 
Fatwa on 
Necessity to 
Move US Forces 
Out of the Gulf; 
Saudi 
Oppositionist 
Usama Bin Ladin 
Supports It' 
50 166 FBIS Bin Laden.. 18-May-
98 
FBIS Al-Quds Al-
Arabi 
UBL Statement/
Article 
'Bin Ladin : 
Afghanistan's 
Inclusion on US 
'Terrorism List' Is 
'Certificate of 
Good Conduct' 
for Taliban" 
51 167 FBIS Bin Laden… 19-May-
98 
FBIS Al-Hayah 
(London) 
UBL Report on 
statement 
'World Islamic 
Front Backs 
'Intifadah of 
Palestine's Sons' .. 
Title of statement: 
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'Wounds of Al-
Aqsa Mosque' 
52 168 FBIS Bin Laden.. 28-May-
98 
FBIS The Dawn 
(Islamabad) 
UBL report on 
press 
briefing 
'Bin Ladin Creates 
New Front 
Against US, 
Israel' 
53 169 FBIS Report… 29-May-
98 
FBIS Al-Quds Al-
Arabi 
UBL Article/sta
tement 
'United States 
Admits that 
Keeping Its 
Troops in the 
Gulf Is Causing 
Dissatisfaction; 
Bin Ladin 
Threatens To 
Launch Attack 
Soon' 
54 170 FBIS Bin Laden.. 01-Jun-98 FBIS Al-Quds Al-
Arabi 
UBL Report on 
Statement 
'Bin Ladin 
Congratulates 
Pakistan on Its 
Possession of 
Nuclear Weapons' 
55 171 FBIS Bin Laden.. 15-Jun-98 FBIS The News 
(Islamabad) 
UBL Interview/
article 
"In the Way of 
Allah" - interview 
with UBL 
56 172 FBIS Bin Laden.. 21-Aug-
98 
FBIS AFP (Hong 
Kong 
Branch) & 
The News 
(Islamabad - 
Peshawar) 
UBL Report of 
statement 
'Bin Ladin Calls 
For 'Jihad' 
Against Jews, 
Americans' 
57 173 FBIS Bin Laden .. 23-Aug-
98 
FBIS Al-Quds Al-
Arabi/Abd-
al Bari 
Atwan 
UBL report on 
statement 
'The Battle Has 
Not Yet Started, 
We Will Reply to 
Clinton in Deeds' 
58 174 FBIS Bin Laden … 02-Sep-98 FBIS The Nation 
(Islamabad) 
UBL Statement/
article 
'Bin Ladin Praises 
Pakistanis for 
Love of Islam' 
59 126 FBIS Bin Laden 
1994-2004 [Usama 
Bin Ladin Sends 
Message to Anti-US 
Conference] + 
FFI_AQ Comms 
1990-2002 
12-Sep-98 FFI 
Dokjumentasjon 
om Al-Qaeda... 
+ FBIS 
Compilation.. 
Al-Akhbar, 
Pakistani 
newspaper 
in Urdu + 
Bodansky 
(1999) 
UBL Letter Letter to anti-US 
Islamist 
conference in 
Islamabad 
60 175 FBIS Bin Laden … 18-Nov-
98 
FBIS Jang 
(Rawalpindi
) 
UBL Letter/stat
ement 
Bin Ladin: Expel 
Jews, Christians 
From Holy Places 
61 176 FBIS Bin Laden .. 24-Dec-98 FBIS Afghan 
Islamic 
Press 
through 
AFP (Hong 
Kong) 
UBL Article/sta
tement 
'Bin Ladin Denies 
Role in Bombings 
of US Missions' 
62 177 FBIS Bin Laden … 06-Jan-99 FBIS The News 
(Islamabad)/ 
Rahimullah 
Yusufzai 
UBL Interview 'Taliban let Bin 
Ladin Break his 
Silence' 
63 178 FBIS Bin Laden .. 11-Jan-99 FBIS TIME 
Magazine 
UBL Interview 'Wrath Of God; 
Usama Bin Ladin 
lashes out against 
the West' 
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64 180 FBIS Bin Laden … 13-Jan-99 FBIS CBS UBL Statement 'Accused Terrorist 
Leader Usama bin 
Ladin Declares 
War on All 
Americans' 
65 116 Militant Ideology 
Atlas - Research 
Compendium 
14-Jan-99 Militant 
Ideology Atlas 
Research 
Compendium 
November 2006 
Minbar al-
Tawhid 
wa'l-Jihad 
AAZ Article 'Muslim Egypt 
Between the 
Whips of the 
Torturers and the 
Administration of 
Traitors' 
66 179 FBIS Bin Laden … 01-Feb-99 FBIS + Esquire Esquire 
Magazine/J
ohn Miller + 
ABC News 
UBL Interview/
Article 
'Esquire Interview 
With Bin Ladin' 
see also 'President 
Bush on terrorist 
attacks; Interview 
with Usama Bin 
Ladin from 1998' 
[ABC News 18 
Sept 2001] 
67 182 FBIS Bin Laden… 20-Feb-99 FBIS Pakistan 
newspaper 
(Islamabad, 
Urdu) 
UBL Interview May 1998 
Interview With 
Bin Ladin 
Reported 
68 123 Asharq - secret AQ 
emails 
19-Apr-99 'Al-Qaeda's 
Secret Emails' 
Al-Sharq al-
Awsat articles 
by Mohammed 
Al-Shafey. 
Published 
12/06/2005. 
Al-Sharq al-
Awsat 
AAZ Letter / 
email 
Letter to Abu 
Yasir 
69 183 FBIS Bin Laden… 08-Jun-99 FBIS Wahdat 
(Peshawar) 
UBL Report of 
statement/
letter 
'Usama Bin Ladin 
Pens Letter in 
Support Of 
Kashmir Jihad' 
70 184 FBIS Bin Laden.. 10-Jun-99 FBIS Al-Jazeera UBL Interview 'Usama Bin 
Ladin, the 
Destruction of the 
Base' 
71 185 FBIS Bin Laden … 25-Jul-99 FBIS Jang 
(Rawalpindi
) 
UBL Statement 
- Report 
'Bin Ladin Calls 
On Muslims To 
Declare Jihad 
Against US' 
72 186 FBIS Bin Laden .. 12-Sep-99 FBIS Khabrain 
(Islamabad) 
UBL report on 
statement 
'UBL Orders 
Mujahidin To 
Shoot US 
Commandos 'on 
Sight'' 
73 187 FBIS Bin Laden .. 09-Jan-00 FBIS Pakistan 
Daily 
(Islamabad) 
UBL Statement 'Usama Bin Ladin 
Denounces US-
Sponsored 'World 
Order'' 
74 188 FBIS Bin Laden .. 02-May-
00 
FBIS Pakistan 
Daily 
(Islamabad) 
UBL Statement/
Report 
'UBL Sees Holy 
War in 'Every 
Street' of US' 
75 189 FBIS Bin Laden.. 22-May-
00 
FBIS Ummah.net 
+ Al-Jihaad 
newsletter 
of 
Supporters 
of Shari'ah 
UBL Statement '"Usama Speaks 
on Hijrah and the 
Islamic State?" 
76 190 FBIS Bin Laden .. 26-Jun-00 FBIS Pakistan 
Observer 
(Islamabad) 
UBL Report on 
statement 
'Usama Bin Ladin 
Renews Call For 
Jihad' 
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77 191 FBIS Bin Laden .. 21-Sep-00 FBIS Al-Jazeera UBL & 
AAZ 
Statement 'Bin Ladin, Others 
Pledge 'Jihad' To 
Release Prisoners 
in US, Saudi Jails' 
78 124 FFI_AQ Comms 
1990-2002 
13-Nov-
00 
FFI Report 
(Hegghammer) 
Dokumentasjon 
om Al-Qaeda: 
Intervjuer, 
kommunikéer, 
og andre 
primærkilder, 
1990-2002 
al-Ra’i al-
‘Amm, 
Kuwaiti 
newspaper 
UBL Telephone 
interview 
Short telephone 
interview with 
Kuwaiti 
newspaper 
79 192 FBIS Bin Laden … 07-Jan-01 FBIS Nawa-i-
Waqt 
(Rawalpindi
) 
UBL statement 'Daily Prints 
Usama Bin Ladin 
'Letter' Calling 
For Global 
Islamic State'' 
[FBIS title] 
80 193 FBIS Bin Laden .. 03-Mar-
01 
FBIS Ausaf 
(Islamabad) 
UBL poem Ausaf Receives 
Bin Ladin's Poem 
on Resolve To 
Continue Jihad' 
81 194 FBIS Bin Laden .. 07-Mar-
01 
FBIS Al-Jazeera UBL Poem/mes
sage 
  
82 120 AFGP-2002-
901188-Trans + 
nefaublletterpaksch
olars 
01-Apr-01 Harmony 
Database - CTC 
+ NEFA 
N/A UBL Letter Letter from 
Usama Bin Laden 
to the scholars of 
Deyubende in 
Peshawar in 
Pakistan 
83 195 FBIS Bin Laden .. 03-Apr-01 FBIS The Dawn 
(Karachi) 
UBL Reports of 
Letter 
"Usama regrets 
curbs by Taliban" 
84 196 FBIS Bin Laden .. 10-Apr-01 FBIS The Nation 
(Lahore 
Edition) 
UBL Statement 'Usama urges 
Muslims to help 
Afghans, wage 
jihad' 
85 197 FBIS Bin Laden 07-May-
01 
FBIS The News 
(Islamabad) 
UBL Speech 'Usama urges 
Ummah to 
continue Jihad' 
86 198 FBIS Bin Laden 17-May-
01 
FBIS Islamabad UBL Statement 'If Taleban allow, 
I can make US 
life miserable: 
Usama" 
87 199 FBIS Bin Laden 27-May-
01 
FBIS Al-Arab Al-
Alamiyah 
(London) 
UBL Statement 'Bin Ladin Sends 
Voice Message to 
Palestinian 
People: 'We will 
Not Let You 
Down!'"' 
88 200 FBIS Bin Laden .. 16-Sep-01 FBIS Afghan 
Islamic 
Press 
Agency 
UBL Report of 
Statement 
'Afghanistan: Bin 
Ladin Denies 
Involvement in  
Terrorist Attacks 
in US' [FBIS title] 
89 181 FBIS Bin Laden 21-Sep-01 FBIS Daily News 
- New York 
UBL Report 
with UBL 
remarks 
'BIN LADIN: 
FROM RICH 
KID TO 
TERRORIST 
RINGLEADER 
Sheds his fancy 
clothes to hide in 
Afghani hills' 
90 201 FBIS Bin Laden.. 24-Sep-01 FBIS Al-Jazeera UBL Statement 'Text of Bin 
Ladin's Letter to 
the Pakistani 
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People 24 Sep' 
91 202 FBIS Bin Laden … 28-Sep-01 FBIS Ummat 
(Karachi) 
UBL interview "The US should 
search attackers 
within itself" - 
Exclusive 
interview with 
Usama bin Ladin 
92 130 FFI_AQ Comms 
1990-2002 + FBIS 
Bin Laden … 
10-Oct-01 FFI Rapport 
1990-2002 + 
See also FBIS 
Al-Jazeera 
& Jihad 
Online 
News 
Network 
(and others) 
UBL Interview Tayseer Allouni 
interviews bin 
Ladin in 
Afghanistan 
93 77 FFI_AQ Comms 
1990-2002 
03-Nov-
01 
FFI 
Dokumentasjon.
.. 1990-2002 
Al-Jazeera UBL Statement Bin Laden 
condemns the UN 
94 203 FBIS Bin Laden.. 07-Nov-
01 
FBIS Al-Jazeera UBL Statement 'Al-Jazirah 
Carries Bin 
Ladin's Address 
on US Strikes' 
[FBIS title] 
95 125 FFI_AQ Comms 
1990-2002 + Osama 
claims he has 
nukes_interview 
with Hamid Mir 
10-Nov-
01 
The Dawn + 
FFI 
Dokjumentasjon 
om Al-Qaeda... 
The Dawn, 
Pakistani 
Newspaper 
UBL Interview 'Osama claims he 
has nukes: If US 
uses N-arms it 
will get same 
response' - 
Interview with 
Hamid Mir 
96 119 Zawahiri - Knights 
under the Banner of 
the Prophet 
02-Dec-01 FBIS Report Al-Sharq al-
Awsat 
AAZ Book 'Knights under the 
Prophet's Banner: 
Mediations on the 
Jihadist 
Movement' 
97 129 UBL_Al Jazeera-
131201 
13-Dec-01 Al-Jazeera + 
Archive.org / 
Islamist website 
Al Jazeera UBL Video 
Statement 
Address to go into 
the details of what 
the 9/11 attacks 
and subsequent 
invasion denote. 
"The facts of the 
conflict between 
us and America". 
98 204 FBIS Bin Laden .. 01-Feb-02 FBIS CNN [and 
Al-Jazeera] 
UBL Report of 
statement 
'Al-Jazirah TV 
Website Reports 
on 'Row' With 
CNN Over Bin 
Ladin's Tape' 
[FBIS title] 
99 205 FBIS Bin Laden … 28-Mar-
02 
FBIS Al-Quds Al-
Arabi + See 
also 
www.jihad.
net 
UBL Statement 'Usama Bin 
Ladin: Prince 
Abdallah's 
Initiative Is High 
Treason' 
100 206 FBIS Bin Laden … 17-Apr-02 FBIS MBC 
Television 
(London) 
UBL 
[and 
other 
AQ] 
Report on 
statement 
'MBC TV Carries 
Video of Bin 
Ladin, Aides 
Supporting 911 
Attacks' [FBIS 
title] 
101 207 FBIS Bin Laden … 
+ 19M-2.DAT 
18-Apr-02 FBIS + Islamist 
websites 
Al-Jazeera + 
As-Sahab 
UBL + 
AAZ 
AQ 9/11 
film 
'Al-Jazirah Airs 
'Selected Portions' 
of Latest Al-
Qa'ida Tape on 11 
Sep Attacks' 
[FBIS title] + 'The 
Wills of the 
  226 
Martyrs of the 
New York and 
Washington 
Battles: The Will 
of the Martyr Ibn 
ul Jarah Al-
Ghamidee Ahmed 
al-Haznawi' 
102 108 19M-1.DAT 19-Apr-02 Islamist 
Websites 
As-Sahab UBL, 
others 
Film 
about 9/11 
'The Wills of the 
Martyrs of the 
New York and 
Washington 
Battles: The Will 
of the Martyr 
Abdulaziz 
Alomari' (Abu al-
Abbas al-Janoobi) 
a.k.a. 19 Martyrs 
(part 1) 
103 209 FBIS Bin Laden .. 19-May-
02 
FBIS The Times 
(London) + 
AFP Paris 
UBL Reports 
on video 
release 
'Bin Ladin Film 
Vows Revenge 
On the UK' + 
'British-Based 
Islamic News 
Agency Receives 
Encrypted Bin 
Ladin Video' 
104 43 [no filename: 
document from 
book] 
01-Jun-02 Ibrahim, 
Raymond 
(2007). Al 
Qaeda Reader. 
Broadway 
Books. 
N/A UBL 
[purport
ed, or 
close 
affiliatio
n] 
Letter 'Al-Qaeda's 
Declaration in 
Response to the 
Saudi Ulema: It's 
Best You 
Prostrate 
Yourselves in 
Secret' 
105 210 FBIS Bin Laden .. 26-Jun-02 FBIS Al-Sharq al-
Awsat 
UBL Report on 
statement/
poem 
'A Site Close to 
Al-Qa'idah Posts 
a Poem 
by Bin Ladin in 
Which he 
Responds to his 
Son Hamzah, 
Who Inquires 
About the Future' 
106 22 20020000 
zwhr_interview 
01-Sep-02 ITSTIME + 
IntelCenter: 
Words of 
Ayman Al-
Zawahiri Vol. 1 
(2008) 
As-Sahab AAZ Interview 'The Interview of 
Dr Ayman al-
Zawahiri' 
107 75 [no filename, 
document from 
book] 
06-Oct-02 IntelCenter: 
Words of 
Osama bin 
Laden Vol. 1 
(2008) + FBIS 
Al-Jazeera UBL Statement 'A Message 
Addressed to the 
American People' 
108 211 FBIS Bin Laden .. 14-Oct-02 FBIS Al-Qal'ah UBL Statement '"Statement From 
Shaykh Usama 
Bin Ladin, May 
God Protect him, 
and Al-Qa'ida 
Organization" 
109 212 FBIS Bin Laden .. 26-Oct-02 FBIS Waaqiah UBL Statement 'Letter From 
Usama Bin 
Muhammad Bin 
Ladin to the 
American 
  227 
People"' 
110 213 FBIS Bin Laden … 27-Oct-02 FBIS Al-Majallah 
(London) 
UBL Reports of 
statement/'
will' 
'"Al-Majallah 
Obtains Bin 
Ladin's Will: It 
Bears His 
Signature in His 
Own Hand and Is 
Dated Ramadan 
1422 Hegira, 
Corresponding to 
14 December 
2001…' 
111 76 [no filename, 
document from 
book] 
12-Nov-
02 
IntelCenter: 
Words of 
Osama bin 
Laden Vol. 1 
(2008) + FBIS 
compilation (p 
227) 
Al-Jazeera UBL Statement Osama bin Laden 
hails recent 
operations in Bali, 
Moscow, Jordan 
112 214 FBIS Bin Laden .. 21-Nov-
02 
FBIS Alneda 
(internet) 
UBL Statement ''Statement from 
Abdallah Usama 
Bin Ladin to the 
Peoples of 
Countries Allied 
to Tyrannical US 
Government" 
113 215 FBIS Bin Laden .. 28-Nov-
02 
FBIS Al-Quds Al-
Arabi 
UBL Report on 
Statement 
'Bin Ladin in a 
Special Message 
to the 'People of 
the Peninsula': 
Take up Arms To 
Defend Your 
Honor. Warned of 
'Critical Days and 
All-out War" 
114 45 [no filename, 
document from 
book] 
30-Dec-02 Ibrahim, 
Raymond 
(2007). Al 
Qaeda Reader. 
Broadway 
Books + Kepel 
& Milelli (2008) 
N/A AAZ Book 'Al Walaa wa al 
Baraa' (Loyalty 
and Enmity: An 
Inherited Doctrine 
and a Lost 
Reality' 
[Ibrahim's 
translation]), 
'Loyalty and 
Separation: 
Changing an 
Article of Faith 
and Losing Sight 
of Reality' (Kepel 
& Milelli). 
115 216 FBIS Bin Laden .. 19-Jan-03 FBIS Al-Sharq al-
Awsat 
UBL Report of 
Statement 
'New Message 
From Bin Ladin 
Justifies Mistakes 
of Al-Qa'ida 
Leaders, Attacks 
'Secularist 
Movements', and 
Calls for Unity of 
'Islamic Factions' 
.. Original title: 
"Islamic Action 
Between Causes 
of Consensus 
and Advocates of 
Disagreement" 
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116 78 [no filename, 
document from 
book] 
01-Feb-03 IntelCenter: 
Words of 
Osama bin 
Laden, Vol. 1 
unknown UBL Audio 
statement 
On the obligation 
of Jihad for 
everyone, the 
weak foundations 
of America, the 
plot to annex 
Saudi Arabia and 
establish a Jewish 
superstate. 
117 79 [no filename, 
document from 
book] 
11-Feb-03 IntelCenter: 
Words of 
Osama bin 
Laden Vol.1 + 
FBIS 
compilation, p. 
247 
Al-Jazeera UBL Audio 
Statement 
'A Message to 
Our Brothers in 
Iraq' 
118 217 FBIS Bin Laden … 09-Apr-03 FBIS usaf 
(Islamabad) 
UBL Reports 
on 
Statement 
'Usama Bin Ladin 
Urges Muslims 
To Launch 
Suicide 
Attacks Against 
US' 
119 218 FBIS Bin Laden .. 18-May-
03 
FBIS Le Matin 
(Algiers) 
and Khilafa 
News 
(Algeria) 
UBL Report on 
Statement 
'Riyadh, 
Casablanca 
Attacks' [FBIS 
title] 
120 54 AQ Statements 
2003-2004 
Hegghammer_CST
PV database 
21-May-
03 
FFI Al-Jazeera + 
BBC 
AAZ Statement Attack on Arab 
support for US 
war in Iraq. Call 
for attack on 
Norway, et al. 
121 219 FBIS Bin Laden … 29-May-
03 
FBIS Movement 
for Islamic 
Reform 
website 
(London) 
UBL Report on 
statement 
''Very Urgent: 
Shaykh Bin Ladin 
and the Mujahidin 
Threaten Terrible 
Response to Two 
Shaykh's Death" 
122 220 FBIS Bin Laden .. 11-Jul-03 FBIS Ilaf news UBL Letter '"'Ilaf' Learns 
From its Own 
Sources in 
Jeddah: Usama 
Bin Ladin to His 
Mother Through 
an Intermediary: I 
Did Not Carry 
Out Terrorist 
Actions 
Against Saudi 
Arabia" 
123 55 AQ Statements 
2003-2004 
Hegghammer_CST
PV database 
03-Aug-
03 
FFI + 
IntelCenter 
Ayman Al-
Zawahiri vol. 1 
Al-Arabiya AAZ Statement Audiotape about 
Guantanamo 
prisoners 
124 110 FBIS Bin Laden 
1994-2004 
10-Sep-03 Foreign 
Broadcast 
Information 
Report: 
'Compilation of 
Usama Bin 
Ladin 
Statements 1994 
- January 2004' 
Al-Jazeera UBL & 
AAZ 
Audio 
statement 
Al-Jazirah Airs 
Bin Ladin, Al-
Zawahiri Tape on 
Anniversary of 11 
Sep Attacks 
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125 56 AQ Statements 
2003-2004 
Hegghammer_CST
PV database 
28-Sep-03 FFI Al-Jazeera + 
Al-Arabiya 
+ BBC 
AAZ Statement 'Message to 
Muslims in 
Pakistan and 
Afghanistan' 
126 98 [no filename, 
document from 
book] 
18-Oct-03 Kepel & Milelli: 
Al Qaeda in its 
Own Words 
(2005, 2008) + 
see also FBIS 
Al-Jazeera UBL Statement 'Second letter to 
the Muslims of 
Iraq' 
127 221 FBIS Bin Laden … 16-Nov-
03 
FBIS Al-Quds Al-
Arabi + Al-
Jazeera 
UBL Report on 
Statement 
'Al-Jazirah TV: 
Al-Qa'ida Claims 
Responsibility for 
Istanbul 
Bombings' 
128 57 AQ Statements 
2003-2004 
Hegghammer_CST
PV database 
19-Dec-03 FFI Al-Jazeera + 
BBC 
AAZ Statement Audiotape 
recognising the 
two year 
anniversary of the 
battle of Tora 
Bora 
129 111 FBIS Bin Laden 
1994-2004 + UBL 
statement Jan 2004 - 
Guardian 
04-Jan-04 Foreign 
Broadcast 
Information 
Report: 
'Compilation of 
Usama Bin 
Ladin 
Statements 1994 
- January 2004' 
+ Observer 
Al-Jazeera, 
Observer 
UBL Audio 
statement 
Bin Ladin Warns 
of 'Grand Plots' 
Against Arabs, 
Criticizes Gulf 
Rulers .... 'Resist 
the New Rome' 
130 58 AQ Statements 
2003-2004 
Hegghammer_CST
PV database 
24-Feb-04 FFI Al-Jazeera + 
Al-Arabiya 
AAZ Statement Zawahiri on the 
state of the union 
speech and the 
French headscarf 
ban 
131 59 AQ Statements 
2003-2004 
Hegghammer_CST
PV database 
25-Mar-
04 
FFI Al-Jazeera AAZ Statement Audiotape calling 
for Musharraf 
overthrow 
132 52 [no filename, 
document from 
book] 
14-Apr-04 Ibrahim, 
Raymond 
(2007). Al 
Qaeda Reader. 
Broadway 
Books. 
Audiotape 
delivered to 
media 
UBL Statement Offer of peace 
treaty to 
Europeans 
133 80 [no filename, 
document from 
book] 
15-Apr-04 IntelCenter: 
Words of 
Osama bin 
Laden Vol. 1 
al-Jazeera + 
al-Arabiya 
UBL Audio 
statement 
Peace offering to 
Europeans 
134 82 [no filename, 
document from 
book] 
06-May-
04 
IntelCenter: 
Words of 
Osama bin 
Laden Vol. 1 
Al-Jazeera UBL audio 
statement 
'People of Iraq' 
135 31 tr.2 + tr. 1 [folder: 
20041029 
obl_threat to the 
US] 
29-Oct-04 ITSTIME + 
MEMRI 
As-Sahab UBL Statement Threat to the US 
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136 83 [no filename, 
document from 
book] 
30-Oct-04 IntelCenter: 
Words of 
Osama bin 
Laden Vol 1 + 
also ITSTIME 
and MEMRI, 
see above + Al 
Qaeda in its 
Own Words 
(edited by Gilles 
Kepel and Jean-
Pierre Milelli, 
translated by 
Pascale 
Ghazaleh). 
As-Sahab UBL audio 
statement 
on video 
Message to 
Americans. On 
9/11, how the 
idea (allegedly) 
was formed, and 
the policies of the 
two presidents 
Bush' 
137 84 [no filename, 
document from 
book] + OsAmA-
2002_ozooo-
161204 
16-Dec-04 IntelCenter: 
Words of 
Osama bin 
Laden Vol. 1 + 
Archive.org/Al-
Hesbah 
unknown UBL audio 
statement 
Message 
concerning Saudi 
Arabia 
138 86 [no filename, 
document  from 
book] 
27-Dec-04 Words of 
Osama bin 
Laden Vol. 1 
(2008) 
As-Sahab UBL audio 
statement 
To the people of 
Iraq Muslims. On 
the Allawi 
regime, elections 
139 109 The Freeing of the 
Humanity and 
Homelands Under 
the Banner of the 
Quran 
11-Feb-05 Jihadunspun.co
m, 
forums.Islamica
wakening.com 
Jihadunspun
.com 
AAZ Essay 'The Freeing of 
Humanity and 
Homelands under 
the Banner of the 
Quran' 
140 222 In condolence of the 
two Martyred 
leaders of the 
Islamic state of 
Iraq_25-5-10.pdf 
25-May-
05 
Ansarnet and 
other Islamist 
sites 
As-Sahab AAZ Statement 'In condolence of 
the two Martyred 
leaders of the 
Islamic state of 
Iraq' 
141 72 [no filename, 
document from 
book] 
17-Jun-05 IntelCenter: 
Words of 
Yaman al-
Zawahiri Vol. 1 
As-Sahab AAZ Video 
Statement 
On the need to rid 
the Muslim world 
of Crusaders and 
their supporters, 
implement Sharia. 
Need to unite 
Iraqis. 
142 128 12a-AAZ + 
12bAAZ 
04-Aug-
05 
MEMRI clips 
no 799 & 791 
Al-Jazeera AAZ Interview Interview with 
Ayman al-
Zawahiri aired on 
Al-Jazeera 
143 53 [no filename, 
document from 
book] 
15-Nov-
05 
Ibrahim, 
Raymond 
(2007). Al 
Qaeda Reader. 
Broadway 
Books. 
As-Sahab AAZ Statement 'Wills of the 
Knights of the 
London Raid' 
144 26 20051206 
zwhr_Islam in Iraq 
06-Dec-05 ITSTIME + 
IntelCenter: 
Words of 
Ayman Al-
Zawahiri Vol.1. 
As-Sahab AAZ Statement 'The Victory of 
the Islamic 
Religion in Iraq' 
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145 49 [no filename, 
document from 
book] 
07-Dec-05 Ibrahim, 
Raymond 
(2007). Al 
Qaeda Reader. 
Broadway 
Books. + 
IntelCenter: 
Words of 
Ayman Al-
Zawahiri Vol.1. 
As-Sahab AAZ Interview First interview 
with Ayman al-
Zawahiri 
146 25 20050900 
zwhr_obstacles of J 
10-Dec-05 ITSTIME + 
IntelCenter: 
Words of 
Ayman Al-
Zawahiri Vol.1. 
As-Sahab AAZ Statement 'Obstacles to 
Jihad' 
147 50 [no filename, 
document in book] 
+ 20-OBL + 
OBL_toAmerican19
012006_ar_vcd-
190106 
19-Jan-06 Ibrahim, 
Raymond 
(2007). Al 
Qaeda Reader. 
Broadway 
Books + 
IntelCenter + 
MEMRI + 
Archive.org 
Al-Jazeera UBL Statement Bin Laden truce 
offer to the 
Americans 
148 29 gta zawahiri0106 20-Jan-06 Global 
Terroralert 
As-Sahab AAZ Statement Zawahiri presents 
a poem from 
Maulawi 
Muhibbullah al-
Kandahari 
149 51 [no filename, 
document from 
book] 
21-Jan-06 Ibrahim, 
Raymond 
(2007). Al 
Qaeda Reader. 
Broadway 
Books. + 
IntelCenter: 
Words of 
Ayman Al-
Zawahiri Vol.1. 
As-Sahab AAZ Statement ´Bajawr Massacre 
and the Lies of 
the Crusaders' - 
Response to 
attempted attack 
on Zawahiri's 
location in the 
FATA (the 
village of 
Damdula, in 
Bajuar) which 
killed 18 people 
150 73 [no filename, 
document from 
book] 
04-Mar-
06 
IntelCenter: 
Words of 
Ayman Al-
Zawahiri Vol.1. 
As-Sahab AAZ vid 
statement 
'The Alternative is 
Da'wa and Jihad' 
151 238 [no filename, 
document from 
book] 
12-Apr-06 IntelCenter: 
Words of 
Ayman Al-
Zawahiri Vol.1 
(2008) 
As-Sahab AAZ Statement 'Four Years Since 
the Battle of Tora 
Bora - From Tora 
Bora to Iraq' 
152 90 [no filename, 
document from 
book] + Ya-
AhL_ozooo_256kb-
230406 + 25-OBL 
23-Apr-06 IntelCenter: 
Words of 
Osama bin 
Laden Vol.1 + 
Al-Jazeera + 
Archive.org 
As-Sahab UBL audio 
statement 
on video 
'Oh People of 
Islam' 
153 81 [no filename, 
document from 
book] 
28-Apr-06 IntelCenter 
Words of 
Ayman al-
Zawahiri Vol. 1 
As-Sahab AAZ Vid 
statement 
'Letter to the 
People of 
Pakistan' 
  232 
154 91 [no filename, 
document from 
book] + 
SaHaTaT_ozooo-
230506 
23-May-
06 
IntelCenter: 
Words of 
Osama Bin 
Laden + 
Archive.org / 
Al-Hesbah 
As Sahab UBL audio 
statement 
on video 
'A Testimony to 
the Truth' 
155 85 [no filename, 
document from 
book] 
09-Jun-06 IntelCenter: 
Words of 
Ayman al-
Zawahiri Vol. 1 
As-Sahab AAZ vid 
statement 
'Support for 
Palestinians' 
156 87 [no filename, 
document from 
book] 
21-Jun-06 IntelCenter: 
Words of 
Ayman al-
Zawahiri Vol. 1 
As-Sahab AAZ vid 
statement 
'American Crimes 
in Kabul' 
157 32 20060624 
zwhr_lamentation 
for zrqw (2) 
24-Jun-06 ITSTIME + see 
also IntelCenter 
As-Sahab AAZ Statement Lamentation of 
Abu Musab Al-
Zarqawi - 
'Elegizing the 
Ummah's Martyr 
and Emir of the 
Martyrs Abu 
Musab al-
Zarqawi, May 
Allah Have 
Mercy on Him' 
158 88 [no filename, 
document from 
book] 
27-Jun-06 IntelCenter: 
Words of 
Ayman al-
Zawahiri Vol. 1 
As-Sahab AAZ vid 
statement 
'The Zionist 
Crusader's 
Aggression on 
Gaza and 
Lebanon' 
159 92 [no filename, 
document from 
book] 
29-Jun-06 IntelCenter: 
Words of 
Osama bin 
Laden Vol. 1] 
As-Sahab UBL audio 
statement 
on video 
'Elegizing the 
Ummah's Martyr 
and Emir of the 
Martyrs, Abu 
Musab al-
Zarqawi' 
160 93 [no filename, 
document from 
book] 
01-Jul-06 IntelCenter: 
Words of 
Osama bin 
Laden Vol. 1 
As-Sahab UBL audio 
statement 
on video 
'To the Ummah in 
General and to the 
Mujahideen in 
Iraq and Somalia 
in Particular' 
161 33 Invitation to Islam 
Sept. 06 - Zawahiri 
and mainly Gadhan 
- As Sahab-Al 
Boraq xx 
02-Sep-06 Al-Boraq.com As-Sahab AAZ + 
Gadahn/
Amriki 
Statement 'An Invitation to 
Islam' 
162 21 20060911 zwhr_ 
second interview by 
As-Sahab (2) 
11-Sep-06 ITSTIME + see 
also IntelCenter 
As-Sahab AAZ Interview/
Statement 
'Hot Issues with 
Shaykh Ayman 
Al-Zawahiri' 
163 89 [no filename, 
document from 
book] 
29-Sep-06 IntelCenter: 
Words of 
Ayman al-
Zawahiri Vol. 1 
As-Sahab AAZ video 
statement 
'Bush, the 
Vatican's Pope, 
Darfur and the 
Crusaders' 
164 94 [no filename, 
document from 
book] 
22-Dec-06 [IntelCenter: 
Words of 
Ayman al-
Zawahiri Vol. 
1] 
As-Sahab AAZ video 
statement 
'Realities of the 
Conflict Between 
Islam and 
Unbelief' 
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165 95 [no filename, 
document from 
book] + 30-AAZ 
30-Dec-06 IntelCenter: 
Words of 
Ayman al-
Zawahiri Vol.1 
+ Laura 
Mansfield 
As-Sahab AAZ Audio 
statement 
on video 
'Congratulations 
on the Eid to the 
Ummah of 
Tawhid' 
166 96 [no filename, 
document from 
book] 
05-Jan-07 IntelCenter: 
Words of 
Ayman al-
Zawahiri Vol. 1 
As-Sahab AAZ video 
statement 
'Rise and Support 
our Brothers in 
Somalia' 
167 28 Zawahiri message 
to Bush feb 2007 
1of2 XX + Zawahiri 
message to Bush feb 
2007 2of2 XX 
22-Jan-07 You Tube + 
Laura Mansfield 
+ IntelCenter 
As-Sahab AAZ Statement 'The Correct 
Equation' 
168 97 [no filename, 
document from 
book] 
13-Feb-07 IntelCenter: 
Words of 
Ayman al-
Zawahiri Vol. 1 
As-Sahab AAZ audio 
statement 
on video 
'Lessons, 
Examples and 
Great Events in 
the Year 1427'. 
169 18 Zawahiri march 
2007-1 + Zawahiri 
march 2007-2+ 
20070311 
zwhr_Palestine 
11-Mar-
07 
You Tube, 
forums, 
ITSTIME + see 
also IntelCenter 
As-Sahab AAZ Statement 'Palestine is the 
concern of all 
Muslims' 
170 23 20070505 
zwhr_third 
interview by As-
Sahab tr. 1, 
20070505 
zwhr_third 
interview by As-
Sahab tr. 2 
05-May-
07 
ITSTIME + see 
also IntelCenter 
As-Sahab AAZ Interview 'The Empire of 
Evil is About to 
End, And a New 
Dawn is About to 
Break Over 
Mankind' 
171 30 20070523 
zwhr_Dadullah 
23-May-
07 
ITSTIME + see 
also IntelCenter 
As-Sahab AAZ Statement Announces the 
death of Taliban 
leader Mullah 
Dadullah Akhund 
172 101 [no filename, 
document from 
book] 
25-Jun-07 IntelCenter: 
Words of 
Ayman al-
Zawahiri Vol. 1 
As-Sahab AAZ audio 
statement 
on video 
'Forty Years Since 
the Fall of 
Jerusalem' 
173 102 [no filename, 
document from 
book] + The-
Advice-of-One-
Concerned_256kb 
04-Jul-07 IntelCenter: 
Words of 
Ayman al-
Zawahiri Vol. 1 
+ Archive.org 
As-Sahab AAZ Video 
statement 
'The Advice of 
One Concerned' 
174 103 [no filename, 
document from 
book] 
10-Jul-07 IntelCenter: 
Words of 
Ayman al-
Zawahiri Vol 1. 
As-Sahab AAZ audio 
statement 
on video 
'Malicious Britain 
and its Indian 
Slaves' 
175 104 [no filename, 
document from 
book] 
11-Jul-07 IntelCenter: 
Words of 
Ayman al-
Zawahiri Vol. 1 
As-Sahab AAZ audio 
statement 
on video 
'The Aggression 
Against Lal 
Masjid' 
  234 
176 10 UBL 09 2007 + 
20070907 OBL(2) 
[videos - ITSTIME] 
+ nefa 8 September 
2007 -UBL + 
Osama_bin_laden_s
_message_to_the_A
merican_people-YT 
0907 1 of 3, 
Osama_bin_laden_s
_message_to_the_A
merican_people. YT 
0907 2 of 3, 
Osama_bin_laden_s
_message_to_the_A
merican_pe 
07-Sep-07 As-Sahab/You 
Tube/Al-
Ekhlass/NEFA 
also ITSTIME + 
IntelCenter 
As-Sahab UBL Statement ‘The Solution: A 
message from 
shaykh Osama 
bin Laden to the 
American people’ 
177 14 nefa 20 September 
2007 - UBL 
20-Sep-07 NEFA 
foundation + see 
also IntelCenter 
As-Sahab UBL Statement 'Come to Jihad: a 
Speech to the 
People of 
Pakistan' 
178 16 nefa 22 October 
2007 - UBL + The-
People-of-
Iraq_Ozooo-221007 
22-Oct-07 NEFA 
foundation + see 
also IntelCenter 
+ Archive.org / 
Al-Hesbah 
As-Sahab UBL Statement 'Message to the 
People of Iraq' 
179 9 Mansfield-UBL 
address to Europe 
November2007_Tra
nscript + nefa 29 
November 2007 - 
UBL + ToEurope-
Ar-En_Ozooo-
291107 
30-Nov-
07 
Laura 
Mansfield/You 
Tube/As-Sahab 
(Al-Ekhlaas 
forum)/NEFA + 
see also 
IntelCenter + 
Archive.org 
As-Sahab UBL Statement 'Message to the 
People of Europe' 
180 12 nefa 14 December 
2007 Annapolis 
statement - 
Zawahiri + 
YT_Zawahiri 
message December 
2007 on Annapolis 
meeting nr 1 - 
Arabic, 
YT_Zawahiri 
message December 
2007 on Annapolis 
meeting nr 2 - 
Arabic 
14-Dec-07 NEFA 
foundation + see 
also IntelCenter 
As-Sahab AAZ Statement 'Annapolis - The 
Betrayal' 
  235 
181 13 nefa 16 December 
2007 Interview - 
Zawahiri + 
Zawahiri interview 
nr 4 with As Sahab 
December 2007 
(YT user al 
masri002) [folder] + 
20071217 
zwhr_fourth 
interview with As-
Sahab tr. 1 
16-Dec-07 NEFA 
foundation, 
ITSTIME + see 
also IntelCenter 
As-Sahab AAZ 'Interview' 'A Review of 
Events' - As 
Sahab publishes 
fourth interview 
with Zawahiri 
182 27 nefa 29 December 
2007 - UBL 
29-Dec-07 NEFA + 
IntelCenter 
As-Sahab UBL Statement 'The Way to 
Frustrate the 
Conspiracies' 
183 20 zawahiri 
exoneration 
01-Jan-08 Open Source 
Center 
Advertised 
by As-
Sahab 
AAZ Book 'Exoneration: A 
Letter 
Exonerating the 
Ummah of the 
Pen and the 
Sword from the 
Unjust Allegation 
of Feebleness and 
Weakness' or 
'Exoneration: A 
treatise on the 
exoneration of the 
nation of the pen 
and sword of the 
denigrating 
charge of being 
irresolute’ 
184 19 nefa 27 February 
2008 on Libi- 
Zawahiri 
27-Feb-08 NEFA 
Foundation + 
see also 
IntelCenter 
As-Sahab AAZ Statement 'An Elegy to the 
Martyred 
Commander Abu 
al-Layth al-Libi' 
185 44 Letters from AQ to 
ISI-Translations 
06-Mar-
08 
Foundation for 
Defence of 
Democracies - 
12http://www.d
efenddemocracy
.org/index.php?
option=com_co
ntent&task=vie
w&id=1178225
5&Itemid=353 
N/A AAZ Letter Letter to Abu 
Umar al-
Baghdadi of the 
Islamic State of 
Iraq 
186 11 nefa 19 March 2008 
- UBL + UBL 
message to Europe 
March 2008 
19-Mar-
08 
NEFA 
foundation, You 
Tube, LiveLink 
+ see also 
IntelCenter 
As-Sahab UBL Statement ‘May our Mothers 
be Bereaved of us 
if we Fail to Help 
our Prophet. 
Peace be upon 
Him)' 
187 6 nefa 20 March 2008 
- UBL + UBL 
March 2008 
Islamist Website 
20-Mar-
08 
NEFA 
foundation, You 
Tube, forums + 
See also 
IntelCenter + 
Islamist forum 
As-Sahab UBL Statement 'A way for the 
salvation of 
Palestine' 
188 17 nefa 23 March - 
2008 - Zawahiri 
23-Mar-
08 
NEFA 
foundation + see 
also IntelCenter 
As-Sahab AAZ Statement 'A Call to Help 
Our People in 
Gaza' 
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189 105 [no filename, 
document from 
book] + nefa 2 April 
2008 Response to 
questions online - 
Zawahiri + First-
Part-of-Responses-
by-Dr-Ayman_al-
Zawahiri-to-Open-
Meeting-
Coordinated-by_al-
Fajr_Center-and_as-
Sahab_en 
02-Apr-08 IntelCenter: 
Words of 
Ayman al-
Zawahiri Vol. 1 
+ NEFA + 
Islamist website 
/ Archive.org 
As-Sahab AAZ audio 
interview 
'The Open 
Meeting with 
Sheikh Ayman al-
Zawahiri, Part 
One' 
190 7 nefa Zawahiri 
message transcript 
17 April 2008-
NEFA xx 
17-Apr-08 NEFA 
foundation, 
forums + see 
also IntelCenter 
As-Sahab AAZ Statement 'Shaykh Ayman 
Al-Zawahiri – On 
the fifth 
anniversary of the 
invasion and 
torture of Iraq' 
191 107 [no filename, 
document in book] 
21-Apr-08 IntelCenter: 
Words of 
Ayman al-
Zawahiri Vol. 1 
As-Sahab AAZ Questions 'The Open 
Meeting with 
Sheikh Ayman al-
Zawahiri, Part 
Two' 
192 8 20080516 OBL En 16-May-
08 
ITSTIME As-Sahab UBL Statement 'Reasons of the 
struggle on the 
occasion of the 
60th anniversary 
of the founding of 
the occupying 
state of Israel' 
193 24 18 may UBL + 
20080518 OBL Ar 
18-May-
08 
Open Source 
Center + 
ITSTIME 
As-Sahab UBL Statement 'A Message to the 
Muslim Nation' 
194 15 Zawahiri 4june80 04-Jun-08 Open Source 
Center 
As-Sahab AAZ Statement 'On the 
Anniversary of 
the Naksa... Break 
the Siege of Gaza' 
195 41 Zawahiri 10-08-08 
message to 
Pakistan_NEFA + 
A_Message_to_the_
Pakistan_Army_and
_the_People_of_Pa
kistan_-_ 
10-Aug-
08 
NEFA + You 
Tube 
As-Sahab AAZ Statement 'A Message from 
Shaikh Ayman al-
Zawahiri to 
Pakistan Army 
and the People of 
Pakistan' 
196 74 nefazawahiri0808-2 24-Aug-
08 
NEFA As-Sahab AAZ Statement 'In Lamentation of 
a Group of 
Heroes' 
197 100 Exit of Bush and 
Arrival of Obama 
19-Nov-
08 
Archive.org / 
Islamist website 
As-Sahab AAZ Statement 'The Exit of Bush 
and Arrival of 
Obama' 
198 237 nefazawahiri1208 + 
The-Fifth-As-
Sahab-Interview-
with-Dr-Ayman-al-
Zawahiri-with-
english-subtitle 
21-Nov-
08 
NEFA + 
Archive.org / 
Islamist website 
As-Sahab AAZ Interview 'Al-Azhar: The 
Lions Den: 
Interview with 
Shaykh Ayman 
al-Zawahiri' 
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199 106 The Death of our 
Heroes and Betrayal 
of our 
Rulers_Zawahiri 
01-Dec-08 NEFA As-Sahab AAZ Audio 
recording 
'The Death of our 
Heroes and 
Betrayal of our 
Rulers' 
200 121 Massacre-of-Gaza-
and-the-Siege-of-
the-traitors_En + 
nefazawahiri0109 
06-Jan-09 Archive.org / 
Islamist website 
+ NEFA 
Global 
Islamic 
Media Front 
- As-Sahab 
AAZ Statement 'The Massacre of 
Gaza and the 
Siege of the 
Traitors' 
201 122 Osama Gaza 14 Jan 
2009_EN + 
nefabinladen0109 
14-Jan-09 Archive.org / 
Islamist website 
+ NEFA 
As-Sahab, 
Jihad Media 
Battalion 
[translation] 
UBL Audio 
statement 
'Call for Jihad to 
Stop the Gaza 
Assault' 
202 131 AAZ Gaza 13 feb 
09.doc 
03-Feb-09 Ansarnet.info As-
Sahab/GIM
F 
AAZ Written 
statement 
'The Sacrifices of 
Gaza… and 
Conspiracies' 
203 132 AAZ from Kabul to 
Mogadishu 
22-Feb-09 Ansarnet.info As-Sahab AAZ Video 
message 
(still) w 
footage 
'From Kabul to 
Mogadishu' 
204 133 Practical Steps UBL 
March 09 
14-Mar-
09 
Ansarnet.info As-Sahab UBL Still on 
video 
'Practical steps to 
Liberate Palestine' 
205 134 Champions of 
Somalia UBL 
March 09 
19-Mar-
09 
Ansarnet.info As-Sahab UBL Still on 
video 
'Fight on, O' 
Champions of 
Somalia' 
206 135 AAZ on Sudan 
March 09.docx 
24-Mar-
09 
Ansarnet.info As-Sahab AAZ   'The Crusade Sets 
its Sights on the 
Sudan' 
207 136 AAZ Six Years 
since the Invasion 
of Iraq.rm 
20-Apr-09 Ansarnet.info + 
other Islamist 
sites 
As-Sahab + 
Global 
Islamic 
Media Front 
AAZ Still on 
Video + 
footage 
'Six years since 
the invasion of 
Iraq and thirty 
years since the 
signing of the 
Israeli Peace 
Accords' 
208 137 AAZ Obama in 
Egypt_June2009 
02-Jun-09 Al-Qimmah 
Islamic forum, 
+ other Islamist 
site 
As-Sahab AAZ Written 
transcript 
'The executioner, 
Egypt and the 
American puppets 
welcome Obama' 
209 138 Message to the 
People of 
Pakistan_12 Jul 
2009.pdf 
12-Jul-09 Ansarnet.info + 
other Islamist 
sites 
As-Sahab UBL Official 
transcript 
'And fight with 
them until there is 
no more 
persecution and 
religion should be 
only for Allah: A 
Message to the 
People of 
Pakistan' 
210 139 AAZ on Pak 15 Jul 
09.divx 
15-Jul-09 Ansarnet.info et 
al 
As-Sahab AAZ Still on 
video 
'My Muslim 
Brothers and 
Sisters in 
Pakistan' 
211 140 AAZ Facts of jihad 
and lies of the 
hypocrites_NEFA 
Aug09 + AAZ 
interview with As-
Sahab posted 3-8-
09_AR 
04-Aug-
09 
Ansarnet.info + 
NEFA 
As-Sahab AAZ Interview 'The Realities of 
Jihad and Fallacy 
of Hypocrisy' 
  238 
212 142 AAZ 260809_Road 
of Doom.rmvb 
26-Aug-
09 
Ansar1.info/oth
er jihadists sites 
As-Sahab AAZ video 
message 
'The Path of 
Doom' 
213 144 UBL Statement to 
American 
People.AVI 
13-Sep-09 Ansarnet and 
other Islamist 
sites 
As-Sahab 
and Global 
Islamic 
Media Front 
UBL Audio 
message 
'A Statement to 
the American 
People' 
214 143 OBL to Europe 09-
1430_en.mp4 
25-Sep-09 Ansar1.info / 
other jihadist 
sites 
As-Sahab UBL Audio 
message 
'A Message to the 
European People' 
215 147 Eulogy for Meshud 
+ Eulogy for 
Meshud_NEFA.pdf 
28-Sep-09 Ansarnet/jihadis
t 
websites/NEFA 
foundation 
As-Sahab AAZ Audio 
message 
'Shaykh Dr. 
Ayman al-
Zawahiri: Eulogy 
for the Role 
Model of the 
Youth – The 
Commander and 
Shahid Baitullah 
[Mehsud]' 
216 145 Eulogy for Ibn 
Sheikh Al Libi by 
Sheikh Ayman Al 
Zawahiri 5-Oct-
09.rmvb 
04-Oct-09 Ansarnet and 
other jihadist 
sites 
As-Sahab AAZ video 
message 
'Eulogy for Ibn 
Sheikh Al Libi by 
Sheikh Ayman Al 
Zawahiri' 
217 146 AAZ Arabic 14 Dec 
09.rmvb + Idol of 
National 
Unity_NEFA.pdf 
14-Dec-09 Ansarnet and 
other jihadist 
sites + NEFA 
foundation 
As-Sahab AAZ Audio 
message 
(on video 
showing 
Al-Aqsa 
mosque) 
'The (Palestinian) 
National Unity: A 
Worshipped Idol' 
218 141 MorningAndTheLa
mpToExtinguish_E
ng_2NDDraft.pdf 
16-Dec-09 Archive.org As-Sahab - 
translated 
by Abu 
Musa 
Abdussalam 
AAZ Book 'The Morning and 
the Lamp to be 
Extinguished: An 
Analysis of the 
Claim that the 
Constitution of 
Pakistan is 
Islamic' 
219 148 From Osama to 
Obama.mpg + 
NEFA Usama to 
Obama Jan 10.pdf + 
[Al Jazeera subtitled 
version on 
YouTube] 
16-Feb-10 Ansarnet, 
YouTube, and 
other Islamist. + 
NEFA 
Al-Jazeera UBL Audio 
message 
'From Osama to 
Obama' 
220 149 The Way To Save 
The Earth.pdf 
19-Feb-10 Ansarnet and 
other Islamist 
sites 
As-Sahab UBL Written 
message 
'The Way to Save 
the Earth' 
221 223  Al-Quds will not be 
converted to 
Judaism_en.pdf + 
Al-Quds will not be 
converted to 
Judaism_AAZ 19-7-
10_AR.mp4 
19-Jul-10 Ansarnet and 
other Islamist 
websites + 
Flashpoint 
Partners 
As-Sahab AAZ Statement 'Al-Quds will not 
be converted to 
Judaism' 
  239 
222 224 In Condolence of 
Sheikh Mustafa 
Abu al-Yazid_AAZ 
27-7-10_AR.mp4 
27-Jul-10 Ansarnet and 
other Islamist 
websites 
As-Sahab AAZ Statement ''In condolence of 
Sheikh Mustafa 
Abu al-Yazid 
R.A' 
223 225 AMEF transl of 
AAZ_Message to 
the Muslim People 
of Turkey"_15-8-
10.avi 
15-Aug-
10 
Ansarnet, Al-
Qimmah and 
other Islamist 
websites 
As-
Sahab/Ansa
rnet English 
AAZ Statement/
specific 
message 
''Message to the 
people of Turkey'' 
224 226 AAZ_A Victorious 
Ummah A Broken 
Crusade_15-9-
10.divx 
15-Sep-10 Ansarnet and 
other Islamist 
websites 
As-Sahab AAZ Statement ''A Victorious 
Ummah, A 
Broken Crusade'' 
225 227 UBL_Stances 
Regarding the 
Method of Flood 
Relief_Sept10.pdf 
01-Oct-10 Ansarnet and 
other Islamist 
websites 
As-Sahab UBL Statement "Some Points 
regarding the 
method of relief 
work" 
226 228 UBL_Help Your 
Brothers in 
Pakistan_AMEF13 
Oct 10.wmv 
13-Oct-10 Ansarnet and 
other Islamist 
websites 
As-Sahab UBL Statement "Help your 
Brothers in 
Pakistan" 
227 229 Defense of the 
Scientist Afia 
Siddiqui_AAZ-6-
11-10.pdf 
04-Nov-
10 
Ansarnet and 
similar Islamist 
websites 
As-
Sahab/Glob
al Islamic 
Media Front 
AAZ Statement "Who is going to 
support Aafia 
Sidique?" 
228 230 UBL to French Oct 
2010.pdf + To... 
The French 
People_Nov 10.pdf 
07-Nov-
10 
Ansarnet and 
similar Islamist 
websites + 
NEFA 
As-
Sahab/Ansa
r Al-
Mujahideen 
English 
Forum 
(Ansarnet) 
UBL Message "Message from 
Shaykh Usama 
bin Ladin to the 
People of France" 
229 231 UBL to French Jan 
2011.pdf 
22-Jan-11 Ansarnet and 
similar Islamist 
websites + 
NEFA 
As-Sahab UBL Message "From al-Sheikh 
Osama bin 
Mohammed bin 
laden to.. The 
French people" 
230 232 A-Message-of-
Hope.pdf 
19-Feb-11 Ansarnet and 
other Islamist 
websites 
As-
Sahab/Glob
al Islamic 
Media Front 
AAZ Statement A Message of 
Hope and Glad 
tidings to our 
people in Egypt 
(1) "By Sheikh 
Ayman Al-
Zawahri H.A" 
231 233 message of hope 
2.pdf 
24-Feb-11 Ansarnet and 
other Islamist 
websites 
As-
Sahab/Glob
al Islamic 
Media Front 
AAZ Statement A Message of 
Hope and Glad 
tidings to our 
people in Egypt 
(2) "By Sheikh 
Ayman Al-
Zawahri H.A" 
232 234 A-Message-of-
Hope-3.pdf 
27-Feb-11 Ansarnet and 
other Islamist 
websites 
As-
Sahab/Glob
al Islamic 
Media Front 
AAZ Statement A Message of 
Hope and Glad 
tidings to our 
people in Egypt 
  240 
(3) "By Sheikh 
Ayman Al-
Zawahri H.A" 
233 235 message of hope 
4.pdf 
04-Mar-
11 
Ansarnet and 
other Islamist 
websites 
As-
Sahab/Glob
al Islamic 
Media Front 
AAZ Statement A Message of 
Hope and Glad 
tidings to our 
people in Egypt 
(4) "By Sheikh 
Ayman Al-
Zawahri H.A" 
234 236 Message of Hope 
5_NEFA.pdf + 
MPM5 
14-Apr-11 NEFA + 
Ansarnet and 
similar Islamist 
websites 
As-
Sahab/Glob
al Islamic 
Media Front 
AAZ Statement "A Message of 
Hope and Glad 
Tidings" to Our 
Fellow Muslims 
in Egypt (5) by 
Sheikh Ayman Al 
Zawahiri (H.A.) 
235 240 The Speech by the 
Martyr of Islam 
19-May-
11 
Ansarnet and 
other Islamist 
web forums 
Global 
Islamic 
Media Front 
UBL Statement The Speech by the 
Martyr of Islam 
(As We Consider 
Him) The 
Mujahid Sheikh 
Usama Bin Laden 
- May Allah Have 
Mercy on Him-To 
His Muslim 
Ummah 
236 238 AAZ Glad Tidings 
6 
21-May-
11 
Ansarnet and 
other Islamist + 
NEFA 
Foundation 
As-Sahab AAZ Statement Message of Hope 
and Glad Tidings 
to Our People in 
Egypt, Episode 6 
237 239 The Noble Knight 
Dismounted 
08-Jun-11 Ansarnet and 
other Islamist 
forums 
As-Sahab + 
GIMF 
AAZ Statement The Noble Knight 
Dismounted 
238 241 GEBD 28-Jul-11 Ansarnet + 
other Islamist 
extremist web 
forums 
As-Sahab + 
GIMF 
AAZ Statement Glory of the East 
.... The First 
Being Damascus - 
Sheikh Mujaahid 
Ayman Al-
Zawahiri 
(Hafidhahullaah) 
239 242   09-Aug-
11 
Ansarnet + 
other Islamist 
extremist 
As-Sahab AAZ Statement A Message of 
Hope and Glad 
tidings to our 
people in Egypt 
(7) [(The Victory 
of Allah Support 
You)] "By Sheikh 
Ayman Al-
Zawahri H.A 
240 243 zawahiri_81511 15-Aug-
11 
Ansarnet + 
other Islamist 
extremist web 
forums + NEFA 
As-Sahab AAZ Statement "Do not become 
weak nor grieve" 
or "Be Neither 
Weakened or 
Saddened" 
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APPENDIX 3.1 Condemnation of Prevailing Societal Forms 
 
UBL=Usama bin Ladin 
AAZ=Ayman Al-Zawahiri 
 
Communiqué and 
author [ID] 
References to undesirability of existing societies 
[excerpts, quotes, notes] 
AAZ [unknown 
date] “Introduction 
to Characteristics of 
Jihad” 
35 'Secularism, its artificial laws, the American hegemony, the Israeli 
supremacy, the apparatus of oppression, the sexually oriented media, the 
hypocrite clerics, and those who confuse matters in order to serve the 
tyrants?'. 
AAZ [early 1991] 
“The Bitter Harvest: 
The Brotherhood in 
Sixty Years” 
46 Muslim brotherhood taking part in 'jahiliyya governing that is democracies, 
elections, and parliaments'.  
 
'Know that democracy, that is, "rule of the people", is a new religion that 
defies the masses by giving them the right to legislate without being 
shackled down to any other authority'. 'Democracy is a man-made infidel 
religion'. These leaders become masters of the world, which people 'take 
for lords in place of Allah'. 'Democracies grant the rights of legislation to 
the masses, as found in the eighty-sixth article of the Egyptian 
Constitution'.  
 
'Loyalty: we cannot reconcile loyalty with God's unbelieving enemies, 
affection for them, or praise for them and their impious doctrines, like 
consultation, positive law, and democracy'. [see how the dogma of loyalty 
and enmity/separation - al walaa wal baraa - subject of a separate book in 
2003, was already being developed].  
 
Taking part in democracy questions the very foundations of monotheism: 
'either we govern according to God's revelation, making our actions agree 
with our words ("There is no God but God"), or we govern in spite of 
God's revelation, which means associating other gods with God, because 
sovereignty is God's alone'. 
AAZ/Islamic Jihad 
[early 1993] 
“Advice to the 
Community to reject 
the Fatwa of Shakyh 
Bin Baz authorising 
Parliamentary 
Representation: 
Published under the 
Supervision of 
Ayman Al-
Zawahiri” 
99 The impious positive legal system left by the invading unbelievers in the 
Muslim countries and embraced by the domestic rulers 'allow such illicit 
behaviour, as fornication, usury, wine, and gambling but forbid that which 
is licit, like jihad along God's path, commanding good, and forbidding evil'. 
'Democracy is a new religion. In Islam, legislation comes from God; in a 
democracy, this capacity is given to the people. Therefore, this is a new 
religion, based on making the people into gods and giving them God's 
rights and attributes. This is tantamount to associating idols with God and 
falling into unbelief' [see 12:40]. This relates to the Egyptian constitution’s 
embrace of democracy too. 
UBL [April 1994] 
“Our Invitation to 
Give Advice and 
Reform”  
36 The state of affairs in Saudi Arabia (according to the petitions of the ulema 
and UBL himself): deviation of shariah law, economic situation and debt 
due to wastefulness, 'contemptible' social situation including water 
distribution, state of the armed forces, corruption, false media, foreign 
policy that works against Muslims, restriction of worship, waging of war 
against just people, 
UBL [December 
1994] “Open Letter 
for Shaykh Bin 
Baz” 
63 Flaws in current (Saudi Arabian) society: 1) corruption, man-made laws, 
the practice of usury (or adding interest) by government supported banks. 
He who tolerates such practice has committed sin, but he who legitimises 
this - as the Saudi regime has done - is an apostate because he has made 
himself an equal to God, 2) The King donned a cross, and the shaykh didn't 
  245 
Communiqué and 
author [ID] 
References to undesirability of existing societies 
[excerpts, quotes, notes] 
object, 3) the attacking Jewish Crusader army occupied the country under 
the justification of protecting Kuwait, and the Shaykh justified this in a 
fatwa, 4) when the Saudi regime aided and supported Yemeni communists 
against the Muslim Yemeni people, and the Shaykh said nothing, 5) The 
regimes attacked members of the ulema who had been criticising its 
actions. 
UBL [January 1995] 
“Second Letter to 
Shaykh Abdal Aziz 
Bin Baz..” 
64 'Today the Muslims' ailment is not military weakness or financial poverty, 
but rather their leaders' betrayal, regimes' failures, plus scholars acceptance 
of current situations and befriending bad leaders'. 
UBL [March 1995] 
“Saudi Arabia 
Continues its War 
against Islam and its 
Scholars” 
66 The scholars have spoken out against the man-made laws, economic 
management, usury, called for media reform and removing immoral 
programmes, highlighted the deteriorating social programmes, poor state of 
the military, how the judicial system changed most of the religious laws 
into laws imposed by the regime, spoke out against the foreign policy 
which consisted of supporting infidels against Muslims. These scholars 
were put away because: 1) of the regime's personal hostility against the 
Muslims, 'getting rid of Islamic da'wah, whose positive outcome has 
started to emerge', 2) its adherence to implementing the infidels' (US, Jews, 
Nato) plans to destroy Islamic da'wah and preachers. 
UBL [August 1995] 
“An Open Letter to 
King Fahd on the 
Occasion of the 
Recent Cabinet 
Reshuffle” 
62 The major underlying problem with the Saudi regime is that it does not 
govern according to the pillars of Islam, 'the foundations of monotheism 
which distinguish between infidelity and faith.' This lead to 1) abandoning 
Shariah law and 2) 'Allegiance to the Infidels and Hostility towards 
Muslims'.  
 
By obeying and revering monks and man-made laws, Christians have 
elevated these people to the position of lords' this is in derogation of the 
real Lord. Jews are also guilty of such polytheism.  
 
The man-made laws in Saudi Arabia: 'A quick look at the charts of 
commercial courts and the laws that allow and authorize bank usurious 
transactions and others, labour and labourers laws, the law of the Saudi 
Arabian army, and other godless laws which exemplify to what extent and 
influence have these arbitrating and blasphemous laws achieved in this 
country.' As blasphemous is the mechanism to settle disputes between 
nations within the GCC.  
 
Worldly failures of the Saudi authorities: 1) economic situation, Fahd's 
'suicidal' policies have engulfed the state in debt impacting schools, 
hospitals, the labour market etc. The Luxury life of the royal family whilst 
it asks the population to be frugal and save energy. Fahd particularly 
contributed to this problem by: a) playing part in lowering oil prices, b) 
failing to secure alternative sources of revenue, c) paying the bill for the 
Gulf war and buying military hard-ware off the British, d) exhausting 
financial assets abroad, d) taking interest loans. 2) The military situation: 
the astronomical funding for the military is merely to give money to 
princes and the backers of the regime, notes the immense squandering of 
funds and corruption. 
UBL [November 
1996] “Bin Ladin 
interviewed on jihad 
against US” 
150 'I would rather die than live in any European state.' [Bear in mind when 
considering AQ's unclear relationship with diasporas in Europe]. 
AAZ [December 
2001] “Knights 
119 'Who is banning the hijab [veil] at schools and the niqab [face cover] at 
universities in order to fight the values of Islam and to force our daughters 
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Communiqué and 
author [ID] 
References to undesirability of existing societies 
[excerpts, quotes, notes] 
under the Prophet’s 
Banner..” 
to emulate the west and its immorality?'. 
UBL [purported] 
[June 2002] “Al-
Qa’ida’s 
Declaration in 
response to the 
Saudi Ulema..” 
43 The document utterly contradicts the shariah and 'is built on Western 
conceptions, which themselves rest upon the most loathsome, secular 
principles, whose basis is the United Nations and its satellites.' The West 
was key in abolishing 'legitimate Islamic education in exchange for secular 
education, whose influence we still suffer from to this very day'. ´The 
essence of our problems with the West revolves around these principles' [of 
Islam: 'faith in Allah alone, all the prophets, and emulation of Muhammad; 
upholding the doctrine of Loyalty and Enmity [loyalty to Muslims, 
hostility towards non-Muslims]; repudiating all enslavement save to Allah 
alone, and rejecting all idolatry and false worship; and jihad in the path of 
Allah Most High'. 'The West is hostile to us on account of Loyalty and 
Enmity, and Jihad'.  
 
'The issues most prominent in the West revolve around secularism, 
homosexuality, and atheism.' (37). 
UBL [October 
2002] “Letter from 
Usama bin 
Mohammed bin 
Ladin to the 
American People” 
212 America: 'You are the nation who, rather than ruling by the Law of Allah, 
choose to implement your own inferior rules and regulations, thus 
following your own vain whims and desires. You run a society contrary to 
the nature of mankind by separating religion from your policies. So much 
so that people believe that even if they commit adultery, theft, and other 
wicked acts, as long as they go and confess, everything will be okay.' On 
the prominence of drugs, sex, alcohol and gambling in US society. On the 
sexual presentation of women, US tourists 'spreading filth upon whoever 
comes into contact with' them, US as the greatest pollutant which still 
refused to sign Kyoto. The AIDS virus and other diseases being spread 
from America. US reliance on offensive weapons and WMD. 
UBL [February 
2003] “A Message 
to Our Brothers in 
Iraq” 
79 The grave sins, according to the sharia: 'polytheism, sorcery, killing, unless 
permitted by God, usury, taking the money of orphans, fleeing from 
combat, and slandering innocent faithful women' (the seven grave sins). 
'Also, all grave sins, such as consuming alcohol, committing adultery, 
disobeying parents, and committing perjury'. 
UBL [October 
2003] “Second letter 
to the Muslims of 
Iraq” 
98 'Islam is God's religion, and parliaments are an ignorant religion, so those 
who obey princes and ulema (who allow what God has forbidden, like 
entering legislative councils, and forbid what God has allowed, like jihad) 
commit the sin of making these men lords in place of God - when strength 
is only in him!'. 
UBL [December 
2004] audio 
statement  
84 Man-made laws, usury, collaboration with the infidels. The opening of the 
Arabian Peninsula to Jews and Christians. Absolute supremacy is given to 
the King and his laws, and not those of God, this includes policies which 
contradict the Sharia, e.g. on permitting usury (interests) - even though this 
is a 'cardinal sin', and through loyalty with infidels (such as the Jordanian 
regime) and punishing those who criticise these links. 
UBL [December 
2004] audio 
statement 
86 'People worship other people in the name of the so-called international 
legitimacy or the New World Order and its satellite regimes [...] whose 
existence is based upon the implementation of the arbitrary decisions of the 
Security Council and the UN resolutions against oppressed countries'.  
 
Subservience to the West.  
 
'Man-made and pagan constitution'. 
AAZ [February 
2005] “The Freeing 
of Humanity and 
109 'The freedom we want is not the lowly, filthy American freedom, it is not 
the freedom of the banks of usury, major corporations, and deceitful media, 
it is not the freedom of destruction of others for the sake of material 
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Communiqué and 
author [ID] 
References to undesirability of existing societies 
[excerpts, quotes, notes] 
Homelands under 
the Banner of the 
Quran” 
interests, it is not the freedom of AIDS, spreading obscenity, and symbol 
marriages. It is not the freedom of gambling, alcohol and family breakups, 
it is not the freedom of using women as merchandise to gain customers, 
sign deals and attract tourists and sell products. It is not the freedom of 
double standards, and dividing people into robbers and robbed, it is not the 
freedom of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it is not the freedom of selling torture 
machines, and supporting regimes of force, suppression and might, the 
friends of America, it is not the freedom of Israel massacring Muslims, 
destroying Masjid Al-Aqsa and turning Palestine into a Jewish state, it is 
not the freedom of Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib, it is not the freedom of 
carpet bombings, seven ton bombs, cluster bombs and leaf fallers, nor 
depleted uranium, and the destruction of villages in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
It is not the freedom of the government of Halliburton and its sister blood 
suckers. It is not the freedom of monopolization of weapons of mass 
destruction, developing it and then forbidding it from others. It is not the 
freedom of monopolizing the vote in the Security Council to the five big 
nations, four of whom are crusaders'. 
AAZ [December 
2005] “Obstacles to 
Jihad” 
25 This material world is 'drowned in atheism, unbelief, criminality, 
hypocrisy, disgrace and surrender'. 
UBL [April 2006] 
“Oh People of 
Islam” 
90 The way of the Security Council: 'America and Britain represent the 
Protestant Christians, Russia represents the Orthodox Christians, and 
France represents the Catholic Christians, while China represents the 
Buddhists and pagans of the world. As for the Islamic world, it is 
represented by 57 countries, and comprises a 5th of the world's people, and 
more than a 4th of the countries in the UN [...] yet it has no seat in the 
Security Council. And here I am not asking for that, because that is wrong, 
am simply describing the facts of the matter'. The UN is an organisation of 
unbelief, used to implement Zio-Crusader resolutions against Muslims. 
[religion the real identity]. 
AAZ [June 2006] 
“Support for 
Palestinians” 
85 'The constitution and laws clash with the Shari'ah which is absent from 
government in Egypt'. 
UBL [July 2006] 
“To the Ummah in 
General and to the 
Mujahiden in Iraq 
and Somalia in 
Particular” 
93 'I also tell my Islamic nation we have lost our Caliphate state, which has 
been fragmented and fell under the Crusader occupation almost a century 
ago. Ever since, the Crusaders have been trying to prevent us from 
reinstating the Caliphate state or even establishing any Islamic state. For 
this reason, they invaded Afghanistan and applied pressure on Sudan'. 
AAZ + Adam 
Gadhan [September 
2006] “An 
Invitation to Islam” 
33 G: There can be no separation of religion and state, its laws and 
government. Islamic faith, and the spirit of jihad, not democracy, is needed 
to topple corrupt leaders domestically. Attacks on Christianity, sanctions 
attacks on women and blacks, is a false religion etc... 
AAZ [September 
2006] “Bush, the 
Vatican’s Pope, 
Darfur and the 
Crusade” 
89 'Christianity cannot be accepted by a sound mind because it includes 
superstitions like the trinity, the crucifixion, redemption, the original sin, 
the infallibility of the pope, and the church's forgiveness of sins'. 
AAZ [December 
2006] “Realities of 
Conflict between 
Islam and Unbelief” 
94 Membership of the UN means recognising Israel. Its charter also 
challenges the Shariah, and forces the recognition of Russian occupation of 
Chechnya, China's of East Turkistan, Spain's of Ceuta and Melilla and 
other cases. 
AAZ [March 2007] 
“Palestine is the 
Concern of All 
18 The surrender, concessions and recognitions of Israel witnessed in 
Palestine are the results of secular democracy. 
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Muslims” 
AAZ [July 2007] 
“Malicious Britain 
and its Indian 
Slaves” 
103 Nationalism, socialism, liberalism, and submissiveness. 
UBL [September 
2007] “The 
Solution..” 
10 Democratic system cannot protect human beings as it is manipulated by 
corporations. Must rid the world of Capitalism. Man-made laws serve only 
those with capital. Total obedience to the orders and prohibitions of God. 
The rabbis altered the words of the Torah and the monks altered the words 
of the Evangel. Western society has partitioned state from God. In the 
Islamic society there will be no taxes apart from the 2.5%. Islam is the 
religions of all the prophets, including Jesus 
UBL [September 
2007] “Come to 
Jihad: Speech to the 
People of Pakistan” 
14 Ulema of Pakistan refuse to rule by the religion of Islam in 'in all of life’s 
affairs, like politics, economy, social life and other matters'. 
AAZ [December 
2007] “A Review of 
Events” 
13 The Jihad media must fight those who are trying to drag the Ummah 
'towards secularism, and away from the rule of Shariah, and towards 
nationality-based partisanship and away from the brotherhood of Islam and 
towards submission of the Sykes-Picot instead of the Caliphate state from 
ocean to ocean' ... ' and those who are abandoning their territories under the 
pretext of political expertise, world-wide pragmatism, national unity, 
saving lives and other such myths.' All governments are illegitimate since 
they are recognized in an international community rather than by the rule 
of Allah, they take part in the UN and do not fit the requirements of Dar-ul-
Islam. 
AAZ [April 2008] 
“The Open 
Meeting.. p.1” 
105 'Egypt after 25 years [of Mubarak rule] has become more degenerate, 
corrupt and vassal-like'. 
AAZ [April 2008] 
“The Open Meeting 
with Shaykh 
Ayman..p.2” 
107 'Democracy contravenes the sharia because democracy is based on the rule 
of the majority whereas sharia is based on the rule of the laws that are 
revealed by the lord of the universe'. . The Egyptian constitution & 
democracy; 'In Islam, no people, no matter how many they are, have the 
power to change sharia, which must be implemented whether the majority 
agrees or disagrees'.  
 
(Asked about modern technology): 'I like or do not like this or that value 
not because it is old or modern. However, I reject and I am hostile to 
polytheism; scorn for religion; the establishment of relations based on 
profit, sensual delight, lies, deception, and treachery; usury, alcohol, 
gambling and vile deeds; seizing others' countries and inflicting justice on 
them based on arrogance and mischief; the plundering of their resources; 
double standards; and immunity to punishment for crimes for which others 
are punished; spreading killing, exploitation, and destruction; and the 
destruction of environment and climate in order to be elated with mighty 
arrogance and for the sake of plundering and looting'. 'Scientific 
knowledge is neither Western or Eastern, but it is the property of mankind 
and it rotates among them in time and place. 'The West's scientific 
advancement has basically relied on our resources'. 'The West became 
superior to us because we have abandoned our values, and not because of 
the superiority of its values'. 
UBL [May 2008] 
“A Message to the 
Muslim Nation” 
24 'These youths' source of talaqqi [learning] are not the laws of the United 
Nations or the so-called the international legitimacy, the idols of the West 
and east, or the ulema or leaders of groups in whose shadow they hide. 
Their sources of learning are also not political analyses by tendentious 
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media that do not comply with the law of God, which disdain the rituals of 
religion under the name of humour, spread atheism under the name of the 
freedom of expression, and seek to distort the image of mujahidin and 
weaken them.' 
AAZ [August 2008] 
“A Message from 
Shaykh Ayman Al-
Zawahiri to Pakistan 
Army and People of 
Pakistan” 
41 Nationalism, Western democracy, British legislative and judicial system - 
divided the ummah and were the reasons for great catastrophes for the 
ummah. 
AAZ [November 
2008] “Al-Azhar: 
The Lions Den..” 
237 Government controlling selection of ulema and controlling their deeds. The 
'corrupt and secular judiciary' in Egypt. ‘We - and for Allah is all praise - 
don't have a Pope or a Wali-al-Faqih who speaks in the name of the Hidden 
Imam [Shia / Iran]. Rather, everyone judges by the Quran and Sunnah'. 
UBL [January 2009] 
“Call for Jihad to 
Stop the Gaza 
Assault” 
122 'False international legitimacy'. There can be no man-made laws. 
AAZ [February 
2009] “From Kabul 
to Mogadishu” 
132 On the need to ensure the eradication of the Somali constitution in favour 
of a constitution implementing the Shariah. .. Recognising the UN means 
recognising Israel's control over Palestine, Russia's over the Caucasus, 
Spain's over Ceuta and Melilla, and China's over East Turkistan. .. 
References to the fallacy of democracy, specifically in Palestine. 
UBL [March 2009] 
“Practical steps to 
Liberate Palestine” 
133 'The fact is, all states of the Islamic world from Indonesia to Mauritania 
without exception fall into one of two categories: crooked states and even 
more crooked states; and Islam is innocent of all of their rulers'. 
UBL [March 2009] 
“Fight on, O’ 
Champions of 
Somalia” 
134 'Oh, how desire for wealth, eminence and status has ruined our 
leaderships!' 
AAZ [August 2009] 
“The Realities of 
Jihad and Fallacy of 
Hypocrisy” 
140 'The Western civilization is the civilization of degeneracy, adultery; 
freedom from ethics, morals and religion…isn't the civilization of AIDS? 
That is why, the female veiled Muslim brings out all of these provocations, 
and she uncovers their usage of women as a product to attract consumers 
and market supplies, and it uncovers the degeneracy of their capitalism that 
adopts the trade obscenity in all its kinds and colors and considered one of 
the important sources of its income, and she uncovers the fakery of their 
freedom as it is OK for them that a woman unveils her entire body, it is 
even OK for her to sell her body, but they cannot withstand a veiled 
Muslim woman.' 
AAZ [August 2009] 
“The Path of Doom” 
142 Among the lies that have sustained the Pakistani state is the notion that its 
constitution is Islamic (refers to his book 'The Morning and the Candle'). 
AAZ [September 
2009] “Eulogy for 
the Role Model of 
Youth..” 
147 The constitution and British-based judicial system in Pakistan. 
AAZ [December 
2009] “The 
Palestinian National 
Unity: A Worshiped 
Idol” 
146 Condemns 'national unity' with secular governments. 
AAZ [December 
2009] “The Morning 
and the Lamp to be 
141 ['Disfiguration of Pakistan due to corrupt legal base] 'This is what has 
occurred in Pakistan after sixty years of its establishment. Thus, Pakistan 
(which ironically translates to: “the pure land”) has become a foundation 
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Extinguished..” for the activities of America in South Asia and the Middle East; in their 
Crusade against Islam.' .. When we actually study the Constitution (the 
“father of all law” - abul-qawānīn – as they consider it), then we find that it 
decisively proclaims, without doubt, that the right to amend the 
Constitution or to issue laws solely belongs to the majority of 
representatives without exception.' The text appears to recognise the appeal 
on consultative processes involving the 'Muslim masses', but expresses 
anger that this includes the provision that majority rule is absolute, above 
divine authority: 'Second, there would be no issues if the representatives of 
the Muslim masses after consultation deliberated to amend the text of their 
laws or their constitution, in order to realize their own interests, so long as 
they adhere to the religion of Allah and His Sharī`ah. But that is a matter 
that is not mentioned in the Pakistani Constitution.' .. Specific issues: '1. 
Key Principle: Legalizing fisq (disobedience to the Sharī`ah) is in itself 
kufr The remaining chapters discuss the following conflicts:] 2. Immunity 
against prosecution and questioning. 3. Right of the President of the State 
to pardon any crime. 4. Lack of pre-requisite of Islam in appointment of 
judges except in the Sharī`ah Court and of just [character] in all courts. 5. 
Lack of pre-requisite of masculinity for the President of the State. 6. 
Protection against executing a penalty retrospectively. 7. Protection against 
applying a punishment twice. 8. The position of the constitution on ribā 
[usury]', this last point pertains to frustration about the lack of emphasis put 
on shar'iah implementation, since the constitution only expresses the desire 
to nullify riba. .. On the many references to democracy in the constitution 
and the way in which this contradicts Islamic law and creed, including 
42:21 and 10:59.  
 
'Amongst them [who established Pakistan] was a certain class that had 
received training within the English culture and were in awe of their 
civilization.' [UK focus]. 
AAZ [July 2010] 
“Al-Quds will not 
be converted to 
Judaism” 
223 'Rejecting the rule of shariah, the brotherhood of Islam and the return of the 
Caliphate, and accepting secularism and democracy and the spread of the 
majority's wishes and the social state’..  
 
Muslims must not become servants of the 'secular international order' 
dominated by the West, its secular creed and crusade bias, and primarily 
the 'Anglo-Saxon protestant publics.' 
AAZ [September 
2010] “A Victorious 
Ummah, a Broken 
Crusade” 
226 Pakistani newspapers and media depicting 'feminine beauty' and other acts 
of 'disobedience' and 'decadence'. Pakistani authorities spreading vices 
such as 'drinking of wine, drugs, nudity, displaying of feminine beauty, 
gambling, usury and perversions.' [norms important too, not only 
grievance]. 
UBL [October 
2010] “Help Your 
Brothers in 
Pakistan” 
228 ''Law makers are making laws away from Allah's governance' and have 
dismissed judges who rule according to Shari'ah, executive power and that 
of the media is dependent on the whims of the ruler.  
 
'Hateful and narrow' nationalism has prevented the ummah from uniting in 
responding to the crisis, using the 'Muslim wealth' of the Arabian peninsula 
etc. 
AAZ [February 
2011] “Message of 
Hope and Glad 
Tidings.. (1)” 
 
232 'The Egyptian government, as stated in its principle documents, is a 
nationalistic, secular, democratic government. In reality, it is a 
nationalistic, secular, tyrannical and maybe a hereditary government.'  
 
The Egyptian government is being characterised by “Hukm al Jahiliyyah 
(the judgement of Jahi-liyyah). 'It being “democratic” means that 
sovereignty is derived from the wishes of the majority, without regards to 
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any standard, morality or creed. A democratic government must be secular, 
or in other words atheist, because governance and authority is not the sole 
right of Allah Most High, but rather subject to the desire of the majority.' 
Egyptian government nationalist - based on the principles of Sykes Picot. 
This ignores the Islamic division of people according to piety (taqwa). .. 
“(1) The Egyptian government is secular in creed, while an Islamic 
government is one which abides by a heavenly creed. (2) The Egyptian 
government claims to be democratic, i.e., that its source is the wishes of the 
people, without adherence to any set standard, morals or creed, while an 
Islamic government is one of shura (consultation), in which the Ummah 
refers to the Shariah and judges the rulers, who are selected and also held 
to account by them. (3) The Egyptian government in reality, is a 
suppressive government which relies upon brutality and rigged elections, 
while an Islamic government is one based upon shura which relies upon 
spreading justice, confronting oppression, and enjoining the good and 
forbidding the evil. (4) The Egyptian government is a nationalistic 
government based upon the principles of the nationalistic state, which 
embodies the goals of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, while an Islamic 
government is one based on the principle of Muslim equality and the unity 
of their nations, under the shade of the Caliphate. “ .. 'Thus, we must stop 
here and clarify that secularism was introduced into our country as a result 
of military occupation, suppression and massacre, and it still lives off of 
this as we will see, and that Western secularism in its deep inside harbours 
enmity to Islam and sides with the Zionists.' 
AAZ [February 
2011] “Message of 
Hope and Glad 
Tidings.. (3)” 
 
234 Tunisian Govt. ''the beloved child of France, who waged a war against 
Islam, persecuted sisters who practiced Hijab, promoted prostitution, moral 
depravity and sinfulness, built bridges with the Jews and carried out 
sinister forms of repression, torture, imprisonment, hunting down every 
freeborn and noble person who sought to defend his religion, people, land, 
and sanctities.' 
AAZ [March 2011] 
“Message of Hope 
and Glad Tidings.. 
(4)” 
 
235 'Secularism in our Muslim World in general, and particularly in Egypt, was 
not a choice made by the Egyptian people.' It was forced on them by Sadat 
and his foreign backers. .. 
 
 'Democracy tries to fulfil one religion and worships one idol, which is the 
wished of the majority, without abiding by any religion, standards or 
ethics.'  
 
'They seek a democracy which alters our principles which guide our 
behaviour in society. We must accept homosexuality and a family structure 
which is not necessarily composed of a father, mother and children, but 
rather grotesque forms of depravity.' 
AAZ [April 2011] 
“Message of Hope 
and Glad Tidings.. 
(5)” 
 
236 'People of Egypt: those who seek to alienate Sharia from governance so 
America can be content will spread amongst you usury, adultery, 
insobriety, moral dissolution, familial schisms and all kinds and forms of 
crimes, which the man-made laws add to the increase and spread of.' 'The 
man-made ordinances turn people in prison into beasts that fight over three 
things: homosexuality, drugs and gambling.'  
 
'“This is the truth about democracy; it allows everything regardless of it 
being degrading or contradictory, as long as the majority agrees with it. 
Democracy in reality is the games of the number of votes without any 
moral, valuable or religious reference.” [the anti-democratic tone has been 
turned up in these 'Glad Tidings' messages - anxiety over the wishes of the 
people and the reason they protested?] .. 'In Shura, for example, it is not 
allowed to give licenses to the alcohol manufacturer or the heresy and 
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adultery locations or the dissolute, collapsed media, which cause 
corruption in the country, even if the majority of the Shura agrees.' 
AAZ [May 2011] 
“Message of Hope 
and Glad Tidings.. 
(6)” 
 
238 Complains about the legal system in Egypt now that does not demand the 
head of state be male and a Muslim, that gives authority to others than 
Allah and permits alcohol production, clubs where "mortal sins" are 
committed etc. "Al-Azhar must gain back its stances and its scholars must 
choose their Shaykh from amongst themselves, and not to be enforced on 
them by the corrupt and corruptive governments"  
 
The Military council in Egypt has not released political prisoners. Talks of 
"social injustice" in Egypt and unfair distribution of wealth. 
AAZ [August 2011] 
“Message of Hope 
and Glad Tidings.. 
(7)” 
 
242 "I had mentioned earlier that the present state of Egypt is one which can be 
summarized as a deviation from Islam, and I had spoken of the first type of 
corruption in this ruling regime, which is corruption in creed (Aqeedah), 
explaining how the Egyptian regime is a secular, authoritarian, and 
nationalist regime." Reviews how this was brought about by "Zionist 
leaning" French campaign, secular laws in the era of Muhammad Ali, the 
British invasion, the English creation of a nationalistic, secular state. 
Talked in previous 'Glad Tidings' speeches about how the UK corrupted 
the Egyptian legislative system, awarded Egypt 'fake' independence and 
turned it into a secular state. Devotes this communiqué to discussing how 
Britain allowed "fake, corrupt life" to spread in Egypt. “Secularism in 
Egypt and the rest of the Muslim lands was never a choice for the Muslim 
masses, who to this day demand Islamic rule". America wishes to establish 
in Egypt and other Muslim lands a fake political life in which parties 
contest in elections and parliament, while America and its proxies watch 
the game from behind the curtains and intervene only when necessary." 
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UBL=Usama bin Ladin 
AAZ=Ayman Al-Zawahiri 
 
 
Communiqué 
and author [ID] 
 
(A) References to past 
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(B) References to ongoing political 
events and crises 
[excerpts, quotes, notes] 
 
UBL [unknown 
date] 
“Methodological 
Guidelines” 
112  Violence in Chechnya, Palestine, the 
Philippines,Kashmir, Sudan, and Iraq. The 
Bush-Blair alliance is likened to the Sykes-
Picot agreement: both represent crusader 
occupation and rule, and both aim to 
oppress and destroy the Islamic umma. 
Bush and Blair seen as trying to divide and 
rule Muslim world and create greater 
Israel. 
AAZ [unknown 
date] “The 
Forbidden Word” 
113  No freedom of speech in Egypt. The 
hardships suffered by the Afghan people 
are blamed on a variety of factors, among 
them U.S. intelligence, Saudi intelligence, 
the Iranian government and the Afghan 
Communist party 
UBL [unknown 
date] Letter to 
Mullah Omar 
61 References to the Afghan jihad 
against the Soviets, the 'calamity' 
of disunity after that and Mullah 
Omar's feat in uniting Afghanistan 
under Shariah law. 
 
AAZ [unknown 
date] “Introduction 
to Characteristics 
of Jihad” 
35 Muslims are currently living in 
the worst times of their history, 
with the collapsed caliphate, 
occupation by colonialists, who 
installed traitor governments. The 
curriculum focused on 
demolishing the Islamic language, 
history and religion. 
There is a worldwide conspiracy against 
Jihad, particularly in the Arab world - the 
heart of Islam.  
 
The Sharm el-Sheikh conference and the 
traitorous leaders who attended, trying to 
prevent jihad in Palestine [this presumably 
refers to the September 1999 conference 
and memorandum], including Yeltsin, 
Clinton, Chirac and their allies along with 
Shimon Peres, and of the apostates 
included Hosni Mubarak. [The 
memorandum was signed by Arafat, Barak, 
overseen by Albright and witnessed by 
King Abdullah of Jordan and Mubarak]. 
AAZ [early 1992] 
“The Black Book: 
An account of the 
Torture of 
Muslims in the 
Time of Husni 
Mubarak” 
114  Torture and killing of activists by State 
Police in Egypt under Mubarak control and 
use of torture and intimidation throughout 
the judicial system. 
AAZ/Islamic Jihad 
[early 1993] 
“Advice to the 
Community to 
reject the Fatwa of 
99 'When the impure unbelievers 
came to dominate Muslims 
countries at the end of the 
nineteenth century, the revealed 
law of Islam was put aside in 
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Bin Baz..” governing our countries, and they 
brought in impious positive law 
instead. When they left, the 
colonizers handed the reins to a 
group of Muslims who had 
reached power through these 
laws'. 
UBL [March 
1994] ‘Usama bin 
Ladin Denies 
“Terrorism” Link’ 
1  Palestine, Bosnia 
UBL [April 1994] 
“Our Invitation to 
Give Advice and 
Reform” 
36 Refers to the freezing of his bank 
accounts, travel ban, 'defamation 
campaign' in the local and 
international press and 
confiscating of passports by the 
Saudi authorities. Refers to the 
petitions by members of the ulema 
and intelligentsia and others 
demanding reform, first during the 
Gulf War but later in subsequent 
petitions. All these were ignored. 
References to the situation in Saudi Arabia 
and the state of exile. Announces the 
creation of the Committee for Advice and 
Reform. 
UBL [June 1994] 
“Saudi Arabia 
supports the 
Communists in 
Yemen” 
37  The Yemeni Socialist Party has enslaved 
its people for the past 25 years. The regime 
in Algeria used 'terror and violence to 
prevent Islamic forces from coming to 
power' [what about the terror and violence 
of the GIA?]. ... Crimes against and 
massacres of Muslims in Bosnia 
Herzegovina, the global Crusader 
conspiracy prevented them from getting 
weapons. Hindu killing of Muslims in 
Kashmir, Jewish killing of Muslims in 
Lebanon ö all sanctioned by UN. 
UBL [September 
1994]  “Saudi 
Arabia Unveils its 
War against Islam 
and its Scholars” 
40  The Saudi Kingdom wages war against 
Islam and its scholars. - Government critics 
who call for correct implementation of the 
Shariah etc. 
UBL [September 
1994] “Urgent 
Letter to Security 
Officials” 
42  The Saudi regimes ' insane campaign to 
strike at the Islamic awakening and its 
scholarly and popular symbols' in the 
Peninsula. The Saudi regime has 
committed the evil crime of throwing the 
best of the Ummah and Ulema into prison. 
UBL [January 
1995] “Second 
letter to Shaykh 
Abd Al-Aziz bin 
Baz from the 
Reform and 
Advice 
Foundation” 
64  Peace agreement between the Jews and 
apostate secular Arab leaders recognises 
Jewish ownership of where the Prophet 
ascended to heaven and calls of jihad. It is 
invalid.  
 
Any agreement with Israel supports the 
eternal Jewish ownership of the land they 
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took in 1948. 
UBL [February 
1995] “Prince 
Salman and 
Ramadan Alms” 
65  Saudi assistance to Yemeni communists, 
the Algerian regime, cooperation with the 
Americans with the so-called peace plan 
with the Jews, and the latest was their 
establishment and replacement of aid 
organizations with their own 
establishments which they use to support 
their own policies, against the interests of 
the Muslims. 
UBL [March 
1995] “Saudi 
Arabia Continues 
its War against 
Islam and its 
Scholars” 
66  The Saudi regime has detained more 
scholars in a recent raid on mosques and 
houses. 
UBL [July 1995] 
“Prince Sultan and 
the Air Aviation 
Commissions” 
68  The collapse of Saudi economy due to 
mismanagement and accumulation of 
interest debt, plundering of public wealth, 
most recently through the guise of 
Privatisation. The latest example is selling 
the national airline, this is done in order to 
provide ready money and in order to buy 
tens of US-made aircraft which will be 
popular in America and create jobs. The 
regime is trying to force the private sector 
to buy the airline, but this will cost them a 
lot of money, and people will lose their 
jobs. 
UBL [August 
1995] “An Open 
Letter to King 
Fahd on the 
Occasion of the 
Recent Cabinet 
Reshuffle” 
62 Saudi government sending funds 
to the Soviets 'which has not yet 
cleansed its hands smeared with 
the blood of the Muslim people in 
Afghanistan', the Syrian regime as 
an 'award' for the massacres of 
Hama, the Algerian government, 
and Christian rebels in southern 
Sudan, and finally - the political 
and financial support for Yemeni 
communists. 
References to 'temporal tranquillisers' 
against the people in the form of arbitrary 
changes which don't actually reform 
anything, such as the stillborn Shura 
Council.  
 
Economic collapse in Saudi.  
 
Concerning the continued presence of US 
forces in Saudi Arabia after the Iraq war: 
'do not we have the right to question the 
objective for allowing them to remain on 
the land of the two Great Mosques with all 
their staggering numbers and equipment? 
Does Iraq still pose a real danger to your 
throne after the destruction of its army and 
the starvation of its Muslim people? All 
facts tend to prove otherwise and 
emphasize that the danger these forces are 
stationed here to deter is not an illusive 
peril from a starved and destroyed Iraq but, 
as the experts suggest, from the Islamic 
danger on the inside since the kingdom is 
witnessing a blessed and heightened 
Islamic awakening'  
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'It is not reasonable to keep one’s silence 
about transforming the nation to an 
American protectorate to be defiled by the 
soldiers of the Cross with their soiled feet 
in order to protect your crumbling throne 
and the preservation of the oilfields in the 
kingdom'. 
UBL [August 
1995] “The Bosnia 
Tragedy and the 
Deception of the 
Servant of the 
Two Mosques” 
69 During the Afghan war, the Saudi 
authorities used money for the 
mujahideen in order to 'pressure 
the mujahidin and influence their 
policies in a way that would 
benefit the interests of the West. 
Sometimes these interests were 
used for the private interests of 
the princes. 
In order to divert people's attention from 
the dire economic and political state of 
Saudi Arabia, 'the king is trying to escape 
from the internal facts by drawing attention 
away from his problems to those going on 
outside the country. He is creating a 
diversion, tickling the nation's emotions by 
raising the shirt of the support for Bosnia 
Herzegovina and all contributions to its 
people'  
 
'We have not yet forgotten the 
contributions that were collected on behalf 
of the Palestinian cause, which at the end 
were given to the extortive Jews as a token 
of friendship and as a present of cordiality. 
Is the Bosnian cause going to be more 
important to the regime than the 
Palestinian cause? How are we going to 
believe the regime when it says it will 
support Islam and the Muslims in Bosnia, 
when the best of the scholars, the preachers 
of the nation, and the cream of its youth 
remain in prisons of the regime?'. The 
Saudi authorities held a conference on the 
situation in Bosnia threatening to 
intervene, giving the UN one last chance to 
protect the Muslims, but it did not move to 
protect them when 'the UN persisted on its 
deathly plan for the destruction of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. The conference was only 
meant for a domestic audience, and the 
Bosnian Muslims were left to surrender to 
the 'Serbian monster to be devoured in 
front of the eyes and ears of the entire 
world, forbidden from the right of legally 
defending themselves according to the 
decisions of the United Nations!!'. The 
Saudi regime prevented arms and support 
from being sent to Muslims in Bosnia. 'The 
regime's propaganda of showing support 
for the Muslims in Bosnia was nothing 
more than crocodile tears and deceit'. The 
regime is using this event to try to 'raise 
the value of its declining political stock'. .. 
The real allies of the Bosnian Muslims 
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from the Arabian Peninsula are the youth, 
and those who send money directly.  
 
The Christian Croats managed to break the 
siege of Bosnia, so why not the rulers of 
the Muslim world, particularly the Saudi 
regime?  
 
'The Bosnian cause, with all its bitterness, 
contained great lessons, among which are 
the following: 1 - it uncovered the ruling 
regimes of Muslim countries and exposed 
them as mere tools in the hands of the great 
and powerful Crusaders. Those regimes do 
not represent their people who supported 
the Muslims of Bosnia. 2 - The human 
rights an equality slogans raised by the 
West are nothing but dead slogans, when it 
comes to Muslim matters. 3 - The United 
Nations is nothing but a tool to implement 
the Crusaders' plan to kill the causes of the 
nation of Islam and its people. 4 - 
Complying with the articles of the United 
Nations is a joint practical operation to 
conspire against Muslim causes'. 
UBL [July 1996] 
“Interview with 
Saudi Dissident 
Bin Ladin” 
 US entering the land of two holy 
places. Legacy of US aggression 
towards Muslims 
 
UBL [September 
1996] “Bin Ladin 
Declares Jihad on 
Americans/Letter 
from Usama bin 
Muhammad bin 
Ladin to his 
Muslim Brothers 
in the Whole 
World and 
Especially in the 
Arabian 
Peninsula..” 
5 Palestine, Iraq, Qana, Ogaden, 
Assam, Philippines, Burma, 
Tajikistan, Kashmir, Fatani, 
Somalia, Eritrea, Chechnya, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Occupation 
of SA worst catastrophe since 
death of Mohammed. References 
to the Lebanon blasts in 1983 and 
Aden double bombings 
emphasizing US ‘false courage’. 
Also Mogadishu 
Saudi ruler’s mistakes: 1) replacing shariia, 
2) allowing in enemies, which ruined the 
economy. Also ignoring memoranda from 
religious scholars pointing to internal 
weaknesses and disrespect for Muslim 
causes and the shariia. Israel seen as trying 
to conquer the Arabian peninsula. 
Palestine. 
UBL [November 
1996] “Bin Ladin 
interviewed on 
Jihad against US” 
150 Palestine, and the US veto 
ensuring continued suffering. 
Qana massacre.  
 
Occupation of the Arabian 
peninsula by American forces and 
their meddling in affairs in order 
to bring down oil prices [which 
UBL implied should still be 
traded with the US - 'we are not 
going to drink it']. 
Ignores a question concerning the possible 
role of the 'shiite Hezbollah' in the Khobar 
bombings, talking in stead of conspiracies 
within the Saudi state and presence of US 
troops [Shia].Goes on to praise the attacks.  
 
The embargo against Iraq resulting in the 
death of more than 600 thousand children. 
The Sharm el-Sheikh conference. 
UBL [March 152  US occupation in Saudi Arabia. Struggle of 
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1997] “Bin Ladin 
Cited on Prince 
Sultan’s US Visit” 
Palestinians. 
UBL [March 
1997] “Bin Ladin 
Charges US 
involvement in 
China bombings” 
153  Said to have accused US of seeking to 
harm relations between Muslims and 
China. Said to have 'promised action' to 
'bring about an understanding' between 
Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and China 
 
Article claims UBL's animosity towards 
US became more determined after US 
sought to assassinate him.  
 
Arrest of 'Algerian activists' in France, said 
to have angered UBL.  
 
Animosity towards UK: 'Ben Ladin also 
accuses the British of supporting 
authoritarian regimes in the Middle East in 
their bid to crush the Islamic movements 
there. He said that the British were in the 
forefront, some times even ahead of the 
United States, in advocating continued 
siege, collective punishment, and sanctions 
against the Muslim peoples of Sudan, Iran, 
Libya and Iraq.' 
UBL [March 
1997] “Pakistan 
interviews Usama 
bin Ladin” 
154 Argues the US has been stealing 
from Saudi Arabia and the Arabs 
through forcing down oil prices 
over the past years, the price of 
US wheat has risen three-times 
that of oil in the Middle East. As a 
result the US owes 1100 billion 
dollars, 11 thousand for each 
Muslim. Their greatest crime 
however, is their presence in the 
Arabian peninsula. 
 
UBL [March 
1997] “Interview 
with Usama bin 
Ladin” 
155  Occupation of land of two holy places - 
exploitation of oil exports by US. 
UBL [April 1997] 
“The Saudi 
Regime and the 
Reputed Tragedies 
of the Pilgrims” 
70 Saudi spending on Communists in 
Yemen, Christians in Southern 
Sudan, and the tyrants of Algeria, 
Egypt and elsewhere. Muslim 
resentment towards the 
occupation of the holy places, 
stealing of its resources, 
neglecting of fiscal policy. 
References to the 'seasonal tragedy' 
whereby hundreds and sometimes 
thousands of pilgrims die each year due to 
accidents, several thousand in a fire in 
1997. The reasons are lack of space in 
public areas leading to overcrowding, 
negligence of organisers and lack of safety 
and security precautions. The organisers 
have not accounted for the increased 
number of pilgrims. Other countries do not 
seem to have the same problems when they 
deal with mass events. The underlying 
reason for all this is the incapacity and 
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despotism of the Saudi royal family. They 
have spent a lot more on their own palaces 
then on facilities for a billion Muslims. 
These tragedies happen every year because 
the family wants to rule everything, and no 
questions are asked, no one brought to 
trial. At the same time the regime is going 
out of its way in expressing its condolences 
for Christian and Jewish enemies when 
they lose people, and hastened to the 
Sharm El-Sheikh conference showing 
sympathy to the Zionists, after 60 of them 
were killed in Palestine. 
UBL [June 1997] 
“Usama bin Ladin 
Dares US 
Commandos to 
Come to 
Afghanistan” 
156  Arrest of Ramzi Yusuf Kansi. 
UBL [August 
1997] “Usama bin 
Ladin Urges 
‘Befitting Reply’ 
to Horan” 
157  On US Attorney Robert Horan's comments 
perceived as hostile and insulting towards 
Muslims. Compared to earlier book by 
Salman Rushdie and both condemned. 
West condemned for protecting Rushdie 
and welcoming him as a hero. This seen as 
sign of hostility towards Islam and 'moral 
degradation' in the West.  
 
On the 'abduction' of Aimal Kansi for 
killing some Americans.  
 
Says that now Muslims must insist that 
America withdraw not only from the 
Arabian Peninsula, but from all Muslim 
lands. 
UBL [November 
1997] “Daily 
Reports Usama 
bin Ladin’s Threat 
against 
Americans” 
158  US crimes against Muslims 
UBL [January 
1998] “Bin Ladin 
Claims Foiling of 
UN’s Afghan 
‘Conspiracy” 
159 Claims to have prevented the UN 
from establishing a coalition 
government in Afghanistan 
between communists and 
mojahideen following Soviet 
withdrawal, says UN and its chief 
Butros-Ghali threatened that any 
other form of government would 
not be recognised. Claims other 
mohaideen leaders were prepared 
to sign. 
 
UBL [February 160  The 'International Christian crusade' 
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1998] “Bin LAdin 
Condoles with Al-
Bashir on Salih’s 
Death” 
against Sudan. '"its (the international 
Christian crusade's) fleets are ploughing 
the seas of Islam. They are besieging and 
blockading the peoples of the region as a 
whole with total disregard for pledges and 
charters, and are violating the sacred sites 
and draining all the wealth, while the al-
Aqsa Mosque remains the prisoner of this 
Christian-Jewish alliance." 
UBL + AAZ + 
others [February 
1998] “Text of 
Fatwa Urging 
Jihad Against 
Americans” 
161  Three major grievances against the 
US/Zionist-Crusader alliance: (1) 7 years 
on-going occupation of the 'holiest of 
places', Arabian peninsula - also used as 
staging post for aggression in neighbouring 
regions including Iraq. (2) Even after the 
atrocities already committed against Iraqis 
resulting in more than a million deaths, 
Americans continue their campaign against 
the Iraqi people. (3) In addition to the 
religious and economic reasons for this 
campaign against the Muslims in the 
region, another strong reason is the need to 
weaken the enemies of Israel and divert 
attention away from the murdering of 
Muslims in Jerusalem. 
UBL [March 
1998] “Bin Ladin 
Urges Expulsion 
of Invaders..” 
162 On the long-standing US 
ambitions in the Arabian 
Peninsula - expressed by 
President Roosevelt: its oil 
reserves, link to global 
communication [geographic 
importance], and importance for 
Israeli security. This has not 
changed. The 1973 war 
demonstrated to the West and US 
the importance of protecting Israel 
and securing the oil reserves more 
directly, and President Reagan 
reiterated the importance of 
'seizing' strategically important 
hubs. Schwartzkopf insisted in 
1996 that it served US interests to 
continue to be based in the 
Peninsula. 
 
UBL [March 
1998] “Interview 
with Usama bin 
Ladin Reported” 
163  Denies accusations of responsibility for 
recent attacks on US personnel resulting in 
24 deaths in Saudi Arabia as 'totally false 
and baseless.' 
UBL [April 1998] 
“Bin Ladin warns 
against Richardson 
Mission to 
Afghanistan” 
164 Says America at the time tried to 
prolong dissent and infighting 
between mojahideen in 
Afghanistan following Soviet 
withdrawal in order to weaken 
these forces and undermine jihad. 
Reference to visit by US envoy Richardson 
to Afghanistan for talks with the Taliban 
[which they, in turn, welcomed] 
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UBL [May 1998] 
“Supporting the 
Fatwa of the 
Afghani Religious 
Scholars of 
Ejecting the 
American Forces 
from the Land of 
the Two Holy 
Mosques” 
71 The 1990 occupation in the 
LTHM by the US forces, the 
criticism of prominent scholars, 
their incarceration, the 
declarations of scholars 
supportive of the regime declaring 
the occupation crucial for defence 
purposes. And then the obvious 
desire of the Americans to stay 
beyond the Iraq war after it ended. 
'The nation of Islam is still faced with the 
case of invasion by the American forces 
into the land of the two holy mosques. The 
reaction [of the Muslim ummah] is 
escalating and deepening'. The latest 
example is the fatwa issued by the 'united 
religious scholars of Afghanistan, stressing 
the necessity of ejecting the American 
forces from the Arab Peninsula and the 
land of the two holy mosques'. 
UBL [May 1998] 
“Clerics in 
Afghanistan Issue 
Fatwa..” 
165  On the US occupation in Saudi Arabia, 
how they are they under the false pretence 
of providing security and how the 
Peninsula has to be cleared of their 
presence. 
UBL [May 1998] 
“Bin Ladin: 
Afghanistan’s 
inclusion on US 
terrorism list is 
‘Certificate of 
good conduct’ for 
Taliban” 
166  On the US announcement Afghanistan was 
considered a state sponsor of terrorism. 
That 'US accusations of terrorism against 
states, groups, or individuals are no longer 
of any value or credibility, since everyone 
now knows that the United States brands as 
terrorist anyone -- state, group, or 
individual -- who is opposed to its 
imperialist policy and hegemony, while it 
continues to practice the ugliest forms of 
world terrorism and support the evil of the 
forces of terror in the world.' US killing of 
'hundreds of thousands of children, 
women, and elderly people by sentencing 
them to death by starvation in Iraq' [note 
how this implicitly suggests views of those 
whose killing is forbidden] as well as US 
support for 'Zionist terrorism in Palestine 
and Lebanon.' 
UBL [May 1998] 
“World Islamic 
Front Backs 
Intifadah of 
Palestine’s 
Sons/Wounds of 
Al-Aqsa” 
167 'the United States, government 
and parliament, has always 
worked to spoil Israel and bolster 
its economic and military power.' 
Palestinian intifadah 
UBL [May 1998] 
“Bin Ladin 
Creates New Front 
Against US, 
Israel” 
168 Claims the US tried to split up 
Afghanistan into fiefdoms lead by 
individual tribal leaders 
 
UBL [May 1998] 
“United States 
Admits that 
Keeping its 
Troops in the Gulf 
is Causing 
Dissatisfaction…” 
169  'Arab land has either been occupied or 
there is a conspiracy to occupy it. For the 
first time since the Prophet's death atheists 
are occupying Mecca, Medina, and al-Aqsa 
Mosques.' 
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UBL [June 1998] 
“Bin Ladin 
Congratulates 
Pakistan on 
Possession of 
Nuclear Weapons” 
170  'For the first time in Muslim history' a 
'Muslim nation' has acquired nuclear 
weapons.  
 
Indian 'occupation' of Muslim lands. 
UBL [June 1998] 
“In the Way of 
Allah” 
171  Criticism of Pakistani authorities for 
failing ot invite Afghanistan-based 
mujahideen to fight for the liberation of 
Jammu and Kashmir. Says emphasis 
should not be placed on internal Muslim-
China disagreements, since the main focus 
needs to be on the US - and thus China 
could be an asset in this regard. 
UBL [August 
1998] “Bin Ladin 
Calls for ‘Jihad’ 
against Jews, 
America” 
172  US bombings in Afghanistan in retaliation 
for East Africa attacks 
UBL [August 
1998] “The Battle 
Has Not Yet 
Started” 
173  References to US retaliation to Africa 
bombings through cruise missile attacks in 
Afghanistan. 
UBL [November 
1998] “Bin Ladin: 
Expel Jews, 
Christians, from 
Holy Places” 
175  'At this moment, Israel and United States 
are dominating Palestine and other holy 
places in such a way that Mujahidin are 
being killed and besieged and Muslims 
have been economically ruined' 
UBL [December 
1998] “Bin Ladin 
Denies Role in 
Bombings of US 
Missions” 
176  'I had no hand at all in the bombings in 
Kenya and Tanzania […] but I feel no 
sorrow over the blasts' 
UBL [January 
1999] “Wrath of 
God..” 
178  US and UK bombing of Iraq which shows 
they are acting on behalf of Israel, seeking 
to divide and rule the Middle East 
UBL [January 
1999] “Accused 
Terrorist Leader 
Usama Bin Ladin 
Declares War on 
All Americans” 
180  Occupation of Saudi Arabia, other Muslim 
lands, support for Israel 
AAZ [January 
1999] “Muslim 
Egypt between the 
Whips of the 
Torturers and the 
Administration of 
Traitors” 
116  Talks of the corruption of the Egyptian 
regime and their 'crimes' against Islam, this 
is manifest in four main categories: (1) 
constitutional - sovereignty not from God. 
Constitution anti-Shari'a and based on 
British values since they created it. (2) 
Foreign policy - Egypt following US and 
Jewish policies, complains about the close 
ties with the two, about US military being 
allowed to go through and be based in 
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Egypt, says America and Israel are spying 
together in Egypt to help Israel, complains 
about the peace treaty between Egypt and 
Israel. (3) Domestic affairs - the 
emergency law used to persecute Islamists 
and their families. Also complains about 
weak media, ineffective bureaucracy, 
election fraud, and government 
interference in student organisations. (4) 
Educational issues - complains about 
government control over all schooling and 
curricula, control over Islamic schools 
through Al-Azhar, and constraining of 
Mosque speakers who are not allowed to 
criticise the state or create unions. 
UBL [February 
1999] “Esquire 
interview with bin 
Ladin” 
179 On how the Afghan war 'cleared 
from Muslim minds the myth of 
superpowers' and the US 
involvement in Somalia 
convinced the 'Muslim youth' that 
America was a 'paper tiger'. On 
Somalia: "When this took place, I 
was in the Sudan, but this great 
defeat pleased me very much, the 
way it pleases all Muslims." . 
  
Accuses America of double 
standards in its outrage at civilian 
deaths in Saudi Arabia - when 
America dropped the atomic 
bombs in Japan. .. US soldiers 
fleeing Beirut and Somalia after 
being confronted. 
The American imposes himself on 
everyone. Americans accuse our children 
in Palestine of being terrorists--those 
children, who have no weapons and have 
not even reached maturity. At the same 
time, Americans defend a country, the state 
of the Jews, that has a policy to destroy the 
future of these children.' Talks of 
'shameful' US stance towards Palestine and 
the death of a million Iraqi children 
through US-lead sanctions on Iraq. 
UBL [February 
1999] May 1998 
interview reported 
182  Christian and Jewish occupation of Muslim 
Arab lands - primarily the land of the two 
holy places, with the Kaaba surrounded 
from four directions by American forces. .. 
 
Claims the Pakistani Peoples Party 
prevented UBL and fellow mujahideen 
from travelling to Kashmir to fight India. .. 
Talks of how America and the UN tried to 
divide Afghanistan after the war with 
Soviets 
AAZ [April 1999] 
“Letter to Abu 
Yasir” 
123 'The experience of Hassan al 
Banna with the Egyptian 
government is still fresh in our 
minds. His end came after he 
chose to praise the despots and 
declare peace. They killed him as 
a present to the King! [Banna was 
killed on King Faruq's orders, he 
was informed of the successful 
operation on his birthday]. If 
'I hesitated before writing to you, after 
hearing, in the media, about your 
announcement of end to military 
operations'. 'There are many frightening 
thoughts going through my mind at 
present. Did you all agree on this policy [of 
non violence]? What is the strategy vis-à-
vis the government? Have you reached an 
agreement with the authorities? If so, what 
are the details? Why wasn’t it publicised? 
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making agreements with the 
authorities was productive, the 
Brotherhood would’ve benefited 
before you. Instead, members are 
still being imprisoned across 
Egypt '. 
Is the accord secret in some parts or 
entirely? Would the secret be known to the 
government but concealed from [the rest of 
Islamic Jihad]? If an agreement has taken 
place, what is the government permitting 
you to do?'. 'Furthermore, why was the 
declaration issued? Why was it frank on 
the withdrawal from the “International 
Front” but silent on other issues? What is 
the position of Muntasir (al Zayyat, lawyer 
representing Islamic Jihad members in 
Egypt )? If an accord has been signed with 
the authorities, what are the implications 
for other militant movements? What are 
the facts regarding report alleging that 
Salah Hashim (One of Islamic Jihad’s 
founders and currently imprisoned in 
Egypt) has called for the formation of a 
new political party?'. 
UBL [June 1999] 
“Usama bin Ladin 
Pens Letter in 
Support of 
Kashmir Jihad” 
183  Insists Kashmir should be independent. 
Offers help against Indian aggression.  
 
Condemns King Fahd, whom he says is not 
worthy as custodian of the holy places. 
UBL [June 1999] 
“Usama bin Ladin, 
The Destruction of 
the Base” 
184 Refutes claims that the US was 
allied with the mujahideen against 
the Soviets. Claims he has always 
spoken out against them. Arab 
support for the mujahideen was 
due to their own self-interest in 
'protecting their thrones'. Talks 
about the 1987 assault on the 
Lion's Den camp, describes how 
the Afghan's fled early and praises 
his own efforts in standing his 
ground and defending the camp.  
 
Refutes claims he was behind the 
assassination of Abdallah Azzam 
as US-Israeli plot against him. 
Says there was no competition 
between them.  
 
On alleged US attempts to split up 
Afghanistan following the war, 
and collusion of the likes of 
Ahmad Shah Masoud. .. 
Condemnation of Arab leaders 
who 'betrayed' the 'cubs' of 
Palestine in their efforts against 
the Israelis (refers to peace 
treaties in Egypt).  
 
'Massacres committed in Sabra, 
Claims CIA ran plots to kill Somalis and 
partition Sudan in the Nairobi Embassy, 
thus it was a legitimate target. The 
Embassies was the 'greatest CIA centre in 
eastern Africa.' ..  
 
The latest attack on Iraq a few days ago 
was led by the United States and Britain.' 
US, however, did not react when Saddam 
was using weapons against the Kurds and 
Iran, they reacted now because Saddam has 
become a danger for Israel. In fact, it is 
America that used WMD to murderous 
effect against Japan. 'The Jews managed to 
employ the Christians -- the Americans 
and British -- to carry out the duty of 
attacking Iraq.' Similar attacks against 
Libya and Sudan are designed to curb the 
rise of Muslim states. 'Another implication 
of these incidents is that they emphasized 
clearly and explicitly that Muslims and all 
sensible people should not go to the United 
Nations.'. Taking cases to the UN is 
against Islamic law, but even if cases are 
taken, and judged in favour of the Muslims 
they are vetoed by the US. 
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Shatila, Dayr Yasin, Qana, 
Hebron, and elsewhere.' 
UBL [January 
2000] “Usama bin 
Ladin Denounces 
US-Sponsored 
‘World Order” 
187  US is trying to rule the world, but will not 
be successful. It, like the Soviet Union 
before it, will be split into 52 countries and 
fail. 
UBL [May 2000] 
“Usama Speaks on 
Hijra and the 
Islamic State” 
189  Occupation of the 'holiest sites of Islam' by 
Christians and Jews.  
 
'So the American troops today, Christians, 
Jews, crusaders, prostitutes, lesbians, 
homosexuals, atheists, all these people are 
walking in the holy land where Allah 
Ta'ala has chosen to reveal the Al-Qu'ran.' 
[note - not just grievance, also calsh of 
values].  
 
British: dismantled the Caliphate system, 
created the Palestine and Kashmir 
problems, embargoed Muslims in Bosnia, 
bombed Iraq. 
UBL [June 2000] 
“Usama bin Ladin 
Renews Calls for 
jihad” 
190  Occupation of holy lands and other 
Muslim places and plundering of resources 
UBL [September 
2000] “Bin Ladin, 
others pledge 
‘Jihad’ to release 
Prisoners..” 
191  'These heathens have spread their forces in 
Egypt, Yemen, and the Gulf killing our 
children, persecuting our scholars, soiling 
our holy shrines, and stealing our wealth' 
[AAZ] 
UBL [January 
2001] “Daily 
Prints Usama bin 
Ladin Letter 
Calling for Global 
Islamic State” 
192  US and Israeli occupation of holy lands 
Muhammad bin 
Ladin [January 
2001] video 
speech addressed 
to his father 
127  Clash of civilizations: 'Two lashkars, (The 
forces of West and Islam) have been pitted 
against one another. One lashkar is 
endowed with the teachings of Prophet 
Muhammad (PBUH) and is imbibed with a 
desire to be martyrs, while the second 
lashkar is manned and directed by a worn-
out, aged infidel leadership (kaisar). A 
confrontation is now bound to take place 
and the war clouds have truly engulfed 
both the lashkars'. 
UBL [March 
2001] “Ausaf 
receives Bin 
Ladin’s Poem..” 
193  Implied Americans bombed Afghanistan in 
order to harm Mullah Omar - 'the 
embodiment of Islamic respect' and the 
Taliban, killing children and elderly 
people.  
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Jews killing 'my brothers' the Palestinians 
UBL [March 
2001] 
poem/message 
194  References to Al-Aqsa intifada and praise 
for those taking part in it. Reference to 
USS Cole bombings reportedly in this 
context. 
UBL [April 2001] 
letter to scholars 
of Deyubende in 
Peshawar 
120  Killing of children through economic 
boycott and war, sanctioned by the UN and 
fought by the Crusader west and their 
Jewish clientele. References to an Islamic 
conference in Pakistan, and how previous 
such gatherings in the Arab world have 
failed. 
UBL [April 2001] 
“Usama regrets 
curbs by Taliban” 
195  Refers to Taliban destruction of Buddha 
statues in Bamiyan and fierce reaction in 
West to show US/West is against Taliban, 
not only UBL. 
UBL [April 2001] 
“Usama urges 
Muslims to help 
Afghans” 
196  On UN sanctions against the Taliban: 'I am 
delivering the message to you at a time 
when innocent young children in 
Afghanistan are the victims of the so-
called New World Order and the UN 
curbs. They are aimed at killing the 
Muslims," 
UBL [May 2001] 
“Usama urges 
Ummah to 
continue Jihad” 
197  The Martyrs will liberate the Masjid-e-
Aqsa.  
 
The Palestinian struggle and their lack of 
weaponry. 
UBL [May 2001] 
“IF Taleban allow, 
I can make US life 
miserable” 
198  US imposed sanctions harming Muslim 
interests and lives. 
UBL [may 2001] 
“Bin Ladin sends 
voice message to 
Palestinian 
People..” 
199  Plight of Palestinians 
UBL [September 
2001]  “Bin Ladin: 
from rich kid to 
terrorist..” 
181 'American history does not 
distinguish between civilian and 
military'. 'Almost three-quarters of 
the American people support 
Clinton's strikes on Iraq. They are 
a people whose President 
becomes more popular when he 
kills innocent people. They are 
lowly people who do not 
understand the meaning of 
principles."' 
 
UBL [September 
2001] “Text of bin 
Ladin letter to the 
201  Talks of and mourns the death of 
Pakistanis in Karachi who appear to have 
died whilst 'defending Islam'. 
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Pakistani People” 
UBL [September 
2001] “The US 
Should search 
attackers within 
itself” 
202  Not responsible for 9/11 - the attacks might 
have been perpetrated by someone within 
the 'America system', Jews, or the 
intelligence agencies in a bid to secure 
more funding, or due to some conspiracy 
seeking to cause war between Muslims and 
the West. 
UBL [October 
2001] “Tayseer 
Allouni interviews 
bin Ladin in 
Afghanistan” 
130  Argues America is attacking Afghanistan 
not because of the presence of himself or 
AQ in the country but because they want to 
prevent the establishment of the Islamic 
State.  
 
"we are being attacked in Palestine, Iraq, 
Lebanon, Sudan, Somalia, Kashmir, the 
Philippines and everywhere else." When 
challenged on the issue of Palestine, and 
why he is focusing more on this now rather 
than the Arabian Peninsula, which was the 
main focus before: "Sometimes we find the 
right elements to push for one cause more 
than the other", the Intifada meant a 
refocus on the Palestinian issue could be 
made.  
 
On the million child deaths in Iraq, and 
how these are not seen as innocent as those 
in the West are seen as innocent. [some 
limited discrimination still there]. … "We 
are in a decisive battle with the Jews and 
those who support them from the crusaders 
and the Zionists", sees this as a clash of 
civilizations. 
UBL [November 
2001] “Bin Ladin 
condemns the US” 
77 Partitioning of Palestine and role 
of the UN. 
On the clash of civilizations: The way in 
which the West was saddened by the 9/11 
attacks but happy at the invasion into 
Afghanistan, and how the Muslim world 
was happy America was struck and angry 
that Afghanistan was attacked. 'This war is 
fundamentally religious. The people of the 
East are Muslims. They sympathized with 
Muslims against the people of the West, 
who are the crusaders'. 'But when the 
victim starts to take revenge for those 
innocent children in Palestine, Iraq, 
southern Sudan, Somalia, Kashmir and the 
Philippines, the rulers’ ‘ulama’ and the 
hypocrites come to defend the clear 
blasphemy. It suffices me to seek God’s 
help against them.'. 'Take for example the 
Chechens. They are a Muslim people who 
have been attacked by the Russian bear 
which embraces the Christian Orthodox 
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faith'. And on the Muslims killed in Bosnia 
in the 'UN safe havens'. 50 years of killings 
in Kashmir. Genocide in Chechnya, and 
the West and the UN do nothing to help. 
Indonesia suffered being split up by the 
UN when it was coerced into giving 
independence to East Timor. Somalia: 'In 
Somalia, on the excuse of restoring hope, 
13,000 of our brothers were killed' 
 
The killing of a million children in Iraq 
and the ongoing trauma in Palestine. 
UBL [November 
2001] “Al-Jazirah 
carries bin Ladin’s 
address..” 
203  The Palestinians have suffered vioence and 
oppression, but the world does not 
condemn this. The same for bombing of 
Japan [in WWII], atrocities against the 
Iraqis - and yet the infidels and hypocrites 
all mourn the 9/11 attacks. 
UBL [November 
2001] Osama 
claims he has 
nukes (article title) 
125  'Right now a great war of Islamic history is 
being fought in Afghanistan. All the big 
powers are united against Muslims'. 
AAZ [December 
2001] “Knights 
under the 
Prophet’s Banner” 
119 'It is an irony of fate that 
Pakistan's secular government 
expelled to an unknown 
destination the very persons who 
had defended its borders'..  
 
The truth that everyone should 
learn is that the United States did 
not give one penny in aid to the 
mujahidin'. . Imprisonment and 
torture of Islamists in Egypt.  
 
Afghanistan: 'While the United 
States backed Pakistan and the 
mujahidin factions with money 
and equipment, the young Arab 
mujahidin's relationship with the 
United States was totally 
different'. But says it preposterous 
that bin Laden was allied to 
America. ' "For this reason [the 
successful jihad in Afghanistan] 
the United States was alert to this 
danger in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Its 
primary condition to implement 
the Dayton agreement was to 
expel all the Arab mujahidin from 
Bosnia-Herzegovina." The Arabs 
in Afghanistan had changed it 
from a local conflict to a global 
one.  
 
'An analysis of the political situation in 
Egypt would reveal that Egypt is 
struggling between two powers: An official 
power and a popular power that has its 
roots deeply established in the ground, 
which is the Islamic movement in general 
and the solid jihad nucleus in particular  
 
The first power is supported by the United 
States, the west, Israel, and most of the 
Arab rulers. The second power depends on 
God alone then on its wide popularity 
[importance of reaching the masses] and 
alliance with other jihad movements 
throughout the Islamic nation, from 
Chechnya in the north to Somalia in the 
south and from Eastern Turkestan in the 
east to Morocco in the west'.  
 
On the pivotal importance of Palestine in 
mobilising the Muslim masses: 'The fact 
that must be acknowledged is that the issue 
of Palestine is the cause that has been 
firing up the feelings of the Muslim nation 
from Morocco to Indonesia for the past 50 
years. In addition, it is a rallying point for 
all the Arabs, be they believers or non-
believers, good or evil'. 
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' Thus this nucleus, which the 
writer of this book joined, was 
formed in the shape of the Al-
Jihad Organization. Events added 
another serious factor that 
affected the march of the jihad 
movement in Egypt, namely, the 
1967 setback. The symbol Jamal 
Abd-al-Nasir--whose followers 
tried to depict to the people as the 
immortal and invincible leader--
fell' . Details British incursions 
into Egypt in the late 19th century 
and its quest for increased control 
over the region, its support for the 
creation of a Jewish state, 'Britain 
the famous Sykes-Picot 
Agreement, which blew the hopes 
of Britain's Arab allies up in the 
air along with the words of 
honour guaranteed by the British 
Crown'.  
 
The FIS in Algeria found out the 
hard way that democratic 
initiatives are useless in dealing 
with apostates - the values of the 
west refer to them only, the only 
way forward is jihad.  
 
UBL [December 
2001] “The Fact of 
the Conflict 
between us and 
America” 
129 America ceased helping the 
Afghan fighters after they turned 
their attention to aiding the 
Palestinians in their hardship.  
 
Bush snr. responsible for more 
than a million deaths of Iraqi 
children. 
"It has become crystal clear that the West 
in general, and the US in particular, 
harbour an implacable, incredible Crusader 
hatred against Islam" this made evident by 
the airstrikes in Afghanistan. This results 
in suffering of people in villages in 
Afghanistan who did nothing wrong. 
Seems to complain that the West would not 
have reacted in the same way if a European 
actor, e.g. the IRA had been responsible. 
There is no evidence to implicate the Arab 
mujahideen in Afghanistan.  
 
Palestine today sees the "deliberate murder 
of children". Killing of Mohammad al-
Durra. America continues to aid these 
"attackers of our sons in Palestine" (Israel).  
 
"And America is participating [in] this 
vicious terrorism [of killing women and 
children] in its most abhorrent form in 
Palestine and in Iraq".  
 
"Arrogant nations who do not know the 
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meaning of 'freedom' unless it applies to 
the white race"  
UBL [March 
2002] “Usama bin 
Ladin: Prince 
Abdallah’s 
initiative is High 
Treason” 
205 'By announcing it, he [Prince 
Abdullah] is following in the 
footsteps of his father who 
aborted the intifadah of 
1936/1354 Hegira with a false 
promise made by him and the 
English Government. He deceived 
the Palestinians and they stopped 
the intifadah while the English 
occupation remained until 
1948/1366 Hegira when it handed 
Palestine over to the Jews. He is 
also following in the footsteps of 
his ilk, the traitorous rulers who 
sent the seven armies under an 
English command, the command 
of the English Government's man 
(Glubb Pasha), and crushed the 
serious popular action to liberate 
Palestine. They completed the 
conspiracy and signed a truce to 
stop the fighting in 1949/1367 
Hegira. Their biggest treason to 
crush the first Al-Aqsa intifadah, 
however, was Oslo in 1992/1412 
Hegira."' He also defamed the 
Two holy places by inviting the 
Americans to stay in the country. 
Saudi initiatives to make peace with Israel 
'destroy the serious popular move to 
liberate Palestine." 
UBL [April 2002] 
“MBC Carries 
video of Bin 
Ladin” 
206  Suffering of Palestinians, Chechens and 
other Muslims which called for response. 
UBL [May 2002] 
“British-based 
Islamic news 
agency receives 
encrypted bin 
Ladin video” 
209 Crusades 'This war [in Afghanistan] is similar to the 
previous crusades, led by Richard the 
Lion-Heart, [King Frederick] Barbarossa 
of Germany and Louis [IX] of France. In 
the present age, they rally behind [George] 
Bush.' 
UBL [purported] 
[June 2002] “Al-
Qaeda’s 
declaration in 
response to the 
Saudi Ulema..” 
43 Crusades, launched by the 
European church. British, French, 
Belgian and Italian colonization. 
'Slaughter befalling Muslims in Palestine, 
Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines, 
Indonesia, Chechnya, Eritrea, Kashmir, 
[...] Gujarat.' 
UBL [June 2002] 
“A Site Close to 
Al-Qa’ida posts 
Poem..: 
210 UBL's ongoing struggle and 
nomadic lifestyle 
'Security has gone, but danger remains. It 
is a wor[l]d of crimes in which children are 
slaughtered like cows.' 
AAZ [September 
2002] “The 
Interview of Dr 
22 'Here in Afghanistan, the course 
of history of the Soviet Union, the 
largest land-based military force 
The Americans are losing in Afghanistan - 
the government is extremely weak and out 
of touch and relies on American air support 
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Ayman Al 
Zawahiri” 
in the world, was dashed to pieces 
on the boulders of the Afghan 
jihad'.  
 
'The defeated Soviet Union fled 
from Afghanistan, turning their 
back only to face their own 
political break-up and intellectual 
collapse. This is the fate that 
awaits America in Afghanistan, 
by the permission of Allah   
 
If the mujahideen had allowed 
themselves to be affected by the 
voices of concern saying that the 
enemy was too strong - 'then the 
Soviet forces would today be in 
the Arabian Peninsula' and 'Israeli 
tanks would today be in Medina, 
Cairo and Damascus in realization 
of the goal of Greater Israel'. .. 
9/11 a complete success. Shows 
how few people can successfully 
attack America. America has not 
achieved its goals in Afghanistan, 
the puppet regime does not trust 
its own people. Al-Qaeda and the 
Taliban enjoy much popular 
support. 
and military, the US military also rely on 
'mercenaries and bandits'. The Americans 
are bogged down in a guerrilla war in the 
mountains, where the Soviets - despite 
their greater numbers and Communist 
dictatorship, were defeated. So the same 
will happen to America  
 
´The whole world is witness to the 
Guantanamo Bay masquerade and the 
comedy of hundred's detained without any 
charge or court hearing in America'  
 
The US strategy in Iraq: the US aims to 
destroy any effective military in proximity 
to Israel, then consolidate its supremacy in 
the region. After Iraq, the US seeks to 
invade other Muslim countries including 
Iran and Pakistan and destroying nuclear 
weapons' programmes, enhancing Israeli 
supremacy. Then it seeks to split the Arab 
world into small states incapable of 
protecting themselves - Iraq will be 
divided into three. Egypt will be split into a 
Coptic state and Muslim state. Saudi 
Arabia will be split, with the US seeking 
full control over the oil reserves.  
 
Rumsfeld's announcement that troops will 
have to remain in Afghanistan and that 
victory is a long way off shows the US is 
failing. US admits it could face another 
terrorist attack any time. 
UBL [October 
2002] “Statement 
from shaykh 
Usama bin Ladin, 
may God protect 
him, and the Al-
Qa’ida 
Organization” 
211  'The US Crusade that the US President has 
declared and in which he led a coalition of 
more than 90 countries against Afghanistan 
began on these days one year ago.' .. Now 
the US is preparing to invade Iraq, 'to 
complete its scheme of fragmenting and 
ripping apart this nation, looting its 
resources and wealth, and preparing for the 
establishment of the greater State of Israel 
after expelling the Palestinians from it.' .. 
 
 The US has failed in all its objectives in 
Afghanistan; in securing AQ and Taliban 
leaders and securing the country. It is now 
split between warlords, and US committed 
many war crimes against unarmed and 
women, children and elderly. And the 
opium trade is blooming like never before. 
The US is trying to cover up its failure in 
Afghanistan by invading Iraq. 
UBL [October 212 'Palestine is a place that has been 'You attacked us is Somalia. You have 
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2002] “Letter from 
Usama bin 
Mohammed bin 
Ladin to the 
American People” 
suffering from military occupation 
for more than 80 years. The 
British handed over Palestine, 
with your help and your support, 
to the Jews who have occupied it 
for more than 50 years. The Jews 
attacked the Palestinians 
viciously, sparing no method, 
including killings, crimes, 
punishments and destruction. The 
creation, nurturing, and protection 
of Israel is a great crime and you 
[America] are the leaders of this 
crime.' 
been silent towards, and at times even 
encouraged Russian atrocities against us in 
Chechnya. You have clearly supported 
Indian butchery against us in Kashmir, and 
the world has been witness to your 
relentless assistance to several Jewish 
attacks, including killing us in Lebanon.' 
'Under your [US] supervision and 
instructions, your agent countries continue 
to attack us and hunt us on a daily basis' 
preventing the establishment of Shariah, 
stealing Muslim wealth, oppressing the 
people, submitting to Israel etc. ..  
 
'Your forces occupy our lands spreading 
your ideology and thereby polluting the 
hearts of our people. You have laid siege 
on our holy places, mocking the sanctity of 
our mosques. You have done all of this to 
protect the Jews and safeguard your pillage 
of our treasures.'. US 'starving' people of 
Iraq. US helping Israel secure Jerusalem as 
its capital and destroying the Al-Aqsa 
mosque.  
 
On alleged US double standards: they 
perceive one set of legal codes for them 
selves and do not apply these to others - 
Democracy is not for Algeria, nuclear 
weapons are allowed for Israel, it does not 
respect UN resolutions even though it uses 
force pretending to act in their name, US 
searches for war criminals whilst 
protecting its own, US pretends to be 
vanguard of Human Rights - yet after 9/11 
takes active part in such abuses. 
UBL [November 
2002]  “Osama bin 
Laden hails recent 
operations..” 
76 Australia fighting in Afghanistan, 
East Timor. 
Killing of children in Palestine, Iraq. 
People killed in mosques of Khost. People 
killed in a wedding reception in 
Afghanistan. People being killed in 
Chechnya. 
UBL [November 
2002] “Statement 
from Abdullah 
Usama bin Ladin 
to the Peoples of 
countries Allied to 
Tyrannical US 
Government” 
214 Rumsfeld's legacy of killing in 
Vietnam. 
Killings of Muslims in mosques in 
Afghanistan and wedding parties, in 
Palestine, in Iraq. 
UBL [November 
2002] “Bin Ladin 
in a special 
message to the 
people of the 
215  The 'bitter reality and of the conspiracies 
and terrible disasters being hatched 
between the corridors of the crusaders and 
Jews in Congress and the so-called 
"Security Council" and with which they 
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Peninsula..” will strike, starting in the Middle East with 
a strike on Iraq.' 
AAZ [December 
2002] “Al Wala 
Wa al Baraa..” 
45  'What we see today: a state of absolute 
submission to the Neo-Crusaders. Palestine 
is torn asunder and demolished, its children 
slaughtered every day - yet its Arab 
neighbours respond with either silence or 
connivance. Iraq is victim to one campaign 
after another, in order to slay its Muslim 
populace, divide the land, and pillage its 
oil' and the Arab leaders support, 
'Afghanistan is victimized by the 
Crusading forces', again with acquiescence 
from its neighbours. The Crusader forces 
aim to go on from Iraq and divide and 
plunder Saudi Arabia and Egypt and other 
Muslim lands].  
 
The Crusade, emanating from the West has 
sought to 'erase the lines between Truth 
and Falsehood, and to mix enemies and 
allies. 'Thus, we saw the noblest of 
dynasties placing itself in the service of 
American interests while claiming to 
defend monotheism; we saw impious 
imams imposing secular constitutions' etc. 
UBL [February 
2003] audio 
statement 
78 Sykes-Picot agreement, which 
'lead to the division of the Islamic 
World'.  
 
Americans have been trying to get 
control over Saudi Arabia, ever 
since the British lost their 
influence 60 years ago.  
 
Crown Prince Abdullah's Beirut 
summit, 'in which he sold the 
blood of our martyrs an the 
Palestinian cause'. 
'This is a time when blood of the Muslims 
continues to flow in Palestine and 
Chechnya, in the Philippines, Kashmir, and 
Sudan and when our children are dying 
because of the American sanctions on 
Iraq'. Bush & Blair have drafted a new 
Sykes-Picot agreement, aiming to 'finish 
Islam and destroy it' under the banner of 
fighting terrorism. Attacking Iraq will just 
be a continuation of attacks against Egypt, 
Syria, Iran and Sudan [note Iran - Shia]. 
The real intention is to Conquer the land of 
the Two Holy Mosques. With this military 
build-up, America and Britain attempt to 
seize this 'strategic target of immense 
significance'.  
 
The Crusade also aims to establish 'a huge 
Jewish super state', where the suffering is 
going to be multiple of that suffered in 
Palestine today. 
UBL [February 
2003] “A Message 
to our Brothers in 
Iraq”  
79  Crusader preparations to invade Iraq, 
plunder its wealth, install a loyal agent 
government, and prepare for the 
establishment of greater Israel. 
UBL [April 2003] 
“Usama bin LAdin 
urges Muslims to 
217  After Iraq, the US will target Iran, Saudi 
Arabia, Egypt, and Sudan  
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launch suicide 
attacks against 
US” 
UBL [May 2003] 
report on 
statement 
219  Deaths of Saudi extremist clerics Shaykh 
Ali al-Khudayr and Shaykh Ahmad al-
Khalidi at the hand of Saudi security forces 
UBL [July 2003] 
letter 
220  May 2003 Riyadh bombings 
AAZ [August 
2003] audio 
statement  
55  References to the Guantanamo camp and 
the decision to start military tribunals 
which could lead to a death sentence. 
AAZ [September 
2003] “Message to 
the Muslims in 
Pakistan and 
Afghanistan” 
56  'The effective Israeli-Indian co-operation 
in the security, military, and other fields is 
no secret to anyone. The visit by criminal 
Jew [Israeli Prime Minister Ariel] Sharon - 
the killer of thousands of Muslims and the 
one who encroached on the sanctity of the 
al-Aqsa Mosque - to India, as well as the 
agreements and deals he concluded with 
the Indians, are only the tip of the iceberg. 
This US-Jewish-Indian alliance is against 
Muslims. This alliance, which is getting 
stronger, calls on the Pakistanis to 
recognise Israel so that the United States 
and Israel will be pleased with them.' 
UBL [October 
2003] “Second 
letter to the 
Muslims of Iraq” 
98 'The "Road Map" is just another 
episode in the series of plots 
aimed at liquidating the intifada'. 
'Bush thought Iraq and its oil would be 
easy pray, but now he is in a difficult 
situation'. 
UBL [January 
2004] “Resist the 
New Rome” 
111 Arab governments are incapable 
of defending Islam, as seen with 
the Iraq invasion of 1991.  
 
Describes how the Spanish 
economy grew under Muslim rule, 
and is now larger that all those of 
the failed Arab states today  
The occupation of the 'house of the 
Caliphate' in Iraq, the Road Map and 
Geneva peace initiative, seen as an attack 
on Jihad in Palestine and an attempt to 
'destroy the al-Aqsa mosque'. Condemns 
American attempts to 'change the beliefs, 
curricula, and morals of the Muslims to 
become more tolerant, as they put it'. This 
is all part of a 'religious-economic' war 
against Muslims. The war in Iraq is to 
spread to occupation of the entire Gulf 
region. 'The West's occupation of our 
countries is old, yet new. The struggle 
between us and them, the confrontation, 
and clashing began centuries ago, and will 
continue because the ground rules 
regarding the fight between right and 
falsehood will remain valid until Judgment 
Day'.  
 
References to the Sharm al-Shaykh summit 
in 1996, the Arab initiative in the Beirut 
summit, and the road map. 'It has become 
clear that the rulers are not qualified to 
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apply the religion and defend the Muslims'. 
AAZ [February 
2004] audio 
statement 
58  “The latest decision by the French 
president to create a law preventing 
Muslim girls from covering their heads in 
schools is […] consistent with the burning 
of villages along with their people in 
Afghanistan, demolishing houses over their 
sleeping residents in Palestine, killing the 
children of Iraq, and [consistent with] the 
right that the United States granted itself to 
kill any human being or arrest anyone 
anywhere.” 
UBL [April 2004] 
Peace offering to 
Europeans 
80 Sabra and Shatilla. Shaikh Ahmed 
Yassin assassination. 
 
UBL [May 2004] 
“People of Iraq” 
82 The role of the UN: 'handed 
Palestine over to the Jews', 
'separated Eastern Timor', 
'justified the sanctioning of Iraq 
and killing more then a million 
Children'. 
Events of Iraq that need to be addressed: 
(1) the 'appalling and alarming event' when 
Bremer declared Islam would not be the 
source of all legislation. This shows that 
the Iraqi governing council is a tool in the 
hands of Americans. It also shows that the 
conflict is 'a dogmatic, religious and 
cultural one', their aim is to 'overcome 
Islam' in the region. (2) The promise of 
transferring power to Iraqis is only a trick 
to numb them. (3) In identifying Iraq as a 
front for fighting terrorism, Bush has 
identified Iraq as the focus point of his war 
against Islam, and Muslims need to 
respond. America is planning to implement 
its plan from Iraq of 'removing religion, 
plundering resources, murdering men, 
frightening and aggression against women 
in their homes in the middle of the night' in 
the entire Islamic world. 
UBL [October 
2004] Threat of 
the US 
31 How UBL got the idea for 9/11: 
the American support for Israel 
attacking the Palestinians said to 
have been the main reason, 
especially the 1982 invasion into 
Lebanon. 'When the US permitted 
the Israelis to invade' through the 
presence of the sixth fleet and 
coastal shelling. 'I still remember 
those moving scenes – blood, torn 
limbs, and dead women and 
children; ruined homes 
everywhere, and high-rises being 
demolished on top of their 
residents; bombs raining down 
mercilessly on our homes'. 'As I 
was looking at those destroyed 
towers in Lebanon, I was struck 
by the idea of punishing the 
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oppressor in the same manner and 
destroying towers in the U.S'.  
 
On Iraqi sanctions 'causing the 
slaughter of children', and the 03 
Iraq war. 9/11 is a response to all 
these things. The Americans 
received plenty of warnings about 
this intention through interviews 
and 'deeds' (attacks). 'it was easy 
for us to provoke this 
administration and to drag it [after 
us]'. 
UBL [October 
2004] “Message to 
Americans” 
83 'embargoing to death of millions 
as Bush Sr did in Iraq in the 
greatest mass slaughter of 
children mankind has ever 
known', 'throwing of millions of 
pounds of bombs and explosives 
at millions of children - also in 
Iraq - as Bush Jr did'. Describes 
how Bush Sr got to know 
dictatorship and monarchies and 
military regimes in the Middle 
East and took similar governing 
methods to his son, implemented 
in the Patriot Act. The 'election 
fraud' of 2000 or the placement of 
his other son as governor in 
Florida. 
 
UBL [December 
2004] “Message 
concerning Saudi 
Arabia” 
84 About Abd-al-Aziz's [father of the 
King] collaboration with the 
English against the Ottoman state.  
 
The al-Yamamah deal $ 30 billion 
dollar defence contract.  
 
The killing of a million Children 
in Iraq, 'the most horrific 
massacre of children in history' 
and yet the scholars were silent 
and did not protest (although they 
did later at the killing of a single 
Crusader soldier). On the Saudi 
government's support for Arafat, 
the Sharm-el-Sheikh conference 
of 1996 supporting the Jews, 
offering of military bases for Iraq 
invasion, training of Iraqi police 
to fight the mujahideen, and the 
Beirut initiative recognising the 
Zionists. 
On feuds between the rulers of Riyadh and 
the citizens of the homeland, much talk 'on 
the need for security and safety and the 
inadmissibility to shed blood of Muslims 
and those [foreign] whose security has 
been guaranteed [by the state]'. 'The sins 
committed by the regime are very huge. 
The regime went beyond committing 
mortal sins to deeds that lead to one 
becoming non-Muslim. It went beyond 
oppressing people, undermining their 
rights, showing disregard for their dignity, 
making light of their minds and feelings, 
and tampering with the nation's public 
funds'. 'The regime supported the infidel 
America against Muslims'. 'It is known that 
this is one of the 10 things that lead to one 
becoming non-Muslim'.  
 
The reason for the friction: 'Looking at the 
internal policies of our countries, we see 
the level of Crusader-Zionist control over 
them'. The king's 'reign has not only fallen 
according to the Sharia by committing acts 
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incompatible with Islam, but his reign has 
also fallen for his incompetence and losing 
the necessary mental ability to manage the 
simplest of matters'. The succession of 
leaders in the ME depends on the whims of 
America. Its power and influence is even 
evident in the educational curriculum's, in 
Egypt, Yemen and elsewhere in addition to 
SA in the 1980s, reducing the emphasis on 
religion. This will create 'educated slaves 
who are champions of America'. This 
treachery can also be seen in the leaders' 
approach to foreign policy, which hasn't 
changed for generations. The government 
in Riyadh has been taking part in the 
conspiracies with America in Afghanistan 
and Iraq.  
 
On regime change: 'True Saddam is a thief 
and a renegade, yet the solution can never 
be taking Iraq from the hands of the local 
thief to hand it over to the international 
thief'. The Saudi regime knew about the 
invasion plans and cooperated with the 
Americans, allowing to happen. Explains 
how repeated attempts to point these 'grand 
deviations' to the govt over the past 
decades have brought no results'.  
 
On the lavish life style of the Saudi regime, 
and the huge amount of money they spend 
on their palaces. 
UBL [December 
2004] audio 
statement 
86 References to the Badr Battle and 
how the conflict in Iraq is as 
important as Iraq. 
No difference between Saddam's massacre 
in al-Halabjah and 'Bush's massacre in al-
Fallujah', this is an 'all-out war against 
Islam and Muslims'. References Chirac and 
Kissinger talking about the danger of Iraq 
becoming a debacle. Bush said "we 
transferred the war to their territory"? 
Since when has Iraq been the home of al-
Qaeda? It is the land of all Muslims'. On 
how the US administration seeks to spread 
Christianity in the region.  
 
Mentions US bombing campaigns 
involving civilian casualties (deliberately 
he claims) including the wife of Zawahiri, 
daughter and son. On the killing of 
innocents by Sharon and Bush. 
AAZ [February 
2005] “The 
Freeing of 
Humanity..” 
109 Secular Europe introduced 
freedom and removed the church 
from ruling, because it had a 
church which gave itself 
infallibility, the right to speak on 
Israel is only a stepping-stone for America 
and the West in their Crusade to take over 
Muslim lands. The issue of Palestine is 
therefore not only for the Palestinians but 
concerns all Muslims and the land of 
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Allah's behalf, invented a trinity, 
gave kings divine rule, sold 
people stamps for forgiveness etc. 
Muslims. Arrogance and stupidity lead 
America to invade Afghanistan and Iraq 
and it is now facing the consequences with 
heavy losses and only defeat in sight. The 
Americans are trying to reduce the hostility 
of Muslims through changing their beliefs 
and feelings, hoping they will adopt 
freedom. But this will not allow Muslims 
to teach what they want to teach, rid the 
Muslim lands of American presence, 
remove Israel or have same right to 
weapons as it has, or price oil as they see 
fit. 'it means permitting disengaging moral 
behaviour, the permitting of everything, 
perverse sexual behaviour and making fun 
of religion, the prophets and manners'. 
'Agreements to them [Americans] are 
nothing but a means of deceiving the 
enemy and lure him; there is no relation 
between it and honesty, loyalty and 
honour'. The move for Western freedom is 
a trick to convince Muslims to abandon 
shari'a and the application of God's law on 
earth in favour of man-made laws. This, 
therefore, constitutes an attack on Islam. 
AAZ [June 2005] 
video statement 
72 Mubarak torturing and 
kidnapping, e.g. of ladies at 
Shubra al-Khayma. 
America is seeking to create a new 
'American Islam without Jihad or 
resistance or the order of virtue and 
prevention of vice'. 'The insurmountable 
obstacle that prevents any reforms in our 
countries is simply, the Zionist and 
crusader control of our Muslim countries 
with the help of the agent rulers'.  
 
Mubarak aiming to put his son in place. 
AAZ [August 
2005] interview 
128  Compares Iraq to Vietnam. Condoleeza 
Rice's visit to Egypt. 
AAZ [November 
2005] “Wills of 
the Knights of the 
London Raids” 
53 'After long centuries of taking the 
battle to our soil and after his 
hordes and armed forces occupied 
our lands in Chechnya, 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Palestine, 
and after centuries of his 
occupying our land while 
enjoying security at home'. 
 
AAZ [December 
2005] “The 
Victory of the 
Islamic Religion 
in Iraq” 
26 Algerian elections stolen from the 
FIS which gained 80% of the 
seats. 
Bush is being defeated in Iraq, Afghanistan 
and Pakistan and Palestine. The use of 
phosphorus in Fallujah. Secret prisons for 
interrogating and torturing Muslims. 
America protested over elections in the 
Ukraine and Venezuela but turns a blind 
eye to fraudulent presidential and 
parliamentary polls in Egypt. America took 
part in rigging those elections.  
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Noted how nuclear weapons are forbidden 
for Muslims according to Crusader nations. 
AAZ [December 
2005] interview 
49 British 'historic crime' in 
establishing Israel. 
The Americans are losing in their crusader 
campaign: Kabul and the north are in 
chaos, the elections were a masquerade, 
theatrics, talks of how the ballot boxes 
were carted around for 15 days and 
generally how the elections were botched 
[this emphasis is interesting given the 
hostility towards democracy]. The UN 
showed double standards in criticising the 
Zimbabwe elections, but not the Afghan 
ones. The double standards of the UN were 
also reviled as it 'whines' about Darfur, but 
was silent about the death of a million Iraqi 
children, partly because the siege benefited 
the Annan family. The UN has also stayed 
silent on the issue of Guantanamo, Abu 
Ghraib and Baghram, where al-Qaeda and 
the Taliban are treated worse then animals. 
Were it not for the assistance of the 
Pakistani military, the Americans would 
already have lost. .. 
 
As for Iraq, elections were again 
ridiculous, boycotted by half the people 
and with US forces eradicating opposition. 
But the UN again sent its congratulations. 
AAZ [December 
2005] “Obstacles 
to Jihad” 
25 When Islambouli and his men 
attacked Sadat - a politician who 
most political forces detested - he 
received no support in the 
community in Egypt. The same 
for mujahideen in Arabia rising up 
against the House of Saud.  
 
'The Muslim Ummah was lowly, 
humiliated, subjugated, plundered, 
divided and victimized, and then 
the raids on New York and 
Washington came to awaken in it 
hope, and show it its latent 
powers'. 
 
UBL [January 
2006] Bin Ladin 
truce offer to 
Americans 
50  'My message to you is about the war in 
Iraq and Afghanistan and the way to end it'  
 
'Our situation, by Allah's grace, is only 
getting better and better'. Goes on to 
explain how soldiers face immense 
dilemmas since going on patrol will be 
killed and maimed by mines, or see the 
same happen to their colleagues, whereas if 
they refuse to fight they will be punished 
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'by the "butcher of Vietnam"'. Faced by 
this 'extreme psychological pressure' and 
receiving no support from home, the 
soldier has no option but to commit 
suicide. Refers to the torture of people in 
Iraq and mentions human rights reports.  
 
Success: 'Iraq has become a point of 
attraction and restorer of [our] energies'. 
AAZ [January 
2006] Zawahiri 
presents poem 
29 Remembers Abu Hafs al-Masri, 
Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri, Isam al-
Qamari, Khalid al-Islambouli, and 
Yahya Hashim. 
 
AAZ [January 
2006] “Bajawr 
Massacre and the 
Lies of the 
Crusaders" 
51  The killing of 18 civilians in the FATA 
AAZ [March 
2006] “The 
Alternative is 
Da’wa and Jihad” 
73 'Have we forgotten Salman 
Rushdie and his insults against the 
Prophet [...]?' who was welcomed 
everywhere in the West, even the 
White House.  
 
The 'repeated American insults 
against the Holy Koran'. Torture 
of Wafa Qustantin and her sisters 
at monasteries. 
The al-Salam ferry incident shows the 
impact of the corruption of the 'agent 
government' in Egypt, imposed on the 
people by America. 'The Crusader grudge 
against Islam': seen again with the insults 
against the prophet, ongoing [cartoons], 
without apology. At the same time no one 
can doubt the Holocaust and insult 
homosexuals since they will be punished. 
In stead of the Prophet and Jesus, the Nazi 
holocaust and homosexuality have become 
holy. In France there is a law which bans 
questioning the holocaust, but still Muslim 
females are banned from wearing the 
headscarf in school and fathers are banned 
from preventing their adultery. In England 
a law was introduced banning glorification 
of terrorism, but insulting the Prophet is 
not prohibited. In Italy a minister even 
wore a shirt with the 'criminal cartoons 
printed on it'.  
 
The hypocrisy of the West: 'what is lawful 
to them is prohibited for others' - regarding 
bombing targets, storming religious places, 
fighting tyranny (they prop up the regimes 
of al-Saud, Musharraf, Mubarak, Abdallah 
Hussein, and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali), 
respecting human rights (whilst 
establishing secret prisons), democracy 
(but opposing it e.g. in Egypt, Palestine) - 
this can be seen e.g. in Bush's State of the 
Union address. 
AAZ [April 2006] 
“Four Years since 
the Battle of Tora 
238 Marking the fourth anniversary of 
the Tora Bora battle: where 
America used tons of bombs but 
'America has been watching Islamic 
charity work, harassing it, and limiting its 
activities'.  
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Bora” dared not enter on foot. 'They 
resorted to their familiar approach 
of assembling hypocrites and 
bandits, in addition to the aerial 
bombardment'. The Americans 
claimed 200 enemy kills, but in 
fact only 30 mujahideen died. 
'The American soldiers do not 
fight for a faith, do not trust their 
leaders, and do not die for a 
principle'.  
 
The peoples of the West followed 
Pope Urban II who falsely 
claimed Muslims were pagans, 
and opened a Crusade against 
them. Now, Bush and Blair are 
using the same methods of 
deception. 
 
On the people of the West: 'I had not 
imagined that they feared the word "why" 
so much [...] why they were attacked in 
New York and Washington, why they 
failed in Afghanistan, why they stumbled 
in Iraq, why their leaders are leading them 
like sheep to the slaughter house, why the 
oppressed of the world hate them so much, 
and why the Muslims bear such an 
animosity toward them'. Why the security 
services have failed, policies brought 
disasters etc. The WMD scandal in Iraq, 
and the link between the Ba'thist regime 
and AQ. 'Because the peoples of the West 
hate, detest, and run away from the word 
"why", they will end up in utter failure and 
complete defeat, God willing. By allowing 
themselves to be fooled by lies and 
illusions they will destroy themselves, ruin 
their countries and lead their economies to 
bankruptcy'. [see further - 20]. The people 
of the West 'acting like brainless herds'.  
 
Mubarak is still in his place after '25 years 
of crimes and corruption', 'Abdallah Bin-
Abd-Al-Aziz is still in place after the death 
of his brother', 'oil continues to be stolen', 
'Israel continues to enjoy military 
supremacy'. America pretending to be 
protector of freedoms whilst it exports 
prisoners to Jordan, Egypt and Saudi 'for 
torture by proxy'.  
 
'I was very surprised by the reactions in the 
Western press and media to our demand to 
the West to leave our countries and to stop 
stealing out wealth and supporting the 
corrupt rulers in out countries. They went 
mad and accused us of foxiness, cunning, 
extremism, and demanding the impossible. 
So what is required from us so that they 
would be pleased? To bless their 
occupation of the countries of Islam, 
applaud their stealing of oil and the 
Muslim's wealth, demand more crimes by 
the tyrannical agents?'  
 
 
On the farce of the 'American elections' in 
Afghanistan, Iraq and Egypt, with the 
implication given that these were false and 
did not represent public opinion.  
 
UN: the oil-for-food scandal. 
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UBL [April 2006] 
“Oh People of 
Islam” 
90 References to the feeling of 
superiority of the West going back 
to the colonial era. The UN was 
created to institutionalise this 
legacy of slavery and superiority 
of the West.  
 
On the Sykes-Picot borders, 
splitting Sudan from Egypt by the 
British and then strengthening of 
the South by Americans. ... 
Bosnians banned from defending 
themselves against Serbian Army, 
Indonesia forced to give East 
Timor away, Kashmirites 
prevented from fighting for 
sovereignty. Use of depleted 
uranium in Iraq and sanctions 
killing millions. 
Cartoon publication and the need to 'punish 
those responsible for the heinous crime'. 
Those who offend Allah and the messenger 
is death. 'The fact is, the matter is too great 
and serious for it to be ended by mere 
regret or apology [...] Rather, the criminals 
must be punished along with all who 
sheltered them or stood by them'. This also 
has to be 'placed in the greater context of 
the aggression being perpetrated against 
our Ummah throughout the past years and 
decades'. Attacks Denmark's failure to 
apologise or punish the perpetrators and 
the solidarity expressed by America and 
Europe. 'These events, along with what 
preceded them, have confirmed that the 
West is incapable of acknowledging others 
and their rights'.  
 
Palestine shows the 'oppression, assault 
and hatred' of the Zionist-Crusaders. Their 
rejection of HAMAS confirms this 
hostility.  
 
America blamed for the Darfur war: 'it has 
exploited some differences between the 
tribes [in Western Sudan] and turned that 
into an all-out war between them which is 
devouring everything, to pave the way for 
the sending of Crusader troops to occupy 
the region and steal its oil' [America 
blamed for everything].  
 
Chechnya is a 'Zionist/Crusader' war as 
well, as is the violence and suffering in 
Somalia. As are continued atrocities in 
Iraq. 'Continuation of the cunning, 
malevolent media and cultural invasion' - 
domestic ones set up by the Crusaders and 
external like Voice of America and the 
BBC - which constitutes 'ideological 
invasion' and spreads 'obscenity and 
depravity'. On France's veil ban, 
oppression of Muslim immigrants and 
setting up of a TV station in the Maghreb. 
On the British and American cheering of 
Salman Rushdie, and subsequent 
defamations of the Prophet - supported by 
the people of the West. All this is part of 
the Zionist/Crusader war. Demand that the 
individuals responsible for the cartoons be 
extradited to face punishment according to 
the shariah. After 9/11 the Security 
Council called for the extradition of UBL 
and Bush called for his head but no 
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evidence was provided and this was before 
they stated they had carried out the attacks. 
These were carried out in self-defence and 
to aid the brothers in Palestine, Lebanon 
and elsewhere - but Europeans had no 
business interfering in Afghanistan through 
Nato. This didn't concern them. 
AAZ [April 2006] 
“Letter to the 
People of 
Pakistan” 
81  Third anniversary of Iraq invasion. 
America, Britain and their allies have 
achieved nothing but losses.  
 
America seeks to weaken Pakistan and 
'fragment it into two entities under the 
control of India, which is allied with the 
Americans and Jews'. 'In this context, India 
appears to be the best candidate to 
implement the Zionist/Crusader plan to 
humiliate Pakistan and weaken it and tear 
it apart'.  
 
The many woes which Musharraf and his 
friends have brought upon the people of 
Pakistan: (1) 'combating of Islam', by 
backing the Crusaders, making war on 
Muslim schools, and removing jihad and 
sharia from Islam, (2) 'threat to Pakistani 
national security', through giving India an 
inroad through Kabul, losing strategic 
depth and gaining a regime hostile to the 
army. The army is not focusing on the 
external Indian threat but is focused on 
fermenting civil war and killing Muslims 
at home, and facilitating the killing of 
Muslims in Afghanistan. (3) 'Squandering 
on the issue of Kashmir', in conceding 
without India doing the same, (4) 
'Musharraf's recognitions of Israel, to 
psychologically prepare the Pakistanis to 
recognize a Hindu state in Kashmir', (5) 
'gave free range to American intelligence 
and investigative agencies (6) 'corruption 
of political life in Pakistan'. Musharraf 
bribes. 
UBL [May 2006] 
“A Testimony to 
the Truth” 
91  Provides 'testimony' on behalf of the 
Muslim brothers in American prisoners, 
for Zacarias Moussaoui and the 
Guantanamo inmates incarcerated from 
2001 and first half of 2002, they have no 
connection to 9/11 and many none to AQ, 
even oppose its war with America. This 
shows the 'oppression, injustice and 
arbitrariness of your administration in 
using force' and is done partly in order to 
justify to the American ppl the millions of 
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dollars spent by the DoD and others in this 
war. 
AAZ [June 2006] 
“Support for 
Palestinians” 
85 Consolidation of Zionist power in 
Palestine: 'from the ceasefire 
agreement of 1949 through the 
Oslo Accord, the conference for 
the protection of Israel at Sharm 
el-Sheikh, and the Arab surrender 
initiative introduced by [the Saudi 
king]'. Despite the vast spending 
of the Arab regimes and 
squandering of wealth they have 
not given any support to the 
Palestinians. On the vast personal 
wealth of the Saudi king, how its 
was accumulated through looting 
and how 
Zionist/Crusader support for the regime in 
Egypt, which has falsified elections and 
attacked the impartiality of the judiciary.  
 
The 'Crusader Security Council's is 
sending military experts to Darfur to pave 
the way for its occupation and separation, 
the treacherous Sudanese government is 
collaborating in order to stay in power. 
AAZ [June 2006] 
“American Crimes 
in Kabul” 
87  On killing of innocents in Afghanistan and 
torture in prisons. On insulting the Koran 
in Bagram prison and Kandahar, and the 
Danish, French, and Italian mocking of the 
prophet [cartoon publication]. Clinton's 
and Thatcher's honouring of Salman 
Rushdie, 'to award him of offending the 
prophet'. 
AAZ [June 2006] 
“The Zionist 
Crusader’s 
Aggression in 
Gaza and 
Lebanon” 
88  The war in Lebanon and Gaza. This war is 
about 'jihad for the sake of God until the 
religion of God is established'. The 
weapons used in Lebanon come from and 
are financed by all countries of the 
Crusader alliance. 
UBL [June 2006] 
“Elegizing the 
Ummah’s 
Martyr..” 
92  'The enemy attacked Iraq, oppressed its 
people, and destroyed its villages'. The 
invasion of Iraq and the Guantanmo prison 
are clear evidence of the tyranny of Bush 
who sought to invade Iraq to plunder its 
oil. 
UBL [July 2006] 
“To the Ummah in 
General and the 
Mujahideen in 
Iraq and Somalia 
in Particular” 
93 The assassination bombing of 
Abu-Alial-Harithi in Yemen. 
 
AAZ + Gadhan 
[September 2006] 
“An Invitation to 
Islam” 
33 G: Crusader civilization brought 
about holocaust, slavery, Crusade, 
inquisition, firebombed Tokyo 
and Fallujah, bombed Dresden, 
brought about rendition, Abu 
Ghraib, establishment of Israel, 
where anti-Semitism is a sin, etc...  
 
Jesus and his disciples were 
Israelites. 
Gadahn: Guantanamo, desecration of 
Prophet. 
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AAZ [September 
2006] “Hot 
issues..” 
21 Chechnya, Afghanistan and Iraq 
show the perils the Crusaders face 
when facing jihad. 
 
AAZ [September 
2006] “Bush, the 
Vatican’s Pope, 
Darfur and the 
Crusades” 
89 On the capture of Ramzi Yousef, 
Umar Abd al-Rahman, Wali 
Khan, Ibn al-Shaykh, Ramzi bin 
al-Shibh, Khalid al-Skaykh, Abu 
al-Faraj al-Libi and other 
Mujahideen, torture in Yemen, 
Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Pakistan and 
Afghanistan. 
On secret US prisons and the capture of 
Khalid al-Ahaykh Muhammed. Bush 
intentionally deceived his nation when he 
claimed there were WMD in Iraq and a 
link between Saddam an al-Qaida. Bush 
lies about the victory gained through 
capturing KSM, since America is trying to 
pull out of Iraq, and redeploying from 
Afghanistan, to be replaced by desperate 
Nato troops.  
 
Pope Benedict's insult of the prophet and 
claim that Islam is unreasonable. This act 
forms part of a series of insults of the 
prophet and Islam, along with Salman 
Rushdie's writings, the 'honoured guest of 
the White House', the French ban on the 
veil, 'US desecration of the Holy Koran', 
US pressure to hold Wafa'i Qustantin and 
sisters in 'vaults of torture in the 
monasteries that are protected by the US-
Crusader influence', and the cartoons 
insulting the prophet. The Pope's speech is 
reminiscent of the one given by Pope 
Urban II declaring the Crusades.  
 
'Darfur 'about to become a new field for 
the Crusader wars'. 
AAZ [December 
2006] “Realities of 
Conflict Between 
Islam and 
Unbelievers” 
94 British crimes: used to occupy 
most Islamic lands, mobilized 
Abd al-Aziz al Sa'ud and Husayn 
ibn Ali against the Ottoman 
empire to stab it in the back. Gave 
one of the holiest places in Islam 
to the Jews. The statement marks 
the 89th anniversary of the 
Balfour Declaration.  
 
Five years since the Crusaders 
marched into Kabul, aided by the 
religion-sellers..Tora Bora and 
Shah-i-Kot showed the weakness 
of America. References to how 
the election in Afghanistan was 
deeply flawed. Massacres came to 
light, e.g. In Dasht-i-Laili. 
On Palestine, the UN's approach, all the 
protocols and resolutions and how these 
criminalize Jihad and recognise Jewish 
control over Palestine. PLOs 'disgrace and 
surrender'.  
 
Congratulates Mujahideen in Iraq on the 
establishment of the Islamic state of Iraq 
and Mujahideen in Iraq urged to join this 
caravan. 
AAZ [December 
2006] 
“Congratulations 
on the Eid to the 
Ummah of 
95  Iraq, Afghanistan, and battles elsewhere. 
The treacherous Palestinian secularists. 
The ban on the Hijab and the need for 
women to confront it. 
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Tawhed” 
AAZ [January 
2007] “Rise and 
Support our 
Brothers in 
Somalia” 
96  Ethiopian invasion into Somalia, backed 
by the US. 'The strongest world power' has 
been defeated in Afghanistan and Iraq 
[success] in 'the face of mujahid groups 
that long for paradise'. 
AAZ [January 
2007] “The 
Correct Equation” 
28 When fighting the Mongols and 
the Crusaders initially the Ummah 
united, but when the colonial 
crusaders attacked again and drew 
up the Sykes-Picot borders, the 
Ummah fell apart and started 
fighting internally. 
The 'surge' - sending 20 thousand extra 
troops to Iraq. Guantanamo. Resolution 
1701, curbing Muslims attempts at 
liberating Palestine. 
AAZ [February 
2007] “Lessons, 
Examples and 
Great Events in 
the Year 1427” 
97 'Since when are those who helped 
America blockade Iraq and kill a 
million of its children protectors 
of the people of the Sunnah?'. On 
how the Muslims have followed 
Turkish, Kurdish and Berber 
leaders historically, since they 
rule correctly. 
On events during the year 1427 (2006-
2007): Bush has admitted failure in Iraq 
and conceded the resistance is getting 
stronger in Afghanistan. Bush claims to be 
spreading democracy but this spreading 
brings torture, corruption, rigging of 
elections, moral degeneration, theft of 
resources, and combating of Islam.  
 
'The American project in Lebanon is the 
same as the American project in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Palestine, Egypt, Saudi 
Arabia, Jordan, the Gulf States, Algeria, 
and Somalia. There is no difference'. ... 
'We must reject all of those resolutions 
which cut off parts of the lands of Islam 
[...] starting with the resolution to partition 
Palestine' and all subsequent updates and 
resolutions on Afgh, Iraq, Darfur and 
Somalia. And 1701 in Lebanon.  
 
From where did the planes set of that 
bombed Iraq and Afghanistan? Who was it 
who recognised Israel and approved its 
usurpation of Palestine? Who provided 
Americans with secret prisons?  
 
On the planned troop surge in Iraq, and the 
need to counter it.  
 
Ethiopoian forces on brink of flight from 
Somalia. 
AAZ [March 
2007] “Palestine is 
the concern of all 
Muslims” 
18 Crusader crimes in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Palestine, Algeria, 
Chechnya, and East Turkistan. 
Tony Blair trying to convince his 'heedless' 
subjects that sending 1400 extra troops to 
Afghanistan will make a difference. 
Tyranny of the world represented in the 
fact that America can bring Darfur before 
international courts even if it doesn't 
recognise them. Also, nobody is trying the 
murderers in Bosnia, Palestine, Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Somalia, Chechnya, Kashmir, 
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Indonesia, the Philippines, and East 
Turkistan. Makes clear he is not calling for 
negotiations in Iraq, the media has been 
manipulating his words when he said that 
America was trying to negotiate with 
people in Iraq with no religious authority. 
UBL offered the Americans a truce, but 
they refused and now they must suffer the 
consequences. America is losing in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, and soon the 
mujahideen will be marching on Palestine. 
References to Egyptian authorities 
cracking down on a sports exhibition at Al-
Azar University Cario. 
AAZ [May 2007] 
“The Empire of 
Evil is about to 
End” 
23  AQ is not stirring up ethnic hatred in Iraq, 
all its efforts go to attacking the American 
enemy, those stirring up hatred are those 
who want America to stay [this goes 
against Zarqawi and his strategy of 
targeting the Shia]. The key out of such 
conflicts is to stop supporting the 
occupiers. Hypocrisy of America which 
calls for Democracy but embraces 
Mubarak and sends people to be tortured in 
Egypt. 
AAZ [June 2007] 
“Forty Years since 
the Fall of 
Jerusalem” 
101 The fall of Jerusalem to the Jews 
forty years ago. This due to 
weakness of own side, not 
strength of enemy - due to 
applauding of charlatans and 
tyrants who lead to defeat. The 
betrayal of the secular regimes [in 
Egypt] lead to the 1948 
catastrophe, 1956 defeat, 1967 
setback, losing the initial victory 
in 1973 and beginning of 
capitulation: colluding in 
blockading and occupying Iraq, 
with Israel in hitting Lebanon, 
intimidating Palestine to adopt 
Crusader-Zionist legal norms. ... 
The failed elections in Palestine 
and the Gaza and Ramallah 
incidents, failures in Egypt and 
Algeria show that there can be no 
freedom until the rule of the 
Crusaders has been ended and 
Sharia implemented. 
The Mecca accords sold four-fifths of 
Palestine and allowed the secular sellers to 
stab the mujahideen in the back. The 
Palestinian issue is not a national liberation 
matter - but is part of the struggle between 
Islam and the West. (see quoting of Azzam 
in section 24).  
 
America being defeated in Afghanistan, 
Iraq, and Somalia. 
AAZ [July 2007] 
“The Advice of 
one Concerned” 
102 Arab nationalists: 'When your role 
model, Abdel Nasser, took over 
Egypt, its borders stretched from 
the Mediterranean coast to the 
borders of Uganda, but by the 
time he died, Sudan had seceded, 
Mecca accords - bringing together 
HAMAS and fatah and sacrificing 'four-
fifths of Palestine'.  
 
Saudi Arabia is the richest in the region, 
spends more than anyone on armed forces, 
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the Sinai had been occupied and 
he had conceded Palestine by 
approving Resolution 242', 'your 
pivotal cause was sold out by your 
nationalist brothers in Oslo and 
what came after' 
but yet they are weak, because: (1) in stead 
of protecting the holy places they act as 
police for the White House and to secure 
oil extraction, (2) the money is not used to 
build a strong army. Indeed there is no 
conscription. In stead it is used to build 
military instillations for Americans. (3) A 
lot of the defence budget goes to the ruling 
family in corruption and bribes, e.g. 
Through the al-Yamama deal. The 
government is unable to tackle the 
unemployment, unable to provide doctors 
and other important educated workforce, 
and skilled workers and nurses, increase 
production or improve the economy. Its 
influence on Iraq should therefore be 
avoided.  
 
On American and allied torture of Muslim 
prisoners and their parading. 
AAZ [July 2007] 
“Malicious Britain 
and its Indian 
Slaves” 
103 British conquest in Asia and 
Africa. Handing Palelstine to the 
Jews. Partition agreements on 
Palestine, starting 1947 and 
ending with the Mecca accords 
need to be renounced, as other 
agreements legitimising 
occupation of Muslim lands, such 
as USCR 1701. 
Salman Rushdie getting a knighthood. This 
is a clear message to Muslims from Blair 
and the Queen: "if you think you will 
defeat us and banish us from Iraq and 
Afghanistan, then we curse your prophet 
and his family and consider whoever does 
so as one of our heroes". 
AAZ [July 2007] 
“The Aggression 
against Lal 
Masjid” 
104  Siege and raiding of Lal Masjid mosque in 
Islamabad 
UBL [September 
2007] “The 
Solution..” 
10 Despite the huge military and 
economic power of America it 
was infiltrated by 19 fighters, who 
managed to influence the policies 
of the US so much (‘change the 
direction of its compass’). ‘The 
subject of the mujahideen has 
become an inseparable part of the 
speech of your leader’. Policies 
changed, reputation tumbled and 
‘it was bled dry economically’. 
Holocaust. The Holocaust was 
carried out ‘by your brethren’ in 
Europe. Burning of live beings 
forbidden in Islam. Had the 
holocaust taken place closer to 
Muslim countries Jews would 
have received shelter there. 
Massacre of red Indians in 
America, Hiroshima & Nagasaki. 
Civilian deaths during Vietnam 
Bush supporting opposing groups behind 
the scenes in Iraq in order to ferment civil 
war. Democratic victory in Congressional 
elections changed nothing, to the 
disappointment of Americans. This is 
because those with capital are those with 
the real power, backing their candidates in 
Congress and White House. Global 
warming and failure to sign the Kyoto 
protocol. Globalisation, capitalism – 
causing famine, global warming. 
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war. Kennedy tried to stop the war 
but against the will of the 
corporations, which benefited 
from his death. ‘Murderous’ 
legacy of Bush cabinet members 
UBL [September 
2007] “Come to 
Jihad..” 
14  Lal Masjid siege (Red Mosque) The most 
important connotations - (1) Shows 
Musharraf is submissive to America. 
According to the Koran (5:51) and the 
Mufti Sizamuddin Shamzai's fatwa 
following 9/11 amounts to betrayal. (2) 
Showing Maulana Abd al-Aziz Ghazi 
(chief cleric in Red Mosque) in women's 
clothes in media. (3) this shows who of the 
Ulema are friends of the Most Merciful, 
and who of Satan (those who criticise 
mujahideen operations, support or praise 
ISI, army, Musharraf). The 'ulema of vice' 
marching in line with the apostate rulers is 
not particular to Pakistan but a disaster 
affecting the entire Muslim Ummah. 
UBL [November 
2007] “Message to 
the People of 
Europe” 
9  9/11 a response to US-Israeli coalition 
murders in Palestine and Lebanon. 
Afghanistan and the Taliban were not 
behind 9/11, bin Laden was responsible for 
the attacks. Grievances: (1) attack on 
Afghanistan unjustified, (2) attack on AQ 
bases, not respecting ‘ethics and protocols’ 
of war, particularly targeting women who 
don’t fight. 
AAZ [December 
2007] “Annapolis 
– the Betrayal” 
12 Treaties that 'sold out' Palestine, 
e.g. Madrid, Oslo, Sharm el 
Sheikh, Camp David, Wey River, 
and now Annapolis. 
Annapolis meeting' last deal in a line of 
treacherous deals to sell Palestine' 
AAZ [December 
2007] “A Review 
of Events” 
13 The Balfour Declaration and all 
events since giving away 
Palestine, with four-fifths being 
given away by the 'politicians of 
bargaining' 
Iraq is, overall, going well for the 
mujahideen; their ranks are growing 
stronger, the conditions of the Americans 
are deteriorating and the British are 
'fleeing'. The Petraeus report to Congress 
was trying to cover up the struggles 
America is facing and the fact that the 
'treacherous' Iraqi army forces were failing 
and would crumble as soon as America 
left. America not coping with costs, public 
dissatisfaction. Iraqi Army abandoned and 
unprepared, treasonous tribal militias 
loosing their leaders. The claim that the 
Americans are depriving the mujahideen of 
grounds shows that they are either lying or 
have learned nothing from the attack-and-
retreat-war in Iraq or Vietnam. On the 
Islamic Army in Iraq: says there is no 
proof of their killing of innocents or 
stirring up ethnic hatred. The ISI abides by 
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the Shariah, does not have shedding 
innocent blood in its methodology, has 
been facing a protracted propaganda 
campaign from the Americans. Non of its 
actions are worse than those groups 
cooperating with America. The ISI also 
declared readiness to 'redress every 
grievance'. 
UBL [December 
2007] “The Way 
to Frustrate the 
Conspiracies” 
27  'The crimes of Muqtada al-Sadr's army, the 
Badr Crops under Abdelaziz al-Hakeem 
and members of the Dawa party both 
outside and inside the Maliki govt and their 
attempts to spread these crimes outside 
Iraq. 
AAZ [early 2008] 
“Exoneration..” 
20 No difference to US bombing of 
chemical factory in Sudan to 9/11. 
The same for sanctions against 
Libya, Iraq and attacks on 
Afghanistan. "We did not put you 
through investigative trials as 
your brothers did to our brothers, 
and we did not massacre you as 
your brothers did to our brothers 
in Srebrenica, Sabra and Shatilla." 
Sykes-Picot. On the strength of 
the Jihad: "The nation that 
subdued the Crusaders alliance in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, Algeria and 
Somalia is not a weak nation. The 
nation, that stood up to the savage 
Russia, four and a half centuries 
ago in the Caucasus, is not a 
powerless nation. The nation that 
expelled the Jews from Gaza is 
not a paralysed nation.; the nation 
that gave birth to Imam Shamil, 
Umar al-Mukhtar, Hassan al-
Banna, Izz al-Din al-Qassam, 
Sayyid Qutb and Khalid al-
Islambuli, Issam al-Qamari, 
Abdullah Azzam, Abu Ubaydah 
al-Banchari, the leader Abu Hafs , 
Muhammad Atta, Khattab, Shamil 
Basayev, Aslan Maskhadov, 
Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, Ahmad 
Yassin, Abd al-Aziz al-Rantisi, 
Abu-al-Walid al-Ghamdi, Abu 
Umar al-Sayf, Abdallah al-Rasud, 
Abu-Mus'ab al-Zarqawi and 
Mullah Dadollah isn't a barren 
nation; and the nation whose 
emigrant and mujahidin sons 
stood their ground against the 
fiercest Crusade in the history of 
Publication of 'Rationalizing' serves the 
interests of the Zionist-Crusader-Arab ruler 
alliance and is designed to sedate the 
mujahideen and convince them that they 
cannot bring about change in Egypt. 
Publication of document a 'desperate 
attempt' during overwhelming jihadist 
awakening, aims to stop Muslim 
resistance. Comes at a time when the US is 
showing double standards in its approach 
to elections (HAMAS, Morocco, Iraq, 
Jordan, Egypt). Reference to Al-Azhar 
protest, Cairo. American atrocities in 
Afghanistan, Palestine, Chechnya and 
elsewhere. Jews' seizure of Palestine, 
India's control over Kashmir, Russia's 
control over Chechnya, and Spain's control 
over Ceuta and Melilla - all of these are 
recognized by corrupt Arab regimes. 
Wadi-al-Arbah, Oslo, Annapolis treaties 
with Israel. 1947 resolution on partition 
and Resolution 242. 
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Islam, isn't a submissive nation. 
AAZ [March 
2008] Letter to 
Abu Umar al-
Baghdadi 
44  'It’s not hidden from you what the Danes 
have committed in renewing their 
assailment on the person of the prophet, 
peace be upon him, even when they don’t 
dare to mention the Jews in a negative 
manner'. This is a part of 'the raging 
crusader war against Islam and its people'. 
UBL [March 
2008] “May our 
Mothers be 
Bereaved of us if 
we fail to help our 
Prophet, peace be 
upon him” 
11  The al-Yamamah deal (i.e. BAE Systems) 
with Saudi Arabia. Indirect references to 
US reluctance to ICC and incarceration of 
people questioning holocaust in Europe. 
Cartoon drawings. Bombing of Muslims 
women and children. However this atrocity 
pales in the comparison with the drawings 
UBL [March 
2008] “A Way for 
the Salvation of 
Palestine” 
6  Siege of Gaza, Palestine. ‘ Siege of 
hundreds of thousands of orphaned 
children and widowed women'. Arab 
support for Annapolis accords. Religious 
scholars endorsing these leaders 
AAZ [March 
2008] “A Call to 
Help our People in 
Gaza” 
17  Gaza siege - Egyptians are preventing help 
from reaching Gazans and giving Israel 
free range to attack Gaza, exactly as the 
Lebanese Christian forces did during the 
1982 invasion, allowing for the Sabra and 
Shattila massacres. References to the West 
'ridiculing' the Prophet. 
AAZ [April 2008] 
“The Open 
Meeting part 
one..” 
105  'The dispute between America and Iran is a 
real dispute based on the struggle over 
areas of influence, and the possibility of 
America striking Iran is a real possibility' 
... 'the situation will be in the interests of 
the Mujahideen if the war saps both of 
them', fierce battles will break out between 
the Mujahideen and whichever state is 
victorious, if any. . The sufferings of Fatah 
al-Islam in Nahar al-Barid in Lebanon. 
These events were not addressed 
specifically when they were occurring, 
since Fata al-Islam had denied a link to 
AQ, and Zawahiri felt that an open 
endorsement would not be helpful at that 
stage.  
 
Mubarak: Israel, Gaza blockade, military 
courts, State Security, US bases, 'vulgar 
media', 'immoral Culture Ministry', secular 
laws, corruption. 
AAZ [April 2008] 
“Shaykh Ayman 
Al-Zawahiri – On 
the Fifth 
Anniversary of the 
7 Munroe doctrine, Sykes-Picot, 
Opium wars, Hiroshima, Nagasaki 
Iraq invasion, ‘financial plundering’ in 
Egypt and elsewhere. On Petraeus 
testimony to Congress, US losing war. 
Also Afghanistan.' Iranian-American 
conspiracy’ – Democrats wanting to strike 
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Invasion and 
Torture of Iraq” 
deal with Iran. Iran wanting to annex south 
and west Iraq. Will cause Sunni revival. 
Era of jihad battles, safeguarding and 
autonomy taking over era of colonizing, 
plundering and oppressing Muslims. 
Zionist-American plot to starve the people 
of Egypt and Gaza. Economic hardship in 
Egypt, also Yemen, Arabian peninsula and 
elsewhere due to US embezzlement 
AAZ [April 2008] 
“The Open 
Meeting.. Part 2..” 
107  'The situation in Iraq demonstrates signs of 
a victory for Islam'.  
 
Recognising the UN means recognising the 
occupation of its member states of Muslim 
lands, including 'Russia's sovereignty over 
the Muslim Caucasus, the sovereignty of 
the Philippines on its Muslim south, the 
sovereignty of India over Kashmir until the 
referendum takes place, which the 
international powers will not allow, the 
sovereignty of China on eastern Turkistan, 
and the sovereignty of Spain over Ceuta 
and Melilla, and indeed on the entire 
Andalusia, and so on'   
 
Talks of the 'massive jihadist awakening' in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan.  
 
Asked about global warming, he says that 
the West and US has failed in dealing with 
it and believes these failures will convince 
the world of the barbarism of the West and 
increase support for the Muslim jihad 
against America.  
 
The crusader forces attacking women and 
children to force fighters to withdraw or 
surrender in Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya, 
and Palestine. 
UBL [May 2008] 
“Reasons of the 
Struggle on the 
Occasion of the 
60th Anniversary 
of the founding of 
the Occupying 
State of Israel” 
8 Palestine. This is basic issue for 
ummah, motivation for UBL since 
childhood and source of clash 
with Western civilization. Since 
then, Lebanon and other actors of 
oppression lead to 9/11. Creation 
of state of Israel. Israel is terrorist 
– kills women and children, e.g. 
Deir Yassin and subsequent 
massacres. Recognition of Begin 
and peace prize. 
 
UBL [May 2008] 
“A Message to the 
Muslim Nation”  
24 Palestine falling into the hands of 
Christians and then the Jews.. 
Salah-al-Din abided by the 
teachings of Islam, confided with 
60 year anniversary of Israel. The Jewish 
state has survived, not because it is 
powerful - but because the Arab leaders 
have relinquished jihad. The Jewish state 
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pious ulema, fought the supporters 
of the Crusader forces, allowed 
free jihad. 
cannot 'bear one hundredth' of the force 
unleashed on the USSR and America in 
Iraq. 
AAZ [June 2008] 
“On the 
Anniversary of the 
Naksa..” 
15 The 1967 war and loss of 
territory. The setbacks in Palestine 
have been due to treasonous and 
corrupt leaderships of Arab 
countries, particularly Egypt. The 
secular Arab regimes have no 
principles, values or beliefs and 
cannot protect its population. This 
system has continued to capitalize 
on the Palestinian situation. The 
borders of Sykes-Picot and the 
insistence of the corrupt Arab 
regimes to maintain them. 
The siege of Gaza, primarily due to the 
'fence of treason' built by Hosni Mubarak 
and protected by his soldiers, this allows 
the Zionist and crusaders to persist in their 
oppression. The security fence prevents aid 
from reaching Gazans, but allows Israeli 
tourists to enjoy Gaza without visas. 
AAZ [August 
2008] “A Message 
form Shaikh 
Ayman al-
Zawahiri to the 
Pakistani Army 
and the People of 
Pakistan” 
41 Ataturk's secularisation and its 
influence on Perves Musharraf. ... 
Draws allegories with resistance 
against the British Indian Army. 
The current crusade of Bush 
mirrors exactly that of British 
rulers against Muslims before. 
The Malta detention centre where 
Sheikh-ul-Hind and Sayyed 
Hussain Ahmad Madni were 
jailed is comparable to 
Guantanamo. 'Isn’t it clear that we 
are fighting a new battle in an old 
war? It is the same struggle 
against the same enemies. The 
facts are the same, only the names 
and faces have changed.' - “The 
king’s viceroy in Delhi has 
become the American ambassador 
in Islamabad, the British Indian 
Army has become the American 
Pakistani Army, the prime 
minister in London has become 
the president in Washington, and 
Sayyed Ahmad Shaheed and Shah 
Ismail Shaheed and their 
mujahideen are today the 
mujahideen fighting to expel the 
neo-crusaders from Afghanistan, 
Pakistan and the entire sub-
continent. But the difference is 
that the jihadi awakening of today 
is by the grace of Allah much 
stronger, wider spread, and not 
limited to the sub-continent and 
the American crusader empire is 
facing by the grace of Almighty 
Allah humiliating defeats in 
Red mosque 'massacre'.  
 
The toppling of the emirate in Kabul with 
the assistance of Musharraf. The assaults 
on the Red Mosque and in the tribal areas 
exposed the anti-Islamic face of the 
Pakistani military leadership. Had this 
been an attack on a church or if a single 
Briton or American had been killed then 
worldwide protests would have broken out 
and Pakistan condemned, but the Red 
Mosque was just seen as a legitimate 
security operation.  
 
Pervez has ignited civil war in Pakistan, 
through its fruitless campaign in the tribal 
areas. This has also made Pakistan 
strategically vulnerable against India.  
 
Musharraf has allowed in the CIA and FBI 
to snatch anyone they want, Pakistani 
security agencies have become their 
'hunting dogs'. 
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Afghanistan and Iraq'. 
AAZ [November 
2008] “The Exit of 
Bush and Arrival 
of Obama” 
100  On the election of Barack Obama and the 
American peoples' acknowledge of defeat 
in Iraq. By electing Obama, the American 
people declared their anxiety and 
apprehension about the future and Iraq. 
Obama does not know the history of 
Afghanistan, the success of the mujahideen 
and the failures of the Soviets and British, 
'the dogs of Afghanistan have found the 
flesh of your soldiers to be delicious, so 
send thousands after thousands to them'. 
He himself has admitted defeat in Iraq and 
his military commanders have admitted 
defeat in Afghanistan.  
 
Obama's commitment to Israeli security 
and statements to this effect 'confirmed to 
the Ummah that you have chosen a stance 
of hostility to Islam and Muslims'. Also on 
pledges to attack into Afghanistan and 
send more troops to Afghanistan. Obama 
not a honourable black American like 
Malcolm X. 'And in you and in Colin 
Powell, Rice and your likes, the words of 
Malcolm X (may Allah have mercy on 
him) concerning “House Negroes” are 
confirmed.' 
AAZ [November 
2008] “Al-Azhar: 
The Lions Den” 
237 Traces betrayals of House of Saud 
of Muslim interests and how it 
sabotaged the Palestinian uprising 
of 1936, harmed the Mujahideen 
efforts in Afghanistan, sought to 
recognise Israel and force 
HAMAS to do the same through 
the Mekkah accords. 
The 'awakening' councils in Iraq and how 
they will be abandoned by Americans. 
Karzai and his appeal to Saudis to help 
broker a deal with the Taliban. .  
 
Egyptian embargo of Gaza. . 'Al-Azhar has 
turned into a government agency' with the 
government selecting friendly shaykhs 
such as Shaykh Tantawi. The case of Wafa 
Constanine. . Reference to the 9 September 
speech by Bush on alleged improved 
situation in Iraq and Petraeus's warnings 
that things may still go wrong. America 
has been defeated in Iraq, is leaving and 
the Islamic state is staying. The 
Awakening councils will be abandoned as 
all other agents by America. They will not 
be assimilated by the Shiite government 
into the security services, 'because it can't 
possibly accept a non-Shi'ite force in Iraq'. 
Iran will not come to their aid since they 
would not be a strong enough force against 
the mujahideen, and also are preoccupied 
with their own security concerns. 
Furthermore, 'Iran, which abandoned Najaf 
and Karbala and allowed American rockets 
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to penetrate the walls of the resting place 
of Imam Ali (may Allah bless him) while it 
warns of woe and destruction for anyone 
who touches a speck of Iran's soil, is 
prepared to sacrifice any ally to protect its 
own interests and benefits'. [no desire 
expressed or indicated in terms of getting 
closer to Iran, but perhaps the attitude to 
Shia outside government is different, 
certainly in terms of targeting]. . The 
economic recession in America: traces this 
to the 9/11 attack and the subsequent 
downturn and reduction in consumer 
confidence, causing 'economic 
haemorrhages’ which will not cease until 
the Americans withdraw from Muslim 
lands. After 9/11, the government pumped 
billions of tax dollars into the economy in 
order to revitalise it, giving the banks the 
impression they had ample liquidity and 
thus providing cheap loans, especially 
mortgages. This caused house prices to 
increase, and the banks envisaged making 
a profit from selling repossessed houses 
from byers who couldn't pay back the loan, 
house prices tumbled leaving mortgages 
lenders out of pocket and banks without 
liquidity. The government has then tried to 
pump even more money to save the 
capitalists and there interest-based 
economy. Thus, there are three major 
causes; usury [interest] and fraud (both 
problems of the capitalist system), and the 
'aggressive Crusader nature' against 
Muslims which resulted in 9/11 and the 
costly, failing Crusade. What would help 
the West is to stop this costly, futile war.  
 
Complains that Hezbollah is receiving 
more media attention for less impressive 
attacks then the mujahideen carried out, 
such as the strikes on Kandahar prison.. On 
the mujahideen uprising in Yemen. . On 
the ICC arrest warrant for the Sudanese 
president. He has been abandoned by the 
Crusaders that he sought to help previously 
by evicting the Mujahideen. He never 
received recognition of this and is now 
experiencing the same fright and turmoil 
he inflicted on the Mujahideen. But this is 
part of a bigger plot against Sudan, which 
'is being targeted in its Islam and 
Arabness'. Does not deny the human 
suffering in Darfur [although he has done 
in the past] but points to inconsistencies 
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with the West when it cares not about 
humanitarian crisis it inflicts on people in 
Muslim countries. Darfur is 'land of the 
Quran', and the problems should be 
resolved by intelligent people and imams 
coming together and applying the Sharia in 
resolution of disputes, away from the 
influences of Khartum, the UN or 'powers 
of the cross'. And the people of Sudan need 
to prepare for jihad against the Crusader 
forces. 
AAZ [January 
2009] “The 
Massacre of Gaza 
and the Siege of 
the Traitors” 
121 Draws comparisons between 
current developments in Gaza to 
the Sabra and Shattila massacres 
in Lebanon and the way in which 
'Jews' cooperated with the Kataeb 
forces there and Hosni Mubarak 
now. 
Israeli airstrikes and fighting in Gaza 
killing and injuring hundreds of civilians, 
the entire world doing nothing to stop it. 
UBL [January 
2009] “Call for 
Jihad to Stop the 
Gaza Assault” 
122 Goes through how the rulers of 
Muslim countries during the time 
of the 1948 war, were infact 
pawns of British generals in the 
region, including Jordan [gen. 
Glub Basha [Maj. Gen. John 
Bagot Glubb]] and the Arabian 
Peninsula ['non-enthroned king 
General Philip' Sir Philip 
Chetwode??].  
 
The French Revolution mentioned 
as a thing the Ummah should 
copy in order to remove the kings. 
Voting is not a solution here, only 
removing the Kings through force 
like the French did and the 
Americans against the British. 
This deceptive system in place when the 
British were in control continues today in 
the form of US control, as 'in each capital 
today there is [a] "Bremer" [...] overtly or 
secretly', there is an "Allawi" to take 
orders, and a "Sistani" [the Shi'a cleric] 
and Tantawi [head of Al-Azhar] supported 
by writers, journalists and other groups to 
give legitimacy to this deception. Another 
system of deception is the transferal of the 
issue of Palestine to the UN and Security 
Council, which Arab rulers do in order to 
free themselves of responsibility. . The US 
war against the mujahideen left it 
'drowning in the economic crisis'. The 
Zionist entity will lose out on support due 
to this 'terrible and fast recession of the 
American power'. This was a crucial 
reason for Israel's invasion of Gaza, since 
the last drop of support had to be squeezed 
from the Bush administration. Quotes 
Biden in saying the situation is worse than 
expected and that the whole economy is 
'exposed to collapse'. Also quotes Spanish 
Minister of Finance, Alan Greenspan, 
Sarkozy, and German Finance Minister on 
the economic collapse and recession. 
Quotes US intelligence report on 
diminished power and influence of US. 
AAZ [February 
2009] “The 
Sacrifices of 
Gaza” 
131  Israeli Gaza conflict, death of 1300 
'martyrs'.  
 
'What is taking place in Gaza is only part 
of the Zionist-Christian Crusade targeting 
this Muslim Ummah in Chechnya, 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine, Somalia, 
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Algeria, and Darfur.  
AAZ [February 
2009] “From 
Kabul to 
Mogadishu” 
132 On Kenyan, Ugandan and 
Burundian invasions of Somalia 
and how the current state of 
affairs is no different in revolving 
around the need to ensure Somalia 
stays an Islamic country. These 
area all 'infidel invading forces' .. 
America killed 'tens of thousands' 
in Somalia in order to 'eliminate 
Islam in it' and turn it into a 
'colony'.  
 
The PLO 'drowned in the swamp 
of Oslo'. 
Recent events in Somalia, mainly the 
success of the mujahideen in expelling 
foreign and hostile forces from cities like 
Baidoa and others  
 
America 'pulverized' villages in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, and provided 
weapons to Israel to do the same in 
Palestine. America also sieged Iraq and 
killed a 'million children'.  
 
References to interrogation in Guantanamo 
(Shihri). 
UBL [March 
2009] “Practical 
Steps to Liberate 
Palestine” 
133 90 years of occupation in 
Palestine. 
Gaza crisis, and especially the use of white 
phosphorus. . 
 
'Jews and Christians carry out the murder 
of our brothers in Palestine, Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Waziristan, Somalia, 
Kashmir, the Philippines and Chechnya'. 
UBL [March 
2009] “Fight on, 
Oh Champions of 
Somalia” 
134  The Muslim world has been surrounded 
and penetrated by nonbeliever armies and 
their proxies, this includes 'From the 
direction of the west, there is another 
Crusader march, this one against the Sudan 
and advancing from Darfur'  
AAZ [April 2009] 
“Six years since 
the invasion of 
Iraq..” 
136 Egypt - Israeli peace accords 
which resulted in a more assertive 
Israel in the region. Iraq war. .. 
Cowardice of the Egyptian 
leadership saw it losing the initial 
momentum it had in the 1973 war 
with Israel. 
Claims that the economic crisis in America 
and the West was due to the wars and 
quagmire in Iraq and Afghanistan. Refers 
to reports showing the economic cost of 
the war..  
 
Talks about the 'human rights of the 
Westerner to enslave all other humans' and 
how these efforts were key in the Iraq 
invasion. The West is invading and causing 
suffering in the Muslim world in order to 
impose its version of democracy and 
freedom.' True democracy is only for the 
West or in its service'. HAMAS and the 
Algerian FIS received only bombs when 
they ran for election (even though this also 
was in breech of the Shariah).  
 
Talks of the 'criminal traitors' in Egypt 
who preside over talks between Israel and 
Palestinian representatives, prevent the 
sending of arms through tunnels to Gaza 
and embargo the strip. 
AAZ [June 2009] 
“The Executioner, 
137  Arrival of Obama for official visit in 
Egypt.  
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Egypt and the 
American Puppets 
Welcome Obama” 
 
Obama's message to the Muslim world has 
already arrived; through his praying at the 
Wailing wall, in his support for Israel and 
Jerusalem at AIPAC, condoning of Gaza 
bombings, promising of more troops for 
Afghanistan, bombings and threatened 
interventions in Pakistan, Bagram prison, 
refusal to apply the Geneva Convention to 
Muslism prisoners, ignoring of Geneva 
racist conference to protect Israel etc. ..  
 
Wafa Constanine and other ongoing cases 
of violation at the hands of Egyptian elite 
and through their collusion with America 
and Israel. 
AAZ [July 2009] 
“My Muslim 
Brothers and 
Sisters in 
Pakistan” 
139  Pakistan's future in jeapoardy because of 
'blatant American Crusader interference' 
AAZ [August 
2009] “The 
Realities of Jihad 
and Fallacy of 
Hypocrisy” 
140  US bombing in Waziristan allegedly 
killing 60 at a funeral held for victims of 
another bombing. Says Obama's hands 
dripping with blood of Muslims. ..  
 
In response to question about the debate in 
France on the Hijab/burqa: 'The publicized 
crusader campaign did not stop 
[criticizing] Hijab only, and before that 
there was the offensive cartoons of the 
prophet Muhammad, prayer and peace 
upon him, and before that was insulting the 
Holy Qur'an in Guantanamo Bay and in 
Iraq.' ..  
 
Goes through alleged French animosity 
towards Muslims through the ages… Goes 
through various acts of Obama perceived 
as hostile against Muslims inc sending 
Muslims to secret prisons, bombing and 
killing civilians in Afghanistan, Iraq, 
Somalia and elsewhere, ignoring the 
Geneva racist conference etc. Thus there is 
not 'change'.  
 
The most important reasons of hostility 
between Muslims and America? Palestine, 
Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, Somalia, 
the American occupation of the Arabian 
Peninsula, stealing the wealth of the 
Muslim Nation with force threats, the 
corrupted and corrupting regimes that 
cooperate with America, and war against 
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Islam in the name of terrorism.' .. Suggests 
Obama is worse news for Palestinians than 
Bush was.  
 
The 'killing the Muslims on the hands of 
the Shiite militias in Iraq and burning them 
and nailing their heads with electric driller'  
AAZ [August 
2009] “The Path 
of Doom” 
142  On the operations of Pakistani Army 
against mujahideen in Waziristan and 
elsewhere on the border with Afghanistan, 
in collusion with Nato forces and 'traitors' 
in Afghan Army designed to deplete moral 
of mujahideen, cause suffering of local 
population, disguise the losses of the Nato 
forces and their aim to secure control for 
US and allies over South Asia. The 
Pakistani Army calls the operation 'The 
Path to Salvation' because, according to 
Ayman, they are trying to save the 
Americans from defeat. This is in actuality 
a 'path of doom'. The Pakistani Army is 
treacherous and designed to aid the 
Americans. It arrested Pakistani nuclear 
scientists and let inspectors to the nuclear 
weapons. 
UBL [September 
2009] “A 
Statement to the 
American People” 
144 The reasons for 9/11: US support 
for Israel and its oppression of 
Palestinians, which has even been 
confirmed by the likes of 
President Obama in his address in 
Cairo and Jimmy Carter. Talks of 
'murderous siege' on the people of 
Palestine, the use of white 
phosphorus and other weapons 
from America. The prevalence of 
'zionist' economic lobby.  
 
Americans could have known that 
the White House planned on 
murder when the 'butcher' from 
Vietnam, Rumsfeld, was 
appointed Defence Secretary. 
Obama is powerless to stop the war since 
he retained senior figures from the Defence 
establishment from the previous 
administration instead of appointing some 
of the generals who opposed the war, such 
as Gen Sanchez. .. On the economic 
calamities being experienced by America 
due to their war of attrition with the 
mujahidoon. 
UBL [September 
2009] “A Message 
to the European 
People” 
143  Talks about the unjust Nato campaign 
where Europeans are supporting the 
Americans against innocent people in 
Afghanistan, even though they have done 
nothing wrong towards Europe. The ware 
started as a result of the 'anger of Bush' to 
which Europeans reacted even though they 
had nothing to do with it. Europeans 
should learn from the cries for American 
help from Georgia during the war with 
Russia that America is not a trustworthy 
ally. 
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AAZ [September 
2009] “Shaykh Dr 
Ayman al-
Zawahiri: Eulogy 
for the Role Model 
of Youth” 
147  On Pakistani Army failing to secure peace 
in Pakistan, treacherous in their collusion 
with the Americans against the Emirate in 
Afghanistan. .. 
 
The role of Germany: '“I wonder how the 
Germans, who were defeated by the 
Americans and the English in Second 
World War, robbed and controlled by 
them, are willing to die instead of them in 
a war that is destined to fail? I wonder how 
their prime minister can stand in the 
parliament and lie to them, saying that 
sending more German forces to 
Afghanistan is needed in order to protect 
the peace and security of these countries? 
How can she lie like that!?'  
 
Laments that Americans have turned their 
embassy in Kabul into a brothel and that 
no such vice was permitted under the 
Taliban. 
AAZ [October 
2009] “Eulogy for 
Ibn Sheikh al Libi 
by Shaykh Ayman 
al-Zawahiri” 
145  On the death of Ali Mohamed Abdelaziz al 
Fakhiri, also known as Ibn Sheikh al-Lib in 
custody. Something Ayman blames on 
torture by American agents in order to 
force out a confession concerning the link 
betweeen Saddam Hussain and Al-Qa'ida. 
AAZ [December 
2009] “The 
(Palestinian) 
National Unity” 
146 Cites the various treaties that have 
seen 'nine-tenths' of Palestine 
going to the Israelis including 
Oslo, Annapolis, Mecca accords 
Y-River and meetings in New 
York and Camp David. . 
 
Mahmud Abbas is no better then 
Al-Sharif Husain who followed 
'his British masters' and gave 
Palestine to the Jews and Syria to 
the French. .. Talks of the 'wicked 
fruits' of national unity that were 
introduced to the Muslims after 
the Sykes-Picot agreement that 
'split the Islamic nation'. 
Talks of the 'tyrant' Mubarak who is trying 
to please America by torturing mujahidoon 
in order to put his 'tyrant son' to power. 
Meanwhile the Egyptians are blocking aid 
for the mujahideen and people in Gaza 
whilst Israeli tourists are welcomed in 
Egypt. This torture is being carried out by 
Egypt and other agents like it on the order 
of Obama. Siege of Palestine is his real 
plan for the region and represents a new 
episode in the Crusade against 
Muslims..The same treachery is taking 
place in Pakistan where the Pakistani 
Army is taking up the role of the British 
Indian Army or the North Africans in the 
French Army during WW2 in dying for 
their master's cause. 
AAZ [December 
2009] “The 
Morning and the 
Lamp..” 
141  'Pakistan has become a service provider to 
the army of America, its security and 
secret agencies. The leadership and 
politicians are actually competing with 
each other to affirm their support of 
America and the West in its New Crusade 
against Islam, under the guise of the “War 
on Terror”.' 
UBL [February 148  US support for Israel, suffering in Gaza 
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2010] “From 
Osama to Obama” 
   Causes of climate change and the impact of 
climate change. The global financial crisis, 
also caused by America, as well as the 
consequences of globalisation. .. Iraq was 
invaded because of oil [UBL does not cite 
animosity towards Muslims as a cause as 
done previously]. Abu Ghraib and 
Guantanamo 'ugly crimes which shook the 
conscience of humanity'  
AAZ [July 2010] 
“Al Quds will not 
be converted to 
Judaism” 
223 Dayton Accord US hostilities, apostate complicity, 
primarily Afghanistan, Bayt al Maqdis 
(Jerusalem). The 'detentions' 'torture 
centres' and courts of Americans.  
 
'The painful tragedy of Jerusalem' which is 
being Judaized and which has been 
betrayed by 'Arab Zionists' who support 
sanctions and prevent uprisings and jihad 
 
US forces 'burning' villages and torturing 
mujahideen, including Sheikh al Liby. 
Americans occupying Afghanistan, Iraq, 
the Gulf, large parts of Egypt, Pakistan, 
Jordan, the Islamic Maghreb and Yemen. 
AAZ [August 
2010] “Message to 
the People of 
Turkey” 
225 Collapse of Ottoman rule allowed 
Jews and secularism to settle in 
Bayt al Maqdis and Muslims to be 
humiliated. .. 
 
The 'English Crusaders' who 
stabbed the Muslims in the back 
during WWI. Abdul Aziz Al Saud 
'stabbed the Ottoman empire 
within an English dagger' as did 
Sharif Hussain. 
Israeli killing of Turks the 'Freedom 
Flotilla'  to Gaza. Turkish participation in 
war in Afghanistan, and cooperation with 
Israel. Turkey has become secular. .. 
 
The 'Safavids' are stabbing the Ummah in 
the back in Afghanistan and Iraq, just as 
they did when the Ottoman empire was 
about to conquer Austria [safaiyoon - not 
rafidah e.g.], but this time with the help 
from secular Turkey. 
AAZ [September 
2010] “A 
Victorious 
Ummah, A Broken 
Crusade” 
226  Pakistani collusion with NATO and 
crusaders in their imprisoning and torture 
of Muslims, burning down Lal Masjid.  
 
Nine years have passed since the beginning 
of the contemporary Crusade.  
 
Accuses Americans of replacing existing 
lackeys like Musharraf with opposition 
members that are serving American 
agendas, such as Benazir Bhutto, who in 
turn was replaced by another 'agent' 
Zardari. .. 
 
Egypt became an 'international terminal for 
torture' under Mubarak. 
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UBL [October 
2010] “Some 
points regarding 
the method of 
relief work” 
227  'What our nation is going through by way 
of great climate changes and its effects in 
terms of the catastrophes and great natural 
disasters that have taken place in many 
Islamic countries, it is not sufficient any 
more to accept what has been done in 
terms of rescue work as it has been done in 
the past.' The human cost of natural 
disasters relating to climate change is even 
greater than from war. Draught in Africa 
and floods in Pakistan 
UBL [October 
2010] “Help your 
brothers in 
Pakistan” 
228 Red Army defeat The flood victims in Paksitan have 
received help from Malaysa, Turkey and 
other countries, but the issue has received 
insufficient attention in the media. These 
media organisations place more emphasis 
on securing the power of the countries’ 
ruler, rather than focusing on the plight of 
millions in Pakistan. The floods in Pakistan 
and resulting famine was 'one of the most 
catastrophic events in the past century.' 
Talks of how the Secretary General of the 
UN travelled to the affected regions a 
month after it happened 'as part of his job' 
and described it as the greatest catastrophe, 
but yet the Arab leaders never ventured 
there despite being much closer.  
 
Suggests a course of action, in terms of 
human relief, shelter, assessing roads and 
infrastructure in the aftermath etc so we 
can learn from this and apply to others 
living in areas where conditions are similar 
e.g. by riverbeds.  
 
Affects of climate change and natural 
disasters now produce more victims than 
war, the media have war correspondents so 
they should also have specialists in fields 
related to these consequences, e.g. civil 
engineering, agriculture, medicine, rescue 
etc. 
AAZ [November 
2010] “Who is 
going to support 
Aifa Siddique” 
229  'An American court has sentenced our 
sister Afia Siddiqui for more than eighty 
years' 
UBL [November 
2010] “Message 
from Shaykh 
Usama bin Ladin 
to the People of 
France” 
230  France assists America in the killing of 
Muslim women and children. French are 
meddling in the affairs of North and West 
Africa, stealing its wealth and inflicting 
suffering. The French who ban 'free 
women' from wearing the hijab can expect 
those meddling in Africa to be targeted 
UBL [January 231  Kidnappings of French in Africa, French 
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2011] “From al-
Sheikh Osama bin 
Mohammed bin 
Ladin to the 
French People” 
participation in wars in Afghanistan and 
presence in Africa 
AAZ [February 
2011] “A Message 
of Glad 
Tidings…(1)” 
232 Sykes-Picot, Treaty of Darin. 
Traces the origins of the modern 
Egyptian state, from Napoleon 
(described as a criminal secularist 
and 'Christian at heart with a tinge 
of Zionism') and his promises of a 
Palestinian homeland for Jews. 
On the impact of British control 
over Egypt and the region: 
introduction of secular 
constitutions, Islamic principals in 
society and governance torn 
down, impact throughout region. 
''History repeats itself today. Today Egypt 
has a president, a government, a 
parliament, an army and police, but the real 
ruler changed his seat from the British to 
the American Embassy!' The same can be 
said about all the other 'Arab Zionist' and 
corrupt rulers of Muslim lands, they run 
torcher champers, armies and courts with 
the real rulers being the 'office in the 
embassy, usually the American, but may 
also be Russian, British, French, or maybe 
even the Israeli embassy.' 
AAZ [February 
2011] “A Message 
of Glad 
Tidings…(2) 
233 The British corrupted the 
Egyptian judicial and political 
system by giving the Egyptians 
'fake independence' whilst 
imposing their will. The British 
broke the Caliphate into pieces 
and introduced nationalism. 
''Who helped the US implement sanctions 
against Iraq? Who helped them invade it? 
Who helped them invade Afghanistan? 
Who is implementing the sanctions on 
Gaza? Who are the ones in pursuit of the 
Mujahideen, arresting, torturing and killing 
them? Aren’t they these corrupt regimes in 
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Iraq, Jordan, 
Pakistan and Algeria?'. Egyptians allow 
US and other ships through the Suez even 
though they are used in the campaign 
against the Muslims. [note how the focus 
has become local again - near enemy]. .. 
Over the expanse of the Islamic  
 
 
The invading Crusader forces in their 
imperialistic Crusades have been faced 
with a heroic resistance, but its 
advancement in weaponry allowed it to 
gain victory. Do we ask, why have we 
fallen back in the sciences and arts of war? 
How have they advanced over us? 
'Political weakness and corruption' as 
fundamental reasons. ‘It is also due to our 
preoccupation in the errors in dialectics, 
Sufism, and superstitions which have made 
us neglect the natural sciences. Another 
cause is the West’s control over us and our 
resources, and thus our deprivation from 
any proper usage of them which would 
enable us to advance and strengthen 
ourselves.' .. 'These Western Crusader 
policies to dissolve and divide the Islamic 
world still continue today. Iraq is being 
divided into three regions: the Kurdish 
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North which has, basically, already been 
partitioned, the Sunni middle, and the 
Shiite South. As for Sudan, the South has 
seceded from the North, and they seek to 
divide it even further by supporting the 
secessionists in Darfur, the Nuba 
Mountains and the East. They are planning 
to divide Saudi Arabia into three regions: 
the Eastern, the Central and the Western. 
As for Egypt, they seek to divide it into 
two: the Southern Copts with their capital 
Asyut, and the Muslim north, by 
supporting the Orthodox minority and 
pretending to cry over the injustices being 
meted out to them, while overlooking the 
aggressions of its Church against the 
Muslims.' Accuses the church of killing 
Wafa Constantine and hiding other women 
converts to Islam and of trying to establish 
an independent Coptic state in Egypt..The 
leadership sees Muslims as guests in Egypt 
and allied with Hosni Mubarak..The crisis 
has been further enflamed by the Mubarak 
regime, scholars of Al-Azhar, corrupt 
judiciary and parliament, and US 
administration. All ignore the 'torture 
chambers' the Coptic Orthodox church 
uses. 
AAZ [February 
2011] “A Message 
of Glad 
Tidings…(3)” 
234  ''These Arab Zionists who wage war 
against Islam and its laws, ban the Hijab, 
seek the spread of licentiousness and 
ignobility, build bridges with the Zionist 
entity, participate with America in their 
war against Islam [..]besiege our fellow 
Muslims in Gaza [..] and those who 
suppress and torture their people, pillaging 
their blood, sanctity and resources.' This is 
part of the 'world order' at war with Islam, 
led by America.  
 
'The events of Tunisia and Egypt, the 
results of which have reached Jordan, 
Yemen and other Muslim lands, must be 
studied carefully, so that the anger of the 
noble and uprising of the freeborn do not 
go to waste, and the fruit born of their 
efforts are not stolen after they watered its 
tree with their souls, blood and years of 
imprisonment.' [Seeking to focus anger 
vented in Arab uprisings against far 
enemy:] 'For these reasons, those global 
forces directly aid and support these local 
governments, turning a blind eye to their 
crimes, injustices, suppression, lies, 
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fabrications, and pillage.' .. 
 
 America has only dumped their agent 
regimes after they've become 
counterproductive, only to seek to install 
new ones. 
AAZ [March 
2011] “A Message 
of Glad 
Tidings…(4)” 
235  ‘‘Propagate moral depravity and 
licentiousness, cooperate with Israel 
against the Mujahideen, continue to 
blockade Gaza while providing Israel with 
the water of the Nile river and gas from its 
reserves, and deprive the people of Gaza 
from entering Egypt for medical treatment 
or trade, at the same time allowing tens of 
thousands of Israelis to cross into the Sinai 
without even a visa, to practice their 
licentious sins to fill the pockets of the lead 
criminals with unlawful wealth. These 
corrupt and corruptive governments which 
have participated with America 
 
 in their war on Islam and the Muslims.' .. 
America wishes to introduce diluted Islam 
which is not true Islam, it ceased its 
support of the Mubarak regime only when 
it saw the security forces were no longer in 
control but will seek to ensure the next 
government will secure the safety of Israel 
and enable America to carry through its 
plan to ‘Judaise’ Palestine and demolish Al 
Aqsa… America and Israel and the West 
want democracy for the Muslim lands in 
order to keep occupying them and stealing 
their wealth. 
AAZ [April 2011] 
“A Message of 
Glad 
Tidings…(5)” 
236  Uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya. 
Withdrawal of US troops in Afghanistan 
(Defeat). ..  
 
America and its allies did nothing to 
alleviate the pain of Libyans during the 
Qaddafi regime and sent prisoners there to 
be tortured. People should not be deceived 
by their 'crocodile tears' for the suffering of 
the local population now that he has 
become unpopular. .. “Also, what does it 
mean by saying that this sector will be 
assigned to counterterrorism? What is this 
‘terrorism’? Is it the terrorism in the 
American-Israeli meaning, which was 
prevalent in the collapsed era? And 
consequently, participating in invading 
Iraq and Afghanistan is countering 
terrorism? And establishing secret prisons 
in Egypt and transforming them into 
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international torture stations is counter 
terrorism? And chasing the mujahideen of 
Gaza and torturing them to know the 
locations of their leaders and their 
headquarters and their financing tunnels, 
and informing Israel about them, is 
countering terrorism? And working 
according the signed security agreements 
with the United Nations is countering 
terrorism? And protecting the Israeli 
prostitution trade in Sinai, with the 
collapsed regime’s gaining its profits, is 
countering terrorism? And oppressing the 
people of Sinai in protection of Israel, and 
in deterring them from supporting their 
brothers in Gaza, is countering terrorism? 
And is arresting everyone who tries to 
participate in Jihad in Afghanistan, Iraq 
and Gaza, or supporting them financially, 
is countering terrorism? What is this 
‘terrorism’? Explain to us so the deception 
doesn’t continue and the prosecutors return 
in new forms.” .. America hypocritical 
when it comes to stances towards torture, 
imprisonment, democracy, governance, 
self-determination etc, whereby it pays lip 
services to these elements whilst inflicting 
this harm on Muslims. 
UBL [May 2011] 
“The Speech by 
the Martyr of 
Islam..” 
240 "The rulers had sought to make 
people give up their most 
important rights that Allah had 
given to them, so they sabotaged 
the minds of the Ummah and 
marginalized its rule in the 
important public affairs by co-
opting the efforts of the media and 
religious governmental 
institutions so as to give them 
legitimacy" 
The revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt. "The 
revolution was not one of food and 
clothing but one of dignity and defiance, a 
revolution of sacrifice and giving." Praise 
for those involved. 
AAZ [May 2011] 
“A Message of 
Glad 
Tidings…(6)” 
238  The Arab revolutions. The "Crusader war, 
which America is launching against our 
Ummah." The imprisonment of political 
prisoners by the military council in Egypt. 
"Speaking about the political prisoners 
reminds us with the prisoners in the Coptic 
Church jails". Social and judicial issues in 
Egypt. On Egyptian gas exports to Israel.. 
On "The [Egyptian] relation with America 
and Israel, and the case of Gaza’s 
sanctions." .. Talks of the "disgraceful" 
relationship with Israel. 
AAZ [June 2011] 
“The Noble 
Knight 
239 "America, which signed the 
Geneva Conventions in order to 
protect civilians and prisoners, 
On the killing of bin Ladin: "The noble 
knight, who loved Palestine with a love 
that possessed his heart, left, and he said to 
  307 
Communiqué 
and author [ID] 
 
(A) References to past 
important events 
[excerpts, quotes, notes] 
 
 
(B) References to ongoing political 
events and crises 
[excerpts, quotes, notes] 
 
Dismounted” and then was the first to violate 
them in Vietnam, Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
Guantanamo, and its secret 
prisons all over the world. And 
America snubbed the treaties it 
signed and required others to 
follow the decisions of the 
International Criminal Court, 
while it was too high with its 
arrogance to follow them." 
its people, “To our brothers in Palestine, 
we say to you, 'Indeed, the blood of your 
sons is the blood of our sons". Compares 
the killing of Bin Ladin to that of Ali Al-
Husayn in Karbala [Shia appeal?]: "Abu 
Abdullah Usama bin Laden was killed as 
Abu Abdullah Al-Hussein, may Allah be 
pleased with him, was killed amid his 
family and children." ..  
 
Incitement success: "And today, all praise 
be to Allah, America does not face an 
individual, group, or sect. No, it faces a 
rising Ummah that has awoken from its 
slumber in a Jihadi awakening that 
challenges it wherever it is." .. "This is the 
Islam which America gladly brings to us, a 
transgressing Islam, fabricated and 
deceitful, which stoops to influence the 
arrogant, and does not know allegiance, 
nor enmity, nor enjoining the good, nor 
forbidding evil, nor Jihad." 
AAZ [July 2011] 
“Glory of the East. 
The first Being 
Damascus..”  
241 Sykes Picot Suppression and oppression in Syria. 
Golan Heights. .. American 'war against 
Islam'. Syrian regime seen as 'guardian of 
Israeli borders' ... The 'global hegemony' of 
America. America, after cooperating with 
the Assaf regime, now pretends to be on 
the side of the rebels, 'after its plans were 
foiled in Tunisia and Egypt, two of its most 
important agents.' America now wishes to 
replace the Syrian regime with another that 
will stifle jihad and safeguard Israel. 
AAZ [August 
2011] “A Message 
of Hope and Glad 
Tidings..(7)” 
242  "America administered a peaceful 
transition of power that preserves its 
interests, so that the popular revolution 
turned into a military coup d'état in which 
rule was transferred from one wing to 
another under American supervision." 
America wishes to suppress Islamism, 
keep Egypt as a strategic power serving US 
interests, and to guarantee safety of Israel. . 
The Gaza blockade has not been lifted 
whilst there is "obscene welcoming of 
thousands of Israeli tourists" into Sinai. .. 
"This is the collapse we have reached at 
the hands of the Military Council that has 
turned the defiant revolution of the 
Egyptian people into a military coup d'état 
that preserves the interests of America, 
protects the borders of Israel and supplies 
it with gas." ..  
 
"Crusader intervention" in Libya whilst the 
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(A) References to past 
important events 
[excerpts, quotes, notes] 
 
 
(B) References to ongoing political 
events and crises 
[excerpts, quotes, notes] 
 
Arab League sits idle. Had it helped the 
Crusader intervention would have been 
"unnecessary" [interesting implicit 
acknowledgement that it is as a result a 
viable option]. 
AAZ [August 
2011] “Do not 
become weak or 
grieve” 
243  "why then isn’t normalization with Israel 
and exchanging ambassadors with her 
halted, as well as removing sanctions from 
Gaza, thus allowing the transfer of 
products and persons from her and to her? 
It is not rational that tens of thousands of 
Israeli tourists enter Sinai without a visa in 
order to practice adultery, while our 
families in Gaza are not allowed entry into 
Egypt except through tearing souls apart" 
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UBL=Usama bin Ladin 
AAZ=Ayman Al-Zawahiri 
 
Communiqué 
and author [ID] 
References to a pious society and ways to achive the ultimate goal 
[excerpts, quotes, notes] 
UBL [unknown 
date] 
“Methodological 
Guidelines..” 
112 Quoting an Islamic authority: 
'The author identifies six criteria for restoring Islam: 1) love for God, 2) 
compassion for fellow believers, 3) counselling each other to goodness and 
obedience to God's commands, 4) hurting unbelievers, 5) jihad in the cause 
of God, and 6) fearlessness in the face of critics. Muslims must establish an 
Islamic state through unity, hearing and obeying, and emigration and 
struggle (hijra and jihad)'. 
AAZ [unknown 
date] “The 
Forbidden Word” 
113 Asked what Egypt will look like if an Islamic state is established, Zawahiri 
states that Hudud [Shari'a punishment] would be implemented immediately. 
But Non-Muslims would be protected under Shar'ia law [with Dhimmi 
status]. 
UBL [July 1994] 
“The Banishment 
of Communism 
from the Arabian 
Peninsula: The 
Episode and the 
Proof” 
38 Implementing the will of the Prophet and 'expelling all the unbelievers from 
the Arabian peninsula, no matter what colour or shape'. 
UBL [May 1995] 
“Scholars are the 
Prophet’s 
Successors” 
 
67 The scholars' responsibilities: 1) 'a scholar must be a role model not only in 
his knowledge but actions as well, 2) 'a scholar needs to make sure of all 
conditions of a fatwa. If he is asked to issue a fatwa, he needs to think very 
hard about the purpose of the person asking him to issue it along with its 
consequences, 3) 'a scholar needs to be aware of the possibility of being lead 
into temptation, exploitation and deceit, especially by rulers who declare 
war against Allah', 4) 'a scholar needs to have courage to speak out, no 
matter what. His courage is what sets him apart from others as a role model 
for others. He needs to say to whoever is/was offensive, that he is/was 
wrong', 5) 'a scholar should stay away from suspicious ways of rulers of 
which the Prophet, peace upon him, and his companions have warned 
against'. 'If scholars do that we ought to respect and honour them'. 
UBL [July 1996] 
“interview with 
Saudi 
Dissident..” 
4 All Muslims would live under Sharia. ‘A guilty man would only be happy if 
he was justly punished.’ 
UBL [November 
1996] 
150 US must remove forces from the 'area of the two holy mosques' and end 
'material support' for the Jews in Palestine. 
UBL [March 
1997] “Pakistan 
Interviews 
Usama bin 
Ladin” 
154 'We have to drive out the United States from the Arabian peninsula because 
this is the root of all problems.’.. A 'pious Caliphate' will be established, 
spreading from Afghanistan. Banking will be interest-free, as the 
mujahideen are against both capitalism and socialism. Says the Taliban are 
not against the education of women, and this should be permitted, 'un-
Islamic' conditions in education, however, should be avoided. 
UBL [May 1998] 
“Supporting the 
Fatwa…” 
71 'The Prophet’s last wish, may Allah's prayers and peace be upon him, is to 
drive the Jews and the Christians out of the Arabian Peninsula, and this must 
be acted on'. 
UBL [November 
1998] “Bin 
Ladin: Expel 
175 
 
The struggle will continue until Americans and their allies are expelled from 
all the holy sites of Islam and Shari'ah is established. 
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Jews, Christians 
From Holy 
Places” 
UBL [February 
1999] “Esquire 
interview with 
Bin Ladin” 
179 The first objective is to rid the Arabian peninsula of American presence 
UBL [February 
1999] “May 1998 
Interview with 
bin Ladin 
Reported” 
 
182 Ridding Saudi Arabia and other Muslim lands of US presence.  
See on near and far enemy: 'We have focused our attention on Israel and the 
United States. First we want to expel them, after which a Muslim state will 
be established and those who are forcefully ruling the people will be given 
severe punishments.' [Near enemy not precluded from UBL strategic 
thinking] 
UBL [June 1999] 
“Usama bin 
Ladin: The 
Destruction of 
the Base” 
184 'We want to free our lands of the Americans.' .. 
UBL + AAZ 
[September 
2000] “Bin 
Ladin, others, 
pledge ‘jihad’ to 
release prisoners 
in US, Saudi 
jails.” 
191 'On this blessed night, we pledge to God Almighty to do all we can to 
support our religion, to establish the shari'ah of Islam in the land of Islam, to 
expel the Jews and the Christians from the sacred places, and to endeavour 
to release our ulema from the United States, from Egypt, from Riyadh, and 
from all Muslim lands.' [UBL] 
UBL [January 
2001] “Daily 
Prints Usama bin 
Ladin Letter..” 
192 'Today, every member of the Muslim world agrees that all the Muslim 
countries of the world having geographical boundaries on the basis of 
nationality, geography, religious discord, colour and race, should be merged 
into one Muslim state, where men do not rule men. There should be one 
caliph for the whole state whose capital should be Mecca. There should be 
one currency and defence for this state and the Holy Koran should be its 
constitution. The name that has been proposed for this vast state is Global 
Muslim State. I want to congratulate you that by the grace of God, from 
today, we have begun the task of achieving a highly important and strong 
target of domination of Islam over all other religions.' 
UBL [April 
2001] “Letter 
from Usama bin 
LAdin to the 
scholars of 
Deyubende in 
Peshawar” 
120 'The unity of Islam which does not distinguish between nationalities and 
skin colour and does not take in consideration, borders or barriers'. 
UBL [October 
2001] “Tayseer  
Allouni 
interviews bin 
Ladin in 
Afghanistan” 
130 'Our aim is also to remove the rules that the United States has imposed on its 
agents in the region. We want this nation to be ruled according to the book 
of God, who created it.'  
'We want the revival of this nation under the Islamic caliphate, as predicted 
by the prophet in his traditions.' 
AAZ [December 
2001] “Knights 
under the 
Prophet’s 
Banner” 
119 Lessons from Afghanistan: 1) need for a base: 'A jihadist movement needs 
an arena that would act like an incubator where its seeds would grow and 
where it can acquire practical experience in combat, politics, and 
organizational matters. 2) The Islam was pure, free of nationalism and leftist 
politics and other influences which affected the Palestinian cause. 3) 
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Afghanistan following Russian withdrawal demonstrated the role of jihad in 
bringing down local rulers who prevent the implementation of the Shari'a, 
like Najibulah; 'He prayed, fasted, and performed pilgrimage. At the same 
time he prohibited government by Islam and allied himself with the enemies 
of Islam, allowed them to enter his country, and brutally oppressed the 
Muslims and the mujahidin'. 4) The Afghan jihad destroyed in the minds of 
young Muslims the idea of superpowers. 'That jihad was a training course of 
the utmost importance to prepare Muslim mujahidin to wage their awaited 
battle against the superpower that now has sole dominance over the globe, 
namely, the United States'.. The pivotal importance of Egypt: 'This would be 
followed by the earth-shattering event, which the west trembles at the mere 
thought of it, which is the establishment of an Islamic caliphate in Egypt. If 
God wills it, such a state in Egypt, with all its weight in the heart of the 
Islamic world, could lead the Islamic world in a jihad against the West. It 
could also rally the world of Muslims around it. Then history would make a 
new turn, God willing, in the opposite direction against the empire of the 
United States and the world's Jewish government'. . 'Conclusion: Has the 
jihad movement failed or succeeded in the past 36 years? The answer is: A. 
We must admit that the fundamentalist movement's goal of establishing an 
Islamic government in Egypt is yet to be achieved. B. The jihad Islamic 
movement, however, has not set a specific date for achieving this goal. More 
importantly, this is a goal that could take several generations to achieve. The 
Crusaders in Palestine and Syria left after two centuries of continued jihad. 
The Islamic nation at the time had jihad rulers and regular and disciplined 
armies. It was led by prominent scholars, such as Al-Izz Bin-Abd-al-Salam, 
Al, Nawawi, and Ibn-Taymiyah, God have mercy on their souls. Despite 
this, the Crusaders did not leave in 30 or 50 years. '. 
UBL [December 
2001] video 
statement 
129 Fighting so "the word of Allah becomes dominant and the word of the 
disbelievers becomes abased". 
n/a [August 
2002] internal 
document 
34 Al Qaeda believes in the Sunnite, following the traditions of the noble 
ancestors. It seeks: 'the victory of the mighty religion of Allah, the 
establishment of an Islamic Regime and the restoration of the Islamic 
Caliphate. 
UBL [October 
2002] “Statement 
from Shaykh 
Osama bin 
Ladin…” 
211 Talks of 'propelling this battle toward its desired aim and intended objective 
of spreading Allah's religion in the world and applying His shari'ah.' 
UBL [October 
2003] “Second 
letter to Muslims 
in Iraq” 
98 'Jihad must continue until an Islamic government is ruling according to the 
revealed law'. 
UBL [early 2004] 
“Bin Ladin warns 
of ‘grand 
plots’..” 
111 'The religion of Islam encompasses all the affairs of life, including the 
religious and the worldly, such as economic, military, and political affairs, 
as well as the scales by which we weigh the actions of men--rulers, ulema, 
and others--and how to deal with the ruler in line with the rules set by God 
for him and which the ruler should not violate. Therefore, it becomes clear 
to us that the solution lies in adhering to the religion of God, by which God 
granted us pride in the past centuries, and installing a strong and faithful 
leadership that applies the Koran among us and raises the true banner of 
jihad'. 
UBL [May 2004] 
“People of Iraq” 
82 'The most important meaning of "there is no God but Allah" is that there is 
no ruler and no legislator except for Allah'. 
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UBL [December 
2004] audio 
statement 
84 'We look forward to seeing no land other than the land of al-Haramain, from 
which we have been away for a long time'. [continued emphasis on Saudi 
Arabia]. 
 'We seek to expel [the enemy] from this land'. 
UBL [December 
2004] audio 
statement 
86 'Islam is one unit that can not be divided', 'If someone believes in a part of it 
and rejects another part, then he becomes an infidel and his prayers and 
fasting will be to no avail', 'if people abide by all the laws of Islam, but do 
not prohibit usury, and sanction dealing with banks that deal in interest, then 
the constitution of this country is a constitution of infidelity'.  
Muslims are allowed to take part in the selection of emir or president, but 
only if he intends to rule according to Islam. Even if 90 per cent of 
regulations are derived from the Islamic Shariah in a society and 10 per cent 
from man-made legislation, then such a constitution would still be 'a 
constitution of infidelity'. 
AAZ [February 
2005] “The 
Freeing of 
Humanity..” 
109 'Our freedom is the freedom of Tawheed, morals, chastity, fairness, and 
justice'. Reform must be based on three principles: 1) Rule of the Shari'a, 'If 
a person believes in Allah then it is not logical to argue with His Lord the 
details of His laws, or to give himself the right to remove himself from those 
laws', 2) 'Freedom of the homelands of Islam', 'freeing it from every 
occupying robbing thief', including Israel. 3) 'The Freedom of Humanity', on 
the rights and obligations of the Ummah. 
AAZ [June 2005] 
video statement 
72 'The real reform is based on three principles; the first principle is the rule of 
Sharia because it is the sharia that was revealed from God of the world that 
guarantees their interests, freedom, dignity and their prestige and it protects 
their honour'. 'The second principle for reform is the freedom of Muslim 
countries. We cannot imagine having any kind of reform while our country 
is occupied by the Crusader forces spread in all corners of our countries'. 
'The third principle for reform is the freedom of the Muslim nation in 
running its affairs. This kind of reform can only be achieved through two 
things. The first is the freedom of independent and Sharia-based judiciary, 
the implementation of its rules and ensuring its stature, influence and power. 
The second is the freedom of the Muslim nation and its right to order virtue 
and prevent vice'. 
AAZ [December 
2005] first 
interview with 
Zawahiri 
49 'There is no way of achieving reform except by uprooting these corrupt and 
corrupting regimes, and be establishing a Muslim government that will 
protect rights, defend sanctities, institute justice, spread consultation, raise 
the banner of jihad, and confront the invaders, the foes of Islam.' 
AAZ [June 2006] 
“Support for 
Palestinians” 
85 'The application of Shari'ah is the hope of every Muslim in Egypt'. 
AAZ [June 2006] 
“Elegizing the 
Ummah’s 
Martyr..” 
32 Iraq must become a Muslim state, then operations will be launched from 
there to free Jerusalem. 
AAZ [June 2006] 
“The Zionist 
Crusader’s 
Aggression in 
Gaza and 
Lebanon” 
88 'It is jihad for the liberation of Palestine, all Palestine, as well as every land 
that was home for Islam, from Andalusia to Iraq'. 
UBL [July 2006] 
“To the ummah 
in general and the 
mujahideen in 
93 'Establish the state of Islam with Almighty God's help' in Iraq, Somalia. 
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Iraq and Somalia 
in Particular” 
AAZ [September 
2006] “Hot 
issues with 
Shaykh Ayman 
Al Zawahiri” 
21 The goal is to establish Islamic emirates in Afghanistan and Iraq. These then 
can be used as bases in the defence of Islam, and thus the Muslims can re-
establish the Caliphate, from Spain to Iraq. [note that AQ relies on utilizing 
new military fronts opened by the US and then rallying the mujahiden to 
these locations, rather than being fully in control of its destiny]. From Iraq 
the Mujahideen can infiltrate Jordan and liberate Jerusalem. 
AAZ [December 
2006] “Realities 
of the Conflict 
between Islam 
and Unbelief” 
94 See further on section ‘Criticising Muslims’ 
 
Litigation to Divine law only, and no other laws; recovery of every land that 
was once Muslim. 'What is the authority which rules? Is it the majority of 
votes? Or Divine Shari'ah?'  
 
'Establish the Islamic state which rules by the Shari'ah and defends the rights 
of the Muslims' 
 
'It is the duty of the Ummah's vanguard to strive for change, because getting 
rid of these puppets is the doorway to deliverance and the beginning of the 
serious Jihadi challenge to the Crusader invasion'. 
AAZ [February 
2007] “Lessons, 
examples and 
great events in 
the year 1427” 
97 Setting up a mujahid Islamic state in Iraq which would proceed to liberate 
Jerusalem 'and take steps towards the reestablishment of the Caliphate state 
which the Crusaders and their helpers toppled'. 
AAZ [March 
2007] “Palestine 
is the concern of 
all Muslims” 
18 Muslims must liberate all Muslim lands from al Andalus to Iraq and fight 
until 'the Word of Allah is supreme and the Caliphate returns to protect the 
sanctuary of Islam'. Muslims must spread its Shariah. 
AAZ [May 2007] 
“The Empire of 
Evil is about to 
end..” 
23 The Jihad in Iraq will lead to the establishment of an emirate and 
enforcement of Shariah law. The oppressed will get their rights back and it 
will become a base for liberating Jerusalem. If elections are held under 
Islamic constitutions and without foreign interference then they are to be 
welcomed, but if they are held under secular constitutions and for falsifying 
rulers then they should be banned and resisted. 
 
On the Strategy: 'The road to reform, and Allah knows best, requires, in the 
Arabian Peninsula and the other Islamic lands, work on two plans. The first 
is in the near term, and seeks to strike Crusader and Zionist interests so that 
the ground erupts in flames under the feet of the Zionists and Crusaders in 
our countries and theirs and everywhere we are able to strike their interests 
until they leave our countries and stop their continuous and increasing 
interference in our affairs. And the second plan is for the longer term, and 
depends on two pillars: the first is preparation for the confrontation, by 
going forth to arenas of battle like Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia, and the 
second pillar is diligent work to change the corrupt and corruptive regimes 
through invitation, incitement, mobilization and planning, and to persevere 
in that however much time it takes or sacrifice it requires. And every time 
we achieve victory in one arena, that will ease – with Allah’s help – victory 
in the next one. And from this, the critical importance of the Jihad in Iraq 
and Afghanistan becomes clear, because the defeat of the Crusaders there – 
soon, Allah permitting, will lead to the setting up of two Mujahid Emirates 
which will be launch pads for the liberation of the Islamic lands and the 
establishment of the Caliphate, with Allah’s permission.' 
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AAZ [June 2007] 
“Forty years 
since the fall of 
Jerusalem” 
101 End rule of Crusader-Zionists and govern by Sharia - only then will 
Muslims have freedom. 
AAZ [July 2007] 
“The Advice of 
One Concerned” 
102 The goals of jihad: 'the word of Allah be supreme and that the vanguards of 
the Mujahideen knock at the doors of Jerusalem, liberate the usurped lands 
of the Muslims from Spain to East Turkistan, and raise the banner of the 
Caliphate to flutter nobly after a long absence'. 
AAZ [July 2007] 
“Malicious 
Britain and 
Indian Slaves” 
103 'Liberate all of the Muslim lands that have been occupied from the times of 
the occupation by Andalusia and up to the occupation of Iraq'   
 
'To establish God's way on earth, to fight so that God's religion becomes 
supreme'.  
 
Make the word of God supreme and implement the rule of the Shari'ah, free 
all occupied Muslim lands and establish a Caliphate 'that does not know 
national affiliation and does not adhere to Sykes-Picot borders'. 
UBL [September 
2007] “The 
Solution: A 
Message from 
Shaykh Osama 
bin Ladin to the 
American 
people” 
10 In the Islamic society there will be no taxes apart from the 2.5% 
UBL [September 
2007] “Come to 
Jihad: A Speech 
to the People of 
Pakistan” 
14 'Allah, the Most High, says, “And fight them until there is no Fitnah 
[polytheism], and religion is wholly for Allah.” (8:39) So if some of the 
religion is for Allah and some of it is for other than Allah, fighting is 
obligatory to make the religion entirely for Allah, the Most High.' 
AAZ [December 
2007] 
“Annapolis: The 
Betrayal” 
12 'We must return to the pure uncompromising faith, which forbids these 
political tricks, and diplomatic frauds that destroys both the religion and the 
world'. 'Free every conquered part of the Islamic world - starting in 
Andalusia and ending with Chechnya.' 
AAZ [December 
2007] “A Review 
of Events…” 
13 Addressing Jihadi media operators: 'You must strive to bring the Ummah, 
long exiled from its Shariah, back to the pristine Mohammed fountain and 
the way of life of his rightly-guided Successors, Good companions and 
purified House'. 
UBL [December 
2007] “The Way 
to Frustrate 
Conspiracies” 
27 Full empowerment cannot be a precondition of establishing an Islamic state 
or pledging allegiance to an imam, since the enemy has military superiority 
and can invade any country and overthrow its government. Thus the time to 
establish an Islamic emirate is now, even though the country is broken. [how 
to get from A to B]. (The strength then lies in the unity of the mujahideen 
and support of the Ummah). 
AAZ [early 
2008] 
“Exoneration…” 
20 'Al-Qa'ida is not merely demanding the expulsion of the crusader occupiers 
and the Jews from the Muslim countries, but also that petroleum should be 
sold at its real price. This call poses the threat of destructive effects on the 
US global hegemony, which was erected on the basis of its theft of Muslim 
resources.' 'If it is said that the benefit to be reaped by expelling the Zionist 
enemy from Palestine is greater than the loss of Palestinian lives, then the 
answer that it is also a benefit to establish a mujahidin Islamic state in Egypt 
that will seek to liberate Palestine and every Muslim land, eliminate 
corruption, establish justice, and restore Egypt's historical role of defending 
Islam and the Muslim people. This benefit is greater than the loss 
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represented by the shedding of some innocent blood.' 'We in Al-Qa'ida of 
Jihad do not seek internal conflict. We seek to expel the invaders from the 
Muslim lands and establish a Muslim state. As we have been led by the 
mental efforts we made to act in accordance with Shari'ah, our practical 
plan, which we have repeatedly announced, is the following: (a). striking at 
crusader and Zionist targets; and (b). making serious efforts to change these 
corrupt regimes and establish an Islamic order. 
AAZ [April 
2008] “The Open 
Meeting..” 
105 'What is important isn't to ask about stopping the bequeathing or not 
stopping it, but rather is to liberate the countries from the American 
Crusader hegemony among the symptoms of which is Mubarak's regime and 
the effort to bequeath power to his son'.  
 
'I expect the Jihadi influence to spread after the Americans' exit from Iraq, 
and move towards Jerusalem'.  
 
The objective: 'at this stage [it] is the withdrawal of all unbelieving forces 
from the lands of the Muslims. The defeat of America 'will end in the White 
House, with Allah's permission' [when asked where the defeat of America, 
which began in Kabul and continued in Baghdad will end].  
 
'Even if Usama bin Ladin doesn't become ill, he must die one day, whereas 
Allah's religion will remain until Allah inherits the earth and everything on 
it'. 
AAZ [April 
2008] “On the 
Fifth Anniversary 
of the Invasion 
and Torture of 
Iraq” 
7 Iraq will become ‘fortress of Islam’ from where assaults on Israel will be 
conducted. Need for independent Islamic authority in Egypt. ‘Expel the 
Jewish-crusader invasion from the Muslim lands and to establish an Islamic 
state subordinate to the rules of Sharia’ 
AAZ [April 
2008] “The Open 
Meeting..P.2” 
107 The leader of the faithful in the world will be the imam of the caliphate state 
which every faithful Muslim seeks to establish. 
 
Muslims have established an Islamic Emirate in Afghanistan and Iraq, but 
have not yet restored the Caliphate. Large sections in Iraq and Afghanistan 
are controlled where the rule of religion is implemented. Counters criticism 
of the Afghan emirate saying it is still ‘viable emirate’, just as it always has 
been, but has redeployed its forces from the capital into the mountain areas 
and forced the enemy out of these areas and into fortified places. The 
southern and eastern areas of Afghanistan are under the Emirate control and 
implement the sharia, appoint governors and officials. It has also been 
inflicting 'painful attacks' on the occupiers and they have admitted their 
defeat in Afghanistan. America tries to pressure its European allies to attack 
in the mountains and die instead of it. The Taliban also enjoy influence and 
control 'vast areas' in Pakistan. 'Musharraf's hunting dogs were forced to 
conclude agreements with the Taliban in order not to harm them' [see on 
success and failure]. The ISI controls large areas of Iraq and is the strongest 
force fighting the Crusaders and Iranian ambitions. 'We hope that the 
caliphate state will be established soon to unite them [the Emirates in 
Afghanistan and Iraq] with all Muslims. Sheikh Osama bin Laden [...] is one 
of the soldiers of [the] leader of the faithful, Mullah Mohammed Omar'. 'The 
establishment of the Islamic state or emirate is a religious duty and a 
realistic necessity. This cannot be delayed for the lack of the best 
circumstances for electing the ruler'. 
UBL [January 
2009] “Call for 
122 'We Muslims believe it is the nation's right to elect its president and we 
believe in Shoura, however we believe that the Western democracy -beside 
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Jihad to stop the 
Gaza assault” 
being a big trick- it is an illegitimate heresy from the Islamic point of view'. 
AAZ [February 
2009] “From 
Kabul to 
Mogadishu” 
132 Discusses meetings being held in Baidoa after the Al-Shabaab took over 
with the city's intelligentsia and notables 'in order to lay down new 
arrangements for the city'. The meetings have 'not been lacking in frankness’ 
 
'.. Muslims urged to fight until 'Allah's word is supreme'. 
AAZ [August 
2009] “The 
realities of Jihad 
and fallacies of 
Hypocrisy” 
140 'The minimum limit the mujahideen would [satisfactorily] accept is the 
withdrawal of the Kufr forces from all the Islamic lands, to stop robbing the 
wealth of Muslims with military force and exchange the wealth and benefits 
with true fair prices, and to stop supporting the corrupt apostate regimes in 
the Islamic World, and to release all the Muslim prisoners, and to stop 
interfering in the affairs of the Muslims World.' 
AAZ [September 
2009] “Eulogy 
for the Role 
Model of the 
Youth, The 
Commander and 
Shahid Baitullah” 
147 'We must be determined and work in order to liberate every land that was 
taken from the Muslims, from Caucasia to Andalusia.' 
AAZ [December 
2009] “The 
Palestinian 
National Unity..” 
146 'What are the most important practical goals for Muslims in Palestine and 
the rest of the world?': freeing Muslim lands from the Kuffar and 
establishing Shar'iah law. 
AAZ [December 
2009] “The 
Morning and the 
Lamp to be 
Extinguished” 
141 'We are not calling for dictatorship nor despotism nor tyranny in the name of 
religion, for that is one of those things that Islam itself is battling against. 
We are only calling the ummah to return to ruling by shūrā; justice; non-
partisanship and elimination of discrimination between people except on the 
basis of taqwā; righteous deeds; enjoining the good and forbidding the evil; 
servitude of both the ruler and the ruled, the noble and the lowly, the strong 
and the weak, to the Sharī`ah, without any discrimination or division; that 
the ummah elect its ruler and be able to hold him to account, just as was 
witnessed in the time of the khilāfah of the rightly guided.' [And yet there is 
praise for the Taliban and their tyrannical regime]. [Then he goes on to insist 
upon the implementation of what appears to be a tyrannical regime]: 
'Therefore, one must demand that it be the Sharī`ah that rule in Pakistan 
(and in all other Muslim homelands) rather than it itself being ruled over by 
other systems. That its authority not be in need of any referendum and not 
open to cancellation, not have to compete with alternatives as an equal and 
not be subject to amendments and substitutions.' 
UBL [February 
2010] “The Way 
to Save the 
Earth” 
149 In order to rid the world of corruption and solve climate change people need 
to: (1) rid themselves of the corruption in their hearts and deeds and 
embrace Islam; (2) avoid wastefulness in that which they consume and use; 
(3) stop purchasing American goods, since this will lead to the closure of 
polluting American factories; (4) punish the leaders of US corporations for 
the damage they have inflicted, this applies to Americans too who have 
suffered from Hurricane Katrina and the economic downturn; (5) stop using 
the dollar in order to 'liberate humanity from enslavement and servitude to 
America and its corporations.' 
AAZ [July 2010] 
“Al-Quds will 
not be converted 
to Judaism” 
223 'Change will not come except through Jihad in order to remove the invasive 
forces and to overthrow these corrupt and corrupting regimes, and the 
alternative is more failure, humiliation, occupation and dependency' [this 
follows right after condemning democratic reform movements, and yet this 
is precisely what brought about change in Egypt and elsewhere - out of 
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touch].  
 
'Establishing the Shariah of Allah, and control for the state of Islam, that 
which does only govern with the Shariah […] spreads justice, lays the 
Shurah, and not in the cause of nationalist, socialist, secular state that 
governs with the which of the majority.' 
AAZ [September 
2010] “A 
Victorious 
Ummah – A 
Broken Crusade” 
226 Loyalty must 'only be to Allah and Sunnah [tradition] of his Prophet and to 
their brothers in Islam' ..  
 
Muslims must be aware of the facts, and the most important is the aqeedah 
of tawheed, which must be the ruling authority in all systems. .. 'Our desired 
objective is ruling by Shar'iah [..] liberation of Muslim lands; spreading 
justice; opening the door to Shura 
AAZ [February 
2011] “A 
Message of Hope 
and Glad 
Tidings.. (3)” 
234 'To fulfil the hopes of the Muslim Ummah of the establishment of a free 
Muslim nation in the Islamic world, which governs with the Shariah, 
promotes justice, implements Shura, liberates the Muslim lands, ends the 
blockade of Gaza, guards morality, destroys the nation of ignobility and 
corruption, establishes a Shura system in which the Ummah chooses its 
rulers without domination, forgery or rigging, holds them to account, 
enjoining them with good and forbidding them from evil, and guards 
Muslim resources from domestic thieves and their international masters who 
loot the treasures of our lands,' 
AAZ [March 
2011] “A 
Message of Hope 
and Glad 
Tidings.. (4)” 
235 ''The cure is to uproot this corrupt government and replace it with proper and 
just government which rules with the Shariah, implements the Shura, 
spreads justice, gives way for the Ummah to participate in the selection of 
its rulers and holds them to account, involves them in the administration of 
its affairs through its representatives, and works to be just in distributing the 
wealth of the Ummah, preventing its theft, prohibiting depravity and 
immorality, confronts Western hegemony over our lands, and helps to free 
all oppressed people from injustice' ..  
 
Thus, the noble and freeborn Muslims who are jealous of their religion, 
sanctities and honour must not suffice with merely removing the tyrant 
whose removal is an obligation, but rather they must continue their Jihad 
and struggle until an Islamic government is established which guarantees 
justice, freedom, and independence.' 
AAZ [April 
2011] “A 
Message of Hope 
and Glad 
Tidings.. (5)” 
236 ''“I also call upon our people in Libya to be patient, steadfast and coalesced 
in order for their goal to be achieved by establishing a Muslim state in 
Libya, to rule by Sharia, bring Shura, spread justice, support the oppressed, 
and seek to liberate Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan, and every occupied 
inch of the Muslim homelands.”'  
 
America, which accuses al-Qadhafi of killing civilians, has killed and is 
killing civilians everywhere; from Hiroshima and Nagasaki to Iraq and 
Afghanistan, and from the most recent events killing 60 civilians, amongst 
them women and children, in Ghazi Abad village in Kunar province in 
February.' America hires mercenaries and kills and tortures in secret prisons, 
and yet pretends to be affected by Qaddafi's use of the same. .. “And the 
anticipated holistic reforms can be summed in three ways, and they are: the 
legislative, political, and social reform": introduction of Shar'iah; Egypt 
must return to its leadership role within the Ummah (including severing all 
ties with Israel, opening borders with Gaza and 'liberate the Ummah from 
the shackles of oppression and fear'; install a 'righteous government in its 
behaviour and practices that preserves morals and values, and stops the 
spread of vice and dissolution' (tackle corruption, achieve just distribution of 
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wealth, tackle drug abuse etc). 
UBL [May 2011] 
“The Speech of 
the Martyr of 
Islam..” 
240 "I remind the faithful people that the creation of a council to offer opinion 
and advice to the Muslim people on all the important points is a Shariah 
duty" 
AAZ [May 2011] 
“A Message of 
Hope and Glad 
Tidings.. (6)” 
238 Talks of internal and external challenges that need to be addressed in Egypt: 
"As for the internal challenges; the most important includes legislative and 
judicial reforms", this includes amending the second article of the 
constitution allowing for rule by shari'ah. ...  
 
Wants Egypt to return to its "role in defending the Islamic and Arab Ummah 
and the rest of the weakened in the world." 
AAZ [July 2011] 
“The Noble 
Knight 
Dismounted”  
239 "and it is incumbent upon us to continue the work on the path of Jihad to 
expel the invaders from the Muslim lands and purge them from oppression 
and the oppressors." ...  
 
"To make the Shariah the ruler and not the ruled, to cleanse the lands from 
the corrupt and thieves, to end the tragedy of the oppressed prisoners, to 
divide wealth fairly and justly, to end all types of social and political 
oppression, and return your lands to being like citadels for Islam and support 
for the Muslims in Palestine and everywhere." 
AAZ [July 2011] 
“Glory of the 
East..” 
241 The revolt in Syria must not end until the flag of jihad is raised over Mount 
Scopus in our beloved and usurped land of Jerusalem' 
AAZ [August 
2011] “A 
Message of Hope 
and Glad 
Tidings.. (7)” 
242 "So be steadfast, our Muslim Ummah, and do not back down from insisting 
on toppling the agents of America, and do not back down from establishing 
just rule that rules with the Shariah, spreads justice, implements Shura and 
uproots corruption and the corrupters." ...  
 
"Your sons, the mujahideen, are paving the way for the heralded change 
with their blessed strikes against the Global Crusader Alliance that has 
started to stagger due to their impact" [hardly reflects events of the Arab 
spring and its aftermath]. ...  
 
"The shariah is the sole source of legislation." Suggests the Constitution is 
rewritten with the clause "Islamic Shariah is the sole source of legislation, 
and all the articles of the constitution and the law which opposed it are null 
and void." Talks of this as the "noble aim" of the "Islamic movement." 
AAZ [August 
2011] Do not 
become weak or 
grieve” 
243 "My Muslim brothers and beloved Mujahideen: we have crossed strides on 
the road, but we still have other strides before us until victory is achieved, 
and we still have Jihad with the hand and the tongue before us until we 
purify all of the Muslim homelands from the occupiers, and until we remove 
from them the corrupt rulers. And until we establish a Sharia-based…rule 
that spreads justice and removes corruption.” 
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and author [ID] 
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UBL 
[November 
1996] “Bin 
Ladin 
interviewed 
on Jihad 
against US” 
150 Taliban Afghanistan 
UBL [March 
1997] 
“Interview 
with Usama 
bin Ladin” 
155 We believe that Taliban are sincere in their attempts to enforce Islamic religious law. 
We saw the situation here before (they took over) and after, and have seen an obvious 
improvement.' 
UBL 
[November 
1998] “Bin 
Laden: Expel 
Jews, 
Christians 
from Holy 
Places” 
175 'By enforcing Shariat in Afghanistan Taleban have established the system of God on 
God's land' 
UBL 
[February 
1999] May 
1998 
interview with 
bin Ladin 
reported 
182 The Taliban 'established peace and restored the confidence of the public.' 
UBL [May 
2000] “Usama 
speaks on 
Hijra and the 
Islamic State” 
189 'Afghanistan is the only country in the world today that has the Shari'ah. Therefore, it 
is compulsory upon on all the Muslims all over the world to help Afghanistan. And to 
make hijra to this land, because it is from this land that we will dispatch our armies all 
over the world to smash the kuffar all over the world.' 
UBL [April 
2001] “Letter 
from Usama 
bin Laden..” 
120 The Afghan emirate is the only one properly implementing the Shari'a. 
 
AAZ 
[February 
2005] “The 
Freeing of 
Humanity..” 
109 'What is our fault, as there is none amongst us who claim the right of forgiving sins, 
nor the engaging in the wealth of the people without consequence, nor do we sell 
stamps in exchange for forgiveness. What is our fault, as never did we fight scientists 
and science, rather we are a nation that honoured science and scientists, and our 
natural sciences like medicine, architecture and astronomy all developed in the arms 
of the mosque and the school'. 
AAZ (and 
Adam 
Gadhan) 
[September 
2006] “An 
invitation to 
Islam” 
33 Islam according to Ibn Tamiyya's interpretation, dedication to God etc... 
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AAZ 
[December 
2012] 
“Realities of 
the Conflict 
between Islam 
and Unbelief” 
94 Caliphate, Salahuddin, Sultan Muhammad the Conqueror.. 
UBL 
[September 
2007] “The 
Solution..” 
10 When rulers ruled according to Islam 
AAZ [April 
2008] “The 
Open 
Meeting..” 
107 The Islamic Emirate in Afghanistan. The people of Afghanistan have 'supported and 
accepted the Islamic Emirate', since it replaced the 'deterioration and damage' that 
existed before. This can be seen in several issues: (1) 'Citizens in the various 
provinces and districts have welcomed and incited the Taliban to come to them to 
purge their areas of those who spread mischief'. This lead to the Taliban's controlling 
of 95 per cent of Afghanistan. (2) 'Two thousand scholars at the Qandahar conference 
pledged allegiance to leader of the faithful, Mullah Mohammad Omar', (3) 'The 
Islamic Emirate took control over large parts of Afghanistan' despite the onslaught 
from crusaders, their collaborators, and despite 'the Pakistani treason'. 'The Emirate's 
control is spreading and becoming stronger due to the great popular support it enjoys'. 
(4) other jihadist groups have also stressed thes factors [assumes support of the 
people, when there is none]. The Islamic Emirate was the only side which recognised 
the mujahid government in Chechnya. The Afghan people support the Taliban and 
their jihad. 
AAZ [June 
2008] “On the 
Anniversary 
of the 
Naksa..” 
15 The Ottoman caliphate, without borders, which protected the Palestinians. 
AAZ [August 
2010] 
“Message to 
the People of 
Turkey” 
225 The Ottomans defended the lands of Islam for five centuries. 
AAZ 
[September 
2010] “A 
Victorious 
Ummah, a 
Broken 
Crusade” 
226 Ottoman empire, defended Muslim lands 
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AAZ=Ayman Al-Zawahiri 
 
Communiqué and 
author [ID] 
 
Importance of violent attack - Claims of attack 
[excerpts, quotes, notes] 
 
AAZ [unknown date] 
“Response to a Grave 
Uncertainty..” 
117 Jihad an individual duty. On the need to take up arms to topple corrupt 
rulers and fight Israel. 
UBL [unknown date] 
“Methodological 
Guidelines” 
112 9/11 showed that America could be struck. Jihad is the only way. 
UBL [unknown date] 
Letter to Mullah Omar 
61 Possible WMD: 'It is a fact that the Islamic Republics region is rich 
with significant scientific experiences in conventional and non-
conventional military industries, which will have a great role in future 
Jihad against the enemies of Islam.' 
AAZ [unknown date] 
“Introduction to 
Characteristics of 
Jihad” 
35 Importance of martyrdom operations 
AAZ [purported] 
[unknown date] “Jihad, 
Martyrdom, and the 
killing of innocents” 
48 A treatise which uses lengthy religious arguments, mainly from the 
hadith to suggest that martyrdom operations are permitted (justified 
due to the intent of killing in the service of Islam), and that 
bombardment of areas where protected people my be harmed is 
permissible, as long as there is need for the Muslims to do so or if 
refraining from attack would delay the jihad.  
 
'Loving martyrdom and engaging in battle lead to glory and strength 
[for the Muslims]'  
 
'There is no difference between a man killing himself with his own 
hands or through the agency of another [...] provided that this is all 
done for the good and glory of Islam'.  
 
The siege of Taif, where the Prophet used catapults.  
 
Sets out three views towards killing those who should be protected 
from the Hadith; total prohibition, total legitimacy with blood money, 
based on al-Shaf'i and the Hanbalis - permission to kill these groups, 
'as long as there is a need or an obligation for Muslims to do so, or if 
not striking leads to a delay to jihad. As for blood money and 
atonement, these are to be judged individually.' 'This third view is the 
one that we hold' à (1) open warfare with the infidels is impossible, so 
'bombarding the organizations of the infidels and apostates [...] 
becomes imperative'. (2) The leaders of infidels shelter themselves in 
armoured cars and the like, so it is imperative to strike them 
explosives, rockets and such weaponry. (3) The leaders do not travel in 
isolation and often with many people around them. (4) Explosives and 
missiles have proved very helpful in Egypt, Algeria, Palestine, and 
Lebanon. (5) The mujahideen should take care to repeatedly warn the 
Muslims who are intermixed with the tyrants and their aides, to stay 
away from their centres, offices etc. (6) Those Muslims who 
intermingle freely with the tyrants are 'less sacred in the religion than 
those Muslims who are coerced and used as shields' (who can however 
also be fired upon). (7) If a Muslim is knowingly killed, then 
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atonement should be made. Blood money should only be paid if there 
are financial surpluses. ...  
 
Quotes Ibn Taymiyya saying: 'It is imperative to distinguish between 
repulsing the invading, oppressive infidel and pursuing him in his own 
lands.' [these arguments easier to justify than the more offensive ones]. 
AAZ [early 1991] “The 
Bitter Harvest” 
46 Criticises the Brotherhood's rejection of violence. 
AAZ [early 1992] “The 
Black Book: An 
account of the Torture 
of Muslims in the Time 
of Husni Mubarak” 
114 Armed resistance, jihad necessary. 
AAZ/Islamic Jihad 
[early 1993] “Advice to 
the Community to reject 
the Fatwa of Bin Baz..” 
99 'These rulers are unbelieving apostates whom it is necessary to fight 
until the unbelief and the corruption that hover over our countries are 
eliminated'. 
UBL [July 1994] “The 
Banishment of 
Communism from the 
Arabian Peninsula” 
38 On the jihad operations against Yemeni socialists. 'All those who 
oppose the faith of the ummah will face this type of ending' [defeat 
through jihad]. 
UBL [August 1995] 
“The Bosnia Tragedy 
and the Deception of 
the Servant of the Two 
Mosques” 
69 Sending arms and fighting in Bosnia recognised as something that 
should have happened 
AAZ [early 1996] 
“Healing the Hearts of 
the Believers” 
118 Discusses the bombing of the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad and 
explains this in Shari'a context. Emphasis on that this was done due to 
the Egyptian regime calling for loyalty of other things than God. The 
operation was carried out both to punish Egypt for its crimes, and 
Pakistan for its espionage and hostility towards mujahideen. . 
Legitimacy of 'martyrdom' operations according to Shari'a: suicide 
justified 'in the interest of religion'. Adopts Shafi`i/Hanbali views on 
targeting Muslims and protected non-Muslims when necessary. But 
ancient arguments written to suit a particular context are twisted and 
turned and interpreted to show that suicide operations are allowed. 
Since it is so difficult to get to leaders themselves since they are 
protected, the 'structure' can be targeted in stead. In defence of suicide 
attacks cites examples of Muslims who were captured and told to 
recant their faith or die, thus justifying suicide for the greater good [but 
this did not involve taking other lives]. Those who work for OR 
support the oppressive, jahil governments must take responsibility for 
this. These includes the media. Thus all falling within this category can 
be targeted. This view, Zawahiri then transferred onto the West when 
developing the attitude and strategy of AQ in this regard. 
UBL [September 1996] 
“Bin Ladin Declares 
Jihad on 
Americans/Letter from 
Usama bin Muhammad 
bin Ladin to his Muslim 
Brothers in the Whole 
World and Especially in 
the Arabian Peninsula..” 
5 Importance of asymmetric warfare – light and agile forces operating in 
secrecy. ‘Jihad and explosives’, shedding of blood’ of enemy only way 
of ridding the Peninsula of American occupation 
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UBL [November 1996] 
“Bin Ladin interviewed 
on Jihad against US” 
150 'Terrorism – if it is against criminals, thieves, and bandits – is a 
legitimate thing adopted by all states in all ages. The blameworthy 
terrorism is the kind committed by thieves against nations.' Welcomes 
recent Al-Khobar and Riyadh attacks as 'praiseworthy terrorism 
because it was against thieves, not individuals but major states which 
went there to plunder the riches of this nation and to encroach on its 
greatest holy sites.'  
 
When asked why they had not attacked after Jihad was declared against 
America earlier in the year, UBL responds that 'major operations' take 
time to prepare.  
 
Claims he, and other Arab veterans from the Soviet war, fought 
Americans in Somalia. 
UBL [February 1997] 
“Correspondent meets 
with opposition leader 
bin Ladin”s 
151 People need 'to not only hit American military but also demand the 
expulsion of civilians.' People should 'kill American soldiers' 
UBL [March 1997] 
“Bin Ladin Cited on 
Prince Sultan’s US 
Visit” 
152 Urges support for mujahideen in order to tackle the US occupiers and 
Isreael 
UBL [March 1997] 
“Bin Ladin Charges US 
involvement in China 
bombings” 
153 Urged attacks on US, UK, and French troops in ME/NA. 
UBL [March 1997] 
“Pakistan interviews 
Usama bin Ladin” 
154 'Only Americans were killed in the explosions in Riyadh and Al-
Khoba. No Saudi citizen suffered any injury. When I got the news 
about these blasts, I was very happy.' Claims he was not responsible 
but urges Saudi's to embrace such tactics to remove the Americans. .. 
Claims to have sent 250 men to fight Americans with Farah Aidid in 
Somalia, to have been responsible for many US deaths, including the 
downing of a helicopter and the displaying of the pilot's body. 
UBL [March 1997] 
“Interview with Usama 
bin Ladin” 
155 "if liberating my land is called terrorism, this is a great honour for me". 
UBL [April 1997] “The 
Saudi Regime and the 
Reputed Tragedies of 
the Pilgrims” 
70 The group leaders of the 'pure youth who are zealous about their belief, 
their country, and their nation' who killed American soldiers in SA, 
offered to the Americans. 
UBL [August 1997] 
“Usama bin Ladin 
Urges ‘Befitting Reply’ 
to Horan” 
157 Muslims must respond to Horan's remarks with a 'befitting reply'. 
Americans will be 'punished' for this 'crime'. 
UBL + AAZ + others 
[February 1998] “Text 
of Fatwa Urging Jihad 
Against Americans” 
161 'And ulema have throughout Islamic history unanimously agreed that 
the jihad is an individual duty if the enemy destroys the Muslim 
countries'  
 
'The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies -- civilians and 
military -- is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any 
country in which it is possible to do it,' 
UBL [March 1998] 
“Bin Ladin Urges 
162 Talks of 'expulsion' of 'invaders' with implicit endorsement of violence 
  324 
Communiqué and 
author [ID] 
 
Importance of violent attack - Claims of attack 
[excerpts, quotes, notes] 
 
Expulsion of 
Invaders..” 
UBL [March 1998] 
“Interview with Usama 
bin Ladin Reported” 
163 Denies attack on US personnel in Saudi Arabia but calls for 
'annihilation' of America 
UBL [May 1998] 
“Clerics in Afghanistan 
Issue Fatwa..” 
165 Need to 'move the polytheists out of the Arabian Peninsula.' 
UBL [May 1998] 
“World Islamic Front 
Backs Intifadah of 
Palestine’s 
Sons/Wounds of Al-
Aqsa” 
167 Urges Jihad against Israel and America everywhere and 'jihad against 
the atheists among Americans Christians and Israeli Jews.' 
UBL [May 1998] “Bin 
Ladin Creates New 
Front Against US, 
Israel” 
168 Since the Americans could be pushed out of Somalia and Yemen, they 
can be pushed out of Saudi Arabia - they almost pulled their forces out, 
according to UBL, when their forces suffered losses in an attack 
[Khobar and Riyadh bombings] 
UBL [May 1998] 
“United States Admits 
that Keeping its Troops 
in the Gulf is Causing 
Dissatisfaction…” 
169 Importance of jihad 
UBL [June 1998] “Bin 
Ladin Congratulates 
Pakistan on Possession 
of Nuclear Weapons” 
170 Muslims 'should not be lax in possessing nuclear, chemical, and 
biological weapons' and follow the example of Pakistan in this regard.  
 
Urges jihad against India, Israel-US. 
UBL [June 1998] “In 
the Way of Allah” 
171 Jihad against India, US/Israel imperative. 
UBL [August 1998] 
“Bin Ladin Calls for 
‘Jihad’ against Jews, 
America” 
172 Claims East Africa embassy bombings were not his responsibility]. 
Jihad urged against US/Israel 
UBL [August 1998] 
“The Battle Has Not 
Yet Started” 
173 Concerns aftermath of Africa bombings, Americans warned that 
further attacks will follow 
UBL [November 1998] 
“Bin Ladin: Expel 
Jews, Christians, from 
Holy Places” 
175 Urges support for the mujahideen's jihad against Americans/Christians 
and Jews/Israel 
UBL [December 1998] 
“Bin Ladin Denies Role 
in Bombings of US 
Missions” 
176 Does not regret East Africa bombings, even though claims not to have 
been responsible 
UBL [January 1999] 
“Taliban let Bin Ladin 
Break his Silence” 
177 Denies involvement in East Africa bombings .. 'If instigating Jihad 
against the Jews and the Americans in order to liberate Al-Aqsa 
Mosque and the Holy Ka'aba is considered a crime, then let history be 
a witness that I am a criminal." 
UBS [January 1999] 
“Wrath of God..” 
178 'The International Islamic Front for Jihad against the US and Israel has 
issued a crystal-clear fatwa calling on the Islamic nation to carry on 
jihad aimed at liberating holy site'  
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Claims not to be behind the East Africa bombings but praises them and 
says he understands the 'motives' of those who carried them out.  
 
On WMD: 'If I have indeed acquired these weapons, then I thank God 
for enabling me to do so. And if I seek to acquire these weapons, I am 
carrying out a duty. It would be a sin for Muslims not to try to possess 
the weapons that would prevent the infidels from inflicting harm on 
Muslims.' 
UBL [January 1999] 
“Accused Terrorist 
Leader Usama Bin 
Ladin Declares War on 
All Americans” 
180 Importance of violence against Americans 
UBL [February 1999] 
“Esquire interview with 
bin Ladin” 
179 On the glory of past days of jihad in Afghanistan, Chechnya and 
Bosnia.  
 
'We believe that the biggest thieves in the world and the terrorists are 
the Americans. The only way for us to fend off these assaults is to use 
similar means.' 
UBL [February 1999] 
May 1998 interview 
reported 
182 Important for Pakistanis to 'strengthen their nuclear power and 
demonstrate it with full strength' in response to Indian nuclear tests. 
Pakistan should have a nuclear bomb of 'better quality' than India's ... 
Explains that the jihad against the Americans has already begun with 
attacks in Saudi Arabia which he applauds - these have already brought 
the result that America is seeking to scale down its presence in the 
country. 
AAZ [April 1999] 
“Letter to Abu Yasir” 
123 The letter attacks the decision to stop violent operations and urges 
support for the Global Islamic Front established in 1998 against Jews 
and Christians. 
UBL [June 1999] 
“Usama bin Ladin Pens 
Letter in Support of 
Kashmir Jihad” 
183 'Armed jihad' needed to liberate Kashmir - this would include 
operations inside India 
UBL [June 1999] 
“Usama bin Ladin, The 
Destruction of the 
Base” 
184 Praises Riyadh, Al-Khobar and East Africa attacks as they 'removed 
the brand of shame from the forehead of our [Islamic] nation'. Praises 
militants in Palestine.  
 
American males should be attacked. Americans support violence, their 
president becomes more popular if he kills the innocents. This needs to 
be replied to in kind. Muslims should pursue nuclear weapons as Israel 
and Christian West are in possession of such weapons. .. Admits to 
'instigating' and 'urging' jihad.  
 
East Africa embassy attacks 'deserved' due to CIA conspiracies being 
run in these embassies. .. 'Our duty -- and we carried it out -- is to rouse 
the nation for jihad against the United States, Israel, and their 
supporters for the sake of God. We continue to move in the direction of 
instigating people.'  
 
Demands the right to secure WMD, and since both Israel and most of 
the Christian world have these weapons - 'it is the duty' of Muslims to 
possess these weapons too. .. East Africa bombings 'delighted' 
Muslims. .. Claims that more than 15,000 men received training in the 
jihad camps of Afghanistan. .. Any country that has insured the 
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necessary requirements for jihad -- number and equipment -- Muslims 
there should embark on jihad against the great infidel.' ..  
 
'As we know, a person between birth and the age of 15 is not duty 
bound for jihad and not fully aware of its demands. And 25 years 
onward, a person will have been involved in family obligations' 
UBL [July 1999] “Bin 
Ladin Calls on Muslims 
to Declare Jihad against 
US” 
185 Jihad urged against US 
UBL [September 1999] 
“UBL Orders 
Mujahideen to Shoot 
US Commandos..” 
186 Urges Muslims to 'shoot on sight' US commandos. 
UBL [May 2000] “UBL 
Sees Holy War in 
‘Every Street’ of US” 
188 Calls for jihad in 'every street' of US. 
UBL [May 2000] 
“Usama Speaks on 
Hijra and the Islamic 
State” 
189 On the glory of 'martyrdom for Allah's sake'. . 
Muslims need to fight the Christians and Jews, 'smash the kuffar all 
over the world', they need to be killed. 
UBL [June 2000] 
“Usama bin Ladin 
Renews Calls for jihad” 
190 Jihad needed against Jews and Christians. 
UBL [September 2000] 
“Bin Ladin, others 
pledge ‘Jihad’ to release 
Prisoners..” 
191 Time for action and jihad 
UBL [January 2001] 
“Daily Prints Usama 
bin Ladin Letter Calling 
for Global Islamic 
State” 
192 Jihad needed to liberate Muslim lands and establish global Muslim 
state 
Muhammad bin Ladin 
[January 2001] video 
speech addressed to his 
father 
127 'I envision you all as Salahuddin Ayubi himself, wielding his all 
conquering sword and his sword is dripping with the blood of the 
infidels. I envision Salahuddin Ayubi coming out of the clouds and in 
our hearts and minds is recreated the remembrance of the battles of 
Badr and Khyber.' 
UBL [March 2001] 
“Ausaf receives Bin 
Ladin’s Poem..” 
193 'I have vowed to continue my jihad against the infidels, because 
oppression cannot be fought with resolutions, but only with jihad." 
UBL [March 2001] 
poem/message 
194 Implicit endorsement of USS Cole bombing 
UBL [April 2001] letter 
to scholars of 
Deyubende in Peshawar 
120 Jihad only way to triumph 
UBL [April 2001] 
“Usama urges Muslims 
to help Afghans” 
196 Clear importance of Jihad in the name of Allah 
UBL [May 2001] 
“Usama urges Ummah 
to continue Jihad” 
197 Praises the glory of the Martyrs who fight for the Umma, its dignity. .. 
Need for a new Salahuddin 'wielding his all conquering sword and his 
sword is dripping with the blood of the infidels' 
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UBL [may 2001] “Bin 
Ladin sends voice 
message to Palestinian 
People..” 
199 Possible implicit referral to USS Cole (Yemen coming to the aid of 
Palestine) 
UBL [September 2001] 
“Afghanistan: Bin 
Ladin denies 
involvement in terrorist 
attacks..” 
200 On 9/11: 'Following the latest explosions in the United States, some 
Americans are pointing the finger at me, but I deny that because I have 
not done it. The United States has always accused me of these 
incidents which have been caused by its enemies' 
UBL [September 2001]  
“Bin LAdin: from rich 
kid to terrorist..” 
181 Indiscriminate targeting 
UBL [September 2001] 
“Text of bin Ladin letter 
to the Pakistani People” 
201 Defensive Jihad paramount 
UBL [September 2001] 
“The US Should search 
attackers within itself” 
202 'Al-Qua'ida was set up to wage a jihad against infidelity, particularly to 
encounter the onslaught of the infidel countries against the Islamic 
states. Jihad is the sixth undeclared element of Islam.'  
 
Jews are the main cause of pain for Muslims and targeting should be 
aimed against them, even Americans are slaves of American Jews  
UBL [October 2001] 
“Tayseer Allouni 
interviews bin Ladin in 
Afghanistan” 
130 Admits to inciting violence against America, although does not claim 
responsibility of 9/11 attacks - implicit approval though. Argues 
America is defeatable, since the USSR was defeated, but also because 
he has heard from his companions in Somalia that they are worthless 
soldiers, "We found they had no power worthy of mention". "The 
events of Tuesday, September the 11th, in New York and Washington 
are great on all levels. Their repercussions are not over." Claims the 
attacks caused the West under American leadership to quickly abandon 
its values of freedom of speech and human rights. They are preventing 
the news from reporting the other side of the story, the suffering of 
Muslims etc. Bush and Blair declared that a Palestinian state should be 
created - this demonstrates the success of the attacks, "They only 
understand the language of attacks and killings. Just as they’re killing 
us, we have to kill them so that there will be a balance of terror. This is 
the first time the balance of terror has been close between the two 
parties, between Muslims and Americans, in the modern age."  
 
Talks of how 'terrorism' can be good, such as that which the police uses 
to constrain the criminal, America and Israel are applying "condemned 
terrorism", "We practice the good terrorism which stops them from 
killing our children in Palestine and elsewhere."  
 
Welcomes the economic impact of the 9/11 attacks on US. 
UBL [November 2001] 
“Bin Ladin condemns 
the US” 
77 'The great strikes that hit the United States in its most important 
locations in New York and Washington'. 
UBL [November 2001] 
“Al-Jazirah carries bin 
Ladin’s address..” 
203 'Terror' has struck America, 9/11 praised, but this is still 'a very small 
thing compared to what we have tasted for tens of years.' Hijackers 
viewed as 'martyrs'. 
UBL [November 2001] 
Osama claims he has 
nukes (article title) 
125 On Nuclear WMD: 'I wish to declare that if America used chemical or 
nuclear weapons against us, then we may retort with chemical and 
nuclear weapons. We have the weapons as deterrent.' Refuses to 
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answer how / where the weapons were acquired. 
AAZ [December 2001] 
“Knights under the 
Prophet’s Banner” 
119 On the attack in Egypt: says that the primary target was the American 
embassy, and if that would prove impossible, then another American 
target or a Western embassy of a Western country 'famous for its 
historical enmity to the Muslims'. When these proved out of reach the 
Egyptian embassy was targeted, in response to Egyptian efforts in 
Pakistan to target Egyptian Islamists. Says the search through the 
debris revealed Egypt-Indian espionage cooperation.  
 
Stresses that violent attacks need to be well planned and complains that 
not enough attention has gone into planning of attacks within the jihad 
movement, they are too haphazard. . 'There is no solution without 
jihad'.  
 
 The gains achieved through targeting Americans and Jews: 1) striking 
a blow against the ‘great master’, 2) gathering support from the masses 
who dislike these the most, 3) expose apostate regimes that come to the 
aid of Americans and Jews (131). 'With the available means, small 
groups could prove to be a frightening horror for the Americans and 
the Jews'.  
 
'The mujahid Islamic movement must escalate its methods of strikes 
and tools of resisting the enemies to keep up with the tremendous 
increase in the number of its enemies, the quality of their weapons, 
their destructive powers, their disregard for all taboos, and disrespect 
for the customs of wars and conflicts. In this regard, we concentrate on 
the following: (1) The need to inflict the maximum casualties against 
the opponent, for this is the language understood by the west, no matter 
how much time and effort such operations take. (2) The need to 
concentrate on the method of martyrdom operations as the most 
successful way of inflicting damage against the opponent and the least 
costly to the mujahidin in terms of casualties. (3) The targets as well as 
the type and method of weapons used must be chosen to have an 
impact on the structure of the enemy and deter it enough to stop its 
brutality, arrogance, and disregard for all taboos and customs. It must 
restore the struggle to its real size.(4) To reemphasize what we have 
already explained, we reiterate that focusing on the domestic enemy 
alone will not be feasible at this stage'. 
UBL [December 2001] 
“The Fact of the 
Conflict between us and 
America” 
129 9/11: "The blessed attacks on world-wide evil against the head of 
disbelief, America" (but implies the Arab mujahideen in Afghanistan 
are not to blame).  
 
"The events of 11 September are but a reaction to the continuous 
injustice and oppression being practiced against our sons in Palestine 
and Iraq and in Somalia and Southern Sudan and in other places like 
Kashmir and Assam. This matter concerns the whole Islamic nation." 
Those who condemned "this operation" failed to put it in context and 
view the past. [Gives an analogy which implies the attacks did not 
harm America that much, which contradicts later statements c.a. Min 
10]. 9/11 "blessed and successful strikes". It has shattered the idol of 
America based on its economic strength. "Loss of upwards of a trillion 
dollars".  
 
Economic targeting: emphasises the need to "strike at the economic 
base that forms the foundation of the military establishment". 
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Important to strike the American economy further.  
 
"And when the youths - we beseech Allah to accept their martyrdom - 
exploded a bomb in Nairobi - a bomb that weighted less than 2 tons - 
America declared it a terrorist strike and that this is a mass destruction 
weapon" [mentions in relation to the US dropping 7 ton bombs in 
Afghanistan].  
 
"Our terrorism [nachnu irhabuna] against America is praiseworthy 
terrorism in order to repel the injustice of the oppressor so that 
America withdraws from its support of Israel who kills our children". .. 
Those who claim martyrdom operations are not permissible are in fact 
agents of America and speak the words it wants to hear.  
 
More attacks are required against America, "I advise the youth to find 
more of the American economic hubs" and attack them. 
UBL [February 2002] 
in Al-Jazirah article 
204 'The battle has moved to inside America' and the fight will continue. .. 
'If urging people to do this [attacking US] is viewed as terrorism, then 
let history record that we are terrorists'.  
 
On the Anthrax attacks: 'These diseases are a punishment from God 
and are in response to the call of persecuted women in Lebanon and 
Palestine." 
UBL [March 2002] 
“Usama bin Ladin: 
Prince Abdallah’s 
initiative is High 
Treason” 
205 'Then came the New York invasion that ignited the house of the idiots 
of the age, smashed their citadels, nullified their witchcraft, exposed all 
the flags that marched behind them, and announced the beginning of 
their end, God willing'  
 
This presented as direct continuation of the Al Aqsa intifada. .. 'Hero' 
Khalid Islambouli for assassinating Sadat. .. Ummah should kill 
'Americans and Jews with a bullet, a knife, or a stone' and support the 
mujahideen [see 2]. 
UBL [April 2002] 
“MBC Carries video of 
Bin Ladin” 
206 Responsibility and praise expressed for 9/11 (Sulayman Abu-Ghayth) 
in response to suffering of Palestinians, Chechens, others.  
 
UBL welcomes the economic impact of 9/11 on America with losses in 
the stock exchange, the airline industry, through 'psychological shock' 
after the attacks and other developments. Praises God for the 
'successful and blessed strikes' and calls the hijackers 'martyrs'. 
UBL/AAZ [April 2002] 
“The Wills of the 
Martyrs..” 
207 Zawahiri, bin Ladin [in numerous different interviews/statements], and 
other speakers praise the efforts of the 19 9/11 hijackers and present 
them as models for other Muslims to follow.  
 
'Martyrdom' in the form of suicide bombing described as the way to 
victory over the enemies.  
 
Film introduces Haznawi as a hero of Islam. UBL talks of the 'huge 
difference in psychological power' between the mujahideen and their 
enemies, especially Americans, which compensates for the lack of 
manpower and hardware. 
UBL/others [April 
2002] “The Wills of the 
Martyrs..” 
108 The film is dedicated to the 'martyrs', the 19 9/11 suicide hijackers. Bin 
Ladin introduces them saying they 'destroyed the idol of the times and 
destroyed its values. 
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 .. UBL: the 9/11 attacks were 'more effective than a million books in 
clarifying the doctrine of allegiance to the believers and disassociation 
from the unbelievers'. .. 'These men [the 19 hijackers] have 
demonstrated and proven that the capability exists to defeat the head of 
infidelity [America] so the youth of Islam must follow the 
methodology of Mohammed [..] by making jihad, as it is obligatory 
today]. 
UBL [May 2002] 
“British-based Islamic 
news agency receives 
encrypted bin Ladin 
video” 
209 Campaign of which 9/11 was part, implied other acts will follow 
UBL [purported] [June 
2002] “Al-Qaeda’s 
declaration in response 
to the Saudi Ulema..” 
43 'As for the atmosphere of shared understandings, what evidence is 
there for Muslims to strive for this? What did the Prophet, the 
Companions after him, and the righteous forebears do? Did they wage 
jihad against the infidels, attacking them all over the earth, in order to 
place them under the suzerainty of Islam in great humility and 
submission? Or did they send messages to discover "shared 
understandings" between themselves and the infidels..?'  
 
Approaching the West and wishing for dialogue mean the 'tearing 
down the wall of enmity from the infidels'.. And 'rejecting jihad-
especially offensive jihad' which is an 'established and basic tenant of 
the religion'. .. 'The essence of all this comes from the halls of the 
United Nations, instead of the Divine foundations that are built upon 
hating the infidels, repudiating them with tongue and teeth till they 
embrace Islam or pay the jizya [tax paid by non-Muslims living in 
Muslim states: Ibrahim: xx] with willing submission and humility'. ... 
'Does Islam; or does it not, force people by the power of the sword to 
submit to its authority corporeally [through paying of the jizya] if not 
spiritually. Yes'. (42).  
 
The matter is summed up for every person alive: Either submit, or live 
under the suzerainty of Islam, or die'. .. The ulema should have said: 
'we will rise up individually and collectively in order to support jihad 
and the mujahideen, and we will support and increase martyrdom 
operations.'. ..'Islam is spread with the sword alone'. 
UBL [June 2002] “A 
Site Close to Al-Qa’ida 
posts Poem..: 
210 'I have sworn by God Almighty to fight the infidel." 
AAZ [September 2002] 
“The Interview of Dr 
Ayman Al Zawahiri” 
22 'The continual attacks on the American system, has finally pulled the 
Biggest Satan to the arena of Jihad [...] Once in the arena of war, it will 
start feeling its own losses [...] 'Our weapon in this battle it patience 
(sabr), perseverance (musaabara) and reliance upon Allah (tawakkul) 
in our fight against America. By the permission of Allah, this war will 
continue until the bleeding of America will result in its collapse'... 'It is 
imperative that we acknowledge the victory achieved by the Muslims 
against the Crusader forces, in New York and Washington. It was a 
clear success, which was more damaging to the Empire of Evil, than 
the heaviest blow ever sustained by the enemies of Islam. The bleeding 
continues even today and only Allah knows how long it will continue 
for. If the only fruit of these attacks is to demonstrate to the Mujahid 
Muslim youth the importance of the few, it would be enough. This 
small group, in numbers and equipment, were able to inflict immense 
slaughter on the greatest idol worshipped today, despite its power and 
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arrogance'  
 
Importance of martyrdom operations: 'we possess, what they cannot. 
The love of death in the path of Allah'. 'It is the love of death in the 
path of Allah, that is the weapon that will annihilate this evil empire of 
America'. 
UBL [October 2002] 
“A Message Addressed 
to the American 
People” 
75 'I call on you to understand the message of the two battles of New 
York and Washington that came in response to some of your former 
crimes and know that the one who has started it is the real oppressor'. 
On targeting centres of American economy. 
UBL [October 2002] 
“Statement from shaykh 
Usama bin Ladin, may 
God protect him, and 
the Al-Qa’ida 
Organization” 
211 'The mujahidin, with the Grace of Allah, still maintain their pledge; 
they do not forgive or give up.'  
 
Praise for Muhammad Atta and the like. .. Praise for the oil tanker 
attack off Yemen, 
UBL [October 2002] 
“Letter from Usama bin 
Mohammed bin Ladin 
to the American 
People” 
212 Threats of attacks matching those of 9/11. Importance of martyrdom in 
the name of Islam. 
UBL [October 2002] 
“Al-Majallah Obtains 
Bin Ladin’s Will..” 
213 'The New York and Washington action represented the third of the 
increasing blows dealt to the United States. The first was the bombing 
of the Marines in Lebanon and the second was the bombing of the US 
Embassy in Nairobi from where the US invasion of Somalia was 
launched during which 31,000 of our brothers were killed under the 
UN flag.' 
UBL [November 2002]  
“Osama bin Laden hails 
recent opertaions..” 
76 The 9/11 attacks, killing of Germans in Tunisia, French in Karachi, 
destruction of French oil tanker in Yemen, killing of Marines in 
Failaka, killing of British and Australian in Bali, and attack in Moscow 
- 'all these events are nothing but a reaction and equal treatment that 
were carried out by the sons of Islam who stood up to defend their 
religion and to follow the orders of Allah'.  
 
''Australia, which we had already warned not to participate in the 
aggression against Afghanistan let alone is abhorrent role in splitting 
East Timor (from Indonesia), ignored our warnings until it woke up at 
the sound of the explosions in Bali. All the time until then, its 
government had falsely stated that they weren't targeted'. Attacks in 
Tunisia, Karachi, Faylaka, Bali, Amman. Attacks in Moscow response 
to killings in Chechnya. 
UBL [November 2002] 
“Statement from 
Abdullah Usama bin 
Ladin to the Peoples of 
countries Allied to 
Tyrannical US 
Government” 
214 'Reciprocity is only fair. What has happened since the New York and 
Washington conquests to this day -- such as the killing of Germans in 
Tunisia and the French in Karachi, the bombing of the French super 
tanker in Yemen, the killing of the Marines in Faylaka, the killing of 
the British and Australians in the Bali bombings, the recent Moscow 
operation, and the miscellaneous operations here and there -- are only 
reactions and reciprocal actions carried out by the ardent sons of Islam 
to defend their religion'. 
UBL [November 2002] 
“Bin Ladin in a special 
message to the people 
of the Peninsula..” 
215 Muslims in the Peninsula should prepare to fight, 'even with light 
arms'. .. 'We will do to the United States what pleases the Muslims and 
fill their hearts with joy, God willing.' 
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AAZ [December 2002] 
“Al Wala Wa al 
Baraa..” 
45 Jihad should be waged against 'original infidels' occupying the lands of 
Islam, and against apostate rulers in the lands of Islam (those who do 
not rule according to the sharia, the friends of Jews and Christians), 
and against the hypocrites.  
 
Importance of warfare against the infidels.  
 
'Two blessed raids on New York and Washington'. 
UBL [February 2003] 
audio statement 
78 The victory against the Soviets in Afghanistan, and the Russians in 
Chechnya.  
 
On the success of violent attack on US forces: (1) 'Let me remind you 
of the defeat of the American forces in Beirut in 1982 [...] when the 
Lebanese resistance was personified by the truck laden with explosives 
that struck the main military base of the US Marines in Beirut, killing 
242 soldiers'. (2) 'Then after the Second Gulf War, America deployed 
her forces to Somalia and killed over thirteen thousand sons of the 
Muslims therein, before the lions of Islam from amongst the "Arab 
Afghans" and their brothers from that region pounced upon her and 
rubbed here arrogance into the dust, killing scores of them, destroying 
their tanks and downing their aircraft. Thus America and her allies fled 
in the darkness of the night'. (3) 'During the same period the young 
Mujahideen prepared for them explosives in Aden and after their 
detonation, the cowardly Americans ran away and fled the country in 
less than 24 hours'. (4) 'Then in 1995, the explosion in Riyadh took 
place, killing four Americans', 'the following year, another explosion in 
al-Khobar killed 19 Americans and wounded more then 400 of them, 
prompting them to move their bases from the cities to the desert', (5) 
Then in 1998, the Mujahideen warned America to cease their support 
to the Jews and leave the Land of the Two Holy Sanctuaries, but the 
enemy refused to heed this warning, so the Mujahideen, with the 
ability from Allah, smashed them with two mighty smashes in East 
Africa'. (6) 'Then again America was warned, but she refused to pay 
attention [...] so the Mujahideen destroyed the American Destroyer, the 
USS Cole, in Aden, in a martyrdom operation'. (7) 'Following that, the 
Mujahideen saw the black gang of thugs in the White House hiding the 
Truth, and their stupid and foolish leader, who is elected and supported 
by his people, denying reality and proclaiming that we (the 
Mujahideen) were striking them because we were jealous of them (the 
Americans), whereas the reality is that we are striking them because of 
their evil and injustice in the whole of the Islamic World, especially in 
Iraq and Palestine and their occupation of the Land of the Two Holy 
Sanctuaries. Upon seeing this, the Mujahideen decided to teach them a 
lesson and to take the war to their heartland. On the blessed Tuesday 
11 September 2001' [...] 'They destroyed the idols of America, they 
struck at the very heart of the Department of Defence and they hit the 
black heart of the US economy'. 'Yet [with 9/11] there occurred an 
even bigger destruction: that of the Great American Dream and legend 
of Democracy [...] one of the many positive results from the retaliatory 
attacks on New York and Washington is that it has exposed the true 
characteristics of the Crusaders and revealed the extent of their hate 
towards the Muslims'. 'The ties of brotherhood between Muslims 
became stronger', 'The American public is also now aware of what is 
happening in Palestine and that what happened to them in Manhattan 
was because of the policies of the leaders that they elected'. 'In 
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conclusion, America is definitely a great power, with an unbelievable 
military strength and a vibrant economy, but all of these have been 
built on a very weak and hollow foundation. Therefore it is easy to 
target that flimsy base and concentrate on their weak points and even if 
we are able to target one tenth of these weak points, we will be able to 
crush and destroy them and remove them from ruling and conquering 
the World'.  
 
To the youths: 'so know that targeting the Americans and killing them 
in any corner of the Earth, is the greatest of obligations and the most 
excellent of ways to gain nearness to Allah. Furthermore, I advise the 
youth to use their intelligence in killing them secretly'. 
UBL [February 2003] 
“A Message to our 
Brothers in Iraq”  
79 'We stress the importance of the martyrdom operations against the 
enemy - operations that inflicted harm on the United States and Israel 
that has been unprecedented in their history'. Emphasises camouflage 
and trenches in fighting the enemy. 
UBL [April 2003] 
“Usama bin LAdin 
urges Muslims to 
launch suicide attacks 
against US” 
217 Martyrdom for those who die for the right cause.  
 
'If you launch suicide attacks [presumably 'martyrdom operations' in 
original], I assure you, the US citizens all over the world will be 
frightened. The United States will retreat in the face of your suicide 
mission' 
UBL [May 2003] 
“Riyadh, Casablanca 
Attacks” 
218 'Punishments will rain down on the Arab regimes that are the 
henchmen of the United States and which refrained from reacting 
during the war."' Statement thought to be precursor to Riyadh attacks 
(12 May 2003) although aired after the event. 
AAZ [May 2003] 
statement 
54 Nothing will do Muslims good except 'through arms and taking 
revenge against your enemies', 'The crusaders and the Jews do not 
understand but the language of killing and blood. They do not become 
convinced unless they see coffins returning to them, their interests 
being destroyed, their towers being torched, and their economy 
collapsing'.  
 
'O Muslims, take matters firmly against the embassies of America, 
England, Australia, and Norway and their interests, companies, and 
employees'. 
UBL [May 2003] report 
on statement 
219 Promises bloody response to Saudi authorities 
UBL [July 2003] letter 220 Claims not to be linked to May 2003 Riyadh bombings 
UBL/AAZ [September 
2003] Audio statement 
110 9/11 hijackers true Muslims. 'He who is not convinced of killing 
should go away and not influence those who are convinced [of killing]' 
[UBL]. 
UBL [October 2003] 
“Second letter to the 
Muslims of Iraq” 
98 Martyrdom is 'the Prophet's way'. The economic impact of 'that blessed 
day in New York' - repercussions that have reached over a trillion 
dollars, and a budged deficit for the third consecutive year - record 
high. 
UBL [November 2003] 
“Al-Jazirah TV: Al-
Qa’ida claims 
responsibility for 
Istanbul bombings” 
221 The attack on two synagogues in Istanbul after detection of the 
'presence of Israeli intelligence agents inside the synagogues' 
UBL [January 2004] 
“Resist the New Rome” 
111 'Jihad is the effective power to foil all their [the West] conspiracies. 
Jihad is the path, so seek it.' 
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UBL [April 2004] 
Peace offering to 
Europeans 
80 'What happened on 11 September and 11 March is your commodity 
that was returned to you', these acts are in reaction to violence against 
Muslims in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Palestine, e.g. the killing of Sheikh 
Ahmed Yassin.  
 
'The killing of the Russians was after their invasion of Afghanistan and 
Chechnya; the killing of Europeans was after their invasion of Iraq and 
Afghanistan; and the killing of Americans on the day of New York was 
after their support of the Jews in Palestine and their invasion of the 
Arabian Peninsula'. Somalia. 
UBL [May 2004] 
“People of Iraq” 
82 'Religion does not develop with pennies and seconds, rather with 
fighting'. The importance of killing occupying soldiers. 'In al-Qaeda, 
we are committed to a reward of 10,000 grams of gold for whoever 
kills the occupier, Bremer, his deputy, the American Forces leader, or 
his deputy in Iraq'. 'Whoever kills Kofi Annan, or his envoy to Iraq, or 
his representative like al-Akhdar al-Ibrahimi, he will receive 10,000 
grams of gold. A reward of 1,000 grams of gold for killing any military 
or civilian individual from the Veto countries [Security Council 5] like 
the Americans or the British. A reward of 500 grams of gold for killing 
military or civilian individuals from the slaves of the General 
Assembly in Iraq like the Japanese and the Italians. [classifies 
countries according to UN status]. Due to the security circumstances, 
distributing the awards will take place in the nearest opportunity'. 
Although the greatest award is martyrdom with the award going to the 
heirs in stead. 
UBL [October 2004] 
Threat of the US 
31 The plan is to bleed America to bankruptcy. Provoking it to take part in 
costly wars. Talks of how he came up with the idea of 9/11. 
UBL [October 2004] 
“Message to 
Americans” 
83 'Just as you lay waste to our nation. So shall we lay waste to yours'. 
The story behind 9/11: 'it had never occurred to us', but after it became 
unbearable and we witnessed the oppression and tyranny of the 
American/Israeli coalition against our people in Palestine and 
Lebanon', 'the events that affected my soul in a direct way started in 
1982 when America permitted the Israelis to invade Lebanon', 'in those 
difficult moments many hard-to-describe ideas bubbled in my soul, but 
in the and they produced an intense feeling of rejection of tyranny, and 
gave birth to a strong resolve to punish the oppressors', 'and as I looked 
at those demolished towers in Lebanon, it entered my mind [...] that we 
should destroy towers in America'. 'Is defending oneself and punishing 
the aggressor in kind, objectionable terrorism? If it is such, then it is 
unavoidable for us'.  
 
As for its results, they have been, by the grace of Allah, positive and 
enormous, and have by all standards, exceeded all expectations'. ... The 
importance of provocation: 'All that we have mentioned has made it 
easy for us to provoke and bait this administration. All that we have to 
do is send two mujahideen to the furthest point East to raise a piece of 
cloth on which is written al-Qaeda, in order to make the generals race 
there to cause America to suffer human, economic, and political losses 
without their achieving for it anything of note other than some benefits 
for their private companies. This is in addition to our having 
experience in using guerrilla warfare and the war of attrition to fight 
tyrannical superpowers'. 'So we are continuing this policy of bleeding 
America to the point of bankruptcy'. The policy of the White House 
that demands opening up new fronts to keep corporations happy, has 
brought spectacular gains for AQ. This 'bleed to bankruptcy plan' is 
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succeeding, evident for instance in Bush resorting to emergency funds 
to continue the war in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Royal Institute for 
International Affairs emphasised the impact of 9/11, costing 500 
thousand and inflicting 500 billion dollars worth of damage, at least. 
Claims Atta was given 20 min to carry out the attacks, but the lack of 
US, and esp. Bush's, response, meant they had three times that time. 
UBL [December 2004] 
“Message concerning 
Saudi Arabia” 
84 The Saudi Regime does not rule according to the principles of Islam, 
'The solution is to unseat the ruler. If he declines, then arms would be 
taken up to unseat him'. 'If a ruler becomes an infidel, his imamate 
becomes null and void, and it would become required to take up arms 
against him'. 'Rights cannot be restored from a regime when the ruler 
becomes renegade or refuses to follow religion except by force'.  
 
'Targeting America in Iraq in terms of economy and losses in life is a 
golden and unique opportunity'. Oil: 'exert all you can to stop the 
greatest stealing operation that takes place in history', 'be active and 
prevent them from reaching the oil, and mount your operations 
accordingly, particularly in Iraq and the Gulf for this is their fate'. 
UBL [December 2004] 
audio statement 
86 'I urge you to strike supply routes and oil lines, and to plant twice as 
many mines that leave no wounded, and to assassinate company 
owners who provide the enemy with supplies, whether in Riyadh, 
Kuwait, Jordan, Turkey, or other places'. 'You should become diligent 
in carrying out martyrdom operations; these operations, praise be to 
God, have become a great source of terror for the enemy. They have 
perturbed its movement, frustrated its plans, and challenged its 
weapons and soldiers'. 
AAZ [February 2005] 
“The Freeing of 
Humanity..” 
109 Jihad and martyrdom key to reform. 
AAZ [June 2005] video 
statement 
72 'To get the invading Crusader forces and the Jews out of the lands of 
Islam cannot be achieved by demonstrating and screaming throats in 
the streets only, reform and driving the crusaders out of the Muslim 
lands will only happen by fighting for God's sake'.  
 
The only way of getting rid of the Saud and Mubarak and like rulers is 
through fighting them in a Jihad, and their American backers. 
Otherwise they will not budge. 
AAZ [August 2005] 
interview 
128 Urges further attacks in Britain, US. 
AAZ [November 2005] 
“Wills of the Knights of 
the London Raids” 
53 'The blessed London raid, which came as a slap in the face to the 
conceited crusader British arrogance, and made it drink from the same 
cup from which it had long made the Muslims drink. This blessed raid, 
like its glorious predecessors in New York, Washington, and Madrid, 
brought the battle to the enemy's soil'. 
AAZ [December 2005] 
interview 
49 [Indirect]: 'The clear declaration of their failure came one day after the 
blessed raid on London, when the Americans and English declared 
they were preparing to leave Iraq'.  
 
'The jihad movement is growing and rising. It reached its peak with the 
two blessed raids on Washington and New York. And now it is waging 
a great historic battle in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, and even within 
the Crusaders' own home. The latest raid on the Crusaders' home was 
the blessed raid against London, which was a slap to the face of British 
Crusader arrogance - and this is after the mujahid lion of Islam, sheikh 
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Osama bin Laden had offered the peoples of the West a treaty, if they 
leave the countries of Islam.' .. 'the arrogant Jack Straw [then foreign 
secretary], said that these proposals should be treated with contempt. 
So let them pay the price! - of their government's fifth and arrogance'.  
 
'I call upon the mujahidin to focus their campaigns on the stolen 
petroleum of the Muslims. Most of its revenue goes to the enemies of 
Islam, and what's left is plundered by the thieves who rule our 
countries. This is the greatest theft in the history of mankind.[...] If the 
only way to repel these thieves is by killing them, then let them be 
killed - without dignity'.  
 
'The blessed London raid is one of the raids that the Qaedat al-Jihad 
organization had the honour of carrying out against the British 
Crusader arrogance'. 
AAZ [December 2005] 
“Obstacles to Jihad” 
25 References to the effectiveness of jihad in Somalia, Iraq and 
Afghanistan, 9/11 against the Americans, Afghanistan against Russia, 
in Palestine etc. If everyone is satisfied with debating and protesting, 
then there will be 'no hope for deliverance'. Mujahideen operations 
have been successful in Iraq where the enemy is reeling from the blows 
inflicted by the mujahideen.  
 
A day after the London raids, the date was set to withdraw troops from 
Iraq. Jihad is the path to victory and honour. Sacrifice of Muslims has 
been key in spreading the religion and defeating enemies. The 
Mujahideen have kept the enemies of Muslims at bay. 
AAZ [March 2006] 
“The Alternative is 
Da’wa and Jihad” 
73 The only way forward is jihad removing the corrupt regime, setting up 
an Islamic government.  
 
Importance of economic attacks: 'The first front is that of inflicting 
losses on the Crusader West, especially its economic structure, through 
dealing strikes which will make it bleed for years. The strikes in New 
York, Washington, Madrid and London are the best example of such 
strikes. In this regard, we have to prevent the Crusader West from 
stealing the Muslims' oil, which is being drained in the biggest robbery 
in human history'.  
 
On martyrdom operations: 'The only way to halt the plot of Crusaders 
of taking over all Muslim lands is 'through the martyrdom and 
sacrifices of mujahideen in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan and Chechnya'. 
AAZ [April 2006] 
“Four Years since the 
Battle of Tora Bora” 
238 The London bombings: 'those who carried out the bombings said 
repeatedly and unambiguously that they carried out these heroic 
operations because of Britain's crimes against the Muslims in Palestine, 
Afghanistan and Iraq'. [not direct indication that the attacks were 
ordered by AQ].  
 
'Any other path than jihad will lead to failure'. Quoting Shaqi: 'if you 
confront evil with goodness, you will be frustrated; but if you confront 
evil with evil, it will retreat'. 
AAZ [April 2006] 
“Letter to the People of 
Pakistan” 
81 'The group Qaida al-Jihad in the Land of Two Rivers alone has carried 
out 800 martyrdom operations in 3 years, besides the sacrifices of the 
other Mujahideen, and this is what has broken the back of America in 
Iraq' 
UBL [May 2006] “A 91 Zacarias Moussaoui has no connection with the events of 9/11, 
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Testimony to the Truth” 'because I was responsible for entrusting the 19 brothers - Allah have 
mercy upon them - with those raids, and I did not assign brother 
Zacarias to be with them on that mission'. 'The participants in 
September 11th were two groups: pilots and support teams for each 
pilot in order to control the aircraft'. 
AAZ [June 2006] 
“Support for 
Palestinians” 
85 'Palestine shall be liberated [...] by the blood of the martyrs, suffering 
of the prisoners, and Jihad in the Path of Allah'. Importance of 
mujahideen and Jihad throughout. 
AAZ [June 2006] 
“Eligizing the 
Ummah’s Martyr..” 
32 Jihad is the way forward 
AAZ [June 2006] “The 
Zionist Crusader’s 
Aggression in Gaza and 
Lebanon” 
88 On 9/11: 'In Kandahar, approximately one year before the New York 
and the Washington raids, the late leader Abu-Hafs [...] was delivering 
a lecture to a number of trainees on the situation in Palestine and the 
conditions of Muslims. At the end of the lecture, the hero Mohammed 
Atta [...] stood up and asked the leader, Abu-Hafs, with seriousness 
and fervour: How can we then resist the aggression in Palestine? 
America knows the rest of the story very well'. 
UBL [June 2006] 
“Elegizing the 
Ummah’s Martyr..” 
92 Importance of martyrdom and carrying the banner. 
UBL [July 2006] “To 
the Ummah in General 
and the Mujahideen in 
Iraq and Somalia in 
Particular” 
93 'The harm by these Crusader infidels and renegades can only be 
stopped through fighting'. Abu-Hamzah al-Mujahir urged to focus his 
attacks on the Americans and their supporters in Iraq. Those countries 
that send forces to Somalia may expect attacks in their own countries, 
as well as against their troops. 
AAZ [September 2006] 
“Hot issues..” 
21 The West only understands retribution and punishment. Must focus on 
its economic interests, particularly petroleum. 
AAZ [December 2006] 
“Realities of Conflict 
Between Islam and 
Unbelievers” 
94 On the fallacy of trying to introduce an Islamic state through 
democratic means (see -free text). 'There is no solution without Jihad', 
any other solutions will be futile and 'like treating cancer with aspirin'. 
'The Mujahideen's love of martyrdom', not elections, or cooperation or 
respect for international law pushed the Americans back in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. 
AAZ [December 2006] 
“Congratulations on the 
Eid to the Ummah of 
Tawhed” 
95 Victory is not brought about through fatwas, or parliamentary 
elections, but only through martyrdom seeking. Must not differentiate 
between foreign invaders and their domestic agents. 
AAZ [January 2007] 
“Rise and Support our 
Brothers in Somalia” 
96 To the Somalian mujahideen: 'employ ambushes, mines, and 
martyrdom-seeking campaigns so as to devour them exactly as lions 
devour their preys'. 
AAZ [January 2007] 
“The Correct Equation” 
28 Duty of all Muslims to bear arms or serve and support those who are 
bearing arms.  
 
Jihad is the only way of freeing the Al-Aqsa mosque. 
AAZ [February 2007] 
“Lessons, Examples 
and Great Events in the 
Year 1427” 
97 'My Muslim Ummah, the duty of each one of us today is to fight in 
Allah's path and bear arms. And the one who is unable to bear arms 
must serve those who bear arms'. 
AAZ [March 2007] 
“Palestine is the 
concern of all Muslims” 
18 Muslims must 'stay in their trenches' and be 'proud of their guns'. 
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AAZ [May 2007] “The 
Empire of Evil is about 
to End” 
23 The Muslims must not beg for rights from their corrupt rulers, such an 
approach is fruitless. The movement which is forcing the Americans 
out of the region is the movement of violence. 'At this stage, it is the 
duty of the Muslim Ummah to bear arms against the trespassing 
invaders and their interests. Everyone who trespasses on the Muslim 
Ummah must have his hand cut off, whether this aggression is in 
Chechnya, or in Afghanistan, or Kashmir, or Iraq, or Palestine or 
Somalia. And along with this confrontation of the invaders, the Muslim 
Ummah must also beware of those defenders of the invaders who stab 
it from behind, and must strive from today to work for their removal'. 
AAZ [June 2007] 
“Forty Years since the 
Fall of Jerusalem” 
101 'Jihad is the road to salvation for the Muslim nation and indeed for all 
mankind'. 'The duty of the Muslim nation today is to carry arms in the 
way of God. If it cannot do so it must give support to those who carry 
arms in the way of God'. 
AAZ [July 2007] “The 
Advice of one 
Concerned” 
102 'Smashing of the two dens of American espionage in Nairobi and Dar 
al-Salam, to the destruction of the destroyer Cole, to the greatest 
conquests in the raids on New York and Washington' these were all 
mujahideen victories, as were conquests in Afghanistan and Iraq, and 
all over the world - from Indonesia to Spain.  
 
'If every officer who murdered an innocent person was to be found 
killed, they wouldn't dare to murder. If every officer who violated 
someone's honour was to be killed, they wouldn't date to violate 
honour'. ... The two-pronged plan to confront the enemy alliance: 'The 
near-term plan consists of targeting Crusader-Jewish interests [...] in 
our country and in theirs'. In the long term: 'force must be an element 
in change'. 'The long-term plan is divided into two halves: the first half 
consists of earnest, diligent work to change these corrupt and 
corruptive regimes' - many different strategies according to each 
individual situation - but several characteristics in all: patience 
paramount in all; as is 'striving to achieve popular sympathy for the 
Islamic Mujahid movement for change'; force through mass-popular 
uprising, military coup, mass disobedience, guerrilla warfare, armed 
political resistance; Ummah must get used to challenging falsehood 
and declaring the truth; 'there must be an organization and leadership 
leading change. 'As for the second half of the long-term plan, it 
consists of hurrying to the fields of Jihad like Afghanistan, Iraq and 
Somalia for Jihad preparation and training' [see also 15] [strategy]. 
UBL [September 2007] 
“The Solution..” 
10 'This innocence of yours [the Americans] is like my innocence of the 
blood of your sons on the 11th’ 
UBL [September 2007] 
“Come to Jihad..” 
14 Rising up against the Musharraf regime is obligatory according to 
Shariah even if this means shedding of blood. 'Fighting in Allah's path 
is an act of worship and it is based on sacrifice of selves. Muslim blood 
is spilled and poured out to protect the religion.' 
AAZ [December 2007] 
“A Review of Events” 
13 The Jihadi intifada and awakening in Pakistan in the tribal regions 
defeated Musharraf. 
AAZ [early 2008] 
“Exoneration..” 
20 There is no peaceful solution to the problems of Egypt, especially after 
the regime banned public protests in mosques after demonstrations in 
the Al-Azhar where crushed. See on end goals. The Muslims are the 
wronged party and they should not be encouraged from attacking the 
enemy. Five indicators of the 'greatness' of 9/11: (1) brought Islam to 
the forefront in the battle against infidels, over ethnic and nationalistic 
causes for conflict, (2) underlined importance of jihad in bringing 
about changes, (3) ended the idea of the nation state, (4) ended the era 
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where the US can attack Muslims with impunity, (5) marked the 
beginning of the collapse of America. 'In their current state, Muslims 
cannot confront America and Israel by conventional warfare, with 
armies containing fleets, airplanes, armoured vehicles, and artillery. 
They can, however, avert the evil of all those weapons trained on them 
by means of jihad operations that make use of the methods permitted 
by the Shari'ah'.  
 
On WMD: 'Nuclear weapons are the invisible participant in all the 
negotiations between the Arabs and Israel' in order to achieve balance 
of power (p 178). Importance of attacking tourists: 'They followed it to 
defend Muslims' lands, lives, and honour. In Jerba, Tunisia, Jewish 
tourists were killed to defend Muslims in Palestine. In Bali, Indonesia, 
Australian tourists were killed to defend Muslims in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. When the Taliban kidnapped Koreans, for example, they 
kidnapped them because they were Christian missionaries operating 
under the protection of crusader bombers. When the mujahidin struck 
tourists, they did not strike tourists from Brazil in Finland or from 
Vietnam in Venezuela!' 
AAZ [February 2008] 
“An Elegy to the 
Martyred Commander 
Abu Layth al-Libi” 
19 Congratulates al-Layth al-Libi for 'joining the caravan of martyrs'. 
AAZ [March 2008] “A 
Call to Help our People 
in Gaza” 
17 Muslims need to carefully plan, seek funding and weapons and carry 
out attacks, seeking martyrdom. Mere public protests are useless. 
AAZ [April 2008] “The 
Open Meeting part 
one..” 
105 'Qaida al-Jihad struck the Jews in Jerba, Tunisia, and struck the Israeli 
tourists in Mombassa'. Dealing blows to America, England, Spain, 
Australia, and France in Afghanistan, Iraq, Peninsula, Yemen and 
Algeria. AQ will strive to 'deal blows to the Jews inside Israel and 
outside it' (1/1). . Zarqawi's bombing of the UN hq in Iraq, which 
forced them out of Iraq and destroyed the plot of Crusader forces to 
add internationals in order to not provoke Arab and Islamic 
sensitivities (as is done in Lebanon).  
 
The importance of a vanguard to implement change: 'among the most 
important of its requirements [to effect change] is the presence of a 
secure base and mobilisation of popular support. And the most 
important cause around which the Arabs and Muslims gather is the 
fighting of the Jews and Crusaders'. America has armed the Egyptian 
Jihad more than the Egyptian regime, hence the need to 'strike at the 
head of unbelief'.  
 
'It is permissible to kill the officers of State Security and the rest of the 
personnel of the police [in Egypt], whether we declare them unbeliever 
individually or declare them unbelievers in general, if that is in the 
framework of a combat campaign [...] of the jihad', in the context of the 
'obligatory defensive Jihad'. . The 'raids on New York and Washington' 
were 'identifying marks' to the collapse of America.  
 
'The means of change differ from one territory to another', for example 
in Algeria the mujahideen target both Jewish/Western interests and 
wage guerrilla war against the 'hireling government' because 
circumstances allow them to do so . 
AAZ [April 2008] “The 107 Jihad against the apostate governments is an 'inevitable step' on the 
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Open Meeting.. Part 
2..” 
road to the Caliphate. . 'Going to jihad is a priority over seeking 
knowledge or marriage because it is an individual duty.'  
 
Violence is crucial given the oppression and violence Muslims are 
suffering. . (Responding to a question regarding how AQ has benefited 
from its actions): 'al-Qaeda has benefited in terms that it has incited 
Muslims to perform jihad, and showed them that the Americans and 
their henchmen are not super humans, but they are weak human beings 
who can be defeated and harmed' [see on success-failure debate]. AQ 
is doing a 'great service to the human community' by 'stopping the 
aggression by America and the crusader West against mankind' [and 
not just Muslims]. . Dodges a question on the perceived success of 
suicide bombings through citing Quranic verses.  
 
On the legitimacy of the AQ jihad: Ayman sees one of the greatest 
sources of this in the fact that America and Nato have acknowledged 
al-Qaeda is their greatest threat [success - failure]. . 'We have stated 
more than once very clearly that it was we who not only destroyed the 
World Trade Center, but the Pentagon as well, thanks be to God'. .  
 
Claims he assisted in assassinating Sadat rather than taking part 
directly. Feels that the assassination achieved only some of its 
objectives: it did not bring about regime change but did scuttle some of 
the US-Israeli plans in the region. But killing the head is not sufficient, 
it has to be part of a wider plan of 'escalating confrontation'.  
 
'There is no hope to remove the corrupt regimes in Muslim countries 
except by force'. Algerian, Egyptian and Jordanian treatment of 
peaceful initiatives to bring about Islamic change are evidence enough 
about their futility. 
UBL [May 2008] “A 
Message to the Muslim 
Nation”  
24 'O youths of the generation: Jihad is the only way to liberate Palestine 
and Al-Aqsa Mosque and to regain the orthodox caliphate'. . 
 
.. 'nothing other than the sword is useful to the youths of the 
generation'. 
AAZ [June 2008] “On 
the Anniversary of the 
Naksa..” 
15 There is 'no other solution in Palestine' than to multiply martyrdom 
operations, rockets and ambushes. 
AAZ [November 2008] 
“The Exit of Bush and 
Arrival of Obama” 
100 Must continue to harm the US, because the criminal expansionist 
project in Muslim lands will only be stopped through the sacrifices of 
the mujahideen. 
AAZ [November 2008] 
“Al-Azhar: The Lions 
Den” 
237 'Confronting this Satanic pact can only be successful through 
sacrifices, blood and fighting'. . 'Jihad is one of the greatest causes of 
the forgiving of sins'. 'The New York and Washington raids forced 
America to allow some semblance of freedom in the Arab world', but 
this was limited and only to allow for more plundering, as the prison 
administrator allows rest and recreation from time to time. 
AAZ [January 2009] 
“The Massacre of Gaza 
and the Siege of the 
Traitors” 
121 'Protests do no good in the face of bombs, Muslims must take 'effective 
steps'. Muslims must fulfill the individual obligation of jihad. Zionist 
Crusader interests must be struck wherever possible. 
UBL [January 2009] 
“Call for Jihad to Stop 
the Gaza Assault” 
122 Jihad needed to reclaim 'Bayt al-Maqdis and al-Quds'. Youths should 
not be satisfied 'protesting in the streets without arms'. 9/11 brought 
down American hegemony. 
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AAZ [February 2009] 
“The Sacrifices of 
Gaza” 
131 'This Zionist-Christian Crusader invasion has revealed that if we do not 
defend ourselves and fight Jihad, the jets, tanks, and missiles which 
struck Gaza, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia will strike Riyadh, Cairo, 
Algeria and Islamabad tomorrow.'  
 
'If the Zionist-Christian Crusade is confronting us everywhere, striking 
at Islam and the Muslims all over the world in what they call the "War 
on Terror", while in actuality it is a "War against Islam", why can't we 
strike them everywhere? Why must we wait for the enemy to choose 
for us the time, place, battleground and mode of warfare?'  
 
Jihad is now an individual obligation (see 2). 
AAZ [February 2009] 
“From Kabul to 
Mogadishu” 
132 'Demonstrations must be followed by explosions' (Al-Wuhayshi). .. 
Ayman emphasises how 'Crusader and Jewish targets are spread all 
over the world' and the enemy will not impose the field, place, time 
and way in which we fight him'. Promises fighters in Gaza support and 
training. 'The entire world is our field against the targets of the Zionist 
Crusade' 
UBL [March 2009] 
“Practical Steps to 
Liberate Palestine” 
133 A 'sufficient force' of mujahideen needs to be assembled to liberate 
Gaza and end the embargo.  
 
The strategy for the liberation of Palestine would be for the Iraq-based 
mujahideen to secure that country, move on to Jordan (where half the 
population is Palestinian) before capturing the West Bank. This is 
'practical and realistic' as well as the Sharia'h-compliant way. This 
campaign will be lead by competent leaders relying on Fiqh 
committees of the Shari'ah 'with branches all over the Islamic world'. 
UBL [March 2009] 
“Fight on, Oh 
Champions of Somalia” 
134 'Shaykh Shareef is one of them, he must be dethroned and fought.' 
AAZ [April 2009] “Siz 
years since the invasion 
of Iraq..” 
136 'Palestine can never be liberated without jihad.' 'If things are tight in 
one area, they area easier in another area. Our Crusader and Jewish 
enemies can be found anywhere' [encouraging out of area/global 
targeting].Other jihadis are willing to help those in Gaza and use their 
resources, homes, training camps etc. 
AAZ [July 2009] “My 
Muslim Brothers and 
Sisters in Pakistan” 
139 'The only hope to save Pakistan from this disastrous fate is Jihad' . 'So 
the only force capable of bringing about the changeover to the Islamic 
system is the Jihadi force.' 
AAZ [August 2009] 
“The Realities of Jihad 
and Fallacy of 
Hypocrisy” 
140 'Continuation of the defeats, losses, fear and terror of the Crusader 
West, until victory is achieved Allah-willing.' (see context in 23). .. 
9/11 'blessed attacks'.  
 
'The enemy [in Palestine] has spread-out targets everywhere; the 
enemy is not just Israel, but also who assists and supports and supplies 
Israel with weapons that by which our people in Palestine are killed'. .. 
'The system in Egypt and in most of the Arabic and Islamic countries 
cannot be removed except by force.' 
AAZ [August 2009] 
“The Path of Doom” 
142 The only way out of the predicament described is Jihad. People of 
Pakistan should support the jihad with their persons, wealth, opinions, 
prayers and call on others to do the same. 
UBL [September 2009] 
“A Statement to the 
American People” 
144 Reflects on the causes for the 9/11 attacks. 
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UBL [September 2009] 
“A Message to the 
European People” 
143 Implicit justification for Madrid and London bombings 
AAZ [September 2009] 
“Shaykh Dr Ayman al-
Zawahiri: Eulogy for 
the Role Model of 
Youth” 
147 Meshud showed that attacks on convoys of the Pakistani army and 
martyrdom operations are permissible and valuable, as much as they 
are against the American convoys in Afghanistan. 
AAZ [December 2009] 
“The (Palestinian) 
National Unity” 
146 The way out of the predicament described is embracing Shari'ah and 
jihad in the way of Allaw in order to liberate Palestine and the rest of 
Muslim lands - this should be aimed at the Jews as well as their allies - 
America and the Westerners and focus of jihad should be on the latter 
if no easy targets are found in the former. 
AAZ [December 2009] 
“The Morning and the 
Lamp..” 
141 'Even if we were to assume that a country had all its laws and systems 
in compliance with the Sharī`ah, but then it made a single law and 
legislated it against the Sharī`ah, as a result it would become a non-
Islamic state. In fact, as a result of that, it would be mandatory to fight 
against it, by the consensus of the scholars, until it returned to its 
original affair.' 
UBL [February 2010] 
“From Osama to 
Obama” 
148 'If our messages to you could be carried by words, we would not have 
delivered them by planes.'  
 
Omar Farouk (Abdulmutallab) reiterated the message sent on 9/11 
AAZ [July 2010] “Al 
Quds will not be 
converted to Judaism” 
223 Celebrates series of 'martyrdom operations' in Afghanistan.  
 
Praise for Mujahid 'Nidal Hasan Malik' 
AAZ [August 2010] 
“Message to the People 
of Turkey” 
225 Praise of Turkish mujahideen and martyrs in Afghanistan 
AAZ [September 2010] 
“A Victorious Ummah, 
A Broken Crusade” 
226 Rejects peace-making and bargaining. … The secular west refers to 
Jihad as Irhab [terrorism]. Calls for jihad free of all nationalistic or 
patriotic and secular influences. .. The only way forward is jihad and 
sacrifice in the name of Allah of self, wealth and any means possible. .. 
The Crusaders have been weakened and are leaving Afghanistan due to 
the blows inflicted by the mujahideen.  
 
Attacks, ambushes and martyrdom operations against NATO in 
Afghanistan. 
UBL [October 2010] 
“Some points regarding 
the method of relief 
work” 
227 Asks Allah to have mercy on the martyrs, whether from the fields of 
jihad or those who died in floods and other disasters 
UBL [October 2010] 
“Help your brothers in 
Pakistan” 
228 The people of the Islamic Crescent will unite in defeating 'greedy 
enemies' as they defeated the Red Army 
AAZ [November 2010] 
“Who is going to 
support Aifa Siddique” 
229 American killings and bombings will be answered in kind. .. Muslims 
urged to seek revenge for Aifa Saddique by joining the jihad.' 
 
There is no good in speaking without action.' 
UBL [November 2010] 
“Message from Shaykh 
Usama bin Ladin to the 
People of France” 
230 The 'capturing' of French nationals in Niger and other threats to French 
security is in response to the 'oppression they impose upon the 
Ummah.'  
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‘As you kill, you will be killed, and as you capture, you will be 
captured, and as you ruin our security, we will ruin your security, and 
the one who started it has done the greater injustice.’ 
UBL [January 2011] 
“From al-Sheikh Osama 
bin Mohammed bin 
Ladin to the French 
People” 
231 Urges targeting of French interests in France and Africa. French public 
can be targeted 
AAZ [February 2011] 
“A Message of Glad 
Tidings…(2)” 
233 ''If we cannot produce weapons in this stage that can match those of the 
Crusader West, we can still ruin its complex system of economics and 
industry. We can exhaust its forces that fight without any creed until 
they flee. For this reason, the Mujahideen had to innovate new 
techniques which the West could not think of. From these types of bold 
and courageous ideas was to use airplanes as powerful weapons, as 
was done in the blessed raids on Washington, New York and 
Pennsylvania.'  
 
Justifications for the terrorist attack against Coptic church in 
Alexandria, although denies AQ had anything to do with it.  
 
Clear focus on far enemies: 'we in Al-Qaeda have reached the 
conclusion that the Zio-American enemies – who have invaded our 
religion, lands, and sanctities – and their lackey aides need to be 
focused on more than others. If this invading enemy breaks, then by 
Allah’s permission their agents and others who seek their help and 
emboldening will also break. So let us focus our efforts on this Zio-
American invading enemy and its agents' 
AAZ [February 2011] 
“A Message of Glad 
Tidings…(3)” 
234 Jihad against Crusaders 
AAZ [March 2011] “A 
Message of Glad 
Tidings…(4)” 
235 Talks of how the 'blessed' 9/11 attacks prompted a change in US 
foreign policy now when it has sought to distance itself from despotic 
leaders and appeal to the people directly.  
 
'Thus, your brother Mujahideen promise that by they Help of Allah, 
they will continue to strike America and its allies and damage them 
until they leave all Muslim lands, by Allah’s leave, and stop their 
support of the despotic tyrants who rule them' 
AAZ [April 2011] “A 
Message of Glad 
Tidings…(5)” 
236 The Americans are abandoning their corrupt allies, this is a process 
that began with the 9/11 attacks. Promises more attacks on America 
and their allies in the 'new Crusade' until they've left Muslim lands and 
the Ummah is united in a Caliphate. 
AAZ [May 2011] “A 
Message of Glad 
Tidings…(6)” 
238 “Be patient O’ lions of Ash-Sham, because the ground has begun 
shaking underneath the titan tyrants, and be patient O’ our Ummah 
everywhere as America has encountered four big disasters in the last 
ten years, starting with the New York, Washington and Pennsylvania 
battles, then it was defeated in Iraq, and here’s it being defeated in 
Afghanistan, and the fourth: her agents began collapsing like the dry 
leaves of the fall in Tunisia and Egypt, and tomorrow in Libya, Yemen, 
Syria and the Arabian Peninsula. 
AAZ [June 2011] “The 
Noble Knight 
Dismounted” 
239 "And America has faced in the last decade four crushing disasters: 
First: The blessed raids in New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania, 
where the martyred eagles smashed the symbol of the American 
economy in New York, and the centre of the American military 
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leadership in the Pentagon, with all that it symbolizes as moral, 
economic, and military losses. Then, there was the second disaster, its 
defeat in Iraq at the hands of the Mujahideen, with the Islamic State of 
Iraq at their head. So it withdrew, after losing its wealth, equipment, 
and the souls of its sons. And there was the third disaster in 
Afghanistan, where American is sinking into the mud of defeat, 
bleeding continuously. And it was forced to announce the beginning of 
its withdrawal this coming July, despite its approval and recognition of 
the control of the mujahideen of the Islamic Emirate over most of 
Afghanistan. Then, there was the fourth disaster: the collapse of the 
corrupt and corrupting agents of America in Tunisia and Egypt, and the 
rocking of their thrones in Libya, Yemen, and Syria. America tried to 
contain the ferocious popular volcano; it declared, after hesitating, its 
support for the popular revolutions. But the popular movements in 
Egypt and Tunisia slapped America when the youth of the revolution 
in Tunisia demonstrated against the visit of Hilary Clinton, and they 
rejected meeting her in Egypt."  
 
"Likewise, we send a message of support to the all the Mujahideen in 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Somalia, the Arabian Peninsula, and the 
Islamic Maghrib. We urge them to exert greater effort in killing 
fighting the Crusaders and their servants." 
AAZ [July 2007] 
“Glory of the East..The 
first Being Damascus..”
  
241 Martyrdom and jihad glorified -- no specifics 
AAZ [August 2011] “A 
Message of Hope and 
Glad Tidings..(7)” 
242 Salutes the "heroes" who blew up the gas pipeline to Israel. 
AAZ [August 2011] 
“Do not become weak 
or grieve” 
243 "America, the leader of the Western Crusade anti-Islamic alliance was 
attacked in her homeland – which she had considered a protected 
fortress, occupying a continent, surrounded by two great oceans – and 
the attack arrived on its symbol of economic power and the centre of 
its military leadership" "Thus, the reputation of America and the 
Crusade alliance have fallen, and this is one of the most important 
gains from the blessed battles of September the Eleventh.”  
 
"Seek to attack America that has killed the Imam of the Mujahideen 
and threw his corpse in the sea and then imprisoned his women and 
children. Seek to attack her so history can say that a criminal state had 
spread corruption on earth and Allah sent her his servants who made 
her a lesson [for others] and left her as a memory.” 
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AAZ [early 1996] 
“Healing the Hearts of 
the Believers” 
118 Hosni Mubarak and government officials demand obedience and 
loyalty, which should only be given to God, and therefore those 
working in the Islamabad embassy could be targeted. Their 
demands are un-Islamic and thus they are infidels. 
UBL [June 1998] “Bin 
Ladin Congratulates 
Pakistan on Possession of 
Nuclear Weapons” 
170 Endorsement of WMD 
UBL [December 1998] 
“Bin Ladin Denies Role 
in Bombings of US 
Missions” 
176 Legitimises East Africa bombings which involved indiscriminate 
killing of (mostly African) civilians 
UBS [January 1999] 
“Wrath of God..” 
178 It is permissible to carry out attacks that result in the deaths of 
Muslims if the goal is to harm America 
UBL [January 1999] 
“Accused Terrorist 
Leader Usama Bin Ladin 
Declares War on All 
Americans” 
180 'All Americans are our enemies, not just the ones who fight us 
directly but also the ones who pay their taxes.' 
UBL [February 1999] 
“Esquire interview with 
bin Ladin” 
179 "We do not differentiate between those dressed in military 
uniforms and civilians; they are all targets in this fatwa' [referring 
specifically to the killing of Americans in Saudi Arabia].  
 
Anyone who 'share or take part in killing Muslims, assaulting holy 
places, or those who help the Jews occupy Muslim land' 
UBL [June 1999] “Usama 
bin Ladin, The 
Destruction of the Base” 
184 'We differentiate between the man, the woman, the child, and the 
old people. The man is a fighter, whether he carries arms or helps 
kill us by paying taxes and by gathering information. He is a 
fighter. With regards to reports among Muslims that 'Usama is 
threatening to kill civilians, then, what are they killing in 
Palestine?' and then goes on to say: 'You may have heard these 
days that almost three quarters of the US people support Clinton's 
strikes against Iraq They are people whose president becomes more 
popular when he kills innocent people. They are people who 
increase their support for their president when he commits cardinal 
sins. They are a lowly people who do not at all understand the 
meaning of values.' 
UBL [September 2001]  
“Bin Ladin: from rich kid 
to terrorist..” 
181 ''Our enemy, the target, if God gives Muslims the opportunity to do 
so, is every American male, whether he is directly fighting us or 
paying taxes." 
UBL [October 2001] 
“Tayseer Allouni 
interviews bin Ladin in 
Afghanistan” 
130 On the killing of innocents: "So we kill their innocents, and I say it 
is permissible in law and intellectually, because those who spoke 
on this matter spoke from a juridical perspective." The prohibition 
on killing children and innocents is "not absolute". Concedes that 
the Prophet forbade the killing of children and innocents but quotes 
a "saying": 'If the infidels killed women and children on purpose, 
we shouldn’t shy way from treating them in the same way to stop 
them from doing it again.’ [How is a 'Saying more powerful than 
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the words of the Prophet' - does 'saying' mean Hadith?]. Says the 
9/11 hijackers did not set out to "kill babies" and that the WTC was 
not a "children's school".  
 
'When we kill their civilians the whole world from East to West 
cries out, and the United States instigates its allies and small 
agents. Who says that our blood is not bad and theirs is good?' The 
infidels should be treated in kind. 
UBL [November 2001] 
Osama claims he has 
nukes (article title) 
125 When asked about the civilians and Muslims who perished on 9/11: 
'This is a major point in jurisprudence. In my view, if an enemy 
occupies a Muslim territory and uses common people as human 
shield, then it is permitted to attack that enemy. For instance, if 
bandits barge into a home and hold a child hostage, then the child’s 
father can attack the bandits and in that attack even the child may 
get hurt. America and its allies are massacring us in Palestine, 
Chechenya, Kashmir and Iraq. The Muslims have the right to attack 
America in reprisal. The Islamic Shariat says Muslims should not 
live in the land of the infidel for long [...] If a child is above 13 and 
wields a weapon against Muslims, then it is permitted to kill him. 
The American people should remember that they pay taxes to their 
government, they elect their president, their government 
manufactures arms and gives them to Israel and Israel uses them to 
massacre Palestinians. The American Congress endorses all 
government measures and this proves that the entire America is 
responsible for the atrocities perpetrated against Muslims. The 
entire America, because they elect the Congress'. 
UBL [April 2002] “MBC 
Carries video of Bin 
Ladin” 
206 Praise for 9/11 and acknowledgement of responsibility 
UBL [October 2002] 
“Letter from Usama bin 
Mohammed bin Ladin to 
the American People” 
212 Americans can be targeted due to support for the government, and 
their taxes: 'By electing these leaders, the American people have 
given their consent to the incarceration of the Palestinian people, 
the demolition of Palestinian homes and the slaughter of the 
children of Iraq. The American people have the ability and choice 
to refuse the policies of their Government and even to change their 
Government, yet time and time again, polls show that the American 
people support the policies of the elected Government. ‘The tax 
paid by the American people is spent against us' through arms, 
support for Israel etc. Moreover - the 'America army is part of the 
American people', 'This is why the American people are not 
innocent. The American people are active members in all these 
crimes.' America kills civilians, steals Muslim wealth and resources 
and destroys cities - thus their cities will be destroyed, civilians 
killed and economy targeted. 
UBL [February 2003] “A 
Message to our Brothers 
in Iraq” 
79 Those who supported the Crusaders, even just with words: 'they are 
apostates and outside the community of Muslims. It is permissible 
to spill their blood and take their property'. 
UBL [December 2004] 
audio statement 
86 'Those Iraqis who get killed, and who belong to Allawi's renegade 
government - such as members of the Army, the security agencies, 
and the National Guard [...] their killing is sanctioned and they are 
infidels'. They should not be buried in Muslim cemeteries, their 
wives should be divorced from them. 
AAZ [April 2006] “Letter 
to the People of Pakistan” 
81 [implicit] looks at how the people, and not just governments are 
guilty (see 9). 
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AAZ [June 2006] “The 
Zionist Crusader’s 
Aggression in Gaza and 
Lebanon” 
88 'According to the Sharia, all these governments and their people are 
fighting the Muslims'. 
UBL [June 2006] 
“Elegizing the Ummah’s 
Martyr..” 
92 'To those who accuse our nation's knight of killing some segments 
of the Iraqi people I say: If someone claimed that a man gouged out 
his eye, you should be patient until you see the defendant because it 
could be the complainant had gouged out the defendant's two eyes'. 
[so the Iraqis had it coming]. 'Whoever insisted on fighting along 
with the Crusaders against Muslims should be killed, regardless of 
their sect or tribe'. 
AAZ [September 2006] 
“Hot issues..” 
21 The Shariah does not differentiate according to civilian and soldier, 
only combatant and non-combatant. The Mujahideen target: 'every 
target whose striking will have the effect of weakening the 
Zionist/Crusader campaign of aggression against the lands of 
Islam.' Military and civilian differentiation does not exist in 
Shariah, only combatant and non-combatant. The combatant is he 
who fights or helps in the fighting with money or opinions. Thus 
the people of the West are combatants., because they have chosen 
their rulers, and chosen the legislative authority which monitors the 
executive and takes it to account. These people also pay taxes and 
provide the regimes with manpower. Even those who oppose the 
policies, still consider the governments legitimate. Also, all the 
political parties in the West supported the creation of Israel. 
AAZ [early 2008] 
“Exoneration..” 
20 On the killing of Muslims, Zawahiri refers to Ithaf Al-Ibad Bi 
Fadail Al-Jihad and says: 'Ignorance of this Shari'ah rule has cost 
the Muslims many victims. A police informant used to come and 
take a man's wife away in the middle of the night but the man 
would not kill him out of fear of shedding another Muslim's blood.' 
'This Hadith shows that women and young boys, that is, those who 
may not be killed separately, may be killed if they are mixed with 
others and it is not possible to distinguish between one and the 
other. The Muslims were asking about night raids, when it is not 
possible to distinguish one person from another. The prophet 
permitted this because an act that follows another as a consequence 
is permitted even if it is not permitted separately. Second: Muslim 
commanders used catapults in their wars with the infidels. It is 
known that a catapult cannot differentiate among those whom it 
hits. It might hit those so-called innocent people. Yet the Muslim 
custom in their wars was to use catapults. They used them against 
Al-Ta'if's inhabitants.' 'Third: Muslim jurists permitted killing 
Muslims used as human shields by the enemy after they fall captive 
into the infidels' hands. If the infidels use Muslim captives to 
protect themselves from the Muslims' arrows, they may be killed 
although they are faultless. Ibn-Taymiyyah, may he rest in peace, 
said: The ulema have agreed that if the infidel army uses captive 
Muslims as human shields and there is fear for the Muslims' lives if 
they do not fight, they should attack even if this leads to killing the 
human shields.' Three categories of civilian casualties: (1) 'They 
might be those who do not fight alongside the countries they live in 
and do not help them with their persons, wealth, counsel, or other 
types of assistance. These may not be killed but on condition that 
they hold themselves separately from he others. If they are not 
separated from the others, it is permitted to kill them including old 
people, women, young boys, sick persons, incapacitated persons, 
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and unworldly monks. Ibn-Qudamah said: Women and children 
may be killed during a night raid on condition that they are not 
killed intentionally and separately. It is permitted to kill their riding 
animals and livestock if this helps the Muslims to kill them. There 
is no disagreement on this point. He added: It is permitted to carry 
out a night raid on the enemy. Ibn-Hanbal said night raids were 
permitted especially against the Byzantines. We will not discourage 
anyone from carrying out night raids. (2) Some do not go forth in 
their own persons to fight alongside their belligerent countries but 
they assist them with money or counsel. These are not called 
innocent persons because they support the troops. Ibn-Abd-al-Birr, 
may he rest in peace, said: The ulema never disagreed that the 
Muslims are permitted to kill women and children if they fight and 
also young boys able to fight and who do so. Ibn-Qudamah 
reported a consensus among the ulema that it is permitted to kill 
women, young boys, and the old and infirm if they help their 
people in battle. Ibn-Abd-al-Birr said: They all recounted that the 
prophet killed Durayd Bin-al-Sammah in the Battle of Hunayn 
because he gave clever counsel to his people in war. All ulema 
agree that an old man of this type should be killed in war. Al-
Nawawi, citing the book "Consensus on Matters of Jihad," said that 
old men among the infidels should be killed if they are men of 
counsel. Ibn-Qasim, may he rest in peace, wrote in his 
commentary: The unanimous opinion is that those who support the 
troops should be killed. Ibn-Taymiyyah cited this unanimous 
opinion. He also said that those who give any kind of aid to the sect 
that refuses to accept Islam should suffer the same fate. (3) If they 
are Muslims, they may not be killed if they stand apart from the 
rest. However, if they mix with others and one cannot avoid killing 
them along with the others, then it is permitted to kill them. This is 
obvious in the case of Muslim captives used as human shields.' 
Expressing regret or concern at the killing of these people 
represents a breech of the Shariah. See Al-Nahl, 16:126 and Al-
Ahzab, 42:39,40 in Koran. Detailed discussion of various positions 
regarding the killing of Muslims when mixed with infidel targets 
(human shield debate) (see pp 156-166). Emphasises disagreement 
among scholars in this regard. Says the Shariah permits attack by 
night even if discrimination between Muslims and non-Muslims 
cannot be secured. Indiscriminate weaponry (such as artillery 
shelling is permitted). This is partially based on the Prophet's use of 
catapults and the siege of Taif. Emphasises the right of 'repaying 
like for like' according to Shariah - quotes Koran (2:194). 'to bomb 
them as they are bombing us and blow them up as they are blowing 
us up'. Civilians may be taken prisoner for ransom, furthermore, 
they may be killed as collateral damage. Finally, since the Women 
and elderly tacitly or directly support and interact with 
governments that wage wars against the Muslims, recognize Israel 
and so on, they become targets too since the legitimacy of these 
governments is based on their recognition. Thus Muslims may 
always 'reply in kind'. The citizenship means that the individual is 
'part of this group' i.e. the country that attacks Muslims. The Hadith 
by Al-Sa'b Ibn Jathama on night raids: "This Hadith proves that 
women and children and those whose killing is not permissible as 
individuals can be killed when mixed with others and could not be 
singled out". Also Catapults. Muslims as human shields - mixed 
with others. [note the determined desire to kill]. All Jews support 
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Israel and are all therefore Zionists, the critics of Israel are such a 
small minority it doesn't matter. 
AZ [August 2008] “A 
Message form Shaykh 
Ayman Al-Zawahiri to 
Pakistan Army and the 
People of Pakistan” 
41 'Possible form of killing a Muslim is when a Muslim fights 
alongside Kuffar against other Muslims or aids them in war so that 
the Kuffar attain success and victory, and when a war is waged 
between Muslims and non-Muslims, he sides with Kuffar. This 
form of the said crime embodies the gravest type of Kufr and 
transgression, and represents such an extreme condition of the 
death of a person’s belief and annihilation of his Islam, that no 
worse form of infidelity and disbelief can possibly be imagined'. 
AAZ [August 2009] “The 
Path of Doom” 
142 Calls for 'Annihilation' of Jews, Americans, Apostate leaders and 
hypocrites who help them. 
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UBL [unknown date] 
Letter to Mullah Omar 
4 Media operations: 'Many international media agencies 
corresponded with us requesting an interview with us. We believe 
this is a good opportunity to make Muslims aware of what is taking 
place over the land of the two Holy Mosques as well as of what is 
happening here in Afghanistan of establishing and strengthen the 
religion, and applying Sheri ‘a (Islamic laws).  
 
‘It is obvious that the media war in this century is one of the 
strongest methods; in fact, its ratio may reach 90% of the total 
preparation for the battles.' 
UBL [September 1996] 
“Bin Ladin Declares Jihad 
on Americans/Letter from 
Usama bin Muhammad bin 
Ladin to his Muslim 
Brothers in the Whole 
World and Especially in the 
Arabian Peninsula..” 
5 Economic boycott of American goods. Women ‘expected’ to do 
their part in this as well 
UBL [March 1997] 
“Pakistan interviews 
Usama bin Ladin” 
154 Calls on Muslims to boycott American goods. 
UBL [September 2001] 
“The US Should search 
attackers within itself” 
202 'Economic boycott of the West is not possible unless economic self-
sufficiency is attained and substitute products are brought out'.  
 
'Tools for building public opinion' need to be procured to instigate 
economic boycott and mobilise the umma internationally. 
UBL [October 2001] 
“Tayseer Allouni 
interviews bin Ladin in 
Afghanistan” 
130 Economic boycotting of America 
AAZ [December 2001] 
“Knights under the 
Prophet’s Banner” 
119 'The weakness of the message to the people: The fundamentalist 
movement's message continues to be mostly geared toward the elite 
and the specialists. The public and the masses do not understand 
this message. This is a gap that the jihad movement must strive to 
fill earnestly, as we will explain later. If we add to the foregoing the 
media siege imposed on the message of the jihad movement as well 
as the campaign of deception mounted by the government media 
we should realize the extent of the gap in understanding between 
the jihad movement and the common people'. 
UBL [March 2002] 
“Usama bin Ladin: Prince 
Abdallah’s initiative is 
High Treason” 
205 Boycott of Jewish and US goods, 'disowning' the Arab treacherous 
rulers, demonstrations and civil disobedience [see 2] 
AAZ [September 2002] 
“The Interview of Dr 
Ayman Al Zawahiri” 
22 Need to cease trading with Americans. 
UBL [February 2003] 
audio statement 
78 Boycott of America and her allies. 
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UBL [January 2004] 
“Resist the New Rome” 
111 The assembly of a council of notables to remove apostate leaders 
and select a righteous Imam, Ahl al-Hall wa al-Aqd. 
AAZ [February 2005] “The 
Freeing of Humanity..” 
109 America must also be confronted in the field of 'beliefs and 
principles'. 
AAZ [March 2006] “The 
Alternative is Da’wa and 
Jihad” 
73 On the economic strikes: 'We should also implement popular 
economic boycott against Denmark, Norway, France, Germany and 
all countries that took part in this lowly insult, and against all the 
countries that took part in the Crusader campaign against Islam and 
the Muslims'.  
 
'When Prophet Mohammed was asked about the greatest kind of 
jihad, he said that it is to utter a word of truth before an unjust ruler' 
- scholars 'should spread a call underlining the need to change the 
corrupt and disgraceful situation we are currently facing so that this 
call would turn into a powerful current that sweeps away corruption 
and corruptors'. 
UBL [April 2006] “Oh 
People of Islam” 
90 Boycott should continue and focus not only on Denmark but also 
Europe and America and all those who follow them, even though a 
boycott alone is not enough. 
AAZ [December 2006] 
“Realities of Conflict 
Between Islam and 
Unbelievers” 
94 'We must exploit all Da'wah, student and union activities to back 
the Jihadi resistance'. These must help the mujahideen by making it 
easier for Ummah to join Mujahideen, stake out targets and observe 
activities of the American-Zionist presence, raise funds, spread 
awareness, and 'disseminate the Mujahideen's public relations and 
rebut the fallacies of the governments and their publicists' [counter-
messaging], declare general strikes.  
 
'The Muslim Ummah must exploit all methods of popular protest, 
like demonstrations, sit-ins, strikes, refusing to pay taxes, 
preventing cooperation with the security forces, refusing to provide 
the Crusaders with fuel, hitting traders who supply the Crusader 
forces, boycotting Crusader and Jewish products, and other ways of 
popular protest'. Students 'must take their anger to the streets'. 
Praises student protests in Turkey against Pope.  
 
'I also remind our brothers who work in Islamic media of their 
crucial, critical role in the Muslim Ummah's battle against the 
Zionist Crusade in clarifying the facts, dispelling misconceptions 
and removing the masks from the traitors'. 
AAZ [December 2006] 
“Congratulations on the 
Eid to the Ummah of 
Tawhed” 
95 Emphasises 'Jihadi media' operations spoiling 'the enemies' 
publicity campaigns'. 
AAZ [February 2007] 
“Lessons, Examples and 
Great Events in the Year 
1427” 
97 Muslim brothers in the jihadi media, 'which have deprived the 
Crusaders, Zionists and their aides of sleep'. Calls on them to 
combine their efforts, concentrate on critical issues, esp. the issue 
of the 'treasonous religion-traders' and 'encourage the Ummah to go 
forth with men and money to the fields of jihad, and to reveal to 
their Ummah just how ugly the crimes of the corruptive rulers 
really are'. 
AAZ [May 2007] “The 
Empire of Evil is about to 
End” 
23 ' I call on all my brothers in Islamic Jihadi media to hone their 
resolve and sacrifice everything in their power, for they are a 
fundamental part of the Jihadi resistance in the face of the fiercest 
Crusade ever faced by the Ummah of Islam'  
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'And I can’t forget in closing to express my thanks to my 
honourable brothers in al-Sahab Media, who are digging rock with 
their fingernails to spread the invitation to Islam, Jihad, garrisoning 
and resistance, so may Allah reward them for what they have done 
for Islam and Muslims'. 
AAZ [July 2007] “The 
Advice of one Concerned” 
102 Asks villagers, neighbours, students, mosque-goers to rise up and 
besiege the police station every time someone from their 
community is arrested.  
 
The two-pronged plan to confront the enemy alliance: 'the long-
term plan is divided into two halves: the first half consists of 
earnest, diligent work to change these corrupt and corruptive 
regimes' - many different strategies according to each individual 
situation - but several characteristics in all: patience paramount in 
all; as is 'striving to achieve popular sympathy for the Islamic 
Mujahid movement for change'; force through mass-popular 
uprising, military coup, mass disobedience, guerrilla warfare, 
armed political resistance; Ummah must get used to challenging 
falsehood and declaring the truth; 'there must be an organization 
and leadership leading change. 'As for the second half of the long-
term plan, it consists of hurrying to the fields of Jihad like 
Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia for Jihad preparation and training' 
[see also 14] [strategy]. 
AAZ [July 2007] 
“Mallicious Britain and its 
Indian Slaves” 
103 Need to boycott British goods. 
AAZ [December 2007] “A 
Review of Events” 
13 'Jihad information media' are waging an extremely important the 
Zionist-Crusader enemy. The media was initially only split between 
government media and then organizations that claim to be 
independent but are essentially government outlets, such as the 
BBC. The Jihad information media demolished this monopoly and 
is winning in the information-propaganda war. 
AAZ [April 2008] “The 
Open Meeting part one..” 
105 Whoever cannot fight must back the Mujahideen 'with financing, 
opinion, information and invitation in schools, universities, unions 
and mosques, and by taking care of the families of Mujahideen's 
captives and martyrs and specializing in the beneficial legal and 
practical sciences which are of use to the Jihad [...] and by 
mastering the techniques of Jihadi information meida'. 'The one 
without sufficient funds is excepted from jihad'. . 'Jihadi media has 
demolished - by the grace of Allah - the monopoly of the Western 
and governmental information outlets wich we have been suffering 
for decades'. 
AAZ [April 2008] “The 
Open Meeting.. Part 2..” 
107 Counter campaign to those who criticise Jihad.  
 
When asked about those who seek negotiating with AQ, he says 
only that truce was offered to Europe but was only met with 
'curses'. 
AAZ [November 2008] 
“Al-Azhar: The Lions 
Den” 
237 People need to 'rise up with their tongues, pens, and hands' in 
protest. Urges general strike for two weeks of students and workers. 
'This is a peaceful struggle which doesn't require bearing of arms or 
fighting'. Even though he later also mentions that it is a duty of all 
Muslims to bear arms. [Amyan is challenged on this by the 
interviewer who asks if he had not previously said that peaceful 
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protest was futile] - 'bearing arms might not be easy for everyone'. 
Popular action can support jihadi action. 
AAZ [January 2009] “The 
Massacre of Gaza and the 
Siege of the Traitors” 
121 'Strikes, protests, and demonstrations'. 
AAZ [August 2009] “The 
Realities of Jihad and 
Fallacy of Hypocrisy” 
140 Protests in Egypt until embargo on Gaza is lifted. 
UBL [October 2010] 
“Some points regarding the 
method of relief work” 
227 The need to create a 'special aid agency' to deal with the effects of 
climate change. This should for instance review the safety of 
settlements close to rivers. 
AAZ [June 2011] “The 
Noble Knight Dismounted” 
239 "Usama bin Laden, may Allah have mercy on him, went to his 
Lord, after he achieved what he desired. He was aiming to incite 
the Ummah to Jihad, and his message reached from East to West 
and all over the world. The Muslims answered it, as did all the 
oppressed on the face of the earth." [success - incitement] 
AAZ [August 2011] “Do 
not become weak or 
grieve” 
243 “The Muslim Ummah in general and the Jihad Movement in 
particular must engage in the battle of statement just as they engage 
the battle of teeth, and their need for the battle of statement is 
higher than the need of the entire Ummah for it, because it [the 
Muslim Ummah] is more insightful towards the hubs of danger, as 
it is the one that faces it and confronts it daily. And it [the Jihad 
movement] has more expertise on the vicious, degraded nature of 
the enemy."  
 
"And the battle of statement has opened many arenas with the grace 
of Allah; as the modern means of communication have allowed big 
opportunities for production and information, and may Allah 
reward the knights of the Jihad Media the best of rewards." 
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AAZ=Ayman Al-Zawahiri 
 
Communiqué and 
author [ID] 
 
Mentioned constraints on the use of violence 
[excerpts, quotes, notes] 
 
AAZ [unknown date] 
“The Forbidden Word” 
113 From report: 'Al-Zawahiri claims the group's actions are not 
"terrorism", rather the removal of an unjust government that is 
sanctioned by the Shari`a. He mentions the arrests, torture and death of 
members of various factions in Egypt as evidence of government 
corruption and justification of the group's means'. Asked if Jama`a 
hurts Egypt and Islam: He categorically denies that it hurts Egypt or 
Islam since their two main targets are the corrupt government and the 
Jews, and those are permissible targets. He supports the violent actions 
of al-Jama`a al-Islamiyya since they issue warnings before they carry 
out an attack'. Non-Muslims in Egypt can be killed because they do not 
have Dhimmi status from a legitimate authority [this protected non-
Muslims living in the Ottoman empire]. Stresses that al-Jihad is not a 
'takfiri' group and does not see sinning Muslims as apostates. 
AAZ [purported] 
[unknown date] “Jihad, 
Martyrdom, and the 
killing of innocents” 
48 'Those whom it is not permitted to kill - such as Muslims, dhimmis, 
women and children, and so forth'. 
AAZ [early 1996] 
“Healing the Hearts of 
the Believers” 
118 Muslims should be given prior warning if they are in a vicinity of an 
area of legitimate targets, such as Jews and Americans, before an 
attack. But argues that the overwhelming enemy and exceptional 
circumstances justify the deaths of children and Muslims. 
UBL [November 1996] 
“Bin Ladin interviewed 
on Jihad against US” 
150 Implicitly alludes to terrorism against individuals (as opposed to 
'thieves') as wrong.  
 
Urges 'wise Europeans' to leave Muslim lands, but stresses most of the 
anger for the time being is against US who now constitute the major 
infidel force in the region. 
UBL [February 1997] 
“Correspondent meets 
with opposition leader 
bin Ladin” 
151 Note 'expulsion of civilians.' American soldiers should be killed [note 
who even after the first declaration of war the violence is still limited 
in this way]. 
UBL [March 1997] 
“Pakistan interviews 
Usama bin Ladin” 
154 See how UBL mentions no Saudis were killed - Muslim deaths still 
undesirable at this stage, 'collaborator' label comes later.  
 
Insists no Pakistani troops were killed by mujahideen in Somalia [in 
sharp contrast to e.g. Ayman later - seems to be recognition at this 
stage that this is sensitive]. 
UBL [March 1997] 
“Interview with Usama 
bin Ladin” 
155 Claims 'we are not against the American people' 
UBL [August 1997] 
“Usama bin Ladin 
Urges ‘Befitting Reply’ 
to Horan” 
157 Although Aimal Kasi's attacks are mentioned and the perceived 
hypocrisy against the condemnation he received and the celebration 
Rushdie received is addressed. The attack is not directly endorsed. 
UBL [March 1998] 
“Bin Ladin Urges 
Expulsion of 
Invaders..” 
162 Note 'expulsion' and focus on US military in Saudi 
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BL [May 1998] “Bin 
Ladin: Afghanistan’s 
inclusion on US 
terrorism list is 
‘Certificate of good 
conduct’ for Taliban” 
166 [Although not directly relevant to targeting - see how US killings of 
'hundreds of thousands of children, women, and elderly people' 
(through starvation) in Iraq are considered illegitimate categories of 
killing] 
UBL [May 1998] 
“World Islamic Front 
Backs Intifadah of 
Palestine’s 
Sons/Wounds of Al-
Aqsa” 
167 Perhaps some implicit discrimination in terms of targeting in setting 
blame on governments, ruling elites, parliaments. 
UBL [June 1998] “In 
the Way of Allah” 
171 Geostrategic focus of violence - .e.g. not on China as this will deflect 
focus away from US/Israel 
UBL [February 1999] 
“Esquire interview with 
bin Ladin” 
179 Does imply that Islam limits violence (when he accuses America of 
having no such limitations in its religion) 
UBL [June 1999] 
“Usama bin Ladin, The 
Destruction of the 
Base” 
184 'Our enemy, the target -- if God gives Muslims the opportunity to do so 
-- is every American male, whether he is directly fighting us or paying 
taxes.’..  
 
Acknowledges 'people regretted the death of some innocent people of 
that country' after the East Africa bombings. 
UBL [November 2000] 
short telephone 
interview with Kuwaiti 
newspaper 
124 UBL says he had nothing to do with the USS Cole attack. Also that he 
had nothing to do with individuals the Kuwaiti authorities had arrested 
shortly before the attack though to be planning terrorist attacks within 
Kuwait and the Persian Gulf. 'Neither myself nor my followers have 
any plans to strike against oil installations or civil or military targets 
within Kuwait or any other Arabic country'. 
UBL [March 2001] 
“Ausaf receives Bin 
Ladin’s Poem..” 
193 Laments US killing of children and elderly in Afghanistan - thus 
implied this is wrong. 
UBL [September 2001] 
“The US Should search 
attackers within itself” 
202 'As a Muslim, I try my best to avoid telling a lie. Neither I had any 
knowledge of these attacks [9/11] nor I consider the killing of innocent 
women, children, and other humans as an appreciable act. Islam 
strictly forbids causing harm to innocent women, children, and other 
people. Such a practice is forbidden ever in the course of a battle.' But 
goes on to say that US policies, particularly in Palestine would call the 
'wrath of Allah' onto America.  
 
'We are against the American system, not against its people, whereas in 
these attacks, the common American people have been killed.' .. 'the 
American people are themselves the slaves of the Jews' 
UBL [November 2001] 
Osama claims he has 
nukes (article title) 
125 'The Sept 11 attacks were not targeted at women and children. The real 
targets were America’s icons of military and economic power. The 
Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) was against killing women and 
children. When he saw a dead woman during a war, he asked why was 
she killed?'. Says he is not against American people [even though they 
are targets] but only the US government. 'The mission is to spread the 
word of God, not to indulge massacring people. We ourselves are the 
target of killings, destruction and atrocities. We are only defending 
ourselves. This is defensive Jihad. We want to defend our people and 
our land. That is why I say that if we don’t get security, the Americans, 
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too would not get security.' .  
 
Claims the list of Arabs the Americans presented as hijackers after 
9/11 were only passengers [refusal to admit to 9/11]. 
AAZ [December 2001] 
“Knights under the 
Prophet’s Banner” 
119 'Our brothers in the Al-Jihad Group carried out the attack on the 
motorcade of Prime Minister Atif Sidqi using a booby-trapped car, but 
the Prime Minister survived the attack. His car escaped the full power 
of the explosion by a split second, although some shrapnel hit it. As a 
result of the attack, a child named Shayma was killed. She was a 
student in a nearby school who was standing near the site of the 
incident'. 'The unintended death of this innocent child pained us all, but 
we were helpless and we had to fight the government, which was 
against God's Shari'ah and supported God's enemies'. Says people were 
warned to stay away from 'pillars of the regime', and that a survey was 
conducted prior to the attack which concluded the school was under 
construction and not operational. 'As regards the consequences 
resulting from the intentional harm done to Muslims, we have opted 
for the opinion of Imam al-Shafi'i, may God have mercy on him, who 
called for paying blood money to the relatives of those killed. 
Therefore, we believe that those who kill Muslims unintentionally in 
such operations must pay blood money to their relatives'. 
UBL [December 2001] 
“The Fact of the 
Conflict between us and 
America” 
129 "One of [the] instincts that all humans agree on is that even if some 
injustice has inflicted them; their souls are not able to kill innocent 
children".  
 
Talks of the "revolting " killing of children. Quotes Quran: "because of 
what we ordained for the Children of Israel that if anyone killed a 
person not in retaliation of murder and (not in order to prevent the 
spread of mischief in the world it would be as if he killed all mankind."  
UBL [October 2002] 
“Statement from shaykh 
Usama bin Ladin, may 
God protect him, and 
the Al-Qa’ida 
Organization” 
211 Refers to 'military' and 'economic' targeting (although this includes 
9/11) 
UBL/AAZ [September 
2003] Audio statement 
110 'We tell them [Americans] that we are not advocates of killing and 
destruction, but with God's help, we will cut any hand that carries an 
aggression against us' [Zawahiri] - some elements of discrimination. 
UBL [October 2004] 
Threat of the US 
31 Sweden taken as example of country which isn't on the attack list 
UBL [October 2004] 
“Message to 
Americans” 
83 'Contrary to Bush's claim that we hate freedom. If so, then let him 
explain why we don't strike for example - Sweden?' 
UBL [December 2004] 
“Message concerning 
Saudi Arabia” 
84 'If some Muslims die in the operations of the mujahidin, we ask God to 
have mercy on them. Those are killed by mistake. We ask forgiveness 
from God and we shoulder the responsible' [sic].  
 
Quoting hadith: ''If the people of earth and heaven kill a Muslim, God 
will throw them all in hell', and the Quran: 'If a man kills a believer 
intentionally, his recompense is Hell, to abide therein forever: And the 
wrath and curse of Allah are upon him, and a dreadful penalty is 
prepared for him'. 
UBL [December 2004] 86 'And be very aware of killing innocent people, except for what is 
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audio statement permissible by religion, such as the innocent who are used as shields, 
without going to excess, and this issue should be left to the judgment 
of the Mujahidin scholars'. 
AAZ [December 2005] 
interview 
49 The Muslims didn't attack the Swiss or Vietnamese for instance. 
AAZ [April 2006] 
“Four Years since the 
Battle of Tora Bora” 
238 In Iraq, violence is focused on occupation forces, i.e. the Americans 
and coalition troops, and unity urged among Muslims. 
UBL [May 2006] “A 
Testimony to the Truth” 
91 Some scope left for negotiations with different leader 
AAZ [July 2007] “The 
Advice of one 
Concerned” 
102 Unlike HAMAS killing Fatah people and vice versa, the ISI 'only kills 
spies and traitors, and declares its innocence of any inviolable blood 
which one of its soldiers might spill, and not just that, but its Amir 
announces his readiness to appear before a judicial council in any 
complaint and that he is prepare to have the right taken from him 
personally if the legal ruling is issued against him.' Yet despite all this 
a storm of media campaigns and allegations is whipped up against 
them - but not HAMAS. 
UBL [September 2007] 
“The Solution..” 
10 Jews of Morocco, Christians of Egypt – societies within Muslim 
countries which will not be targeted 
UBL [December 2007] 
“The Way to Frustrate 
the Conspiracies” 
27 'Those Muslims who are slain during any of the operations against the 
Crusader infidels or their agents, we have not meant to kill him, and 
only Allah knows how it hurts and grieves us when some Muslims die 
in operations we are responsible for. We seek Allah's forgiveness from 
this and we ask Allah to grant these souls mercy and grant them 
paradise and help their families. It is apparent that our enemies intend 
to establish their garrisons among Muslims in order to use them as 
human shields [...] and I stress to my mujahideen brothers that they 
must be very cautious during operations targeting army garrisons 
which are located near Muslims'. 
Z [early 2008] 
“Exoneration..” 
20 'Shari'ah forbids killing children, whether Muslim or non-Muslim. 
Indeed Hizballah's missiles that were fired on northern Palestine killed 
Arabs. Similarly Al-Qassam's missiles are fired haphazardly and it is 
not known if they kill old people or children.' 'You might be asked, do 
you justify the killing of innocent people? Do you claim that there 
have been no mistakes in jihad? The answer is that those who have 
made mistakes can be held accountable and those who suffered 
damage can be recompensed according to Shari'ah, but jihad must 
continue. As in any other human activity, mistakes have been and will 
be made in jihad. For every mistake, there is accountability according 
to Shari'ah. This Shari'ah was not revealed to govern angels, but was 
revealed to humans who sometimes do right but sometimes make 
mistakes.' ‘My answer is this: We have heard a lot of talk from the 
establishment ulema accusing the mujahidin of killing innocent people. 
They brand them as infidels who damage property and do many other 
wrong things. However, you are the first to use the false accusation 
that the mujahidin killed persons because of their skin or hair colour. 
This is an example of the document's tendency, one to which I referred 
in the fifth observation, to make accusations without proof. Therefore I 
urge the writer, or writers, to mention specific incidents and specific 
dates, so that we can deal with them and discuss them. Making 
accusations without proof is the method of security services and police 
detectives. It is not the method of someone who wishes to rationalize 
jihadist action.' A Muslim cannot be killed intentionally - that is a 
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deadly sin - but a Muslim can be killed by mistake whilst undertaking 
jihadi operations. "As I said previously, the property or life of an non-
believer are protected only by peace treaty (sulh), status as a protected 
alien (dhimmah), or safe-conduct (aman). If none of these things is 
confirmed, matters remain in their original state." Not all Christians are 
equal - some resist the Jew-Crusader alliance, some try to mend 
relations with the West and Arab Christians oppose Israel and are 
proud of the Prophet in their history. Copts warned against supporting 
the alliance or Mubarak, but says "we do not want to battle against 
you". On Shimaa again and how this was regrettable, but that people 
should have heeded warnings not to be close to govt buildings, routes 
etc [even though the bomb was by a school]. But "we have fought this 
regime that fights Islam to protect our daughters and daughters of 
Muslims and to protect Shimaa and every Shimaa". 
AAZ [April 2008] “The 
Open Meeting part 
one..” 
105 'We haven't killed the innocents [Muslims], not in Baghdad, nor in 
Morocco, not in Algeria, nor anywhere else'. If an innocent was killed 
by mujahideen it was due to: (1) mistake, (2) 'out of necessity in cases 
of al-Tatarrus (see chapter 8 in Exoneration, plus 'The Healing of the 
Believers' Chest) (1/1). . According to a communiqué from AQIM the 
11 December attacks did not kill Muslims but 'Crusader unbelievers'. It 
targeted UN, constitutional assembly and police academy, not 
'children's schools or women hospitals' (2/1). How do HAMAS justify 
killing innocents with the 'blessed Qassam rockets' which don't 
discriminate between child, adult, Muslim or Jew? (3/1). Attacks in 
Algeria: the truth has been distorted, the Batna attack was attempt on 
the president (but the martyr blew himself up when discovered by 
security forces) and the Dellys attack was against a Naval base. Quotes 
from AQIM charter on targeting showing how they avoid elderly men, 
women and children. 
AAZ [April 2008] “The 
Open Meeting.. Part 
2..” 
107 Advises the mujahideen 'to be absolutely cautious in preparing for their 
operations as much as possible and not harm Muslims'. The AQIM 
'cannot intend to kill a single Muslims wrongly'. Says that 'your 
brothers in the al-Qaeda organisation in the Islamic Maghreb are most 
eager to preserve your souls, property, honor and dignity, and they are 
waging jihad in the path of God to liberate you [Algerians] from 
America, France, and the sons of France'. Muslim dead are either 
mistake or claims for government propaganda. . Replies to an 
accusation that it has supported the use of car bombs against mosques 
and markets saying this is 'propaganda of the United States' and the 
media. 
AAZ [November 2008] 
“Al-Azhar: The Lions 
Den” 
237 When asked about the accusations that AQ kills innocents: says such 
accusations have throughout history been used by tyrants and 
colonialists against freedom fighters and that AQ has been the focus of 
a concerted media campaign of deceitful information by the West. And 
at the same time American and Western forces kill millions under the 
pretext of combat operations. Muslims should imagine what they 
would do about their current situation if Al-Qaida had never emerged. 
AAZ [April 2009] “Six 
years since the invasion 
of Iraq..” 
136 There are references to the American public's frustration with the Iraq 
war, and their expressions through elections that the war should end. 
AAZ [September 2010] 
“A Victorious Ummah, 
A Broken Crusade” 
226 'I emphasise to my brothers the mujahideen everywhere that true 
victory is in adherence to Allah's Shari'ah and not being negligent in 
applying it. That's why the mujahideen must be diligent in abiding by 
the sacredness of Muslim, and that's why their operations must be 
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regulated by the noble Shari'ah, and that's why they must study ever 
operation from all sides. And the Mujahideen must disown every 
operation which is falsely attributed to them despite their innocence of 
it and which is aimed at the Muslims in their markets, mosques and 
gathering places. Moreover, we disown any operation which a Jihadi 
group carries out in which it doesn't show concern for the safety of the 
Muslims.' [So there is anxiety over Muslim deaths - and an attempt to 
place distance between AQ and targeting of Muslims in Iraq, Pakistan 
and elsewhere, but there is also an interesting admission that 'Jihadi' 
groups are partly responsible, and that when they are, these attacks 
should be 'disowned.']  
 
Mujahideen travel to Afghanistan to carry out attacks against NATO, 
not Muslims. 
AAZ [February 2011] 
“A Message of Glad 
Tidings…(2)” 
233 ''There are some operations which are ascribed to the Mujahideen, 
some by due right and others otherwise, in which transgressions occur 
against Muslims in their mosques, their markets, and other gathering 
places. About this, I say the following: Regardless of whether the 
ascription of these acts to the Mujahideen are correct or incorrect, my 
brothers and I in Al-Qaedah declare to Allah that we are innocent from 
these attacks, and that we object to them, whether those who carry 
them are the Mujahideen or others'. 'When planning any operation, 
they should try their utmost to avoid the deaths and injuries of anyone 
whose blood is prohibited, whether Muslim or otherwise. They should 
try as much as possible to avoid harming innocent Muslims in their 
attacks of the enemy, who have planted themselves in their midst 
(called tatarrus), as well as any others who are impermissible to kill, of 
course, other than what is necessary or that which unintentionally 
results from a mistake. They should be very careful not to be lax in this 
matter of tatarrus' [even though Ayman was one who popularised this 
caveat as an excuse for wider targeting.] [guilty Muslism seemingly 
still fair game]. Talks of 'transgressions of the Orthodox Coptic Church 
and its encroachment of and transformation into a government within 
the government, or to be more exact, a government superior to the 
government.'  
 
There are some Christians who take great measure to improve relations 
with the Muslims, who don’t accept the Zio-Christian occupation of 
the Arab and the Muslim World, and who are resisting this occupation 
for whatever reason. There are those pure Arab Christians whose racial 
jealousy forbids them from accepting the Jewish occupation of 
Palestine and the American presence in Arab and Muslim lands, and 
there are those who take pride in their Arab roots and with the Prophet 
of Islam.' 
AAZ [April 2011] “A 
Message of Glad 
Tidings…(5)” 
236 Shari'ah law and Islamic governance will not 'contradict living and 
coexistence with the nation’s partners of Christians and non-Muslims.' 
AAZ [June 2011] “The 
Noble Knight 
Dismounted” 
239 "In Tora Bora, after the ceasefire agreement, around 100 hypocrites 
fell into a trap of the Mujahideen. And the only thing between them 
and their deaths was a command for the mujahideen to open fire. But 
the Sheikh Usama bin Laden ordered his brothers to let them leave the 
trap, and they did not fire a single shot upon them." . 
 
"Likewise, I urge my Mujahideen brothers everywhere to join with the 
masses of the Muslim Ummah and strive to serve them, defend them, 
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and secure their safety and their sanctities. Stay away from any 
operation that exposes them to danger in the markets, mosques, or 
crowded areas. We did not leave our homes and migrate from our 
homelands except to defend them and their honour." 
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UBL [March 
1997] “Pakistan 
interviews Usama 
bin Ladin” 
154 Implicit warning to US 
UBL [June 1997] 
“Usama bin Ladin 
Dares US 
Commandos to 
Come to 
Afghanistan” 
156 If US sends commandos to arrest UBL or other mujahideen they will meet the 
same fate as they did in Somalia 
UBL [November 
1997] “Daily 
Reports Usama 
bin Ladin’s Threat 
against 
Americans” 
158 Americans warned to force its government to stop 'international acts of 
terrorism' against the Muslim world or else 'there cannot be any guarantee for 
the safety of American interests and its citizens in any part of the world' 
UBL [August 
1998] “The Battle 
Has Not Yet 
Started” 
73 Threatens action against US in response to US bombings of camps in 
Afghanistan - 'the battle has not yet started and that the answer is what you see, 
not what you hear' 
UBL [January 
1999] “Taliban let 
Bin Ladin Break 
his Silence” 
177 To America: "Tell them the war has just begun; the Americans should now 
await the answer," 
UBL [January 
1999] “Wrath of 
God..” 
178 'The Americans should expect reactions from the Muslim world that are 
proportionate to the injustice they inflict.' 
UBL [January 
1999] “Accused 
Terrorist Leader 
Usama Bin Ladin 
Declares War on 
All Americans” 
180 Americans everywhere are a target 
UBL [February 
1999] “Esquire 
interview with bin 
Ladin” 
179 "Every day the Americans delay their departure, they will receive a new 
corpse." 
UBL [May 2001] 
“IF Taleban allow, 
I can make US life 
miserable” 
198 UBL to make 'life miserable' to US 
UBL [November 
2001] “Al-Jazirah 
carries bin Ladin’s 
address..” 
203 'As for the United States, I tell it and its people these few words: I swear by 
Almighty God who raised the heavens without pillars that neither the United 
States nor he who lives in the United States will enjoy security before we can 
see it as a reality in Palestine and before all the infidel armies leave the land of 
Muhammad, may God's peace and blessing be upon him.' 
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AAZ [December 
2001] “Knights 
under the 
Prophet’s Banner” 
119 'This book has been written as a warning to the forces of evil that lie in wait for 
this nation. We tell them: The nation is drawing closer every day to its victory 
over you and is about to inflict its rightful punishment [qasas] on you step by 
step'. 
UBL/AAZ [April 
2002] “The Wills 
of the Martyrs..” 
207 UBL refers to his previous message to America sent out on ABC News where 
he warns 'that America has picked a fight with the sons of the Two Holy Places 
that will make it forget the horrors of Vietnam.'  
 
UBL: 'America will not be able to dream, not even in their sleep, of living in 
peace and security, as long as we don't live in real peace in Palestine, in the 
Land of the Two Holy Mosques, and throughout the Islamic world' 
UBL/others [April 
2002] “The Wills 
of the Martyrs..” 
108 Excerpts from earlier statement by UBL are played where he threatens 'America 
and those who live in America' that they will not experience security until it 
becomes reality in Palestine etc. 
UBL [May 2002] 
“British-based 
Islamic news 
agency receives 
encrypted bin 
Ladin video” 
209 He adds that if he "specifically targeted Britain and America -- this war is not 
confined to them -- it served as an opportunity for other nations to revise their 
stance." 
AAZ [September 
2002] “The 
Interview of Dr 
Ayman Al 
Zawahiri” 
22 America is still under threat, as much as it was prior to 9/11. America should 
expect the same destruction it inflicts on others, including that inflicted by 
Israel. AQ continues will continue to attack the American economy. America 
'should expect to be treated the same way it has acted' in Afghanistan, Palestine 
and Muslim lands. AQ advises America and its deputies to know their 'crimes 
will not go unpunished' and they must withdraw. 
UBL [October 
2002] “A Message 
Addressed to the 
American People” 
75 Americans have not learned anything from 9/11. If America does not reduce the 
intensity of their aggression, 'we will respond in an equal manner'. 
UBL [October 
2002] “Statement 
from shaykh 
Usama bin Ladin, 
may God protect 
him, and the Al-
Qa’ida 
Organization” 
211 'Our threat to the Americans and Jews that they shall remain restless, shall not 
feel at ease, and shall not dream of security until they take their hands off our 
nation and stop their aggression against us and their support for our enemies' 
UBL [October 
2002] “Letter from 
Usama bin 
Mohammed bin 
Ladin to the 
American People” 
212 'Here we outline our reply to two questions addressing the Americans: Q1) Why 
are we waging Jihad against you? Q2) What advice do we have for you and 
what do we want from you?' Americans are being fought for they continue to 
attack Muslims, especially in Palestine. ‘The blood pouring out of Palestine 
must be treated - with revenge of equal quantity.' .. 'So it is clear that it is 
essential that we remove these policies [of 'agent' governments failing to 
implement Shari'ah, insulting the ummah, stealing its wealth, surrender to the 
Jews] to make the Shariah (Law of Allah) the supreme law, and that we heal the 
wounds of Palestine. As you are the Chief designers and sponsors for these 
policies that are causing immeasurable harm to this Ummah (nation), our fight 
against these policies is the same fight against you.' [See dynamics in terms of 
far and near enemy debates]. (see long list of grievances blamed on US in 19 & 
20).  
 
'After all, how can you expect that after you have attacked us for more than half 
  363 
Communiqué 
and author [ID] 
 
Threats and warnings to non-Muslims 
[excerpts, quotes, notes] 
 
a century, that we will then let you live in peace?!!' 
UBL [November 
2002]  “Osama bin 
Laden hails recent 
operations..” 
76 'Just as you kill, you will be killed. And just like you bombarded, you will be 
bombarded. Be prepared to receive the glad tidings of what will be bad for you'. 
UBL [November 
2002] “Statement 
from Abdullah 
Usama bin Ladin 
to the Peoples of 
countries Allied to 
Tyrannical US 
Government” 
214 'We had previously warned Australia against participating in Afghanistan in 
addition to its objectionable endeavours for East Timor's secession. It ignored 
the warnings until it woke up to the sound of explosions in Bali and its 
government then claimed falsely and untruly that they were not targeted.'  
 
'The time has come for us to be equal. Just as you kill you are killed. Just as you 
bombard you are bombarded. Rejoice at the harm coming to you.' 
AAZ [August 
2003] audio 
statement 
55 America will pay dearly for any harm inflicted upon Muslims in captivity, as 
will anyone who assisted in their capture. 'what you have seen until now is 
nothing but the first skirmishes. The real battle has not started yet'. 
UBL/AAZ 
[September 2003] 
Audio statement 
110 'We are concerned about telling you more than this and emphasize to you that 
what you have seen so far are only the first skirmishes and the beginning of the 
clash. The real battle, however, has not started yet. So, prepare yourselves to be 
punished for your crimes.' Mothers of soldiers urged to pressure the government 
to get them back, if they want to see them alive. [Zawahiri] 
UBL [November 
2003] “Al-Jazirah 
TV: Al-Qa’ida 
claims 
responsibility for 
Istanbul 
bombings” 
221 Warns of more attacks like the Istanbul Synagogue bombings to come 
AAZ [February 
2004] audio 
statement 
58 “We remind Bush that he did not crush two-thirds of Al Qaeda. On the contrary, 
thanks be to God, Al Qaeda remains on the battleground of the holy war, raising 
the banner of Islam in the face of the Zionist-Crusader campaign against the 
Islamic community.” 
 
“Bush, fortify your targets, tighten your defence, intensify your security 
measures, because the fighting Islamic community  –  which sent you New York 
and Washington battalions  –  has decided to send you one battalion after the 
other, carrying death and seeking heaven.” 
UBL [April 2004] 
Message to 
Europe 
52 AQ will avenge the death of Sheikh Ahmad Yassin on America. 
UBL [April 2004] 
Peace offering to 
Europeans 
80 We will punish America for the killing of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin. 'Reciprocal 
treatment is fair and the one who starts injustice bears greater blame'. 
UBL [October 
2004] Threat of 
the US 
31 Responds to Bush's claims that the mujahideen hate freedom, saying 'because 
we are free men who do not remain silent in the face of injustice'. Just as you 
violate our security we will violate yours. The American people warned that 
Bush is striving only for his own personal financial gain.  
 
The hand-signals of those who jumped from the towers should be examined; 
they were saying that the American people should not have let Washington 
anger the Muslims which brought on this attack. 
AAZ [August 
2005] interview 
128 'As for the English, I say to them: Blair has brought destruction upon you, to the 
centre of London, and he will have more of it, Allah willing. Oh the peoples of 
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the Crusader coalition, we have offered you, at least, to stop your aggression 
against the Muslims. We have offered you... The lion of Islam, the mujaheed 
Sheik Osama bin Laden, may Allah protect him, has offered you a truce, so you 
will leave the lands of Islam. Did Sheik Osama bin Laden not tell you that you 
could not dream of security before we live it as a reality in Palestine and before 
all the infidel armies leave the land of Muhammad? But you have made rivers of 
blood in our countries, so we blew up volcanoes of rage in your countries. Our 
message to you is clear and unequivocal: You will not be saved unless you 
withdraw from our land, stop stealing our oil and our resources, and cease your 
support of the corrupt (Arab) rulers'. To Americans: 'Oh Americans, what you 
have seen in New York and Washington, and the casualties you witness in 
Afghanistan and in Iraq, despite all the media blackout, are nothing but the 
casualties of the initial clashes. If you continue the same policy of aggression 
against the Muslims, you will see, Allah willing, horrors that will make you 
forget what you saw in Afghanistan... I mean, in Vietnam'. 
AAZ [November 
2005] “Wills of 
the Knights of the 
London Raids” 
53 The 'blessed' London raid. 'O People of the Crusader alliances, we have alerted 
you and warned you, but it appears that you want us to make you taste death in 
all its horribleness'. Reference to UBL's peace offering and Jack Straw's 
dismissal. Blair 'continues to exploit the heedlessness and negligence of his 
people and obstinately insists on treating them as if they are idiots incapable of 
understanding by reputedly telling them that what occurred in London had no 
connection to the crimes he has committed in Palestine, Afghanistan, and Iraq'. 
AAZ [December 
2005] “The 
Victory of the 
Islamic Religion 
in Iraq” 
26 As long as the people of the Crusader nations 'fail to interact with the Muslim 
Ummah on the basis of respect and mutual understanding, you shall continue to 
move from one disaster to the next, and your disasters shall not cease until you 
leave our lands and end your theft of our treasure and stop your support to the 
corrupt rulers of our countries'. 
AAZ [December 
2005] interview 
49 'Whoever strikes us [...] we chop off his hand; and whoever acts with insolence 
toward us will pay the price for his audacity'. The Crusader west which follows 
Bush and Blair will pay the price, and the 'battle is still in its first stages'.  
 
'The blessed London raid is one of the raids that the Qaedat al-Jihad 
organization had the honour of carrying out against the British Crusader 
arrogance - as well as the British Crusader aggression toward the Muslim umma 
for more than one hundred years; and against the British historic crime of 
establishing Israel; and against the continual crimes the English perpetrate 
against Muslims in Afghanistan and Iraq. '.  
 
We address them [the British] in the only language they understand; and if they 
don't understand it this time around, we will repeat it until they understand it 
completely.' ..'If they really oppose it [the government], then let them depose it; 
but if they are satisfied with it, then they should pay the price for this 
satisfaction'. 
UBL [January 
2006] Bin Ladin 
truce offer to 
Americans 
50 'As for the delay of similar operations in America, this has not been because of 
failure to break through your security measures. The operations are under 
preparation and you will see them in your own homes once they are readied'. 
AAZ [January 
2006] “Bajawr 
Massacre and the 
Lies of the 
Crusaders” 
51 To the American people: 'Bush and his gang are shedding your blood and 
wasting your money in failed adventures. They have involved you in a struggle - 
which you cannot win - against the Muslims, [in order to] increase their wealth'. 
'Your leaders - due to their desire to accumulate wealth - insist on casting you 
into perdition and destroying your souls, in Iraq and Afghanistan - no, even 
more: in your own homes, Allah willing. 
AAZ [April 2006] 238 'I address his [al-Jafari] two masters: Bush and Blair. I say, God willing, you 
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“Four Years since 
the Battle of Tora 
Bora” 
will pay for these statements [of the Iraqi defence minister saying houses of 
Muslims could be destroyed]'. 
AAZ [June 2006] 
“Elegizing the 
Ummah’s 
Martyr..” 
32 We take revenge for anyone killed. Americans asked how many of them have 
been killed, how much the economy has suffered, how much moral has suffered 
in the ranks, and the extent of Muslim hatred towards Americans. 'You are 
facing neither individuals nor organizations: rather, you are facing the Islamic 
Ummah 
UBL [July 2006] 
“To the Ummah in 
General and the 
Mujahideen in 
Iraq and Somalia 
in Particular” 
93 'We warn all countries of the world against responding to America by sending 
international forces to Somalia [...] we will fight their soldiers on the land of 
Somalia [...] We will also reserve our right to punish them on their own territory 
and everywhere possible at the right time and using the method we deem most 
appropriate'. 
AAZ [September 
2006] “Hot 
issues..” 
21 To the people of the West: 'your leaders are hiding from you', 'new events' are 
coming, the Western people have given the mujahideen every legal justification 
for attacking them. They have been reputedly warned and offered truce. Now 
full legal and rational justifications are in place for attacking the West until its 
people surrender or Western power destroyed. Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan 
are all but defeated, fighting their last battles. The West will be expelled from 
the Gulf, ruining its economy, and from Israel, which will be destroyed. 
AAZ [September 
2006] “Bush, the 
Vatican’s Pope, 
Darfur and the 
Crusades” 
89 To Bush: 'We, by the grace of Allah, are seeking to exact revenge on behalf of 
Islam and Muslims from you and your soldiers and allies'. 
AAZ [December 
2006] “Realities of 
Conflict Between 
Islam and 
Unbelievers” 
94 To Democrats in US: 'And if you don't refrain from the foolish American policy 
of backing Israel, occupying the lands of Islam, and stealing the treasures of the 
Muslims, then await the same fate' [be killed by Mujahideen]. Democrats and 
Republicans in US told that a process of negotiation with different tribes will 
not work in Iraq. The American people: 'a nation which chooses Bush as its 
president is a nation of negligible morals, ideology and intellect'. Argues the 
Americans chose Democratic at 2006 midterms due to Mujahideen operations. 
They will never dream of security until it is experienced in Palestine and all 
lands of Islam. 
AAZ [January 
2007] “The 
Correct Equation” 
28 To Americans: 'most of you don't recognise the language of religion, morals and 
principles, and instead understand the language of running after pillage, and 
plunder [...] if you want to live in security you must accept the facts of what is 
happening on the ground and reject the fantasies [of Bush] [...] You must 
honestly try to reach a mutual understanding with the Muslims for then, and 
only then, you might enjoy security. If, however, you continue with the policy 
of Bush and his gang you will never even dream of peace' ... 'If we are secure, 
you might be secure'.  
 
'You are facing Islam's rage'.  
 
'What awaits you [...] is much worse than anything you have yet seen'. 
AAZ [February 
2007] “Lessons, 
Examples and 
Great Events in 
the Year 1427” 
97 People of the West are not facing organizations or individuals, but 'Jihadi 
Intifada of the angry, alert Muslim Ummmah'. If the West continues with its 
current policies it will be defeated in Afghanistan and Iraq. This will then only 
embolden the mujahideen and enhance the confrontation. 'So pay attention 
before it's too late'. The American people voted for Democrats [in the mid-
terms] because they were opposed to Bush, but in fact they are treading the 
same line and face certain failure. 'And the American people shall discover that 
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you are all one side of the same coin of tyranny, criminality and failure'. 
AAZ [May 2007] 
“The Empire of 
Evil is about to 
End” 
23 'The Empire of Evil is about to come to an end'….'a new dawn is about to rise'. 
'The Americans deserve what they’re getting. They chose this liar two times, so 
let them pay the price for their choice'. 
AAZ [July 2007] 
“Malicious Britain 
and its Indian 
Slaves” 
103 'Therefore, I say to Elizabeth and Blair that we got the message and we are 
preparing for a strong response'. To Blair's successor: 'if you did not learn a 
lesson, we are ready to repeat it' [London]. 
UBL [September 
2007] “The 
Solution..” 
10 Normal Americans claim to be innocent, and yet they failed to bring the leaders 
responsible for the Vietnam war to justice. And elected Bush twice and gave 
him continued mandate to wage war.' This innocence of yours is like my 
innocence of the blood of your sons on the 11th’ 
UBL [March 
2008] “May our 
Mothers be 
Bereaved of us if 
we fail to help our 
Prophet, peace be 
upon him” 
11 Revenge for the drawings will be more severe than for killing of women and 
children 
AAZ [November 
2008] “The Exit of 
Bush and Arrival 
of Obama” 
100 To the American people: references the note sent to the American people from 
Bin Laden telling them to cease all interference in Muslim affairs and 
withdrawing troops. 'So choose for yourself whatever you like, and bear the 
consequences of your choice, and as you judge, you will be judged.' 
AAZ [November 
2008] “Al-Azhar: 
The Lions Den” 
237 'I tell Bush: the dogs of Afghanistan have yet to eat their fill of the flesh of 
Americans. And I challenge you, if you're really a man, to send the entire 
American army to Pakistan and the tribal regions, for it to end up, with Allah's 
help, in Hell'. 
AAZ [January 
2009] “The 
Massacre of Gaza 
and the Siege of 
the Traitors” 
121 Pledges that the oath of bin Laden will be fulfilled that 'neither America nor 
those who reside in it will ever even dream of security until we ourselves live it 
practically in Palestine, and before all the infidel armies have withdrawn from 
the land of Muhammad' [quoting bin Laden]. 
 
AAZ [April 2009] 
“Six years since 
the invasion of 
Iraq..” 
136 Americans will continue to face bloodshed in Iraq and Afghanistan, Obama has 
not changed the policies of Bush. Americans are killing Muslims in Palestine, 
Iraq and Afghanistan, stealing Muslim resources, occupying their lands and 
assisting corrupt rulers to stay in power. American leaders are trying to hide 
from their people that 'the Muslim nation is experiencing an awakening in which 
it is returning to jihad', 'arresting, killing and torturing' will not change this. 
UBL [September 
2009] “A 
Statement to the 
American People” 
144 If Americans decide to continue this war 'we will have no choice but to continue 
this war of attrition against you on all possible fronts.' 
UBL [September 
2009] “A Message 
to the European 
People” 
143 Europeans should recognise that Americans are not reliable allies, and they will 
be left alone to battle the mujahideen. If Europeans were awere of the atrocities 
committed by America they would understand the causes for the Madrid and 
London attacks. 
AAZ [September 
2009] “Shaykh Dr 
Ayman al-
Zawahiri: Eulogy 
for the Role Model 
of Youth” 
147 Americans will see that the jihad will escalate after Baithulla's murder. .. 'And 
we say to the Germans, the Americans and the English, […] Whoever wants to 
lose his child should send him to Afghanistan. Whoever wants to lose his 
money, should spend in on Afghanistan. Whoever wants to damage his 
equipment, should send it to Afghanistan. And whoever wants to bring defeat to 
his army, should send it to Afghanistan.' 
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AAZ [October 
2009] “Eulogy for 
Ibn Sheikh al Libi 
by Shaykh Ayman 
al-Zawahiri” 
145 'You criminals, you murderers, you vampires […] your blood will be spilled and 
your economy will be drained so that you stop your crimes […] We will take 
revenge for every mujahid, orphan, or Muslim you have killed. '. 'Obama, you 
who talks about human rights; how many secret prisons are there? Where are 
they located? How many are their victims? How many of them were killed? 
How many were disabled? What is their fate? To whom were they handed over? 
Why did you hand them over.' 'Why did your administration conspire with the 
Libyan regime to kill Ibn Sheikh al-Libi?'. 
UBL [February 
2010] “From 
Osama to Obama” 
148 'America will not dream of security until we experience it as reality in Palestine' 
AAZ [November 
2010] “Who is 
going to support 
Aifa Siddique” 
229 ‘By the Lord of the heavens and the earth, we will fight you until the Day of 
Judgement or you stop your crimes.’ 
UBL [November 
2010] “Message 
from Shaykh 
Usama bin Ladin 
to the People of 
France” 
230 ‘As you kill, you will be killed, and as you capture, you will be captured, and as 
you ruin our security, we will ruin your security, and the one who started it has 
done the greater injustice.’ French must withdraw from Afghanistan. 
UBL [January 
2011] “From al-
Sheikh Osama bin 
Mohammed bin 
Ladin to the 
French People” 
231 “Our message to you today and yesterday…is that the release of your prisoners 
from the hands of our brothers is dependent upon the exit of your soldiers from 
our homelands.”  
 
“O’ people of France, your president’s refusal to leave Afghanistan is a result of 
his subordination to America. And this refusal is a green light to kill your 
prisoners immediately in order to get rid of the consequences of your case, but 
we won’t do it on the time he assigns.”  
 
“And his stance will cost him and cost you highly, over various axes, inside 
France and outside. And it’s not hidden from you that the size of your debts and 
the weakness of your budget are not in need for opening new fronts.” 
AAZ [June 2011] 
“The Noble 
Knight 
Dismounted” 
239 Zawahiri refers against to the words of bin Ladin, the "Imam of the Age of Jihad 
against America", that "America and those who live in American will not dream 
of security before we truly live in security in Palestine and before all the infidel 
armies leave the land of Muhammad, may Allah's prayers and peace be upon 
him." Later Zawahiri refers to the pledge of ensuring security in all Muslim 
lands before America and its agents can dream of this.. Abu Abdullah Usama 
bin Laden responded in Abbottabad, “Just wait! Humiliation is coming to 
America! Just wait! Humiliation is coming to Crusader arrogance! Just wait! 
Humiliation is coming to the Pakistani agents! How wrong is the neglect of the 
sanctuaries, the holy sites, and the honor of the Ummah!”  
 
Obama and America have rejoice repeatedly after their perceived successes 
against the mujahideen but have always been disappointed, now they rejoice 
with the death of Usama: "so wait for what befalls you after all this rejoicing." 
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UBL [February 1999] 
“Esquire interview with 
bin Ladin” 
179 'And we tell the mothers of soldiers and American mothers in general 
that if they value their lives and the lives of their children, to find a 
nationalistic government that will look after their interests and not the 
interests of the Jews. The continuation of tyranny will bring the fight to 
America, as Ramzi Yousef and others did. This is my message to the 
American people: to look for a serious government that looks out for 
their interests and does not attack others, their lands, or their honour. And 
my word to American journalists is not to ask why we did that but ask 
what their government has done that forced us to defend ourselves' 
UBL [February 1999] 
May 1998 interview 
reported 
182 To China: 'It was the United States that dropped the atomic bomb on 
Japan. So I suggest the Chinese government be more careful of the US 
and the West. China must use its force against the United States and 
Israel and should be friendly towards Muslims.' 
UBL [November 2001] 
Osama claims he has 
nukes (article title) 
125 'I ask the American people to force their government to give up anti-
Muslim policies. The American people had risen against their 
government’s war in Vietnam. They must do the same today. The 
American people should stop the massacre of Muslims by their 
government.' .. 'There are many innocent and good-hearted people in the 
West. American media instigates them against Muslims. However, some 
good-hearted people are protesting against American attacks because 
human nature abhors injustice.' 'The Muslims were massacred under the 
UN patronage in Bosnia. I am ware that some officers of the State 
Department had resigned in protest. Many years ago the US ambassador 
in Egypt had resigned in protest against the policies of President Jimmy 
Carter. Nice and civilized are everywhere. The Jewish lobby has taken 
America and the West hostage'. 
UBL [October 2002] “A 
Message Addressed to the 
American People” 
75 'Indeed, I'm a trustworthy adviser to you. I invite you to the happiness of 
this world of the hereafter and to escape your dry, miserable, 
materialistic life that is without soul. I invite you to Islam'. 
UBL [October 2002] 
“Letter from Usama bin 
Mohammed bin Ladin to 
the American People” 
212 'The first thing that we are inviting you to is Islam, the religion of 
Tawheed.' 'We call you to Islam; the last religion that has replaced all the 
previous religions' .. America 'advised' to: cease support for Israel, 
Russia re Chechyna, Phillipines re Mindanao, Indians re Kashmir; to 
vacate Muslim lands, and cease supporting puppet leaders and interfering 
in the affairs of these lands. 
UBL [November 2002] 
“Statement from 
Abdullah Usama bin 
Ladin to the Peoples of 
countries Allied to 
Tyrannical US 
Government” 
214 'Why did your governments ally themselves to the United States in this 
attack on us in Afghanistan, and I mention in particular Britain, France, 
Italy, Canada, Germany, and Australia?' 
UBL [April 2004] 
Message to Europe 
52 'This is a message to our neighbours north of the Mediterranean, 
containing a peace proposal in response to positive reactions' [Ibrahim 
points out that in Arabic, what was offered to the Europeans was 
'mudabarat sulh' essentially a long lasting peace treaty. To the Americans 
he offered 'hudna', a temporary truce, easily abrogated, p. 303]. 'Our 
actions are merely reactions to yours, represented by the murder and 
  369 
Communiqué and 
author [ID] 
 
Appeals & conciliatory approaches, promises of truce 
[excerpts, quotes, notes] 
 
 
destruction of our people in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Palestine'. 'Reciprocal 
treatment is part of justice; and he who initiates aggression is the unjust 
one'. 'We both suffer injustices by your leaders, who send your sons, 
despite objections [made], to our countries, to kill and be killed. Thus it 
is in both our interests to stop the ones who shed their own people's 
blood, for both their own narrow, personal interests and the interests of 
the gang residing at the White House'.  
 
'I therefore offer them [Europeans] this peace treaty, which essentially is 
a commitment to cease operations against every country that pledges not 
to attack Muslims or interfere in their business - including the American 
conspiracy against the greater Islamic world. This peace treaty can be 
renewed at the end of a government's term and the beginning of a new 
one, if both sides consent. It will commence with the departure of its last 
soldier from our lands; it is available for a period of three months starting 
from the day this statement is issued'. 
UBL [April 2004] Peace 
offering to Europeans 
80 To the people of Europe: 'The examining of the developments that have 
been taking place, in terms of killing in our countries and your countries, 
will make clear an important fact; namely, that injustice is inflicted on us 
and on you by your politicians, who send your sons - although your are 
opposed to this - to our countries to kill and be killed'. 'Therefore it is in 
both sides' interest to curb the plans of those who shed the blood of 
peoples for their narrow personal interest and subservience to the White 
House gang'.  
 
'Based on the above, and in order to deny war merchants a chance and in 
response to the positive interaction shown by recent events and opinion 
polls, which indicate that most European peoples want peace, I ask 
honest people, especially ulema preachers and merchants, to form a 
permanent committee to enlighten European peoples of the justice of our 
causes, above all Palestine. They can make use of the huge potential of 
the media. I also offer a peace initiative to them, whose essence is our 
commitment to stopping operations against every country that commits 
itself to not attacking Muslims or interfering in their affairs'. To be 
renewed by each new government, starting with the departure of foreign 
troops from Muslim lands, offer on the table for three months. 
UBL [October 2004] 
Threat of the US 
31 The security of Americans is in their own hands, not Bush, Kerry or Al-
Qaida - 'any state that does not toy with our security automatically 
guarantees its own'. 
UBL [October 2004] 
“Message to Americans” 
83 To Americans: the Bush family and administration is gaining a lot from 
the war, through its corporations like Halliburton. The real losers here are 
the people of America and their economy. 'So I say to you, over 15,000 
of our people have been killed and tens of thousands injured, while more 
than a thousand of you have been killed and more than 10,000 injured. 
And Bush's hands are stained with the blood of all those killed from both 
sides, all for the sake of oil and keeping their private companies in 
business'. 'Your security is in your own hands. And every state that 
doesn't play with our security has automatically guaranteed its own 
security'. [trying to distance the American public from the 
administration]. 
AAZ [June 2005] video 
statement 
72 'I address the stupid ones who follow Bush and send their sons to 
Afghanistan and Iraq to the massacre [...] we advised you before and 
invited you to Islam so you get out of the mud of materialism to the 
lights of Islam, we advised you to at least stop your aggression against 
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the nation of Islam'. References to the truce offer by UBL. 'If their bodies 
[of your sons] come back to you, don't cry over it, you are the one who 
killed them'. Calls on the West to establish an independent committee to 
establish the exact number of dead from the West during the war on 
terror, then they will discover the extent of 'official American lies'. 
AAZ [November 2005] 
“Wills of the Knights of 
the London Raids” 
53 Blair 'is also taking lightly your (British) blood, he is taking you to the 
inferno in Iraq and exposing you to death and killing [in] your own 
homeland because of his Crusade against Islam'. 
AAZ [December 2005] 
interview 
49 'We call on Americans to join Islam. Instead of waging failed wars 
against the Muslims and continuing to oppress and attack them, we call 
upon them to listen to the voice of truth, to be honest with themselves 
and to realize that their current creed - which is composed of 
materialistic secularism, the distorted Christianity that has nothing to do 
with Jesus Christ [...] will only lead them to destruction. [...] So we call 
upon every rational American and Westerner to conduct a personal soul-
search'. Muslims are not enemies of the People of the Book, they exalt all 
the prophets, they are not hostile to the Torah and the Gospels, only they 
request that original and authentic versions are provided. The Koran has 
not been distorted or altered. 
UBL [January 2006] Bin 
Ladin truce offer to 
Americans 
50 'What has roused me to speak are the continual mistakes your President 
Bush commits regarding his comments over the results of your opinion 
polls, which indicate that an overwhelming majority of you wish 
American forces withdraw from Iraq.' An announcement of defeat in Iraq 
is only a matter of time.  
 
'So we have no qualms in offering you a long-term truce on fair 
conditions that we adhere to. For we are the umma that Allah has 
forbidden from double-crossing and lying. Both sides would be able to 
enjoy security and stability under this truce so we can build Iraq and 
Afghanistan, both of which have been devastated by the war. There is no 
shame in this solution, which prevents the wasting of billions of dollars 
that have gone to those with influence and the merchants of war in 
America'. 'If you are sincere in your desire for peace and security, so here 
it is - we have answered you.' Recommends Rouge State by William 
Blum. 
UBL [May 2006] “A 
Testimony to the Truth” 
91 'Perhaps there will one day come from the Americans someone who 
desires justice and fairness, and that is the path to security and safety, if 
you are interested in it'. 
AAZ + Gadhan 
[September 2006] “An 
Invitation to Islam” 
33 Zawahiri asks Allah to open the hearts of Americans and Westerners, for 
them to join Islam. The hearts even of the most hardened of enemies can 
be softened, Gadhan makes 'heartfelt invitation to my religion'. All the 
Prophets were Muslims. Islam is the final religion.  
 
Gadhan: even for the leaders of the Crusaders and those who have been 
attacking Islam, they can still repent and embrace Islam and be saved, 
even Bush. Gadhan all unbelievers invited to Islam.  
 
Gadhan: the leaders of the mujahideen want the best for the unbelievers, 
they have no choice but to fight those who fight them, they would prefer 
that the unbelievers abandon aggression and embrace Islam. 
AAZ [September 2006] 
“Hot issues..” 
21 AQ does not need to fight until the end, 'we have repeatedly declared our 
political offer to the West, but the leaders of the West deliberately cause 
confusion about them. UBL offered ceasefire, Zawahiri said the way to 
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peace was for the West to pull out of Muslim lands, and stop plundering 
its resources, stop supporting corrupt governments. All victims of 
America invited to Islam, and if they do not convert, then at least they 
should take advantage of the mujahideen strikes against America and rid 
themselves of its influences, each under his own banner. This is a historic 
opportunity. 
AAZ [September 2006] 
“Bush, the Vatican’s 
Pope, Darfur and the 
Crusades” 
89 Pope Benedict and all Christians invited to Islam which does not allow 
superstition and did not allow its book to be distorted and changed. 
AAZ [May 2007] “The 
Empire of Evil is about to 
End” 
23 Denies having suggested negotiations with Americans, when said that 
they weren't negotiating with the real powers in the Muslim world - by 
this he means the mujahideen.  
 
'I am hurt when I find a black American fighting the Muslims under the 
American flag. Why is he fighting us when the racist Crusader regime in 
America is persecuting him like it persecutes us, and oppressing him like 
it oppresses us? And perhaps his slave ancestors whom America 
kidnapped from Africa were Muslims like us.' Condoleeza Rice and 
Powel are, what Malcolm X referred to as, "house slaves". 'That’s why I 
want blacks in America, people of colour, American Indians, Hispanics, 
and all the weak and oppressed in North and South America, in Africa 
and Asia, and all over the world, to know that when we wage Jihad in 
Allah’s path, we aren’t waging Jihad to lift oppression from the Muslims 
only, we are waging Jihad to lift oppression from all of mankind, because 
Allah has ordered us never to accept oppression, whatever it may be'. 'I 
also invite all the world’s weak and oppressed ones to Islam' [this 
invitation seems genuine - not a justification for coming violence]. 'And 
this is why I want every oppressed one on the face of the earth to know 
that our victory over America and the Crusader West – with Allah’s 
permission – is a victory for them, because they shall be freed from the 
most powerful tyrannical force in the history of mankind'. 
AAZ [July 2007] “The 
Advice of one 
Concerned” 
102 'If you are real men, then compete with us by yourselves in the arena of 
ideology, invitation and information, which are the arenas in which you 
yourselves have admitted your defeat',  
 
'you are now practicing the same Communist brainwashing methods you 
used to attack, so stop your lies about freedom and human rights' [on the 
issue of prisoners under pressure speaking out against jihad]. 
UBL [September 2007] 
“The Solution..” 
10 As the people of the West escaped from slavery, feudalism, the Middle 
Ages etc. so they should escape form the shackles of capitalism. 
Americans must embrace Islam in favour of Democracy and Capitalism, 
this will fix all their woes, including ending the war in Iraq 
AAZ [April 2008] “The 
Open Meeting part one..” 
105 Asked about the Coptic influence in Egypt: 'regarding the Christians in 
Egypt, I don't see them as the biggest threat to Islam; rather the biggest 
threat to Islam is the Crusader/Zionist assault and its agents, the apostate 
rulers'. 
AAZ [April 2008] “The 
Open Meeting.. Part 2..” 
107 Invites one of the questioners to Islam and urges him to stay away from 
secularism. 
AAZ [August 2008] “A 
Message form Shaikh 
Ayman al-Zawahiri to the 
Pakistani Army and the 
41 Hopes that one day the people of the West embrace Islam and then their 
languages can become languages of Islam. But now English is only the 
language of the enemy. 
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People of Pakistan” 
AAZ [November 2008] 
“Al-Azhar: The Lions 
Den” 
237 Message for the Crusader West: 'We tell them: Embrace Islam and you 
will be safe. Embrace Islam to live a life free of greed, exploitation, 
forbidden wealth, and the beasts of capitalism who crush the poor'. 
AAZ [August 2009] “The 
Realities of Jihad and 
Fallacy of Hypocrisy” 
140 (Discussing earlier offers from UBL, rather than anything new:) If 
Obama wanted to negotiate, they he should respond to the two offers of 
Sheikh Usama, and they are fair offers.' 
UBL [September 2009] 
“A Statement to the 
American People” 
144 Americans asked to review the causes for 9/11, as the victims of the 
attacks are calling for. This is the first step in ending the war.  
 
Americans need to free themselves from the 'ideological terrorism' of the 
neoconservatives and Isreael/lobby and reconsider its policies towards 
Israel and Palestine in order to live in peace. 'We are ready to work with 
you on this option.' 
UBL [September 2009] 
“A Message to the 
European People” 
143 'An ounce of prevention is better than a pound of cure'. Europeans should 
learn from their mistakes and withdraw from Afghanistan, especially 
since their economy is in tatters. 
AAZ [July 2010] “Al 
Quds will not be 
converted to Judaism” 
223 To Orthodox Copts: 'Isn’t there anyone of sound intellect amongst you? 
Why all this instigation of the Muslims? Are we not neighbours in the 
same country? Why do the leaders of your church and some of your 
brothers seek to embolden themselves with the American invaders who 
will inevitably retreat just like France in the past and, with them, General 
Yaqoob? We have lived with you and will continue to do so as long as 
Allah wills. Allah Most High has commanded us to differentiate between 
those non-Muslims who show enmity to us and those who don’t. Why do 
you side with those who show enmity to us? We don’t want to start a 
battle with you,' 
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AAZ [unknown date] 
“Response to a Grave 
Uncertainty..” 
117 Muslims must see that the corrupt leaders of Arabs are not real 
leaders according to the Hadith. Jihad must be waged against 
these rulers. 
UBL [unknown date] 
“Methodological 
Guidelines” 
112 Erring Imams must be replaced with righteous imams. The 
Muslim youth must get proper education.  
 
Unity in Jihad is crucial if Muslims are to succeed. The 
American enemy is not all powerful as the strikes have shown. 
Jihad has to be supported with any means possible.  
 
Fear has divided the community into three main groups: 1) those 
who sink to joining the government, 2) those who praise the 
government out of fear of losing their possessions or statuses, 
and 3) those who fight in the cause of God.  
 
Success corresponds to the level of faith. Muslims should look to 
old righteous leaders such as Sala-al-Din to see examples of 
proper leaders and not follow the 'neo-Ghassanids' of Arab rulers 
and ulema who sell out to the West.  
 
Muslims must not follow unjust rulers. 
UBL [unknown date] 
Letter to Mullah Omar 
61 'We need to cooperate all together to continue this matter, 
especially Jihad continuation in the Islamic Republics will keep 
the enemies busy and divert them away from the Afghani issue 
and ease the pressure off. The enemies of Islam problem will 
become how to stop the spreading of Islam into the Islamic 
Republics and not the Afghani issue. Consequently, the efforts of 
the Russians and their American allies will be scattered.' 
AAZ [unknown date] 
“Introduction to 
Characteristics of 
Jihad” 
35 Stresses the importance of jihad to follow the past good deeds of 
the early Muslims, and strong belief on the Koran and its rules.  
 
Muslims must decide to which party they belong - 'Do you 
belong in the party of America, Israel, France, Russia and their 
allies among the apostate rulers of our countries, their assistants, 
their soldiers, their journalists, their judges, and their clerics who 
spread confusion, pledge allegiance to them, and call them the 
care takers of the Muslims’ affairs? Or, do you belong in the 
party of the monotheistic, Salafi Mujahideen?'. 
AAZ [purported] 
[unknown date] 
“Jihad, Martyrdom, 
and the killing of 
innocents” 
48 'If believers are week, they are to wage jihad with their hearts 
and tongues; if they are able, they are to enjoin what is good and 
forbid what is evil, fight the infidels, and spread the call of 
tawhid'. 
AAZ [early 1991] 
“The Bitter Harvest” 
46 If a ruler is Muslim, 'but transgresses by becoming cruel and 
despotic, the Sunni madhhabs say that it is forbidden to 
overthrow him [...] However, should the sultan become an 
infidel, then he is not to be obeyed, and its is obligatory for you 
to wage jihad against him, if you can'. [the difference from the 
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'freedom-fighting' ethic of the West/US etc]. 'It is forbidden to 
overthrow a tyrant, but it is a duty to overthrow an infidel'. 
AAZ [early 1992] 
“The Black Book: An 
account of the Torture 
of Muslims in the 
Time of Husni 
Mubarak” 
114 Need to rise up against this system of corruption and torture. The 
poor and uneducated are treated almost as badly as the activists 
and prisoners who face torture. The way out is to support al-
Jihad and other Islamist groups which seek to mobilise the 
masses and grant them freedom from this oppression. 
UBL [June 1994] 
“Saudi Arabia 
Supports the 
Communists in 
Yemen” 
37 Asks the righteous ulema to declare the actions of the Saudi 
authorities in Yemen as dangerous and illegal and to proclaim 
this to the Ummah and Muslim armies. 
UBL [July 1994] “The 
Banishment of 
Communism from the 
Arabian Peninsula” 
38 'One of the main lessons from Yemen, is that the Western world, 
most of all the United States, was not willing to take the risk of 
intervention in order to protect or assist corrupt regimes that do 
not have the support or endorsement of their publics'. [indicating 
that the West would not come to the aid of other illegitimate 
regimes, such as Riyadh]. 
UBL [July 1994] 
“Quran Scholars in the 
Face of Despotism” 
39 The ummah is following the lead of the ulema, allowing for 
Sharia edicts and protesting against the authorities. 
UBL [September 
1994]  “Saudi Arabia 
Unveils its War 
against Islam and its 
Scholars” 
40 Righteous preachers and venerated scholars have to be patient 
and steadfast, they will be victorious. To the Muslim people: 
Stay committed to the 'true religion's practices'. Follow the 
advice of the venerated scholars and do not be confused or lead 
astray by the authorities and their outlets. To the Muslims in the 
government organizations: 'we salute the large majority that 
sympathizes with the scholars. We would like to remind those 
who had a misstep that there is no obedience in disobeying the 
creator' [more polite, less aggressive than later]. 'You are legally 
forbidden to obey the orders of your superiors, to arrest the 
scholars'. 
UBL [September 
1994] “Urgent Letter 
to Security Officials” 
42 Need to reveal the truth to those Muslims who give support to 
the oppressors, but are unaware. 'Perhaps they will repent'. To 
the brother Muslims in the security apparatus: you were trained 
to protect the interest of your people, their religion, property etc. 
'Your rulers today want to take this great and honourable position 
away from you and reduce you to a low and submissive rank'. 
'They want to turn you into slaves'. The members of the security 
services must not obey these orders and turn their spears onto the 
ummah and ulema. The Ulema are not the ones who are 
responsible for stealing land from the tribes, giving it to family 
members, building palaces, establishing banks that charge 
interest, neglected the army, corrupted the media etc. The Ulema 
are the ones who opposed these crimes and called for the 
implementation of shariah. 'Arise, our brothers! Do not call on 
the Dajjals [devil] of the Sa'ud family'. 'They will drive you to 
god's wrath and punishment'. 'Let the ummah see that you are 
slaves of God alone'. The brothers in the security apparatus 
should do the following: 1) repent and seek the forgiveness of 
god, 2) not obey the tyrants when the command you to take 
action against the ulema or Muslims, 3) urge colleagues to do the 
same, 4) helping the people from moving the tyranny, 5) to cease 
  375 
Communiqué and 
author ID 
 
Motivational appeals to Muslim audiences 
excerpts, quotes, notes] 
 
in trusting the regime and partaking in their crimes, 6) strive to 
release the shaykhs. 
UBL [September 
1994] “Urgent Letter 
to Security Officials” 
47 Appeal to the audience not to be deceived by the Saudi 
authority's creation of the Higher Committee for Islamic Affairs, 
which is meant to veil the regime's efforts to silence the ulema 
and sheikhs. Through it seeks to 'destroy true Islam'. 
UBL [December 1994] 
“Open Letter for 
Shaykh bin Baz on the 
Invalidity of his Fatwa 
on Peace with the 
Jews” 
63 The ulema represent the ideal model for the ummah.  
UBL [January 1995] 
“Second letter to 
Shaykh Abd Al-Aziz 
bin Baz from the 
Reform and Advice 
Foundation” 
64 'We are warning the ummah against such discredited fatwas that 
do not meet the requirements [e.g. are contradictory to Islamic 
law, not issued by experts in the particular field]. We are asking 
ummah to go back to fatwas that have been approved by those 
who combined religious knowledge with current affairs, who 
believe in the word of Allah and who did the right thing and did 
not fear anyone by not speaking out'. 
UBL [February 1995] 
“Prince Salman and 
Ramadan Alms” 
65 All donors warned against donating funds or zakat to the new 
organizations established by the royal family, as this will only be 
used to serve their interest. Donors should give to the needy 
directly, both outside and inside the Peninsula, or hand donations 
to trusted individuals. They should avoid using bank accounts in 
Saudi Arabia, in order to avoid the regime's spies. 
UBL [March 1995] 
“Saudi Arabia 
Continues its War 
against Islam and its 
Scholars” 
66 Ummah is warned 'about the viciousness of those declaring 
aimlessly false and unfounded political statements, whether on 
platform or on TV'. 
UBL [May 1995] 
“Scholars are the 
Prophet’s Successors” 
67 'It is known that religious knowledge is the prophecy's 
succession as scholars are to prophets’...’Talking negatively 
about scholars is the beginning of launching destruction of their 
credibility and creating a religious leadership void in the ummah' 
[does UBL himself not later fall into this category, of questioning 
the scholars?]. However, there are bad scholars - those who fail 
to lead their people and follow materialistic ambitions. A bad 
scholar departs from the right path by failing to act according to 
their religious knowledge or changing what Allah said and 
interpreting laws for their own benefit. Islamic scholars must 
stand up to bad scholars. 'True scholars are known for speaking 
the truth and not being afraid of an unjust king or infidel ruler'.  
 
Scholars are not prevented from making mistakes and 
glorification of them should not be exaggerated, to ensure that 
people do not follow scholars who do not rule in accordance with 
religion. 'The more they move away from speaking the truth, the 
more animosity is geared towards them'. 
UBL [July 1995] 
“Prince Sultan and the 
Air Aviation 
Commissions” 
68 'On our path to reform we are tasked with bringing the regime's 
dangers to the attention of the people' .. 'for this reason this 
statement has been released'.  
 
People urged not to invest in government projects and 
privatisation deals. 
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UBL [August 1995] 
“An Open Letter to 
King Fahd on the 
Occasion of the 
Recent Cabinet 
Reshuffle” 
62 'It is needless to alert people’s attention to the towers of usurious 
banks that compete in height with the minarets of the two great 
mosques and apply your positive laws.'  
 
The process of toppling the Saudi regime: 'That cannot be 
specifically achieved by rash personal effort or an individual 
provocative decision. It has to be accomplished by the nation’s 
leadership of honest scholars, missionaries, and reformers whose 
hardships and misfortunes have proven their competence and 
qualifications to confront such grand undertakings'. 
UBL [August 1995] 
“The Bosnia Tragedy 
and the Deception of 
the Servant of the Two 
Mosques” 
69 Muslims urged to help their brethren in Palestine and Bosnia, but 
to avoid institutions controlled by the regimes. 
AAZ [early 1996] 
“Healing the Hearts of 
the Believers” 
118 The main issue facing Muslims is freeing Palestine. Then 
toppling apostate regimes. 
UBL [September 
1996] “Bin Ladin 
Declares Jihad on 
Americans/Letter from 
Usama bin 
Muhammad bin Ladin 
to his Muslim Brothers 
in the Whole World 
and Especially in the 
Arabian Peninsula..” 
5 Majority of Saudis said to oppose regime. Fighting the 
Americans is a collective duty. Everyone should do his best to 
ward off the enemy. Muslims must avoid infighting. Need to 
protect the oil wealth. Members of the military addressed 
specifically. Young men addressed specifically (‘Mohammed’s 
companions were young men’). 
UBL [February 1997] 
“Correspondent meets 
with opposition leader 
bin Ladin” 
151 Duty of Muslims to rid the peninsula of foreign occupying forces 
UBL [March 1997] 
“Bin Ladin Cited on 
Prince Sultan’s US 
Visit” 
152 'We expect a further widening of the resistance against the US 
occupation of the country of the Two Holy Mosques and also the 
Zionist occupation of the Palestinian land.' Concerned with 
'awareness' of Muslims and urges them to join the mujahideen. 
UBL [March 1997] 
“Pakistan interviews 
Usama bin Ladin” 
154 'If Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and China get united, the United 
States and India will become ineffective..'  
 
Muslims encouraged to rise up against US presence in Arabian 
peninsula. 
UBL [April 1997] 
“The Saudi Regime 
and the Reputed 
Tragedies of the 
Pilgrims” 
70 'We offer our deep condolences to the nation of Islam in general, 
and to the families of the victims in particular' 
UBL [November 
1997] “Daily Reports 
Usama bin Ladin’s 
Threat against 
Americans” 
158 'Duty' of Muslims to take action against the US since they are 
now the biggest enemy of Muslims 
UBL + AAZ + others 
[February 1998] “Text 
161 'We -- with God's help -- call on every Muslim who believes in 
God and wishes to be rewarded to comply with God's order to 
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of Fatwa Urging Jihad 
Against Americans” 
kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and 
whenever they find it. We also call on Muslim ulema, leaders, 
youths, and soldiers to launch the raid on Satan's US troops and 
the devil's supporters allying with them, and to displace those 
who are behind them so that they may learn a lesson.' 
UBL [March 1998] 
“Bin Ladin Urges 
Expulsion of 
Invaders..” 
162 Urges 'young men, ulema, notables, traders, and tribal chiefs' to 
fight the US occupation in the Arabian Peninsula 
UBL [March 1998] 
“Interview with 
Usama bin Ladin 
Reported” 
163 'Duty' of Muslims to fight US 
UBL [April 1998] 
“Bin Ladin warns 
against Richardson 
Mission to 
Afghanistan” 
164 Implicit appeal that they resist US efforts to reach out to the 
Taliban 
UBL [May 1998] 
“Supporting the Fatwa 
of the Afghani 
Religious Scholars of 
Ejecting the American 
Forces from the Land 
of the Two Holy 
Mosques” 
71 The responsibility of declaring jihad and ejecting the American 
occupiers from LTHM lies with the entire Muslim ummah, not 
only the residents of the Peninsula. 
UBL [May 1998] 
“Clerics in 
Afghanistan Issue 
Fatwa..” 
165 Calls on 'everyone to adopt and implement it [The fatwa of the 
Ulema Union of Afghanistan], because it is issued by ulema' and 
'move the polytheists out of the Arabian Peninsula.' 
UBL [May 1998] 
“World Islamic Front 
Backs Intifadah of 
Palestine’s 
Sons/Wounds of Al-
Aqsa” 
167 Appeal to Muslims to support 'the jihad against the Americans 
and the Israelis wherever they are' 
UBL [May 1998] “Bin 
Ladin Creates New 
Front Against US, 
Israel” 
168 Muslims are already 'awakening' and the ulema are increasingly 
critical of the Americans and Israelis 
UBL [May 1998] 
“United States Admits 
that Keeping its 
Troops in the Gulf is 
Causing 
Dissatisfaction…” 
169 'All Muslims must declare jihad against them (the US troops) and 
expel them from the holy land.' 
UBL [June 1998] “Bin 
Ladin Congratulates 
Pakistan on Possession 
of Nuclear Weapons” 
170 Urges all Muslims to support Pakistani Muslims in their struggle 
against Indian aggression. They should also seek to follow the 
example of Pakistan in acquiring CBRN weapons, as this will 
halt Western, 'atheist', Indian and Zionist efforts to dominate 
power. 
UBL [June 1998] “In 
the Way of Allah” 
171 Appeal for united front against the 'big' enemy of America/Israel 
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UBL [August 1998] 
“Bin Ladin Calls for 
‘Jihad’ against Jews, 
America” 
172 'Bin Ladin calls on Moslem Ummah (nation) to continue Jihad 
against Jews and Americans to liberate their holy places. In the 
meanwhile, he denies any involvement in the Nairobi and Dar es 
Salaam bombings' 
UBL [September 
1998] “Bin Ladin 
Praises Pakistanis for 
Love of Islam” 
174 Praises Pakistanis for their love of Islam and Pakistani journalists 
for their willingness to undergo treacherous journeys to meet him 
UBL [September 
1998] Letter to anti-
US Islamist 
conference 
126 Pakistani nation and youth thanked for their efforts, their fighting 
in Afghanistan and Kashmir and supporting the mujahideen. 
Obligation of all Muslims to sacrifice their lives and money until 
all Muslim lands are free of the Jewish and Christian occupation 
and the Shari'a is implemented. It is also their duty to support the 
Taliban in Afghanistan 'because by enforcing Shari‘a in 
Afghanistan, Taliban have established the system of God on 
God’s land'. 
UBL [November 
1998] “Bin Ladin: 
Expel Jews, 
Christians, from Holy 
Places” 
175 Expresses gratitude for help from Pakistanis to expel US 
occupiers and their Israeli lackeys. .. 'Obviously, for the 
enforcement of Shariat, it is essential for all Muslims that they 
should establish an Islamic system on the basis of teachings of 
the Prophet Mohammed.' .. 'Obligatory' for all Muslims to 
support the jihad against America and its allies with their wealth 
and lives.  
 
It is a 'religious obligation' of all Muslims to support both the 
mujahideen and the Taliban. 
UBL [January 1999] 
“Wrath of God..” 
178 Jihad and 'hostility towards America is a religious duty'. 'Usama 
Bin Ladin is confident that the Islamic nation will carry out its 
duty. I am confident that Muslims will be able to end the legend 
of the so-called superpower that is America.' 
AAZ [January 1999] 
“Muslim Egypt 
between the Whips of 
the Torturers and the 
Administration of 
Traitors” 
116 Asks all Muslims to support his brothers in al-Jihad and similar 
movements in Egypt. 
UBL [February 1999] 
May 1998 interview 
reported 
182 'I believe that at present the Pakistani nation should unite and 
should end the sectarianism provoked by its opponents.' .. Urges 
Chinese Muslims [when asked by Chines journalist] to contact 
him and 'extent their relations' to other Muslim groups. .. Jihad 
against India obligatory for Pakistanis. 
UBL [June 1999] 
“Usama bin Ladin 
Pens Letter in Support 
of Kashmir Jihad” 
183 Praises Pakistanis as a 'mujahid nation' 
UBL [June 1999] 
“Usama bin Ladin, 
The Destruction of the 
Base” 
184 'We seek to instigate the nation to get up and liberate its land, to 
fight for the sake of God, and to make the Islamic law the highest 
law, and the word of God the highest word of all.  
 
'Nowadays, jihad needs to be waged by the nation.'  
 
'The Muslims, particularly those in power and people of good 
judgment -- true ulema, faithful merchants, and tribal chiefs -- 
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should emigrate for the sake of God and seek a place where they 
can raise the banner of jihad and mobilize the nation into 
safeguarding their religion and worldly affairs.'  
 
'This is serious. People must do all they can to rouse the nation 
with all the means in their power; with their tongues, pens, and 
persons.' 
UBL [July 1999] “Bin 
Ladin Calls on 
Muslims to Declare 
Jihad against US” 
185 Muslims must declare jihad against US 
UBL [September 
1999] “UBL Orders 
Mujahideen to Shoot 
US Commandos..” 
186 Muslims need to 'speed up' jihad against infidels 
UBL [January 2000] 
“Usama bin Ladin 
Denounces US-
Sponsored ‘World 
Order” 
187 Urges Muslims everywhere to help each other out. They must be 
united in order to defeat the enemies of Islam. 
UBL [May 2000] 
“UBL Sees Holy War 
in ‘Every Street’ of 
US” 
188 Urges jihad against America and Jews.  
 
Calls for 'unity' in rank and file of Mujahideen. 
UBL [May 2000] 
“Usama Speaks on 
Hijra and the Islamic 
State” 
189 'As Muslims, we should all implement the hadith of the Prophet 
Muhammad (saw). We should all implement his commandment.’ 
 
'So it's incumbent on all the Muslims to ignore these borders and 
boundaries, which the kuffar have laid down between Muslim 
lands, the Jews and the Christians, for the sole purpose of 
dividing us'. Muslims in the comfort of their homes should 
recognise the sacrifices of the Sahaaba who migrated to the 
battle, left their families to fight the jihad.' 
UBL [June 2000] 
“Usama bin Ladin 
Renews Calls for 
jihad” 
190 'How can we remain silent spectator to this situation. It is the 
joint duty of Muslims to wage Jihad against the Jews and 
Christians" 
UBL [September 
2000] “Bin Ladin, 
others pledge ‘Jihad’ 
to release Prisoners..” 
191 'Dear brothers, I am not trying to play on your emotions or ask 
you for your sympathy; rather, we are now talking business, we 
are talking jihad. The situation now is not that of glittering 
statements; today's struggle  – brothers – is a relentless one.' 
'Dear brothers, we have spoken much and done little.' [AAZ] 
UBL [January 2001] 
“Daily Prints Usama 
bin Ladin Letter 
Calling for Global 
Islamic State” 
192 Muslims need to focus on a 'collective and strong target' of Israel 
and the US.  
 
'No matter which movement or organization you belong to, you 
should propagate this message from your respective platforms in 
such a way that it becomes a voice of the two billion Muslims, so 
that practical steps might be taken as soon as possible' [See 
emphasis on movement and goals, rather than strict adherence to 
AQ] 
Muhammad bin Ladin 
[January 2001] video 
127 The role of the mujahideen: 'Your lives and the last drops of your 
blood are to be shed for the everlasting glory of the umma and it 
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speech addressed to 
his father 
is through these martyrs and their blood that shall bring forth the 
grace and goodness of the umma. They shall always serve as the 
bridge to help give honour and dignity to the umma' . Traders 
and businessmen urged to part with their riches to support the 
mujahideen and Palestinians. 
UBL [April 2001] 
letter to scholars of 
Deyubende in 
Peshawar 
120 'The nation waits for a clear Fatwa from you and a clear plan to 
follow so they can lift away this aggression, imposed on them, 
the holy places, and their children. Are you willing to 
participate?'.  
 
'Teach them that the Jihad for the sake of Allah does happen only 
through a jama’a or a group that listen[s] and obey[s] the one 
EMIR, that God will unite the nation, so there won’t be 
separation, and preserve the entity of the nation so it won’t be 
torn' [this leader is Mullah Omar and the Islamic state to be 
supported is his Afghan 'emirate']. 
UBL [April 2001] 
“Usama urges 
Muslims to help 
Afghans” 
196 'The decisions taken by Mulla Omar about the destruction of 
statues, stopping poppy cultivation and standing in front of world 
campaign must be supported.'  
 
Specific appeal to Muslim youth to join jihadi training camps in 
Afghanistan, and te wealthy Muslims to 'pay donations and 
invest in Afghanistan'.  
 
People need to 'speak boldly' at the conference and address the 
needs of Afghanistan.  
 
'The duty of the ulema [religious scholars] is to explain to the 
people actual problems. The ulema should throw light on the 
importance of 'Jihad-fi-sabillelah (Holy War in the Way of 
Almighty Allah).' 
UBL [May 2001] 
“Usama urges Ummah 
to continue Jihad” 
197 'Your bravery and courage has lifted that veil which Kuffir 
[infidelity] had embalmed in the eyes of the followers. You 
surfaced and created a wall against Kuffir.'  
 
'Unafraid of the might and size of the infidels, an appreciable 
small number of committed Mujahidin, shall prevail upon them.' 
None should infer that you are all without that light which your 
forefathers had carried in their hearts in fights against the infidel.' 
UBL [may 2001] “Bin 
Ladin sends voice 
message to Palestinian 
People..” 
199 UBL, Muslims, coming to the aid of Palestinians 
UBL [September 
2001] “Text of bin 
Ladin letter to the 
Pakistani People” 
201 'We incite our Muslim brothers in Pakistan to deter with all their 
capabilities the American crusaders from invading Pakistan and 
Afghanistan' 
UBL [September 
2001] “The US Should 
search attackers within 
itself” 
202 'Pakistan is a great hope for the Islamic brotherhood. Its people 
are awakened, organized, and rich in the spirit of faith'.  
 
Urges people to support the coming jihad in Af-Pak 
UBL [October 2001] 
“Tayseer Allouni 
interviews bin Ladin 
130 Urges Pakistanis to help win the war in Afghanistan and rise up 
against their collaborating government. 
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in Afghanistan” 
UBL [November 
2001] “Al-Jazirah 
carries bin Ladin’s 
address..” 
203 'Every Muslim should rush to defend his religion.' 
AAZ [December 
2001] “Knights under 
the Prophet’s Banner” 
119 'This book was written in an attempt to revive the Muslim 
nation's awareness of its role and duty, its importance, and the 
duties that it needs to perform' (in prologue).  
 
The Islamic movement in general, and the jihad movements in 
particular, must train themselves and their members on 
perseverance, patience, steadfastness, and adherence to firm 
principles. The leadership must set an example for the members 
to follow.' A powerful leadership is needed to lead on the 
mujahideen. And: 'The jihad movement must come closer to the 
masses, defend their honour, fend off injustice, and lead them to 
the path of guidance and victory', 'We must win the people's 
confidence, respect, and affection. The people will not love us 
unless they felt that we love them, care about them, and are ready 
to defend them' - [see significance for later, in killing of innocent 
Muslims and how this alienated the leadership]. 'We must not 
blame the nation for not responding or not living up to the task. 
Instead, we must blame ourselves for failing to deliver the 
message, show compassion, and sacrifice' . 
 
'In order for the masses to move, they need the following: (1) A 
leadership that they could trust, follow, and understand. (2) A 
clear enemy to strike at. (3). The shackles of fear and the 
impediments of weakness in the souls must be broken'. 
UBL [December 2001] 
“The Fact of the 
Conflict between us 
and America” 
129 Muslims must "wake up from their sleep". 
UBL [March 2002] 
“Usama bin Ladin: 
Prince Abdallah’s 
initiative is High 
Treason” 
205 'In view of the bloody events that our nation is subjected to, 
everyone is today required to take up the jihad and serious 
action.' .. 
 
'Patience is good unless it harms religion, and that forbearance is 
commendable unless there is an opportunity.'  
 
'O nation of Islam, rise against injustice and tyranny, oppression 
and aggression, and humiliation and degradation. Bread is not 
more dear to us than our religion, nor is money more precious 
than our honour, or death more difficult than our sense of 
humiliation and degradation'. Muslim nation should: (1) 'stage 
public demonstrations and exercise civil disobedience until the 
overthrow of the traitorous governments', (2) 'disown the leaders 
of disbelief and hypocrisy', (3) 'Striking at US interests in the 
world in general and on the land of our Arab and 
Islamic nation in particular', (4) 'boycotting US and Jewish 
goods', (5) 'Killing Americans and Jews with a bullet, a knife, or 
a stone', (6) 'Backing the mujahidin and giving them every 
encouragement and support.'  
 
To Palestinian people: 'We swear by the one and only God that 
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we will support you until you achieve victory and Muslim 
Palestine is returned' 
UBL [April 2002] 
“MBC Carries video 
of Bin Ladin” 
206 Muslims must not 'turn their back on the enemy' 
UBL/AAZ [April 
2002] “The Wills of 
the Martyrs..” 
207 Much of the film is set to appeal to Muslims (mainly through 
Haznawi's commentary) to support the mujahideen 
UBL/others [April 
2002] “The Wills of 
the Martyrs..” 
108 UBL: 'the youth of Islam must follow the methodology of 
Mohammed [..] by making jihad, as it is obligatory today.' 
UBL [purported] [June 
2002] “Al-Qaeda’s 
declaration in response 
to the Saudi Ulema..” 
43 'Muslims, and especially the learned among them, should spread 
sharia law to the world - that and nothing else'.  
 
'Muslims are obligated to raid the lands of the infidels, occupy 
them, and exchange their systems of governance for an Islamic 
system, barring any practice that contradicts the sharia from 
being publicly voiced among the people, as was the case at the 
dawn of Islam.' 
Unknown AQ leader 
[August 2002] 
“Constitutional 
Charter” 
34 Conditions of joining AQ: (1) compliance with AQ beliefs and 
goals, (2) subordination and obedience with the higher 
command, (3) forbidden to have membership with any other 
Islamic group besides AQ, (4) operation security, (5) good 
physical fitness, except in admin posts, (6) candidate must not be 
suspect in lacking religion, fairness or morality, (7) taking the 
pledge of allegiance. The principal duties: (1) maintaining unity 
within AQ, (2) maintaining good Islamic behaviour, (3) eating 
kosher food, (4) maintaining fitness and military training, (5) be 
discreet about AQ work, (6) maintain strong Islamic belief and in 
Jihad, (7) guard AQ money, (8) do not deceive brothers and give 
good advice to superiors.  
 
Note one piece of advice: 'We advise all brothers to avoid 
arguments in religion, and it is forbidden to speak on religion 
without knowledge.'. 
AAZ [September 
2002] “The Interview 
of Dr Ayman Al 
Zawahiri” 
22 Those who doubt the Jihad will see the Muslims enslaved and 
subjugated, following American and Israel.  
 
'Jihad, by necessity entails hardship, expense and sacrifice'. The 
Muslims have 'suffered the worst and most serious disasters, for 
more than a century' - lands occupied, resources plundered, 
deprived of free will, rights thrown away, sanctuaries surrounded 
and taken over, corrupt and submissive ruling regimes, 'So what 
harm, after all this harm, are they crying over?'.  
 
'We implore the Muslim nation to act immediately' in stopping 
the enemy from destroying the Muslim nation.  
 
'Have full trust in the victory of Allah and know that America 
has no power against you, if you unite as one body in its face!' 
UBL [October 2002] 
“Statement from 
shaykh Usama bin 
Ladin, may God 
211 'An appeal to the Nation:' There can be no doubt that all Muslims 
are under attack. 'How do we confront this blatant aggression and 
defend our creed, honour, and dignity and therefore earn the 
honour of this world and win the Hereafter?' (1) 'A return to 
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protect him, and the 
Al-Qa’ida 
Organization” 
Allah'; (2) 'Hold fast all together by the rope of Allah' - unity in 
creed, dogma and 'the schools of shari'ah'; (3) 'Mobilizing and 
unleashing the nation's resources', they are 'the battle's fuel and 
the conflict's motor'. The 'scholars and propagators' have the 
foremost duty to mobilise the ummah. .. 'In addition to the 
scholars, there is the group of the Muslim youths who have been 
the driving force of change throughout this nation's history'. .. 
 
Appeal to the 'media men' to unite in propagating the message  
 
Appeal to 'merchants and financers', urged to spend in the way of 
jihad.  
 
'There is the Muslim woman whose role is by no means less than 
that of men.' In giving birth do those who fight the enemies of 
Islam, the martyrs, supporting the mujahideen sons, husbands 
and brothers and even through their own sacrifice. 
UBL [October 2002] 
“Letter from Usama 
bin Mohammed bin 
Ladin to the American 
People” 
212 'So the removal of these policies [implemented by 'agent' 
governments preventing establishment of Shari'ah etc] is an 
individual obligation upon us so as to make the Shariah the 
supreme law and to regain Palestine. Our fight against theses 
policies is the same as fighting against you [America].' 
UBL [November 
2002] “Bin Ladin in a 
special message to the 
people of the 
Peninsula..” 
215 Muslims should not think that the aggression against Iraq is in 
isolation, 'It is between you, all our Muslim brothers, and us on 
one side and the crusaders and the Jews on the other.'  
 
Muslims in the Peninsula should prepare to realise their duty. 
AAZ [December 
2002] “Al Wala Wa al 
Baraa..” 
45 Warns Muslims: 'These enemies [Crusaders] have launched a 
campaign of intellectual and doctrinal deception in tandem with 
their militaristic, Crusading campaign'. Their goal is to sustain 
the corrupt leaders in Muslim lands, prevent the uptake of sharia, 
and make this land vulnerable to conquest. Deviating from the 
doctrine that prohibits befriending infidels is the greatest threat to 
Islam.  
 
The Koran strictly forbids befriending infidels. 'We call the 
umma - on all its factions, classes, and groups - to join the 
caravan of jihad'. Saving the umma from its current reality 
consists of: 'staying clear of idolatrous tyrants, warfare against 
infidels, loyalty to the believers, and jihad in the path of Allah'. 
'We must act and act quickly  
 
Let the Muslim youth not await anyone's permission  
 
Young people of every class must assume responsibility for the 
umma and make plans to defend it from its foes. We must set our 
lands aflame beneath the feet of the raiders; they shall never 
depart otherwise' (114) [this not aimed at Muslims in Europe or 
the West, squarely aimed at those in Muslim lands]. 
UBL [January 2003] 
“Islamic Action 
between Causes of 
Consequences and 
Advocates of 
Disagreement” 
216 On the 'need for unity and consensus and renunciation of disunity 
and differences and for concentrating on the effects and damages 
that differences in views cause.' People should adhere to the 
Sunna and measures should be in place to protect the Islamic 
brotherhood scholastic from disunity, regardless of differences 
regarding 'views and practical interpretations.'  
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When will Muslims wake up from the long slumber and deep 
sleep? When will they rise to carry out serious action for their 
religion and call?'  
 
'The situation that Muslims are living in today requires the 
mobilization of everyone who belongs to this religion and the 
utilization of his resources and efforts in the battle that Islam is 
fighting against the crusaders' alliance, which has bared its teeth 
and revealed its true objectives from fighting Islam and Muslims, 
and is not content anymore with what its agents in the region are 
doing.'  
 
People should not be punished for honest mistakes if their cause 
is noble. 
UBL [February 2003] 
audio statement 
78 Muslims warned against the Crusader plan of conquering Saudi 
Arabia after Iraq, and trying to establish Greater Israel. 'The way 
to protect ourselves from the evil of disbelievers is Jihad in the 
Path of Allah'. 'The Ummah today possesses huge capabilities'. 
'The Ummah has been promised victory by Allah'. 'The Muslim 
Ummah is the greatest human power on the face of the Earth 
only if it establishes Islam properly'. Recites a number of 
historical events where the Ummah was victorious, in order to 
'raise the morale'. Why the battle against the Crusaders will be 
won: The Soviets were beaten in Afghanistan, and the Russians 
in Chechnya, the defeat of American forces in Beirut 1982, in 
Somalia 'the "Arab Afghans" and their brothers from that region 
pounced upon her and rubbed her arrogance into the dust', 'thus 
America and her allies fled in the darkness of the night', then 
goes through a series of attacks against the US and concluded 
that the US power stands on a 'weak and hollow foundation' that 
can be attacked.  
 
Restrictions to embarking upon jihad: (1) corrupt leaders 
domestically, 'it is prohibited by Shariah to pledge allegiance to 
them and follow them', Muslims must distance themselves from 
these leaders. (2) Scholars 'who love the Truth and hate 
Falsehood, but they sit back from Jihad'.  
 
'The Ummah [...] must unite the ranks of the Muslims against the 
ranks of the disbelievers [...] [and] shun a life of play, 
amusement, extravagance and fun, and prepare itself for the real 
life of killing, fighting, striking, and damaging'. 
UBL [February 2003] 
“A Message to our 
Brothers in Iraq”  
79 Message to Iraqis before the looming war: (1) 'fighting should be 
for the sake of one God. It should not be for championing ethnic 
groups, or for championing the non-Islamic regimes in all Arab 
countries', (2) must ask forgiveness from sins (according sharia) 
and prepare for jihad, (3) 'in combat [the Americans] mainly 
depend on psychological warfare. This is in the light of the huge 
media machine they have. They also depend on massive air 
strikes so as to conceal their most prominent point of weakness, 
which is the fear, cowardliness, and the absence of combat spirit 
among US soldiers', 'we also realized that one of the most 
effective and available methods of rendering the air force of the 
Crusader enemy ineffective is by setting up roofed and disguised 
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trenches in large numbers' [emphasize camouflage, but not the 
IED or other tactics that proved potent]. Goes on to explain how 
trenches were important in Tora Bora. 'The US forces dared not 
break into our positions, despite the unprecedented massive 
bombing and terrible propaganda targeting this completely 
besieged small area. This is in addition to the forces of 
hypocrites, whom they prodded to fight us for 15 days non-stop'. 
'Dig many trenches', by hunkering down and waiting, the enemy 
will run out of bombs. 'We also recommend luring the enemy 
forces into a protracted, close, and exhausting fight, using the 
camouflaged defensive positions in plains, farms, mountains and 
cities. The enemy fears the city and street wars most, a war in 
which the enemy expects grave human losses'. Martyrdom 
operations important.  
 
Muslims should mobilize to free their lands of foreign influence 
and implement Gods law. 
UBL [April 2003] 
“Usama bin LAdin 
urges Muslims to 
launch suicide attacks 
against US” 
217 Religious obligation to wage jihad against the US and its 
domestic agents. Urges Muslim women to support the 
mujahideen and raise the moral of Muslims.  
 
Those who cannot take part in jihad directly should support it 
with their funds. 
UBL [May 2003] 
“Riyadh, Casablanca 
Attacks” 
218 Muslims urged to rise up against those who help the Americans 
in Iraq and those leaders who have remained silent. This is their 
duty. 
AAZ [May 2003] 
statement 
54 Muslims need to be aware because after Iraq, the enemy seeks to 
move on to Saudi Arabia, Iran, Syria and Pakistan, leaving 
fractured states around Israel. 
UBL/AAZ [September 
2003] Audio statement 
110 Palestinians addressed 'and assured the issue is at the central, 'the 
wound of Palestine is bleeding in the heart of every Muslim'. 
Palestinians urged not to be deceived by American-backed 
treasonous efforts such as the 'road map to hell'. Palestine will 
only be liberated through Jihad. They must be aware of making 
the wrong allies with un-pious forces. [Zawahiri]. 
AAZ [September 
2003] “Message to the 
Muslims in Pakistan 
and Afghanistan” 
56 The Crusaders seek to 'undermine Islam as a faith and shari‘a, 
subjugate the Muslim nation, and turn it into herds following the 
masters of the world in Washington, Tel Aviv, and London'. 
Muslims in Pakistan must rise up against Musharraf, topple him 
and install a government that protects Muslims and their 
interests. 
UBL [October 2003] 
“Second letter to the 
Muslims of Iraq” 
98 The Iraqi resistance is restoring hope in the hearts of Muslims, 
especially Palestinians. 'It is not surprising that you were able to 
do this to America, to strike such blows against it, because you 
are the sons of the courageous knights who gave Islam to the 
east, all the way to China'.  
 
'Beware of listening to men who obey only their desires [...] or 
those who put faith in their oppressors'.  
 
'People of Rabia and Mudar, O Kurds! Raise the banner and God 
will raise you up. Do not be intimidated by these armed mules'. 
AAZ [December 
2003] audio recording 
57 'America has thus been militarily defeated by those fighters 
despite all the huge military arsenal and the dollars with which 
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they have flooded Afghanistan'. America is losing against the 
Mujahideen'. 'as we were, chasing the Americans and their allies 
everywhere, even in their own doorsteps'. 'After two years of 
Tora Bora, the bloodshed against the Americans has escalated in 
Iraq. The Americans proved incapable of defending themselves 
and even of defending officials such as Wolfwitz, the arrogant 
Zionist' and Americans are being driven out of Afghanistan. 
UBL [January 2004] 
“Resist the New 
Rome” 
111 'Ground rules' in the fight between Muslims and the occupiers: 
no dialogue with the occupiers except through arms. Muslims 
must confront apostate, cooperative rulers in Palestine, Iraq and 
elsewhere - otherwise they will be punished.  
 
Urges the creation of a council of ulema, merchants, dignitaries 
and other notables in a secret place, free from prying eyes of 
corrupt rulers, which would form a council for the removal of 
apostate rulers and selection of a righteous one (called Ahl al-
Hall wa al-Aqd). 'The right to appoint an Imam is for the nation'. 
AAZ [March 2004] 
audio statement 
59 Every Muslim in Pakistan must do his best to get rid of the 
Musharraf regime which cooperates with the enemy. 
UBL [April 2004] 
Message to Europe 
52 'In response to the positive interactions [...] reflected in recent 
events and the opinion polls that demonstrate that most people in 
Europe want peace, I call upon just men - especially the ulema, 
media, and businessmen - to form a permanent commission to 
enlighten the European peoples of the justice of our causes, 
particularly Palestine.' 
UBL [May 2004] 
“People of Iraq” 
82 Appeal for unity in Jihad in Iraq: 'Jihad is designated for all the 
Muslims in Iraq, in the north, the middle and the south, and those 
who claimed their religious leadership in the Interim Council 
have no excuse after this Council approved infidel Bremer's 
constitution'.  
 
'What is happening in Iraq will be repeated where you are'. 
'Defending the rest of the Muslim countries especially the Two 
Holy Places starts by fighting in their front lines in Iraq. O 
Muslims, wake up and realise the size of the danger'.  
 
The crisis in Iraq did not come about due to lack of religious 
knowledge, but rather 'our slackness to act on what we know 
owing to lack of honesty, truth and certainty'.  
 
Appeals to the youth 'to fight the crusaders and the Jews and 
remember God more often', explains the wonders of martyrdom. 
Calls on the youth of the Arabian Peninsula, Egypt, Syria, Saudi 
Arabia, Kurds, Turkey [knights of Mohammed al-Fateh], Hama 
[Umm al-Fida], Allepo, Jordan, Yemen to support their brothers 
in Iraq. 
UBL [December 2004] 
“Message concerning 
Saudi Arabia” 
84 Appeal for unity among Muslims 
UBL [December 2004] 
audio statement 
86 Pleased with the steadfastness of the Iraqi people. People of Iraq: 
'continue to pray and to unite', attack the enemy tanks. 'The 
prowess of the faithful has begun to show results'.  
 
To the Muslim Ummah: 'the most important and serious issue 
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today for the whole world is this Third World War, which the 
Crusade-Zionist coalition began against the Islamic nation. It is 
raging in the land of the two rivers'. Jihad an individual duty, 'the 
nation should devote its resources, sons, and money to fight the 
infidels and drive them out of its land'.  
 
It is the duty to conduct Jihad in Palestine and Iraq, and the 
countries closest to them, Al-Haramayn, Syria, Jordan, Turkey, 
Iran, and Kuwait. And then countries closest to them if this 
doesn't work.  
 
Urges Muslims to support AQ and the mujahideen with men or 
money, talks of how expensive it is [see free text].  
 
'Unity is mercy and division is torture'. 'Victory is imminent'. 
Everyone must partake in the 'war of destiny between infidelity 
and Islam'. 
AAZ [February 2005] 
“The Freeing of 
Humanity..” 
109 'As the Highest helper, Allah the Exalted has guided us to 
confront the lying American power, vexing it, and bringing it 
down to its true size, and to show that its defeat is possible on the 
hands of the people of Jihad and martyrdom, so must we also 
confront America in the field of beliefs and principles, to expose 
their Shirk, sinfulness and hypocrisy'.  
 
'The Ummah must harness its right to choose its ruler, to judge 
him, to criticize him and to remove him, to harness its right to 
command what is right and forbid what is evil, the Ummah must 
confront all types of aggression against the sanctity of people, 
their freedom and their rights, the Ummah has to confront force, 
harshness, robbery, forgery, rottenness, inheriting of rule which 
our rulers practice with the blessings and support of America' 
'The Ummah must accept the authority of the Sharee'ah 
judgement, and that no person has the right to touch the rights of 
others except with its ruling.'  
 
Soldiers and generals need to use their weapons to defend Islam 
not attack Muslims. . Jihad is an obligation, and Muslims must 
also pay Zakat to support the mujahideen. 
AAZ [June 2005] 
video statement 
72 Congratulation to Muslim nation 'for its heroic steadfastness in 
front of the new crusades in its 4th year'. 'My dear brothers, the 
real reform starts by supporting jihad in Palestine, Iraq, 
Afghanistan and wherever there is jihad. Reform will not happen 
unless we support jihad and the mujahideen'. To the people of 
Iraq: 'I call upon and appeal to them in the name of God as 
Arabs, Kurds and Turkmen to group under the banner of the 
great Islam to make up a front that will be ready to take over the 
government after the Americans leave'. 'This front should be 
built, based on the rule of the Sharia, jihad, shura [consulting], 
and the protection of the Muslims' honours'.  
 
Palestinians urged 'not to trust the secularists who sold Palestine 
for a cheap price and not to allow themselves to be dragged into 
the game of secular elections under a secular constitution'. 
AAZ [August 2005] 
interview 
128 'I call upon the Muslim clerics, the writers, the thinkers, the 
tradesmen, the merchants, and the officers to convene and 
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deliberate on the ways to get rid of these corrupt and corrupting 
regimes that burden our nation. I call upon them to start 
preparing for a change, however much time and effort it takes, 
and to spread the call for change throughout the nation. They 
must know that victory comes at a price, since a dark destiny 
awaits us unless we resist.’ 
AAZ [December 
2005] “The Victory of 
the Islamic Religion in 
Iraq” 
26 Need to support victims of earthquake in Pakistan, but avoid 
sending money to Pakistani authorities. Muslims need to come to 
Pakistan themselves, to avoid the authorities taking advantage of 
their aid.  
 
The Ummah will only enjoy free elections, protected sanctities 
and government accountable to its people, and a respectable, 
dignified judiciary when they have been freed of Crusader-
Jewish occupancy and that can only be done through Jihad. 
[inconsistencies: other statements decry the rule by the people 
and the majority rule].  
 
Mujahideen brothers in Iraq need to unite. 
AAZ [December 
2005] interview 
49 'Jihad in the path of Allah is greater than any individual or 
organization. It is a struggle between Truth and Falsehood, until 
Allah Almighty inherits the earth and those who live on it.'  
 
'Muslim brothers, reform will never be realized through endless 
talk and chatter about the corruptions of America, or through 
hoarse shouting at demonstrations'. 
AAZ [December 
2005] “Obstacles to 
Jihad” 
25 The first battle Muslims need to win is with themselves - that is 
the key to beating the Crusaders. This battle is with weakness, 
hesitation, attachment to the earth, inability, fear, position, 
standing, family, children and wealth. The enemies are victorious 
against the Muslims for two reasons only: fear and hesitation of 
the Ummah and ignorance of warfare and fighting. These are the 
only reasons the enemy succeeds, since his armies are fearful and 
greedy. They only succeed when their numbers are much greater.  
 
Victory in the jihad is imminent. 
AAZ [January 2006] 
“Bajawr Massicre and 
the Lies of the 
Crusaders" 
51 Pakistanis urged to 'hold tightly to the rope of Allah and struggle 
for the rule of Shariah and unite under the banner in confronting 
Musharraf'. Pakistanis urged to 'gather around' Mullah Omar. 
AAZ [March 2006] 
“The Alternative is 
Da’wa and Jihad” 
73 Expresses condolences to families of those who died in the al-
Salam 98 Ferry incident.  
 
Cartoon crisis: 'These insults should be confronted not only 
through demonstrations or burning of embassies after which we 
return to our homes to practice our life as usual [...] Confronting 
these insults requires a true awakening by the nation in order to 
combat the Crusader campaign against Islam with hand, tongue, 
words, and swords'. 'We should work on four interrelated fronts': 
(1) 'inflicting losses on the Crusader West, especially its 
economic structure through dealing strikes which will make it 
bled for years '. (2) 'Expelling the Zionist-Crusader enemy from 
the lands of Islam, particularly from Iraq, Afghanistan and 
Palestine'. The collapse of the economies of the warring states is 
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crucial for their removal, allowing for establishment of caliphate. 
(3) 'Changing corrupt regimes which have sold our dignity and 
pride to the Crusader West'. (4) 'All clerics, scholars, writers and 
thinkers of the Muslim nation should play their role in alerting 
the nation to the danger it is facing, motivating it to return to 
Islam, working on implementing the laws of sharia, and warning 
it against any course, even if disguised in Islam, that is against 
the rule of sharia [...] 'they should motivate the nation to support 
its mujahideen sons financially and morally'. 'The Muslims 
should rush to support jihad with men, money, equipment and 
expertise'.  
 
To Muslims in Palestine: they must stay committed to applying 
Gods law, Jihad in Palestine cannot be pursued 'on the basis of a 
narrow, arrogant national approach that sidelines the rule of 
sharia and respects secularists who sold Palestine. Palestinians 
must not accept the legitimacy of the PA.  
 
Muslims must be wary of the 'American game entitled the 
political process' which seeks to force Muslims to abandon the 
sharia, accept the status quo, lay down arms, and welcome 
foreign occupation.  
 
'If we sacrifice the rule of sharia and bestow legitimacy on those 
who sell nations and sign the surrender agreements [...] we will 
lose both religion and the present life and the land will remain 
occupied, injustice present, and sanctities violated'. 
AAZ [April 2006] 
“Four Years since the 
Battle of Tora Bora” 
238 In the wake of the earthquake in Pakistan: 'It also requires from 
us a sincere return to religion, so that God would spare us His 
wrath'.  
 
'The establishment of a caliphate is the duty of every Muslim and 
is the hope of the Muslim nation.'  
 
'Brother Muslims [...] I bring you the good tidings that your 
brothers in Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestine are striking painful 
blows and directing deadly stabs against your enemies'.  
 
Muslims in Iraq: 'Stand fast and hold your ground. Victory is 
achieved through patience and perseverance'. Unity crucial in 
Iraq - among 'the Arabs of Jihad, the Kurds of conquest and the 
Turks of faith'. To the mujahideen in Iraq: 'I do not ask you only 
to treat well your brothers in Iraq, but I also ask you to serve 
them, make sure their needs are met, lend support to them, and 
defend their faith, dignity and sacred things'. Tribes, clans and 
noble men urged to support mujahideen, and ulema urged to 
'guide the nation' and promote jihad, 'to preserve the ideology of 
monotheism against those who want to belittle the governance of 
sharia or the doctrine of al-Wala and al-Bara, and establish a 
government based on race, ethnicity, secularism or renouncing of 
the governance of the sharia'. Muslims in Turkey, al-Sham and 
the Arabian Peninsula urged to support mujahideen of Iraq, with 
men, money, ammunition and prayers. 'They are fighting at the 
gates of Palestine'. 
UBL [April 2006] “Oh 90 'It is obligatory upon the Ummah with all its groups and sections 
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People of Islam” and its men and women, young and old, to provide themselves, 
their wealth, their expertise, and all types of moral and material 
support what suffices to carry on the Jihad in the fields of Jihad'. 
'Happy is he who stands to defend the banner of Tawheed, and 
happy is he who makes a shield out of himself and his chest as he 
defends the religion of Allah'. 
AAZ [April 2006] 
“Letter to the People 
of Pakistan” 
81 Calls on Pakistanis to 'stand against the Zionist/Crusader assault 
on the Islamic Ummah and on Pakistan, and I call on them in 
earnest to topple this bribe-taking, treacherous criminal, and to 
back their brothers the Mujahideen in Afghanistan'. Calls on 
soldiers and officers in the Pak army to disobey their orders. 
AAZ [June 2006] 
“Support for 
Palestinians” 
85 'I call on Muslims everywhere to support their brothers the 
Palestinians, that support which must be directed first to the 
Mujahideen, then to the families of the martyrs and prisoners, 
and then [...] the remainder can be directed to the social and life-
style aspects, in order for the Jihad to remain vital and effective'. 
This is the duty of all Muslims. Hopes Palestinians remain 
committed to 'the creed of Tawheed' and the rule of Shariah and 
refute the secularists, referendums. 
AAZ [June 2006] 
“American Crimes in 
Kabul” 
87 Appeal to Muslims in Kabul and Afghanistan to defend Islam 
and reject injustice. They need to stand united, invaders are 
expelled and the shari'a implemented. 
AAZ [June 2006] 
“Elegizing the 
Ummah’s Martyr..” 
32 On the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi: he had to die because 
'every soul must taste death'. It doesn't matter when we die, only 
how. Abu Musab wore his explosive jacket and didn't try to 
escape death in a basement or aeroplane.  
 
Iraqis must not lay down arms until 'Allah decrees for you 
victory or martyrdom'. The Islamic ummah has put its hope in 
the Iraqi people, they must establish an Islamic state in Iraq, then 
make their way towards captive Jerusalem. The mujahideen of 
Iraq must unite, and defend the Muslim people of Iraq. Muslims 
in regions around Iraq must not abandon the Iraqi mujahideen 
but support them any way they can. 
AAZ [June 2006] 
“The Zionist 
Crusader’s Aggression 
in Gaza and Lebanon” 
88 'Dear Muslim brothers everywhere, I do not whish to move your 
feelings with an over-zealous speech or with an emotional 
address. But I ask you by God Almighty; by your love for God's 
messenger [...]; and by the obligation of jihad, which is the duty 
of every Muslim, to rise and seek martyrdom to hurt the 
Crusaders and the Zionists'.  
 
Need to support the campaign in Iraq due to its proximity to 
Palestine. 
UBL [July 2006] “To 
the Ummah in General 
and the Mujahideen in 
Iraq and Somalia in 
Particular” 
93 To Iraqis: 'I tell you that the first step that needs to be taken to 
ensure the stability in Iraq is the expulsion of the Crusader 
armies through fighting them, and then punishing the leaders of 
the parties [...] who lied to the people' and urged participation in 
the political process. 'The defenceless people of Islam in the land 
of the two rivers are facing genocide by the gangs of rancour and 
treachery, which were spread in all sensitive areas in al-Ja'fari's 
previous government'. Muslims must help their brothers in Iraq 
with men and money. Iraqis must know that there can be no 
peace with 'the Crusaders and renegades and no half solutions'. 
They must avoid disunity and conflict.  
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To the Mujahideen of Somalia: they must fight Abdullahi Yusuf 
and not let him get away. 'As for the international forces, their 
issue is easy, God willing. Their soldiers lack a fighting 
ideology. They do not have a cause to fight for [...] prepare the 
necessary means, especially tank mines and anti-armour RPGs', 
be patient - the US will be defeated in Somalia again.  
 
Take notice that the situation in Iraq is dangerous [...] If you 
leave Baghdad today, then you will leave Damascus, Amman, 
the Gulf, and Riyadh tomorrow'. 'Be cautious of the 
consequences of procrastination'. 
AAZ [September 
2006] “Hot issues..” 
21 All Muslims must come to the aid of Palestine and Lebanon by 
striking the interests of Jews and Crusaders and those who 
collaborate with them. Lebanese must disregard international 
law. The Kurds must not allow the Americans to incite infighting 
between them by supporting secular forces. The Kurds are 
'defenders of Islam and defenders of Jerusalem'. The Ummah is 
boiling but needs a vanguard in order to organize its efforts into a 
manageable force for change. The need is to address the main ill 
facing Muslims - rule by corrupt, rotten regimes, since all other 
problems branch out from this. Congratulates Somalis for 
embracing Shariah and calls on them to reject the Americans and 
their supporters and confront the Ethiopians. Muslims in Somalia 
must not only establish an Islamic state but expel all 
Zionist/Crusader forces from the Horn of Africa and support the 
mujahideen in Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine. 
AAZ [September 
2006] “Bush, the 
Vatican’s Pope, Darfur 
and the Crusades” 
89 The Muslim nation should realise the powerlessness of the 
governments of Muslim lands in the face of the Crusade. These 
governments recognised the legitimacy of the UN, prohibited by 
Islamic law since it meant recognising Israel and are also 
submissive to the US and West. The Muslim ummah also needs 
to recognise the impotence of treacherous Muslims: 1) those 
ideologically defeated, those who accepted governance of the 
masses in stead of Sharia, recognised the Sykes-Picot borders in 
stead of the Islamic caliphate, 2) 'the deceptive merchants of 
religion' in Iraq who colluded with the occupiers, 3) 'clerics of 
beggary' who 'sold their religion for salaries and posts' who 
recognise Israel. 
AAZ [December 
2006] “Realities of 
Conflict Between 
Islam and 
Unbelievers” 
94 Brothers in Palestine: 'Hold onto your Qurans, hold on to your 
rifles'. 'All Muslims stand with you', 'so stand with your brothers 
in Islam in Chechnya, Afghanistan, Kashmir and Iraq, and let the 
world hear your support for them'.  
 
Muslim Ummah has two choices: to 'live under the control of the 
arrogant enemies of Islam, dishonoured, humiliated, plundered 
and occupied' or to 'rely on your Lord, renew your Tawheed, rise 
up with your true faith', 'and there is no third choice'.  
 
'The ummah must arm itself with an awareness guided by the 
light of the Shari'ah, in order for it to determine: who are its 
helpers? Who are its enemies?' otherwise it will never move on 
to victory.  
 
The battle is not 'of a group or organization, but is the battle of 
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the entire Ummah', partisanship must end, and the Ummah unite 
and support the mujahideen. 'So we extend our hand and invite 
every independent and honorable one striving to establish Allah's 
Law on earth [...] to cooperate with us'.  
 
To Turks: 'you know that the entire Islamic Ummah is with you, 
with your Muslim brothers in Cyprus'. To the Kurds: 'secularist 
traitors are striving to sow discord between you and your 
brothers the Mujahideen, who sympathized with you when you 
were hit by the crimes of the criminal, pagan Ba'athists. And you 
know that your Mujahid brothers, especially in Qaida al-Jihad, 
are - by the grace of Allah - the farthest people from ethnic 
fanaticism. They have pledged allegiance to the Commander of 
the Believers, Mulla Muhammad Omar, as their commander, and 
he isn't an Arab'. 'Restore the glory of your forefathers'.  
 
Educated Muslims must confront the Zionist Crusaderrs and 
'idol-kings, tyrants and arrogant ones'.  
 
To brothers in Somalia: 'you are the southern garrison of Islam, 
so don't allow Islam to be attacked from your flank'. Chechen 
rebels not alone. GSPC, 'the guards of Islam's western garrison'. 
AAZ [December 
2006] 
“Congratulations on 
the Eid to the Ummah 
of Tawhed” 
95 Congratulates Ummah on the 'defeat of Americans and their 
Crusader allies in Afghanistan and Iraq, and I ask Allah that we 
see the same thing soon in Palestine'. Congratulates Muslims in 
Iraq for their jihad against Americans and their collaborators. 
Urges unity in Iraq among the mujahideen. Congratulates 
Muslims in Afghanistan. Congratulates mujahideen brothers in 
Kashmir - they must clear their ranks of ISI. Congrats Chechen 
Mujahid and Mujahideen in Indonesia and the Philippines, 
Muslim brothers in Somalia, Mujahideen in Algeria facing the 
'Franco-American Crusade', Mujahid brothers in Yemen, 
brothers working in the Jihadi media - encouraged to expend 
even more effort to spoil the enemies publicity campaigns, 
captive brothers everywhere and in Egypt - who are asked to be 
steadfast 'in face of the carrot-and-stick policies practiced by the 
regime as a service to America and Israel'. Congratulates 'knights 
of Tawhid' and its scholars in prisons of 'The American State of 
Al-Saud'. Congratulates every Muslim woman in prisons of the 
'Idol Kings' and Americans and the mothers and wives and 
orphan and son of captured or killed mujahideen. Congratulates 
Muslim women wearing the Hijab despite 'the fierce Crusade' 
against it, since it is a symbol of her modesty and purity. 
AAZ [January 2007] 
“Rise and Support our 
Brothers in Somalia” 
96 Brothers in Somalia must be steadfast, 'moreover, when you 
pursue your Jihad, make sure you adhere to the creed of loyalty 
and purity and let the Koran be your reference'. The Somalian's 
have defeated the Americans there once before. Muslim brethren 
everywhere asked to respond to the call for Jihad in Somalia. 
Brothers in Yemen, Arabian Peninsula, Egypt, Sudan, the Arab 
Maghreb en everywhere 'through offering sacrifices, money, 
opinion, and expertise'. Urged not to listen to defeatist calls. 
Muslims in Somalia must be patient and steadfast. 
AAZ [January 2007] 
“The Correct 
Equation” 
28 It is the duty of every Muslim to bear arms or support those who 
do and defend Islam. Also responsibility of all to free those in 
captivity, esp. Umad abd-al Rahman.  
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The Muslim Ummah must deafen its ears to the corrupt rulers 
and scholars of beggary who argue against the jihad. The 
mujahideen are the righteous one, the defenders of the religion 
and honour, who broke the back of the invading forces and 
declined to follow the path of nationalism.  
 
To Muslims in Palestine: Al-Aqsa will only return through jihad. 
The fighting in Palestine must be for Allah's cause - not the 
nationalistic cause of the secular traitors.  
 
Calls on Arab nationalists to come back to Islam. 
AAZ [February 2007] 
“Lessons, Examples 
and Great Events in 
the Year 1427” 
97 Muslims, and esp. those in media organizations need to highlight 
the concept of Islamic brotherhood, regardless of tribe or race 
and to disregard nationalism. Calls on nationalists and leftists in 
Palestine to return to Islam, and 'join the march of Jihad'.  
 
Importance of unity in Iraq.  
 
Calls on Muslims in Afghanistan and Pakistan and their 
neighbours to aid the Mujahideen with money, manpower, 
opinion and expertise. 
AAZ [March 2007] 
“Palestine is the 
concern of all 
Muslims” 
18 Muslims must wage individual jihad until all Muslim lands are 
liberated - from 'Al-Andalus [subtitles in video: Spain] to Iraq' 
and until 'the word of Allah is supreme', they must disown the 
international treaties and powers holding them captive. Muslims 
must leave political organizations they have joined. 
AAZ [May 2007] 
“The Empire of Evil is 
about to End” 
23 Appeals to all those who love the Prophet to take up arms against 
Americans. Asks the followers of Ali bin Abi Talib, al-Hasan 
and al-Husayn whether they would be pleased with the 
occupying forces [rallying shia]. Appeal to the Palestinians: 'I 
call on this garrisoned, patient, resolute, heroic, Mujahid Muslim 
people to never concede one sand-grain of Palestine, however 
great the pressure applied to it, however intense the embargo 
becomes and however numerous the conspiracies might be'  
 
'And in general terms, and to reach a beneficial result: I call on 
the Muslim ummah with all its factions to combine its efforts to 
make the purified Shari’ah the highest authority which is 
unrivalled by any other authority, and to take away legitimacy 
from the corrupt and corruptive rulers and end recognition of 
them, their constitutions and their laws'. 'I ask the Muslim 
Ummah in Egypt, and not just in Egypt but in all lands of Islam, 
to bear arms in defence of Islam, to spend in defence of Islam, to 
sacrifice in defence of Islam, and to die in defence of Islam'. 
'And let us keep in mind that our fundamental battle is with 
ourselves: with our fear, with our hesitation, with our 
backtracking, weakness and inability and with our craving for 
this lowly life in which we die every day instead of the 
honourable life in which we die with dignity one time'. 
AAZ [May 2007] 
statement announcing 
the death of Taliban 
leader Mullah 
Dadullah Akhud 
30 The ummah encouraged to continue the march of Dadullah and 
'be among the patient award-seekers'. 
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AAZ [June 2007] 
“Forty Years since the 
Fall of Jerusalem” 
101 'Who is defending the Muslim nation today? Is it not the 
mujahideen?'.  
 
To HAMAS: We, together with the entire Muslim nation, are 
with you. However, you must correct your march'. They must 
remember that achieving power is not a goal in itself, only part in 
implementing 'God's course on Earth'. They must unite with the 
rest of the mujahideen.  
 
To HAMAS: 'We are with you in your confrontation of Israel 
and its agents, the secularists who sold Palestine'. 'How can we 
help the mujahidin in HAMAS and the rest of Palestine?' By 
going there in person, through funds, helping delivering weapons 
and supplies. This is a religious obligation of all neighbouring 
Palestine, and Gaza in particular.  
 
Muslims must not 'go astray' and aspire to become 'a minister, an 
ambassador, a director, a wealthy person, a notable, a 
distinguished writer, a skilful physician, a successful engineer or 
a prosperous businessman, we will lose the afterlife and we will 
be defeated in this world'. 'My Muslim nation, America is not a 
god' it can be defeated. 
AAZ [July 2007] “The 
Advice of one 
Concerned” 
102 People of Iraq: 'The first thing which our beloved brothers in Iraq 
must realize is the critical nature of unity, and that it is the 
gateway to victory'.  
 
'We must study how to take the upright middle path, in order to 
make use of and benefit from every achievement achieved by our 
Mujahid brothers. Those who didn't agree to setting up of the ISI 
must, nonetheless keep in contact with them and seek unity. And 
the brothers in ISI must accept these brothers and listen to their 
comments, and advise about shortcomings of others. The 
mujahideen are human and 'not innocent of deficiency, error and 
slips' and they must always submit to Shari'ah. Thus the 
Mujahideen must resolve the differences amongst themselves, 
they must be 'compassionate and merciful towards each other.' 
But their problems should not be made public. 'And I invite all 
Muslims in all lands of Islam in general and in Iraq in particular 
to support this blessed fledgling Mujahid garrisoning state with 
funds, manpower, opinion, information and expertise'. ... 
Prisoners: 'I caution my Muslim brothers everywhere against the 
statements and retractions of the graduates and guests of the 
prisons on the Peninsula and in Egypt, Yemen, Algeria, 
Indonesia and all lands of Islam, because they are either those 
who have been coerced [...] or are those who are disheartened 
and fallen and looking for a way out of prison  
 
This applies to people under house arrest too. Reminds of those 
who did not collapse but grew stronger in prison, Qutb and Abd 
al-Rahman.  
 
The Kurds 'are the protectors of the Muslim Ummah throughout 
its history', they must not allow anyone to pollute this history. 
AAZ [July 2007] 
“Malicious Britain and 
103 Ummah needs to confront the Britons, Crusaders and their 
agents. Urges Muslims in Lebanon not to accept international 
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its Indian Slaves” forces and agreements. This is the duty of every Muslim in 
Lebanon. Muslims must denounce global and Arab agreements 
justifying occupation of Muslim lands, the latest being the Mecca 
agreement selling four-fifths of Palestine. Appeals to the 
HAMAS leadership which signed the accords, to embrace 
Shari'ah and reject all rulings which have partitioned Palestine, 
starting in 1947. The HAMAS leadership can decide between 
leading a national liberation 'that has nothing to do with the 
causes of the Muslim nation' or 'to lead an Islamic jihadist 
movement that seeks to establish God's way on earth'. To 
Palestinians: asks them to unite around the book. ‘Beware, 
beware of retreating or going backward, deceived by political 
solutions and regional deals'. 'I very seriously warn them to be 
wary of the Arab regimes, especially the Egyptian, the Saudi, and 
Jordanian regimes', especially 'the palace scholars'. 
 104 'I call on the Ulema in Pakistan and tell them: this is what you 
are worth to Musharraf' and the Crusaders, 'and if you don't 
retaliate for your honour, Musharraf won't spare any of you, and 
won't stop until he eradicates Islam from Pakistan'. 
 12 The Palestinians must declare that they are mujahideen 'who 
aspire to implement Shariah law', that they 'renounce popular 
sovereignty and every other sovereignty besides that of the 
Quran and Sunnah.' You must declare that you will take action to 
support the cause of establishing the Caliphate and fight until 
Allah's word reigns supreme.' The rest of Muslims must unite in 
Jihad against the Zionist-crusader enemy and renounce treaties 
which sold out Palestine, e.g. Mecca agreement. 'My Muslim 
brothers in Palestine: join together under the flag of Islam and 
the path of jihad in the cause of Allah and abandon these secular 
organizations that have sold you out.' Many religious rulings and 
Muftis cannot be trusted. Egyptian soldiers urged to disobey 
Mubarak's orders and pass on arms and supplies to Gaza and join 
the mujahideen. 
AAZ [December 
2007] “A Review of 
Events” 
13 Muslims urged to stop supporting treacherous groups 
cooperating with the Americans in Iraq. Urges unity in Iraq to 
the cause of Tawheed. The Iraqi mujahideen must settle their 
differences based on the Shariah law and the advice of righteous 
scholars, not those of the sultans (Saudi Arabia) and rid their 
ranks of traitors. The methodologies of the Jihadi movements 
must be founded on the rule of the Shariah, not the rule of the 
majority; they must be founded on the brotherhood of Muslims. 
The must emphasise setting up a caliphate which is demanded by 
Shariah, they must emphasise liberating Muslim lands, especially 
Palestine, Saudi Arabia, and every Muslim land occupied by the 
infidels. This is an individual duty of all Muslims since the fall of 
Spain. ... 'Each of us must do all he can to carry out the 
individual obligation of confronting this satanic alliance sitting 
on the chests of our Ummah in Egypt and other lands of Islam'. 
Muslims must not accept the constitutions; participate in 
elections and councils which do not rule according to the 
Shari'ah.  
 
Palestinians must not compromise even 'one grain' of Palestine. 
Those who follow secular organisations must 'return to the truth'. 
... Pakistanis must support Jihad 'because Pakistan has turned 
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into Americastan and they must save it before it turns into 
Indiastan or Israelistan' and the Pakistani army must place its 
allegiance in Islam and move against Musharraf. 
UBL [December 2007] 
“The Way to Frustrate 
the Conspiracies” 
27 The mujahideen need to unite in fighting America and its agents. 
It is obligatory for Muslims to unite and support the mujahideen 
in order to bring about an Islamic state, Allah has ordered unity. 
It is a duty of Muslims to pledge allegiance to the 'most sincere' 
and follow them in the establishment of the Islamic state.  
 
People of Palestine reassured that the jihad will spread to liberate 
their land. Nothing will stop jihad spreading to Palestine if the 
mujahideen are successful in Iraq.  
 
To the Muslim nation: 'Stop playing around, listen, understand, 
wake up and pay attention [...] rush forward and do your duty 
[...] today Baghdad, and tomorrow Damascus, Amman, and 
Riyadh'. 
AAZ [early 2008] 
“Exoneration..” 
20 Wants to avoid recriminations between 'brothers'. Claims to 
criticise only the author's words, not himself, for whom he has 
great respect. Serious efforts are needed to bring about change - 
not protests: the need to sacrifice one's dearest possessions. 
'Those who support Shaykh Usama or Mullah Omar, may God 
preserve them, do not do so for a whim or out of fanaticism. 
They support them because they see that these two men always 
back the righteous course and make sacrifices for its sake. We 
pray that their actions and the actions of all Muslims will find 
favour with God.' 
AAZ [March 2008] 
Letter to Abu Umar al-
Baghdadi 
44 Zawahiri says he has been tasked by Bin Laden to urge Baghdadi 
to 'focus whatever effort you or those with whom you contact 
abroad can muster on the Danes, in order to champion the person 
of the prophet, peace be upon him. We also pray that you clarify 
this in your talks and your media'. Bin Laden urges Baghdadi to: 
(1) establish a department within the bureau focusing on the 
mujahideen to identify specific skills and offer training, (1) 
establish a sharia court, (2) advancing the committed and faithful 
in important posts [within Iraq], and offer training in financial 
matters etc., (3) to include in their communiqués requesting 
external support, the nature and quantity of expertise needed - 
this will then be backed up by AQ leadership communiqués. 
UBL [March 2008] “A 
Way for the Salvation 
of Palestine” 
6 Appeal for support from Muslims everywhere for ending the 
siege of Gaza and Palestine through force. ‘Endeavour to liberate 
our nation, Palestine and the Masjid Al-Aqsa’. Particular appeal 
to Muslims of the Levant to join and support forces in Iraq, since 
this will lead the way to Palestine 
AAZ [March 2008] “A 
Call to Help our 
People in Gaza” 
17 Muslims must attack the interests of Jews and Christians. 
AAZ [April 2008] 
“The Open Meeting 
part one..” 
105 Must keep away from the places the enemy gathers. . Warns 
Palestinians not to be caught up in the moves to forget the 
Palestinian territories that were 'stolen' before 1967, and not to 
settle for a two-state solution.  
 
When asked about Palestinian organisations: 'I respond to it by 
stressing that we invite all people to Islam, and we invite 
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Muslims and their organisations to unite around the word of 
Tawhid'.  
 
Ummah in Egypt and elsewhere urged to strike Jewish Crusader 
interests wherever they can be found, push out the occupiers and 
cease endorsing corrupt regimes. . Does not agree with declaring 
HAMAS leaders unbelievers. It deserves to be supported.  
 
'Uniting of the Ummah must be around the word of Tawheed', 
and must not compromise the Shari'ah. 
AAZ [April 2008] 
“Shaykh Ayman Al-
Zawahiri – On the 
Fifth Anniversary of 
the Invasion and 
Torture of Iraq” 
7 Appeal for support. No begging and no elections, only uniting in 
Islam and fighting the oppressors 
AAZ [April 2008] 
“The Open Meeting.. 
Part 2..” 
107 Calls on different factions in Iraq to merge into one entity (the 
Islamic State). [On Shia]: points out that the Sunni are in a 
majority in Iraq, since the Kurds and Turkomen are also Sunni. 
The Islamic State of Iraq: 'the mujahideen groups [in Iraq] must 
express allegiance to the state and not vice versa'.  
 
Need to support the mujahideen with money, and technological 
and scientific assistance.  
 
'I ask those who are firm in their covenant not to pay attention to 
this propaganda war that the United States is launching in its 
prisons, which are located in our countries'. . Calls on wealthy 
Muslims to send funds to the mujahideen and for theoreticians 
and sharia experts as well as those with skills to assist the 
mujahideen.  
 
On AQIM: Says that 'your brothers in the al-Qaeda organisation 
in the Islamic Maghreb are most eager to preserve your souls, 
property, honour and dignity, and they are waging jihad in the 
path of God to liberate you [Algerians] from America, France, 
and the sons of France'. Mistakes will be made in this war, but 
jihad must not stop.  
 
Appeal to Islamic organisations in Palestine to stop consulting 
secular constitutions and international laws. . Expertise is needed 
to support the jihad and also funds, 'funds are the nerve and fuel 
of war'.  
 
'The most important thing jihad today needs is that the nation 
free itself of the shackles of impotence, fear, and hesitation', of 
being affected by propaganda campaigns of the enemy, being 
attached to 'crumbs of life in this world'. 
UBL [May 2008] “A 
Message to the 
Muslim Nation”  
24 It is the duty of Egyptians to break the blockade of Gaza. The 
present Ummah needs to learn from history in order to avoid the 
same mistakes in trying to liberate Palestine. 'Is it not time for 
you to disavow Arab and non-Arab tyrants, from Indonesia to 
Mauritania'?. There is no way to get to Palestine except to fight 
the regimes and parties that surround the Jews and prevent 
fighting them. 
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AAZ [June 2008] “On 
the Anniversary of the 
Naksa..” 
15 The way to salvation is adherence to God and return to His 
religion. Muslims in Sinai must help their brothers in Gaza and 
break down Mubarak's security fence. 'Why does the Muslim 
nation go hungry when it is the richest nation on earth?' The 
money disappears in the pockets of the Crusader invaders, the 
Jews and their treasonous agents - if the Muslim nation does not 
rid itself of them then let it 'die of starvation'. Jihad and 
commitment to Islam is the only way to salvation. 
AAZ [August 2008] 
“A Message form 
Shaikh Ayman al-
Zawahiri to the 
Pakistani Army and 
the People of 
Pakistan” 
41 Muslims in Pakistan need to rise up to their moral and religious 
responsibility - rise up against the Pakistani army. ... How can a 
soldier in the Pakistani army be convinced that he is defending 
Islam and Pakistan when his superiors tell him to kill Muslims, 
Pakistanis, fight against the Taliban etc.? The Americans view 
the Pakistani army only as their 'hunting dog', doing their dirty 
work and are plotting with India behind the scenes.  
 
When a Muslim country is invaded by non-Muslims, the it is the 
duty of all Muslims to expel the invader.  
 
The need to create awareness of the current state of invasion in 
Pakistan and alert the nation - the Ulema play a crucial role here. 
.. The Pakistani soldiers need to repent and join the Mujahideen.  
 
'Finally, I request every Muslim in Pakistan to ask himself 
seriously: Does he want Pakistan to truly become Pakistan? Or is 
he going to stand by idly and passively until it becomes part of 
Greater Hindustan?” 
AAZ [November 
2008] “The Exit of 
Bush and Arrival of 
Obama” 
100 Muslims must stick to the path of martyrdom attacking the US 
since its invasion into Muslim lands continues. Addresses the 
mujahideen in Iraq and Somalia and emphasises that they are 
winning, the enemy is fleeing, the US troops and the Ethiopians, 
'don’t put down your weapons before the Mujahid state of Islam 
and Tawheed has been set up in Somalia'. 
AAZ [November 
2008] “Al-Azhar: The 
Lions Den” 
237 Responsibility of Muslim Umma in general and especially 
Egyptians to rise up and protest against the Egyptian embargo on 
Gaza. The entire population of Egypt needs to go on strike to end 
the blockade on Gaza. Calls on brothers on Islamic and Jihadi 
internet sites to spread such a call. Calls on the Ulema of Al-
Azhar to lead the uprising of the people.  
 
The Ummah needs to ensure that the council of ulema in Egypt is 
financially and administratively independent.  
 
'Foreign enemies are only able to master us with the help of our 
domestic enemies'. 'Trying to change our regimes by working 
according to the rotten and corrupt system and law is fruitless 
futility'. 
AAZ [December 
2008] “The Death of 
our Heroes and 
Betrayal of our 
Rulers” 
106 Jihad has become an individual duty for every Muslim fighting 
the new Christian campaign. 
AAZ [January 2009] 
“The Massacre of 
121 Palestinians urged to be 'steadfast on the path of jihad', 'The 
entire Muslim nation is with you' and every person 'killed, 
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Gaza and the Siege of 
the Traitors” 
injured, widowed and orphaned in Palestine and the rest of the 
Islamic world' will be revenged. 'We dream of the day we are 
able to stand by your sides to liberate the land which shelters Al-
Bait Al-Maqdis'. This latest aggression is a link in the ongoing 
Zionist-Christian crusade. 'We are marching towards you 
swiftly', 'we will break up all these boundaries and restrictions 
which prevent us from reaching you'. The American withdrawal 
from Iraq is one of the signs that 'we are drawing nearer to you'. 
'I myself whish I could be amongst you in these times, treating 
the injured'.  
 
Egyptians urged to plan strikes, protests and demonstrations until 
the siege on Gaza is lifted, involving students and employees. 
Members of the Egyptian military should follow the example of 
Sulimain Khatir [Egyptian soldier who killed seven Israeli 
tourists in Sinai in 1985]. To 'defiant and honourable tribes in 
Sinai': 'today is your day' to help brothers in Gaza. Allah will ask 
them when the day comes how they have contributed to the 
salvation of Gaza.  
 
To Muslims; Obama 'mercilessly killing your Muslim brothers 
and sisters in Gaza'.  
 
Muslims in the 'garrisoned Levant, in the Arabian Peninsula, in 
Yemen, [...], in Somalia, the land of Jihad and Hijrah, in Iraq, 
[...], in Khurasan, and Chechnya': increase your severity against 
the Zionist-Crusader alliance and their interests!' 
UBL [January 2009] 
“Call for Jihad to Stop 
the Gaza Assault” 
122 'I am not the one who stands in front of you [Muslim Ummah] in 
these difficult days under the guise of condemnation and 
denunciation'  
 
'The duty is to instigate the youths to do jihad and to arrange 
them in battalions to fight for the sake of Allah the Zionist-
Crusader alliance and its agents in the region'  
 
The Ummah should rise up to defeat the Zionists, regardless of 
the position of the 'governors' [Arab governments]. Two 
examples show that this is possible: the victory against the Soviet 
Union in Afghanistan and 9/11 which chattered the American 
image of hegemony and in the subsequent war, which left 
America 'drowning in the economic crisis'. Patience is key in 
fighting the enemy. The war has lasted seven years, and they 
should be prepared to fight for another seven and seven more.  
 
Says he knows from experience how expensive jihad is, and 
therefore urges the wealthy to donate more to the cause. . The 
Ummah must be aware of the deception of the ballot box. 
Reminds Ummah that freedom from kings in Europe was 
brought about only through uprising and revolution, especially 
the French revolution.  
 
Sympathy for Palestinians. Says the Mujahideen are living in the 
same situation as the Palestinians. 
AAZ [February 2009] 
“The Sacrifices of 
131 'The Ummah must make a serious and effective move, for 
protests, even though they express the anger of the masses, are 
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Gaza” not sufficient to combat jets and tanks.' .. 
 
No sincere person who seeks the Pleasure of Allah should await 
the permission of anyone, for Jihad today is an individual 
obligation in which permission is not sought from one's father, 
spouse, or loaner.'  
 
To the wealthy: 'The wealthy must support the Mujahidoon 
financially so that the Crusaders do not succeed in their plans of 
besiegement' (Surah Mohammad 35-38 is quoted). 
AAZ [February 2009] 
“From Kabul to 
Mogadishu” 
132 Somalis urged to support the jihad and realises the illegitimacy 
of the Shaykh Shareef regime.  
 
Urges Tribes in Yemen to match the resolve of the Baluch and 
Pushtun tribes in Afghanistan and Pakistan in assisting the 
mujahideen in attacking America and their allies.  
 
Urges Afghan Muslims to support the Taliban. 
UBL [March 2009] 
“Practical Steps to 
Liberate Palestine” 
133 Appeal for support of the Jihad 
UBL [March 2009] 
“Fight on, Oh 
Champions of 
Somalia” 
134 'I address my brothers the Mujahideen, the honest sons of 
Somalia, and call on them to continue their steps on the path of 
Jihad.'  
 
'I send my appeal to the Muslim Ummah everywhere, and ask 
them  extend a helping hand to our family in Somalia.' 
AAZ [April 2009] 
“Six years since the 
invasion of Iraq..” 
136 Muslims urged to support the ISI, the jihad in Iraq and 
Afghanistan and elsewhere. The 'truthful scholars' urged to 
'expose those who barter the religion' by helping the invading 
and agent powers in Iraq and Afghanistan. Urges scholars to 
convince the Ummah to topple the corrupt leaders in the Muslim 
world who came to power due to the sanction of the Zio-
Crusader forces.  
 
Urges Muslims to support the jihad and not believe the lies of 
Americans or their allies and agents that they are making 
progress. 
AAZ [June 2009] 
“The Executioner, 
Egypt and the 
American Puppets 
Welcome Obama” 
137 'Our people in Egypt: Be the supporters of God and his 
messenger (peace and blessings be upon him). Do not be among 
those who befriend the enemy of God' 
AAZ [July 2009] “My 
Muslim Brothers and 
Sisters in Pakistan” 
139 Pakistanis should not 'run away from confronting the real facts' 
and realise that Muslims are being targeted by a 'new Crusade' 
AAZ [August 2009] 
“The Realities of Jihad 
and Fallacy of 
Hypocrisy” 
140 'I advise the leaders of the Islamic Movements to come to 
Afghanistan and learn lessons from the Taliban and Mulla 
Muhammad Omar, to fix with that their approaches and renew 
their faith.” .. 
 
To 'Kurdish brothers': 'The Americans and the Jews are using 
your government to their benefits.' ..  
 
  401 
Communiqué and 
author ID 
 
Motivational appeals to Muslim audiences 
excerpts, quotes, notes] 
 
Egyptians urged to mount forceful protests until the embargo on 
Gaza is lifted. 
AAZ [August 2009] 
“The Path of Doom” 
142 The battle in Swat and elsewhere in the region is part of the 
wider struggle against the Crusaders in Afghanistan and 
elsewhere. To people of Pakistan: 'there is no honour except 
through jihad'. 
AAZ [September 
2009] “Shaykh Dr 
Ayman al-Zawahiri: 
Eulogy for the Role 
Model of Youth” 
147 Muslims in Pakistan and Afghanistan: 'look at the mujahideen 
and join them'.  
 
“Oh, respectable dear Afghans! Stand with your brothers, the 
soldiers of the Islamic Emirate, while they protect your religion, 
your dignity, your force, your forbidden things, your country and 
your nation.'  
 
'How can the Turkish liberated Muslim people agree with these 
crimes against the Islamic religion and the Muslims?'  
 
It is the duty of Muslims in Gaza and elsewhere to support the 
jihad.  
 
Special appeal to Muslim youth. 
AAZ [December 
2009] “The 
(Palestinian) National 
Unity” 
146 Muslims urged to realise that all the battles that the mujahideen 
are fighting in Afghanistan, Waziristan, Somalia, Palestine, Iraq 
and Islamic Maghreb are not bound to that particular part of the 
world - they are being fought for the pride of all the Muslim 
umma. 
AAZ [December 
2009] “The Morning 
and the Lamp..” 
141 'that the Muslims of Pakistan become conscious of the reality of 
what is going on around them and to what end.' .. On desire to 
create mass movement: 'Finally, this awareness must be 
propagated amongst the Muslims of Pakistan until it takes the 
form of a mass movement that endeavors for a sound change; not 
one that loses its way like those movements that preceded it: on 
entering the threshold of politics and the pursuing the mirages of 
conferences.' 
AAZ [July 2010] “Al 
Quds will not be 
converted to Judaism” 
223 The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan is presenting a practical 
example and is realist in the field of jihad, Muslims are urged to 
follow this example.  
 
Special appeal to the youth of Islam, who are urged to prepeare 
for jihad, be patient and careful in preparation before going 'forth 
like lions against your enemies.' People with money are urged to 
support the Jihad. Those with qualifications and skills that Jihad 
can use should go forth in jihad or support through other means. 
The 'knights of the jihadist media' praised. Muslim women urged 
to fight pressure to uncover themselves, retain their purity and 
raise children for jihad. Praise for Muslim prisoners. 
AAZ [August 2010] 
“Message to the 
People of Turkey” 
225 Condolences for those who fell in Israeli raid on 'freedom 
flotilla'. Muslims must engage in the religious duties of Islam 
and defend its honour. 
AAZ [September 
2010] “A Victorious 
Ummah, A Broken 
Crusade” 
226 Condolence for Pakistanis over recent floods. Pakistani 
authorities will not help them as they're too busy spending 
money on the relationship within the West and the army is too 
busy killing Muslims. .. 'Change won't be achieved under the 
banner of the secularists' [in Egypt]. .. Urges Muslims to spread 
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this knowledge that the current corrupt situation is unacceptable.  
 
Palestinians must recognise the difference between the two 
methodologies - secularism which involves submission to the 
West and Israel and includes the Palestinian Authority and all 
Arab states. This involves ruling by majority, which they call 
'democracy'. The other methodology believes in the rule of 
Shari'ah the unity of the Muslim ummah and the brotherhood of 
Islam  
 
'it relies on the explicit and definite proofs of the Qur'an and 
Sunnah and cites the historical and political reality of the Muslim 
Ummah.' An Islamic state must be established in Palestine. 
UBL [October 2010] 
“Some points 
regarding the method 
of relief work” 
227 Asks Muslims to aid fellow Muslims in Pakistan suffering the 
consequences of floods. Appeals for more to be done to alleviate 
the effects of: climate change; famine and malnourishment; 
underdevelopment; food security; sustainable water consumption 
in Muslim lands; and generally to alleviate suffering of those 
Muslims less able. 
UBL [October 2010] 
“Help your brothers in 
Pakistan” 
228 All Muslims, young and old, men and women need to help the 
victims of the Paksitan floods.  
 
Muslims need to volunteer to help with relief efforts and do so in 
an organised fashion, emphasising the skill of managers 
(including those working for the Red Crescent); using the 
tremendous financial resources of Muslims collectively. Urges 
unity in responding to these crises and preparing for future 
catastrophes. 
AAZ [November 
2010] “Who is going 
to support Aifa 
Siddique” 
229 Pakistanis urged to join the Mujahideen in jihad and revenge for 
Afia Sidique 
AAZ [February 2011] 
“A Message of Glad 
Tidings…(1)” 
232 Talks of the importace of Islamic principles and laws over 
secular and nationalist norms that govern Egypt and the region 
AAZ [February 2011] 
“A Message of Glad 
Tidings…(2)” 
233 Urges Muslims not to target those 'Arab Christians' who do not 
attack or harm the interests of Muslims.  
 
'I advise the Muslims two things: a) That they differentiate 
between those Christians who show enmity to the Muslims and 
those who don’t. b) That they focus their strikes against the Zio-
Christian Crusader invaders and their agents.' 
AAZ [February 2011] 
“A Message of Glad 
Tidings…(3)” 
234 ''I salute every freeborn and noble Muslim jealous over their 
religion, nation, sanctity and nobility, who has risen against their 
oppressive and traitorous rulers'  
 
'Thus, it is a must that the freeborn people of Tunisia who are 
jealous in their religion, their Shariah, and Muslim sanctity and 
lands, to stop these political tricks which lie in wait. They must 
continue their sacrifice and struggle until Tunisia once again 
becomes a fortress of Islam, Jihad and Ribat, and frees itself 
from corruption, bribery, theft, suppression, injustice, 
debauchery and enslavement, and until Tunisia once again fulfils 
its proper role in the Muslim Ummah, defending its western 
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borders (or Al Aqsa Mosque) and supporting the Mujahideen in 
the various Islamic lands, coming to the aid of the weak and 
oppressed, and working to liberate the Muslim lands from the 
armies of the neo-Crusades, in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, the 
Arabian Peninsula, Somalia and the Islamic Maghreb.' . 
AAZ [March 2011] “A 
Message of Glad 
Tidings…(4)” 
235 'I salute all freeborn and noble Muslims who have sacrificed their 
lives and comfort to confront these corrupt and corruptive evil 
tyrants in Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Yemen, Jordan, and the rest of 
the Muslim lands.' 'indeed your brother Mujahideen are with you, 
confronting the same enemy. They have stood up to face 
America and its Western allies, who have cast Hosni Mubarak, 
Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, Ali Abdullah Saleh, Abdullah bin 
Husain and their likes over you.' . 
 
'Every noble and freeborn Muslim who is jealous for his religion, 
sanctities, and nobility must hold fast to their principles, 
constants and creed, and work on fulfilling and empowering 
them.' .. 'Thus, the noble and freeborn Muslims who are jealous 
of their religion, sanctities and honour must not suffice with 
merely removing the tyrant whose removal is an obligation, but 
rather they must continue their Jihad and struggle until an 
Islamic government is established which guarantees justice, 
freedom, and independence..'  
 
'O’ lions of Azhar! O’ lions of Islam! This is your day! Rise and 
lead the Ummah in its resistance to establish an Islamic 
government.' 
AAZ [April 2011] “A 
Message of Glad 
Tidings…(5)” 
236 ''In the beginning, I would like to send greetings to the free, 
honourable ones who are protective of their religion, honours, 
countries and dignity, from amongst the sons of our Ummah, 
who rose and keep rising against the injustice, oppression, 
tyranny, and dependency on the foreign, arrogant infidel that has 
launched on our Ummah and our Islam the contemporary crusade 
war in the name of war on terrorism.'  
 
Asks Egyptians and especially those of the Western Tribes to 
assist the Libyans with weapons, food and medicine.  
 
'I also would like to alert my Muslim brothers in Libya, Egypt, 
Algeria, Tunisia, and the rest of the Muslim homelands, that if 
the Americans and the NATO forces entered Libya, their 
neighbours in Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria and the rest of the 
Muslims must rise to fight both the al-Qadhafi mercenaries and 
the NATO crusaders.”'  
 
Appeal for release of prisoners, praise for those who stormed the 
state security headquarters in Cairo.“ And I call upon every 
honourable and free lawyer and journalist, and everyone who 
possesses details on the corruption of the security forces in 
Egypt, to publish them and trace those criminals.” .. 
 
 “Then, we are before a network of interconnected interests that 
remain in governance until today. And so, we should not close an 
eye away from the dimensions of the true struggle, and not 
imagine that our problems will only be solved with changing 
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Hosni Mubarak or changing his regime. There is another, more 
dangerous enemy that is ambushing us and keeps interfering in 
our affairs.” [America].  
 
'The third message is to the Muslim Ummah everywhere: 
America is dwindling – with the grace of Allah – under the 
attacks of the Mujahideen, so mobilize and rise and resist against 
America and her allies with your tongues, hands and money, and 
break the chains of fear and life-yearning and do not fear the 
enemies of Islam' 
UBL [May 2011] “The 
Speech by the Martyr 
of Islam..” 
240 "We rejoice for your joy, and we grieve for your distress. 
Congratulations to you for your triumphs, and may Allah have 
mercy on your martyrs, treat your wounded, and release your 
prisoners". Praise for those who toppled the tyrannical regimes.  
 
To the "noble rebels": "Maintain the initiative, and beware of 
dialogue, for there is no half-way meeting point between the 
people of righteousness and the people of deception." Talks of an 
"opportunity for advancing the Ummah and becoming liberated 
from serving the whims of the rulers, manmade laws, and 
Western domination." 
AAZ [May 2011] “A 
Message of Glad 
Tidings…(6)” 
238 "Muslims in the neighbouring countries around Libya and 
especially Egypt, and in particular the western desert tribes must 
rise up and support their brothers in Libya with money, food, 
medicine, and weapons and to fight along their side against the 
mercenaries of the tyrant al-Gadhafi." Tactical advice for fighters 
in Libya.  
 
“Thus, O’ Ummah of the Qur’an and O’ [Qur’an’s] supporters 
and soldiers: engage in the battle of the Qur’an and take off in 
defence of the Qur’an, its rulings and legislations in an inciting, 
popular Da’wa that would bring together the Ummah of the 
Qur’an in defence of the Qur’an.” “I call upon all the workers for 
Islam to take advantage of this chance before it gets lost, and 
before the secular government trick the Ummah." .. “The Youths 
must continue their march so Egypt can return to bring 
independent and free, and to take charge of her usual role in 
defending the Islamic and Arab Ummah and the rest of the 
weakened in the world, and Egypt shall not return to that role 
except through breaking the shameful, disgraceful relation with 
Israel.” .. 
 
Urges revolutionaries to fight on in Syria, dismissing any voices 
of support from US. .. America is losing [see 14] 
AAZ [June 2011] 
“The Noble Knight 
Dismounted” 
239 Encourages Palestinians, Yemenis and Pakistanis to stand fast. 
"O Muslim people of Pakistan, rise up as did your brothers in 
Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria. Shake off the dust of 
humiliation, and cast off those who sold you in the slave market 
to America." .. "do not accept humiliation from an atheist like 
Gaddafi or the Crusader NATO alliance. Do not permit the 
NATO Crusaders to bargain your independence, your dignity, 
and your creed." . 
 
"My brothers working for Islam, the doors have been opened in 
uprising Tunisia and garrisoned Egypt to make the corrupting 
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tyrants disappear. So, cooperate, support each other, rely on one 
another, and incite the Muslim Ummah into a massive popular 
movement and a collective inciting wind in order to make the 
Shariah the ruler and not the ruled," 
AAZ [July 2011] 
“Glory of the East. 
The first Being 
Damascus..”  
241 Tribute to the subjugated, tortured and oppressed, those who 
enjoin good and forbid evil.  
 
Urges Syrians to show America that they are waging a war for 
liberation and freedom, 'liberation from the corrupt idolic tyrants 
and liberation from the Muslim lands.'  
 
'Our brothers and fellow Muslims of Sham, the land of Ribat and 
Jihad! Allah knows that if it weren't for this raging war with the 
New Crusaders in which we are engaged, and were it not for the 
borders and restrictions penned by Sykes and Picot, then 
sanctified by our rulers, my brothers and I would be at your side 
today, in your midst, defending you with our necks and chests.' 
[statement follows calls for Syrian rebels to capture Jerusalem].  
 
Heavy emphasis on poetry throughout. 
AAZ [August 2011] 
“A Message of Hope 
and Glad Tidings..(7)” 
242 Congratulates the Ummah for the "beginning of the American 
Crusader's withdrawal from Afghanistan" 
AAZ [August 2011] 
“Do not become weak 
or grieve” 
243 Jihad " doesn’t stop with the death of a commander or the loss of 
a leader."  
 
Emphasises that the mujahideen are of the ummah, that they 
share its suffering and are "not alienated from its suffering." 
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AAZ [unknown date] 
“Introduction to 
Characteristics of Jihad” 
35 The infidel leaders of Muslim countries. These 'collaborating rulers' 
use huge armies of traitors consisting of soldiers, writers, teachers, 
artists, judges, legislators, journalists and media people to support 
their regimes against the Muslims and their Jihadist vanguard'. 
Officials from ministries of religious endowment 'who sell Islam in 
exchange for benefits and security'. 
AAZ [early 1991] “The 
Bitter Harvest” 
46 'Thus whoever claims to be a 'democratic Muslim,' or a Muslim who 
calls for democracy, is like one who says about himself 'I am a 
Jewish Muslim,' or 'I am a Christian Muslim' - the one worse than the 
other. He is an apostate infidel'.  
 
'The current rulers of Muslim countries who govern without the 
sharia of Allah are apostate infidels. It is obligatory to overthrow 
them, to wage jihad against them, and to depose them, installing a 
Muslim ruler in their stead'. These rulers scatter and divide the umma, 
leading them to abandon the sharia. 'Regimes that exchange the sharia 
of Allah are outcasts from the Muslim umma'.  
 
Those who are governed by Allah alone are Muslims, those who do 
not submit to this are not Muslims, even if they claim to be. ... 
Whoever agrees to democracy is an infidel. Highest authority must 
never be accorded to the nation. Declaring freedom of religion means 
limitless apostasy, since jihad against the apostates is abolished, and 
the jizya din dhimmi conditions applying to non-Muslims citizens are 
abolished. Such a declaration would also bring about 'abolition of 
man's dominion over woman' [quotes 4:34, which-in Ahmed Ali's 
translation is far less direct then the quote: "Men have authority over 
women, for Allah has made the one superior than the other"].  
 
'And whoever participates while fully aware of the truth of 
democracy is an apostate infidel, an outcast from the Islamic umma'. 
AAZ/Islamic Jihad [early 
1993] “Advice to the 
Community to reject the 
Fatwa of Bin Baz..” 
99 'Someone who claims to be a Muslim and cites a democratic or 
socialist thinker becomes an unbeliever and an apostate'. 
UBL [June 1994] “Saudi 
Arabia supports the 
Communists in Yemen” 
37 King Fahd opposes the Islamic Awakening, supports anti-Islamic 
regimes and parties, including the Soviet Union before its collapse, 
the Algerian junta, and Sudanese govt. The Saudi government 
collaborates with the UN and conspires against Muslims. This will 
breed disunity within Muslim ranks, worsen the economic situation 
and strengthen the enemies of Islam. 
UBL [July 1994] “The 
Banishment of 
Communism from the 
Arabian Peninsula” 
38 The conduct and policies of Saudi authorities will only 'bring it 
shame in this world and torture in hell'. 
UBL [July 1997] “Quran 
Scholars in the Face of 
Despotism” 
39 Saudi government’s anti-Islamic policies. - Rulers of debauchery. 
UBL [September 1994]  40 King Fahd is trying to drive people away from the path of Islam.  
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“Saudi Arabia Unveils its 
War against Islam and its 
Scholars” 
 
'To the Saudi Government headed by King Fahd: the people of the 
Peninsula are proud people [...] they are guards of the Prophet's heirs'. 
'Your allegiance to the enemies has reached its end'. 
UBL [October 1994] 
“Higher Committee for 
Harm!” 
47 Saudi rulers, who hate Islam and its true preachers and fight against 
it. 
UBL [December 1994] 
“Open Letter for Shaykh 
bin Baz on the Invalidity of 
his Fatwa on Peace with 
the Jews” 
63 'God and His messenger have proclaimed war against the one who 
tolerates usury without putting an end to it'. 
UBL [January 1995] 
“Second letter to Shaykh 
Abd Al-Aziz bin Baz from 
the Reform and Advice 
Foundation” 
64 'Secularism amounts to atheism' 
UBL [February 1995] 
“Prince Salman and 
Ramadan Alms” 
65 'The Saudi regime exploited the nation, besieged its resources, and 
had its hand on its capabilities in order to prevent it from serving 
Islam' 
 
‘The regime has seized its citizens' liberty and religious rights. The 
regime deprived scholars and those speaking the truth of their rights 
It punishes whoever exercised his rights and his duties in defending 
the ummah's religious rights by facing the regime's injustice'. It also 
failed economically, and has removed charities aimed to help people 
in need and replaced them with organizations which benefit the royal 
family, especially Prince Salman. Fatwas from Shaykh Bin Baz, the 
one of the family's mufti have tried to legitimise these. Prince Salman 
is known for his actions against Islam, he does not care about the 
people, and the regime will not distribute the money to the needy, but 
only use for their own cause. 
UBL [March 1995] “Saudi 
Arabia Continues its War 
against Islam and its 
Scholars” 
66 The Saudi regime has opened a 'new chapter of an open war against 
Islam and those calling for an implementation of its teachings'. 
AAZ [April 1995] “Our 
Stance towards Iran: 
Response to the Accusation 
of Cooperation Between 
the Salafi Jihad Movement 
and Renegade Iran” 
115 On Shia: vehemently denies receiving or seeking help from the Iran. 
Describes the Shia heresy according to the report: 'The Shiites created 
a heresy in the Sunni orthodox religion after distorting the Qur'an and 
the image of the Islamic caliphate through the 12th Imam concept and 
offending the companions of the Prophet. Zawahiri adds that anyone 
who believes in this, even after being showed all the facts, is outside 
the realm of Islam'. 
UBL [July 1995] “Prince 
Sultan and the Air Aviation 
Commissions” 
68 'Our differences with the Saudi Regime surpass important incidental 
matters like economic collapse, administrative corruption, oppressing 
the people, and confiscating their legal rights. These differences 
become more important, greater, and deep-rooted matters. It is 
concerned with the basic matter of the requirements of monotheism 
and witnessing that (there is no God but God and Mohammad is his 
messenger. The Saudi regime has abandoned these concepts, and thus 
is has completely lost its legitimacy.' 
UBL [August 1995] “An 
Open Letter to King Fahd 
62 King Fahd attacked for 'atrocities you and your clan have perpetrated 
against God and His religion, against the rights of His worshipers and 
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on the Occasion of the 
Recent Cabinet Reshuffle” 
His country, and against the sanctity of His holy lands and nation'. 
The Saudi leadership has oppressed simple people and driven them 
from their rights. King Fahd is guilty of 'insulting its dignity and 
honour, sacrilege its holy lands, plundered its resources, and robbed 
its wealth’; he has led the country to economic collapse.  
 
'Whoever permits himself or others to follow a positive or man-made 
law is transgressing God’s Law and therefore is an infidel and an 
apostate who no longer belongs to our religious community'.  
 
'He who follows [corrupt, man-made law] is an infidel who must be 
fought until the rule of God and His messenger is regained so that no 
one else judges no more no less'.  
 
On the issue of Palestine: 'you have blessed the efforts of 
normalization, submission, and deception of the Palestinian cause, the 
mother of all Islamic causes. You continued the process of the 
imposed peace and submission in Palestine. You volunteered to pay a 
huge bulk of the cost of the process despite the economic hardship 
that Saudi Arabia experiences. You donated $100 million to Yasir 
‘Arafat’s secular authority which was brought in to exercise 
oppressive ways against the Palestinian people that the Jewish 
occupation authority has so far failed to accomplish. You are at war 
with the Palestinian people’s jihadi movements especially the Islamic 
Resistance Movement (Hamas)'.  
 
'From what we said above, it is proven, O King, that your regime has 
committed the forbidden things in Islam which nullify its validity 
before God. The devastating failure and the dishonourable corruption 
which have been proven against your regime are enough reasons to 
overthrow it. By legislating the positive blasphemous laws and 
obligating people to seek judgment by them, by pledging your 
allegiance and support to the infidels against the Muslims, you have 
committed many of the things which are contrary to the teachings of 
Islam and which demand that you be revolted against and removed.' .. 
'We ask that you abdicate.’ 
 
’You have aged too much'. All the ministers and those culpable for 
the dire state of affairs need to resign too. 
UBL [August 1995] “The 
Bosnia Tragedy and the 
Deception of the Servant of 
the Two Mosques” 
69 Fahd's 'opposition to the will of Allah' as made clear by 'his use of 
laws of positivism', loyalty to infidels and animosity towards 
Muslims, especially the ulema.'It is clear that this regime has deviated 
from Islam, and it has committed apostasy'. 'How can this regime 
bring victory to Muslims when it is an apostate?'. 
AAZ [early 1996] “Healing 
the Hearts of the Believers” 
118 Leaders of many Islamic countries are infidels since they demand 
loyalty to other entities than God, they interact with the UN and have 
neglected to pull Palestine into the Islamic Ummah. This includes 
Saudi Arabian government which supports Israel indirectly through 
its alliance with the US, and also through interaction with the UN. 
UBL [November 1996] 
“Bin Ladin interviewed on 
Jihad against US” 
150 Implicit takfir of Saudi authorities and other Arab leaders. 
UBL [January 1999] 
“Wrath of God..” 
178 Muslim rulers have accepted invasion of occupying forces, Muslims 
need to rise up and expel these forces 
  409 
Communiqué and author ID 
 
Allegations of apostasy and direct threats towards Muslims 
[excerpts, quotes, notes] 
 
UBL [February 1999] May 
1998 interview reported 
182 Ahmed Shah Masoud seen as enemy. 
UBL [June 1999] “Usama 
bin Ladin, The Destruction 
of the Base” 
184 'Agent' rulers of the Arab world, colluding on Palestine and 
submitting to the West. 
UBL [March 2001] “Ausaf 
receives Bin Ladin’s 
Poem..” 
193 The 'stooges of the US' who signed resolutions with Israel 
UBL [October 2001] 
“Tayseer Allouni 
interviews bin Ladin in 
Afghanistan” 
130 "He who claims there will be a lasting peace between us and the Jews 
is an infidel." 
UBL [November 2001] 
“Bin Ladin condemns the 
US” 
77 'Anyone who lines up behind Bush in this campaign has committed 
one of the 10 actions that sully one’s Islam. Muslim scholars are 
unanimous that allegiance to the infidels and support for them against 
the believers is one of the major acts that sully Islam.' There can be 
no isolation of battles being fought by Muslims, it is all one big 
conspiracy by the Zionist-Crusader West and all Muslims need to 
unite under one banner: 'Those who distinguish between America and 
Israel are the real enemies of the nation.' 
AAZ [December 2001] 
“Knights under the 
Prophet’s Banner” 
119 'The crowds that serve their [tyrant rulers] purposes, including the 
writers of falsehoods, those who exploit principles for personal gain, 
and those who sell their fatwas [religious rulings] as commodities'. 
UBL [March 2002] 
“Usama bin Ladin: Prince 
Abdallah’s initiative is 
High Treason” 
205 'High treason' of Saudi ruling family for approaching Israel for peace. 
.. Prince Abdallah Bin-Abd-al-Aziz (Zio-American in Saudi 
Government's clothes)' - he is no better than those who helped the 
English commanders and Jews against the Palestinians in the first 
half of the 20th Century. .. 'Traitors' and 'agents' of the West in the 
Muslim lands (Arab rulers). 
UBL [purported] [June 
2002] “Al-Qaeda’s 
declaration in response to 
the Saudi Ulema..” 
43 'Cooperation with the West against what they call Islamic extremism, 
whether it's performed by one word, or a declaration, or any other 
manner, either directly or indirectly, is apostasy from the religion of 
Allah Most High'. 'Thus whoever refuses the principle of terror 
against the enemy also refuses the commandment of Allah [...] and 
His sharia' (54) 
AAZ [September 2002] 
“The Interview of Dr 
Ayman Al Zawahiri” 
22 Treachery of the Pakistani authorities. 
AAZ [December 2002] “Al 
Wala Wa al Baraa..” 
45 References to the leaders who collaborate with the west, submit to 
and recognise Israel. Take money from the Americans, like the 
Northern Alliance, to battle the mujahideen. The apostasy of the 
ruling clique in Muslim lands: 'this clique governs without sharia, it 
also befriends and submits to the external enemies of Islam - in 
particular, the Jews and Christians.' 
UBL [January 2003] 
“Islamic Action between 
Causes of Consequences 
and Advocates of 
Disagreement” 
216 Crusader 'agents' in the region. 
UBL [February 2003] 
audio statement 
78 The rulers of the region cooperate with the Bush & Blair plans. .. 
'Evil government scholars, corrupt ministers, salaries writers, and 
those similar to them'. 'Karzai is an American agent and supporting 
him against the Muslims takes the person outside the fold of Islam'. 
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The Crusaders appointed the Karzai of Kabul, the 'Karzai of 
Pakistan', Karzai of Kuwait', 'Karzai of Bahrain', 'Karzai of Qatar' and 
'Karzai of Riyadh'. These leaders have betrayed the Muslim nation. 
UBL [February 2003] “A 
Message to our Brothers in 
Iraq”  
79 'We also point out that whoever supported the United States, 
including the hypocrites of Iraq or the rulers of Arab countries, those 
who approved their actions and followed them in this Crusade war by 
fighting with them or providing bases and administrative support, or 
any form of support, even by words, to kill Muslims in Iraq, should 
know that they are apostates and outside the community of Muslims. 
It is permissible to spill their blood and take their property'. 
UBL [April 2003] “Usama 
bin LAdin urges Muslims 
to launch suicide attacks 
against US” 
217 Condemnation of 'agent' governments in the Middle East 
UBL [May 2003] “Riyadh, 
Casablanca Attacks” 
218 Condemnation of Arab 'agent' regimes for their complicity with 
America and failure to react to the Iraq war 
UBL [May 2003] report on 
statement 
219 King Fahd will 'see' rather than 'hear' the response from UBL in 
response to the killings of the two clerics. 'We will not issue a 
statement on the matter other than one dripping with blood that will 
be a strong deterrent to anyone who is tempted to harm the nation's 
jihadist ulemas' 
AAZ [August 2003] audio 
statement  
55 Those who assisted America with the capture of Muslims will suffer, 
they will not be protected by the US which cannot protect itself. 
AAZ [September 2003] 
“Message to the Muslims 
in Pakistan and 
Afghanistan” 
56 Musharraf enabled the Americans to topple the Taliban and seeks 
sending troops to Iraq. 
UBL [October 2003] 
“Second letter to the 
Muslims of Iraq” 
98 Governments created by the Americans, including the Karzai regime 
and Mahmud Abbas, are 'treacherous puppet regimes'. 
AAZ [March 2004] audio 
statement 
59 Pakistani soldiers fulfilling the regime's plans are infidels. 
UBL [May 2004] “People 
of Iraq” 
82 'The members of the Interim Council are considered unbelievers', 
'they do not rule by the law of God in all of our affairs while they are 
allies with America'. ... 'Whoever assisted the infidels against 
Muslims like assisting the occupying forces and what derived from it 
like the temporary or permanent government has committed sin; his 
money and blood are sanctioned and his wife would be divorced from 
him'. 
UBL [December 2004] 
“Message concerning Saudi 
Arabia” 
84 The Saudi regime 'went beyond the mortal to deeds that lead to one 
becoming non-Muslim' . 'The regime supported the infidel America 
against Muslims'. 'It is known that this is one of the 10 things that 
lead to one becoming non-Muslim'.  
 
'Absolute obedience and supremacy are given to the king and his 
laws, and not to God's religion'.  
 
Denies the accusation from the Saudi authorities that he is Khawarij 
[rebels in early Islam who pursued a very strict interpretation of 
Islam], 'we believe that the sins that are less than infidelity, such as 
killing and drinking alcohol, do not deprive the believer of his faith.  
 
To the 'Riyadh rulers': 'you have oppressed the people without their 
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agreement and without consulting them with the support and backing 
of the British [...] the people have woken up from their slumber and 
realized the extent of the tyranny and corruption that you exercise' 
[...] Therefore you have two options. The first is to restore the trust to 
the people in a peaceful manner and let the inhabitants choose the 
Muslim ruler who will govern them on the basis of God's book and 
the teachings of the prophet [...]'. The second option, if the rulers 
refuse these rights, is to face the people when they demand their 
rights and the security services will not cope, as was the case with the 
Shah of Iran and Ceausescu in Romania. 
UBL [December 2004] 
audio statement 
86 'The one who stays behind and fails to join the Mujahideen when 
Jihad comes commits a cardinal sin'. Supporting 'the infidels against 
the Muslims', 'foreign and Arab', like America or the regimes of 
Allawi (Iraq), Karzai, or Abbas, is 'tantamount to infidelity and a 
cause for departure from the [Islamic] nation'. Included are owners 
and workers of companies who transport food supplies, ammunition 
and any other needs for the infidels. 'Everyone who aides and 
supports them in any kind of way has defected from religion and 
must be fought'.  
 
Collaborators with the Allawi regime, from the Army, National 
Guard etc are infidels.  
 
Those who call jihad terrorism and champion apostate rulers by hand, 
tongue or pen, then they have 'no right to live'. 
AAZ [November 2005] 
“Wills of the Knights of the 
London Raids” 
53 'Here are the ulema of beggary, O Muslims, working to please 
[Queen] Elizabeth, head of the Church of England, blindly imitating 
her and issuing fatwas according to her views. They say: We are 
British citizens subject to Britain's Crusader laws and we carry its 
passports and are proud of our submission to Sultan Blair, who fights 
against Islam, and Elizabeth, head of the Church of England'. 
AAZ [December 2005] 
“The Victory of the Islamic 
Religion in Iraq” 
26 Pakistani rulers.  
 
'Dealers of religion, scholars of beggary and spreaders of myths who 
have forbidden resistance against the occupier and those who make 
traitorous pacts with the Crusaders, the Crusaders shall leave them 
alone just as Satan abandons his allies'. 
AAZ [December 2005] 
interview 
49 On the Shia: 'Movements attempting to sever the south [of Iraq] 
purport to belong to "Islam", yet they agreed with the Americans, led 
by the Crusader Bush, to occupy Iraq'. On Kurdistan: 'So now there is 
an independent state in the north, infiltrated by Jewish intelligence 
agencies, and which is divided between two collaborating [with 
invading forces] political parties that fight over every little thing. The 
agreement is only on secularism and combating Islam, under the 
American banner'.  
 
Pakistan and Pakistani military. 'Musharraf wants a Pakistan without 
Islam..'and they are inventing a new religion, which they composed 
for him in America. They call this fairy tale "enlightened 
moderation".' 
AAZ [December 2005] 
“Obstacles to Jihad” 
25 The 'idol-kings' that rule the Muslim world. Those who deny the 
effectiveness and importance of jihad and say it only brings death and 
misery. They support the cause of apostate rulers and the West. Says 
the West would have invaded Afghanistan and Iraq even if 9/11 had 
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not happened. 
AAZ [March 2006] “The 
Alternative is Da’wa and 
Jihad” 
73 Lashes out against Palestinian Authority, who 'sold Palestine' 
AAZ [April 2006] “Four 
Years since the Battle of 
Tora Bora” 
238 'The religious scholars of beggary, the ulema of flattery and the 
philosophers of defeat'.  
 
People in Iraq: those who discourage jihad against the occupiers are 
traitors to God. 
UBL [April 2006] “Oh 
People of Islam” 
90 Labour minister of Saudi Arabia an unbeliever 
AAZ [April 2006] “Letter 
to the People of Pakistan” 
81 In Iraq: 'The faction of traitors falsely associated with the Muslims, 
these traitor who made pacts with the Crusaders [...] and promised it 
that they would be loyal guards of its interests after it leaves; they are 
traitors, even if they dress like Muslims or have the same names', 
'even if their beards are long and turbans great', even if they claim 
noble descent or a connection with the unseen' [shia?]. Take not Jews 
and Christians for your friends 
 
In addition to those in Iraq, those 'affiliated with the clan of Hasim in 
Jordan, and their peers on the Arabian Peninsula, those who permit 
the recognition of Israel and making peace with it, and those like 
them in Egypt, who help the French against the veiled Muslim 
women and receive the Israeli ambassador [...] all of them are traitors, 
and the Muslim Ummah must confront them'.  
 
'The traitor Musharraf'.  
 
Calls to the Pakistani Army's attention, that they have become tools 
in the destruction of Pakistan, 'aligned under Bush's cross', and they 
will suffer in the afterlife. Musharraf is 'throwing them into the 
burner of civil war'. 
AAZ [June 2006] 
“Elegizing the Ummah’s 
Martyr..” 
32 'Grand treason' being committed by those who falsely affiliate 
themselves with Islam in Iraq but help the occupiers.  
 
The 'perversion' of the Turkish secular model, abandoning Shariah, 
welcoming American bases and recognising Israel and take part in 
military exercises with it.  
 
The 'scholars of beggary' in Egypt and the Arabian Peninsula. 
UBL [June 2006] 
“Elegizing the Ummah’s 
Martyr..” 
92 'hypocrites [in Iraq] disowned their covenants and joined the ranks of 
the Christians and the Jews'.  
 
'Supporting the infidels against Muslims is one of the ten things that 
nullify Islam, as stipulated by scholars'. 
UBL [July 2006] “To the 
Ummah in General and the 
Mujahideen in Iraq and 
Somalia in Particular” 
93 'Southern Iraqis cannot participate with the United States and its 
allies in invading al-Fallujah, al-Ramadi, Ba'qubah, Mosul, Samarra, 
al-Qa'im and other towns and villages while their areas remain safe 
from reprisal and harm' [shia]. 
AAZ [September 2006] 
“Hot issues..” 
21 The charlatans of Iraq supporting America. 
AAZ [September 2006] 
“Bush, the Vatican’s Pope, 
89 Talks of categories of Muslim traitors 
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Darfur and the Crusades” 
AAZ [December 2006] 
“Realities of Conflict 
Between Islam and 
Unbelievers” 
94 The 'secularists who have approved these resolutions [on Palestine] 
are criminals in the eyes of Islam', they are traitors, enemies of Islam 
and cannot be seen as brothers or rulers. 
AAZ [January 2007] “The 
Correct Equation” 
28 The nationalist, leftist movements in Palestine have submitted to 
international accords and sold Palestine and satisfied themselves with 
the reality drawn up by Washington. 
AAZ [February 2007] 
“Lessons, Examples and 
Great Events in the Year 
1427” 
97 'The long beards, huge turbans, majestic titles, purported lineages and 
popular myths are no substitute for the truth and cannot conceal the 
crimes of cooperation with the Crusaders, loyalty to the infidel 
invaders and killing of the Muslims in Iraq and Afghanistan'. Those 
who cooperate with the Zionist-Crusaders are traitors.  
 
The secular Kurdish parties were trying to implement America's plan 
of splitting up the lands of Islam. 'There are doctrinal and legal taboos 
which, if committed, call into question the legitimacy of any group 
claiming to belong to Islam': agreeing to the rule of something else 
than Shari'ah, helping invading enemies, embracing their institutions, 
laws etc.  
 
Mahmoud Abbas an Mohammed Dahlan 'represent a class of corrupt 
secularists who cooperate with America, sell Palestine, surrender to 
Israel, and make war on Islam'. Fatah began as a secular organization, 
fighting for a secular state, not Islamic, in Palestine. 
AAZ [March 2007] 
“Palestine is the concern of 
all Muslims” 
18 HAMAS leaders have joined the Sadat caravan of humiliation and 
surrender. It first sold the rule of Shariah, and then Palestine itself. 
All in order to keep some power. They 'took a ride with the American 
devil and his Saudi representative'. 
AAZ [May 2007] “The 
Empire of Evil is about to 
End” 
23 On the treachery of supporters of America in Iraq. Allah will punish 
those who cooperate with the occupiers. Condemns the methodology 
that lead to the acceptance of King Farooq, Mubarak, the leaders of 
the 'petrol shop' Gulf states, the PLO etc and the culture of obedience 
and acceptance by Muslims. Quotes Malcolm X when he addressed 
his 'repressed black brothers in America': '“If you're not ready to die 
for it, take the word ‘freedom’ out of your vocabulary.”  
 
Quotes extensively from Malcolm X. 
AAZ [June 2007] “Forty 
Years since the Fall of 
Jerusalem” 
101 'Jerusalem is lost because of an extremely corrupt regime which sent 
its army against its people and betrayed its religion and history' - 
tortured prisoners, allied with Muslims and nationalists. The 'secular 
regimes that have fought the Sharia from the time of King Faruq until 
Hosni Mubarak' [Egypt focus]. 
AAZ [July 2007] “The 
Advice of one Concerned” 
102 Al-Saud 
UBL [September 2007] 
“Come to Jihad..” 
14 Musharraf and his aides and excusers, including from the Ulema, are 
kufr and apostates. Al-Qaeda will revenge for the killing of Maulana 
Abd al-Rashid Ghazi and rebels in Waziristan. 
AAZ [December 2007] “A 
Review of Events” 
13 'Treasonous hypocrites' in the ranks of Iraqi mujahideen who 
cooperate with the Americans. These must be cast out of the Iraqi 
caliphate, their destiny is death and hell. The Americans will not be 
protecting them for long, and then they will lose their lives and 
religion. 'History is recording everything'. All governments in 
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Muslim lands are illegitimate since they are not based on Shariah, all 
their leaders are apostates, and the Muslim population is being 
oppressed by them. When asked about how to stop shia-sunni 
fighting in Iraq, Zawahiri responds: 'don't ask the one under attack 
not to defend himself' - the Shia must stop their aggression before the 
matter is resolved. Only when the militias stop cooperating with 
America, start fighting them, release captives and compensate for 
their crimes, can there be basis for agreement. 
UBL [December 2007] 
“The Way to Frustrate the 
Conspiracies” 
27 Many 'free and proud tribes' refused to sell their religion to American 
occupiers in Iraq but there were some deviants like Abdel Sattar Abu 
Risha and his followers. The 'lions of Islam' punished these people in 
order to deter others from taking the same path.  
 
The person who participates in a government of national unity 'is 
headed to a fate of eternal punishment in the Hellfire' since this 
government would mean that law is man-made rather than the 
Shariah, the nation is the most sacred thing. .. People and parties that 
participate in Islamic scholarship, missionary work an jihad have 
participated in the treachery of America and its agents in Iraq under 
the banner of nationalism and patriotism. The Iraq Islamic Party even 
called for negotiations with America on security.  
 
HAMAS sold out its religion when it engaged in the al-Saud peace 
initiative and took part in the unity govt. ... King Abdullah of Riyadh 
is the 'most important American agent in the region' - why do some 
leaders in Iraq then cooperate with him? ... The apostate Shia militias.  
 
Compares the treachery of some Iraqi leaders with those from 
Afghanistan who decided to collude with Americans, e.g. The 
Northern alliance. Supporting the infidels against the Muslims makes 
these leaders apostates. This is not a 'forgivable stumble' but a sin that 
will not be forgiven. 
AAZ [April 2008] “The 
Open Meeting part one..” 
105 'Officers of the State Security Investigations [Egypt] - Anti-Religious 
Activities Branch and those like them who interrogate the Muslims 
and torture them are infidels, each and every one of them'. But does 
not recommend declaring whole armies as infidel, there are 
'particulars'. Apostates in the Awakening Councils [Egypt]. . The 
secular Fatah movement. . 'It is not permitted to work in the police 
force which executes and protects the man-made laws and rules and 
forces the people to abide by them'. 
UBL [May 2008] “A 
Message to the Muslim 
Nation”  
24 Arab leaders are apostates - they rallied under America's flag, 
shunned Islamic teachings, bribed ulema with jobs, and jailed 
resisters, corrupted the media, stopped jihad. 
AAZ [June 2008] “On the 
Anniversary of the 
Naksa..” 
15 Egyptians are free to enter Gaza and anyone who stands in their way 
'should only blame himself'. 
AAZ [August 2008] “A 
Message form Shaikh 
Ayman al-Zawahiri to the 
Pakistani Army and the 
People of Pakistan” 
41 Rulers of Pakistan have betrayed their Muslim brothers and are also 
killing their citizens and destroying their houses, even mosques and 
madrassas. 'This greedy gang worships its salaries, benefits and 
bribes.' .. Soldiers in the Pakistani army are enemies of Islam. 
Musharraf has prevented mujahideen from entering India and has 
conceded on Kashmir.  
 
There will be grave consequences for those who assist the kafirs 
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against the Muslims'. 
AAZ [November 2008] 
“Al-Azhar: The Lions 
Den” 
237 The nationalists, left wing activists and so on in Palestine who 
cooperate with the Americans and Israeli intelligence. 
AAZ [January 2009] “The 
Massacre of Gaza and the 
Siege of the Traitors” 
121 Mubarak is part of the plan to 'kill the Muslims of Gaza'. . The 
traitors: Abdullah ibn Abdul-Azeez inventing the 'mockery of 
"interfaith"' in order to recognise Israel. Ali Abdullah Salih 'turns the 
honourable and defiant Yemen into a supply base for the Christian 
Crusade'. Nouri al-Maliki 'begs America to keep its troops in Iraq'. 
UBL [January 2009] “Call 
for Jihad to Stop the Gaza 
Assault” 
122 There is an "Allawi" to take orders from the "Bremers" [the American 
CIA controlers], and a "Sistani" [the Shi'a cleric] and Tantawi [head 
of Al-Azhar] supported by writers, journalists and other groups to 
give legitimacy to this deception. All these groups are enemies of the 
Ummah. 
AAZ [February 2009] “The 
Sacrifices of Gaza” 
131 'The treachery and betrayal of the official Arab regimes', especially 
the 'traitorous Egyptian regime' 
AAZ [February 2009] 
“From Kabul to 
Mogadishu” 
132 Features Shareef Shaykh Ahmad who is presented as dismantling the 
Shariah constitution and allying with America. 
UBL [March 2009] 
“Practical Steps to Liberate 
Palestine” 
133 Arab rulers who cooperate with America and their allies, whose 
'necks need to be cut'.  
 
Talks about Hassan Nasrallah's recognition of UNSCR 1701 resulting 
in blockade of Palestine and showing that 'there is no difference in 
this issue between Hassan and Hosni [Mubarak] and the rest of the 
Arab idol-kings'.  
 
Cooperating with the nonbelievers is Kufr resulting in expulsion from 
Islam. 
UBL [March 2009] “Fight 
on, Oh Champions of 
Somalia” 
134 Abdullahi Yousef, Shaykh Shareef and others who turned against the 
Mujahideen such as Ahmed Shah Massoud. .. 'If a ruler becomes an 
infidel during his reign, his authority collapses, and he must be 
removed with armed force.' 
AAZ [August 2009] “The 
Realities of Jihad and 
Fallacy of Hypocrisy” 
140 'the governing corrupt political class, and the oblique military group 
leading the Pakistani Army, who works as hunting dogs for the 
Americans and receives bribes and commands from the American 
Ambassador.'  
 
Condemned the 'traders of faith' in Iraq. Warning to those in the 
'Crusader awakenings' in Iraq that they will have to beg for 
redemption if they are not to suffer in the afterlife. .. Mahmoud 
Abbas described as a tool of the Mossad and CIA. Salam Fayyadh 
(Fatah PA prime minister) also condemned. 
AAZ [August 2009] “The 
Path of Doom” 
142 Anyone who supports the Pakistani Army is in fact supporting the 
Americans and Crusaders against the Muslims. Soldiers in the 
Pakistani Army will end up in hell unless they recant. 
AAZ [September 2009] 
“Shaykh Dr Ayman al-
Zawahiri: Eulogy for the 
Role Model of Youth” 
147 Turkish and Pakistani leadership and military. Other 'collaborators'. 
AAZ [December 2009] 
“The (Palestinian) National 
Unity” 
146 The group lead by Mahmud Abbas is treacherous since it does not 
seek to govern by Islamic law and embraces 'national liberation' for 
own personal gain. But even on this front they fail to live up to the 
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banner of national liberation since they invite the occupiers to take 
over their land and seek to live under their authority. 'Mahmoud 
Abbas is the one who kills, tortures and indicates the places of the 
mujahideen for the Jews'. 
AAZ [December 2009] 
“The Morning and the 
Lamp..” 
141 'Whosoever does that[rules by a legal system other than shari'ah] 
from amongst them then he is a kāfir.' 
AAZ [July 2010] “Al Quds 
will not be converted to 
Judaism” 
223 Muslims in US military condemned. 'Ulema of the Marines' who 
justify bloodletting of Muslims, permit these soldiers to operate and 
kill Muslims and sacrifice their honour condemned. 
AAZ [August 2010] 
“Message to the People of 
Turkey” 
225 Turkish government and military. 
AAZ [September 2010] “A 
Victorious Ummah, A 
Broken Crusade” 
226 Members of the Pakistani security organs have befriended Jews and 
Christians, fought Muslims and committed major sin.  
 
Muslims of Pakistan warned: Allah will not only punish disobedience 
but also those who kept silent and did nothing to command them to 
do good. ..  
 
Talks of some from nationalist movements and even Islamic 
movements who now support the cause of the West, the most 
prominent of which is Fatah..  
 
Ulema of the 'marines' in Cairo, Riyadh etc 
AAZ [February 2011] “A 
Message of Glad 
Tidings…(3)” 
234 ElBaradei the 'secular replacement' for Mubarak in waiting: ‘He is a 
replacement who voices no opinion over normalization with Israel, 
nor the acts of aggression against Afghanistan and Iraq, the blockade 
of Gaza, the Joint Arab Defence, supporting the low income strata 
with basic supplies, the sale of the public sector, and self sufficiency 
in staple crops. He is a replacement who lives in Vienna, visiting 
Egypt in his free time.' 
AAZ [March 2011] “A 
Message of Glad 
Tidings…(4)” 
235 The leadership of the Egyptian army is in the pockets of the 
Americans and Israel, even though there are honourable people 
within its rank and file. 
AAZ [April 2011] “A 
Message of Glad 
Tidings…(5)” 
236 The Mubarak elite, military council, judicial leadership etc 
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AAZ [unknown date] 
“Response to a Grave 
Uncertainty..” 
117 Criticism of Saudi Shaykh Nasruddin al-Albani for supporting 
passivity, diverting attention from jihad. 
UBL [unknown date] 
“Methodological 
Guidelines” 
112 Criticism of 'Neo-Ghassanids' of corrupt Arab rulers and ulema who 
cooperate with the Zionist-Crusaders 
AAZ [unknown date] 
“Introduction to 
Characteristics of Jihad” 
35 Muslims need to support jihad with any means possible if they don't 
take part directly.  
 
The people fail to criticise the sinful media and begin to engage in 
some of these sinful acts, like kissing, in the street, under the banner 
of freedom. Thus an Islamic generation has grown up far from the 
Islamic manners and behaviours except for those who were saved by 
God. They began imitating these actors and actresses. They should 
emulate the Prophet in stead. They need to learn 'good morals', the 
need for this has been highlighted by the Prophet 
AAZ [early 1991] “The 
Bitter Harvest” 
46 'The Brothers have abandoned pursuing legitimate Muslims 
government in place of the current governments that rule Muslim 
lands. This deviation has made the Brothers idle from fulfilling their 
true calling, as Allah wills it'. The brothers have not fulfilled their 
duty of waging jihad, and have described infidel governments as 
legitimate, and have 'joined them in the jahiliyya governing, that is 
democracies, elections, and parliaments'.  
 
Criticism of Hassan al-Banna's and the Brotherhood's adoption of 
'constitutional legitimacy, democracy, support for the regime, and 
rejection of violence'.  
 
The Brothers must mend their ways, implement sharia, denounce 
tyrants, embrace jihad. 
AAZ/Islamic Jihad [early 
1993] “Advice to the 
Community to reject the 
Fatwa of Bin Baz..” 
99 Errors of Sheikh Abd al-Aziz Bin Baz, who authorised entering the 
National Council (parliament), with his fatwa distributed by the 
Muslim Brotherhood. In order to give legal opinion, one must have 
precise knowledge of the reality and context, in addition to sound 
character and religious knowledge - Bin Baz lacks knowledge of 
reality. Thus he is an erroneous religious scholar. His message 
condones all the illicit aspects of the secular society and forbids jihad. 
UBL [July 1997] “Quran 
Scholars in the Face of 
Despotism” 
39 'Let the servant of the Dinar and the ones who sold their religion for a 
life of power be miserable'. 
UBL [September 1994]  
“Saudi Arabia Unveils its 
War against Islam and its 
Scholars” 
40 To the scholars that stayed silent or let the influences of the Saudi 
authorities get to them: they are required to stand with their fighting 
scholar brothers 
 
'Otherwise it is a betrayal of trust, which will be viewed as a disgrace 
[...] on the day of judgement'. 
UBL [September 1994] 42 Allah will judge those who harm the ulema. Following orders is no 
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“Urgent Letter to Security 
Officials” 
excuse for those who do so. 'You are servants of God, you are not 
servants of the Saudi rulers'. 
UBL [October 1994] 
“Higher Committee for 
Harm!” 
47 Why do some ulema support the anti-Islamic actions of the Saud? 
UBL [December 1994] 
“Open Letter for Shaykh 
bin Baz on the Invalidity of 
his Fatwa on Peace with 
the Jews” 
63 'We want to remind you in this time in which the liar struts about, and 
evil prattlers make noise, and the truth is buried alive, and preachers 
imprisoned, and reformers silenced. It is strange that you do not know 
of this and are silent, especially since your fatwas and positions have 
dealt with these matters'  
 
Not only has usury been tolerated - it has directly been sanctioned 
and supported by the regime. Although the Shaykh has decreed usury 
as haram, he as not spoken out against the leaders who allowed this to 
happen. The Shaykh sought to legitimise and justify the positions of 
the regime as regards the occupying of the country by the Jewish and 
Crusader enemies, support for Yemeni communists, attacks against 
members of the ulema and other crimes.  
 
Now the Shaykh has recommended peace with the Zionist enemy, 
issuing a fatwa allowing for peace to support the regime's policies. 
This fatwa serves to ad a veneer of legitimacy to the occupation. This 
goes directly against earlier fatwas from the Shaykh which called for 
jihad to liberate Palestine. The Shaykh has legitimised the actions of 
the apostate rulers, and this fatwa goes against his previous rulings. 
Perhaps he did not know the situation well enough. 'You are 
advanced in years and were skilled in the services of Islam 
previously'. The Shaykh should consider these words 'polite advice'. 
UBL [January 1995] 
“Second letter to Shaykh 
Abd Al-Aziz bin Baz from 
the Reform and Advice 
Foundation” 
64 The Shaykh saw a deal making peace with the Jews and recognising 
their authority over Palestine as permissible reconciliation with the 
enemy. We expected you to change course after evidence showed the 
invalidity of the fatwa. But instead of changing course the Shaykh 
issued an explanation supporting his previous conclusion.  
 
'If you cannot bear the consequences of speaking the truth and of 
supporting those who speak out against leaders, then you should 
remove yourself from official positions in which the regime has 
placed you, and leave those leaders who declared war against Allah. 
In this way you will not suffer as they will'. 
UBL [May 1995] “Scholars 
are the Prophet’s 
Successors” 
67 Criticism of bad scholars, who follow materialistic goals and fail to 
follow the right path. For instance shaykhs of the Al-Azhar who 
sought to legitimise Nasser's socialism and the actions of him and his 
regime. Standing up to these kind of scholars is a priority in 
defending Islam. 'Responding to this category of scholars does not 
correspond to addressing mistakes made by true scholars because bad 
scholars are those who are against Islam and are not fully integrated 
in what is called "people of knowledge" within this religious context'.  
 
What should be said to the scholars who align themselves with the 
Jews to fight the mujahideen in Palestine or other places? What 
should be said to those who collude with bad rulers and buried the 
truth? If they do this intentionally or if they issue fatwas without 
being familiar enough with the issue, they should be reprimanded. 
Scholars: 'The more they move away from speaking the truth, the 
more animosity is geared towards them'. 
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UBL [July 1995] “Prince 
Sultan and the Air Aviation 
Commissions” 
68 Economic mismanagement of the Saudi rulers, the privatisation of the 
national airline, job losses, and job gains in the US because the fleet 
will be renewed, unnecessarily. 
UBL [August 1995] “The 
Bosnia Tragedy and the 
Deception of the Servant of 
the Two Mosques” 
69 The Saudi ruling family has 'sought to block all abilities and 
capabilities of the ummah by placing control over it', it has insisted 
on full political and economic control meaning the charities which 
were supposed to support Muslims have been taken over by 
institutions controlled by the royal family.  
 
'The regime has disappointed us in the big causes, especially the 
Palestinian cause, which is the mother of all Islamic causes' 
UBL [March 1997] 
“Pakistan interviews 
Usama bin Ladin” 
154 Criticism of Borhanoddin Rabbani, Ahmed Shah Masud and 
Golbodin Hekmatyar, who were mujahideen but then became 
responsible for infighting, supporter Dostum against the Taliban and 
sought relations with India. 
UBL [August 1997] 
“Usama bin Ladin Urges 
‘Befitting Reply’ to Horan” 
157 Duty of Muslims to respond to these remarks. 
UBL [January 1998] “Bin 
Ladin Claims Foiling of 
UN’s Afghan ‘Conspiracy” 
159 Accuses Ahmad Shah Masud, Hekmatyar and Rabbani of willingly 
signing a UN plan for coalition government in post-war Afghanistan 
after Soviet withdrawal, giving communists access to power. 
UBL [March 1998] “Bin 
Ladin Urges Expulsion of 
Invaders..” 
162 Criticises royal court ulema 'who have gained status through the 
rulers' money, power, and tyranny, selling their [reward in the] 
hereafter for others' lives' 
UBL [January 1999] 
“Wrath of God..” 
178 'Whoever denies even a minor tenet of our religion commits the 
gravest sin in Islam.' Condemnation of PLO/Palestinian Authority for 
seeking to negotiate with Israel, this has brought them nothing. 
AAZ [April 1999] “Letter 
to Abu Yasir” 
123 'Let me repeat, once more, that the declaration [of a truce] 
contradicts, for a large number of brothers, the principles on which 
Islamic Jihad was founded and its proud legacy. If one is to believe 
media reports and analyses, the initiative represents a serious setback 
to, with you continuing silence giving me the impression you accept 
it'. 'Beware of losing both in this world and thereafter. Your loyalty 
must be to God and His Prophet. Righteousness will be you salvation 
in this world and the next'. 
UBL [June 1999] “Usama 
bin Ladin Pens Letter in 
Support of Kashmir Jihad” 
183 Criticism of Arab rulers who 'bow before evil' 
UBL [June 1999] “Usama 
bin Ladin, The Destruction 
of the Base” 
184 Criticism of those who do not engage in jihad: 'Without even 
engaging in combat, they suffered a psychological defeat. They 
acknowledge the necessity for jihad. Nonetheless, they say that they 
cannot fulfill such an obligation'.  
 
Muslim regimes that 'anesthetize' Muslims by convincing them the 
way of international legitimacy is the way forward.  
 
If people did not rise up when their qiblah [Saudi Arabia] was 
occupied, when will they rise up?  
 
Criticises that 'generation of scholars' who have no experience of 
jihad, claiming now that it is not obligatory - they are not in a 
position to state such claims. Unfortunately, some youths are 
influenced by this hesitation.  
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Criticism of the rich and benevolent among the Muslims who have 
turned their back on Afghanistan. 
UBL [July 1999] “Bin 
Ladin Calls on Muslims to 
Declare Jihad against US” 
185 If Muslims do not rise up against US, it will split them appart and 
eliminate them. 
UBL [May 2000] “Usama 
Speaks on Hijra and the 
Islamic State” 
189 'Any person who does not follow the Holy Qu'ran and the Sunnah of 
our beloved Prophet Muhammad (saw), not only is he astray, but he 
should lead a wretched life.'  
 
Criticism of those who seek to secure worldly gains rather than live 
by the tenets of the faith.  
 
'What will be your excuse when you stand in front of Allah and you 
are asked: what did you do to drive out the jews and the Christians 
from the (Islamic) peninsula' 
UBL [September 2000] 
“Bin Ladin, others pledge 
‘Jihad’ to release 
Prisoners..” 
191 Muslims have spoken much but done little to fight 'tyrannical' and 
'heathen' enemies [AAZ] 
UBL [March 2001] “Ausaf 
receives Bin Ladin’s 
Poem..” 
193 'We live in a world where the majority of the people constantly worry 
about accumulating wealth. How should I correct those who sell 
themselves for a few pennies?' 
UBL [April 2001] letter to 
scholars of Deyubende in 
Peshawar 
120 Official Arab and Islamic conferences are useless and do not address 
the real concerns of the ummah. They are endorsed by the corrupt 
tyrannical rulers who cooperate with the enemy. 
UBL [April 2001] “Usama 
regrets curbs by Taliban” 
195 To Taliban:'It is surprising that the United States is free to do 
whatever it feels like and I have been placed under restrictions.' 
UBL [April 2001] “Usama 
urges Muslims to help 
Afghans” 
196 Talks of the 'duty' of ulema in Pakistan and elsewhere to make clear 
for people their role in the jihad.  
 
Why have Muslims not come to the aid of the Afghans during the UN 
sanctions?' 
UBL [May 2001] “Usama 
urges Ummah to continue 
Jihad” 
197 How can the wealthy hold on to their riches when the Palestinians are 
defending themselves without arms? 
UBL [May 2001] “IF 
Taleban allow, I can make 
US life miserable” 
198 Implicit criticism of Taliban - that UBL could 'make life miserable' 
for US if Taliban allowed 
UBL [September 2001] 
“Text of bin Ladin letter to 
the Pakistani People” 
201 Warns that those who fail to support the Jihad in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan will face punishment from God on the Day of Judgement 
UBL [September 2001] 
“The US Should search 
attackers within itself” 
202 Those leaders who support or condone the coalition against 
Afghanistan and cooperate with the Western alliance should consider 
'what will remain of their religious and moral position' 
UBL [November 2001] 
Osama claims he has nukes 
(article title) 
125 'The Islamic Shariat says Muslims should not live in the land of the 
infidel for long'. 
AAZ [December 2001] 
“Knights under the 
Prophet’s Banner” 
119 Expresses amazement that the Muslim Brotherhood did not revenge 
Kama al-Sananiri's death.  
 
The Palestinian movement mixing Islam with leftist politics and 
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nationalism. 'They allied themselves with the devil, but lost Palestine' 
 
'Failure of some leaders to continue the confrontation: The best proof 
of this is the initiative made by the Islamic Group leaders in the 
Turah Prison to suspend military action. We will talk about this in 
detains, God willing'. 
UBL [March 2002] 
“Usama bin Ladin: Prince 
Abdallah’s initiative is 
High Treason” 
205 Criticism of those who lie in slumber and do not realise their duty to 
support the jihad. 
UBL/AAZ [April 2002] 
“The Wills of the 
Martyrs..” 
207 Haznawi warns that 'Muslims will be in sin' if they fail to support the 
jihad. Complaints about those who have 'abandoned Islam' 
UBL [purported] [June 
2002] “Al-Qaeda’s 
declaration in response to 
the Saudi Ulema..” 
43 Defeatism of the ulema who signed the letter. This letter is not based 
on Koranic verses or the hadith. The religion of Islam described by 
these advocates of dialogue does not contain the doctrine of Loyalty 
and Enmity, jihad or boundaries established by the Shariah.  
 
'Are the intellectuals unaware that the "Muslim" governments and the 
Western governments are in league to strike the essence of Islam and 
religiosity in the Islamic world, striving to secularise the people, and 
[initiating] a separation of religion and sate?' The signatories have no 
right to speak on behalf of the Muslims living in the land of the Two 
Holy Sites [does AQ?]..  
 
And they lack religious authority, 'they were trained in general 
matters, and their degrees are in natural sciences'. [what about AQ, is 
the speaker bin Laden, who has been sensitive of this issue, and 
himself trained as a civil engineer?] 
UBL [June 2002] “A Site 
Close to Al-Qa’ida posts 
Poem..: 
210 [implicit criticism] 'What can I say if we are living in a world of 
laziness and discontent?' 'For how long will real men be in short 
supply?' 
AAZ [September 2002] 
“The Interview of Dr 
Ayman Al Zawahiri” 
22 This is not the time for deliberations or preparation - only the time for 
action, and no attempts should be made to negotiate with 'oppressive, 
sinful rulers'. 
UBL [October 2002] 
“Statement from shaykh 
Usama bin Ladin, may God 
protect him, and the Al-
Qa’ida Organization” 
211 The 'dangerous act of deception and misguidance practiced by the 
authority's scholars and the rulers' clerics who are trading with 
religion, who were put in charge of it before the nation, and who have 
sold their faith for temporal gain.' 
UBL [October 2002] “Al-
Majallah Obtains Bin 
Ladin’s Will..” 
213 'My mujahidin brothers and I were grieved when we saw our nation 
in the east and west watching the United States, the head of unbelief, 
afflicting the worst of torment on the oppressed men, women, and 
children while the nation watched the painful scene as if it was 
watching an entertainment movie."  
 
Laments how many of the Taliban fled before confronting the enemy 
in Afghanistan.  
 
'Clean-shaven clerics' issuing fatwas on demand for America. .. 'If 
every Muslim asks himself why has our nation reached this state of 
humiliation and defeat, then his obvious answer is because it rushed 
madly for the comforts of life and discarded the Book of Allah 
behind its back.' 'Today, the nation has failed to support us and 
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support the loyal ones from the students of religion who established 
the first Islamic state in Afghanistan that applied Allah's shari'ah.' .. 
'O women kinsfolk. Do not ever use cosmetics or imitate the whores 
and mannish women of the West. Be a school that graduates men and 
mujahidin in the cause of Allah, protect your honour and be a good 
example for the mothers of the faithful.' 
AAZ [December 2002] “Al 
Wala Wa al Baraa..” 
45 'Due to the events of this war [between the Muslims and infidels] and 
its realities, there is an urgent need to comprehend the doctrine of 
Loyalty and Enmity in Islam. Negligence and indolence have spread 
in regard to upholding this great pillar of Islamic faith'.  
 
'We warn the umma against falling to defeatism and ignoring the 
dangers that oppressively lie atop out chest. Behold! The Crusader-
Jewish military machine occupies exalted Jerusalem! It crouches a 
mere ninety kilometres from the shrine in Mecca. It surrounds the 
Islamic world with a series of bases, armies, and fleets. It gears its 
aggression against us through a network of submissive rulers'. 
UBL [January 2003] 
“Islamic Action between 
Causes of Consequences 
and Advocates of 
Disagreement” 
216 Frustration with lack of response from Muslims.  
 
'"In addition to being disobedience to Allah the Almighty, disunity 
and differences are the cause of betrayal, defeat, and failure." 
UBL [February 2003] 
audio statement 
78 The followers of the state: 'implore the people that the treacherous 
rulers are our righteous rulers and that it is necessary to support them 
in order to keep our nation in tact and firm. These people have 
deviated from the path so it is obligatory to shun them and warn 
against them'. Notes the immense difference between the 'scholars 
who act and the scholars who compromise'. 'Sitting and giving 
lectures' is not enough'.  
 
'So Jihad today is compulsory on the entire Ummah and she will 
remain in sin until she produces her sons, her wealth and her power to 
the extent of being able to wage Jihad and defend against the evil of 
the disbelievers'. 'So as for the believer who stays back from Jihad 
with his and his tongue, then it is obligatory upon him to make Jihad 
with his heart and this entails hating the enemies of Allah and 
supplicating against them; supporting the believers and the 
Mujahideen'. 'Although Jihad in person is obligatory upon the entire 
Ummah, then it is even more obligatory upon the youths in the prime 
of their lives than upon the old'. 
AAZ [May 2003] statement 54 Protests, demonstrations and conferences will not do Muslims any 
good. The only way of protecting the holy places and evicting the 
enemy is by taking up arms. 
UBL/AAZ [September 
2003] Audio statement 
110 Borderline criticism of Palestinians for not being faithful enough to 
the jihadist cause. [Zawahiri] 
UBL [October 2003] 
“Second letter to the 
Muslims of Iraq” 
98 Those 'calling for a peaceful and democratic solution, calling for 
collaboration with apostate regimes', 'those men have weakened 
sincere Muslims [...] by participating in parliaments, they have lost 
their way and led many others astray with them'. Beware of 
collaborating with Americans or those who have sided with them, 
since this will result in apostasy, the same applies to those who 
support impious political parties like the Baath, the Kurdish 
democratic parties etc. 
UBL [January 2004] 111 Complains about lack of 'correct and comprehensive' understanding 
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“Resist the New Rome” of Islam. 
AAZ [March 2004] audio 
statement 
59 'To Pakistanis: 'Taliban and their supporters are your brothers, so how 
can you allow the agents of crusaders and Jews to hurt them?'. 
UBL [December 2004] 
“Message concerning Saudi 
Arabia” 
84 Examples of the hypocrisy of the scholars supporting the Saudi 
Regime: they declared Abd-al-Nasir an infidel, but retracted their 
declaration when he made peace, they did the same to Al-Qadhafi 
until he agreed with them and the verdict was changed, the 
condemned Al-Sadat for his deal with Israel, but then had nothing but 
praise for Prince Abdullah when he did the same. 'The scholars of 
evil and hired writers change their attitude to best suit the ruler'. 
UBL [December 2004] 
audio statement 
86 If the nation fails to rise up and stop the infidels, 'then everybody will 
be sinful'. The lack of support of the Mujahideen in Afghanistan 
when fighting the Soviets, which lead to their weakening and 
undermining their efforts. 
 
'Stop supporting Allawi's renegade government'. Nobody should take 
part in this regime 'for a few coins'.  
 
'On elections: 'it is no secret that the selection of emirs or presidents 
is the right of the nation. However, this right is governed by 
conditions, whose absence makes participation in the selection of an 
emir prohibited'. Muslims can only take part in elections when the 
ruler is Muslim who will rule according to the law of God.  
 
'If anyone participates in the above-mentioned elections knowingly 
and willingly, he would then have rejected God Almighty'.  
 
'Muslims should know that there is no difference between believing 
that it was right to elect the first Abu-Jahl, Amr Bin-Hisham and 
between electing' Allawi, Mahmud Abbas, Karzai, Mubarak, King 
Fahd'. 
AAZ [November 2005] 
“Wills of the Knights of the 
London Raids” 
53 Why did the ulema of beggary who gathered in front of the British 
parliament to demonstrate their support for Blair and attack the 
mujahideen not gather and protest against the sanctions against Iraq? 
Or bombings of mosques in Afghanistan? Or the killing of Shaikh 
Ahmed Yassin? Or during the Fallujah bombings? Or the desecration 
of the Koran? These ulema issued no fatwa against these. On the 
contrary, the ulema issued fatwas in support Muslims joining the 
Crusader armies. 
AAZ [December 2005] 
“The Victory of the Islamic 
Religion in Iraq” 
26 Pakistani authorities used the earthquake to justify the presence of 
American military advisors and intelligence people in the country. 
AAZ [December 2005] 
“Obstacles to Jihad” 
25 The corrupt regimes keep winning over the mujahideen because the 
Ummah is too afraid of its individual safety and of family members. 
As long as this 'malignant illness' dwell with the Ummah then there is 
no hope for victory.  
 
'The Muslim Ummah has turned into a pile of people assassinated by 
subjugation, ignorance, fear and resignation'. Much time goes into 
attacking those who have been criticising the mujahideen.  
 
There is no justification for supporting jihad against the Jews and 
foreign enemy but not against their agents at home. They must also 
be targeted. Nothing in the Koran or Sunnah justifies such a 
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distinction. 
AAZ [January 2006] 
“Bajawr Massicre and the 
Lies of the Crusaders" 
51 Members of the Pakistani Army are 'humiliated and disgraced'. 
AAZ [March 2006] “The 
Alternative is Da’wa and 
Jihad” 
73 To the Palestinians: 'Should these criminals [PA] receive a majority 
in any upcoming elections, then we will have to accept their right to 
sell Palestine. However, nobody, be he Palestinian or not, has the 
right to relinquish a grain of the Palestinian soil. This was an Islamic 
country, which the infidels occupied'.' 
AAZ [April 2006] “Four 
Years since the Battle of 
Tora Bora” 
238 Thinly veiled criticism of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi: 'God knows better 
his hidden intents, which I hope are better than his public ones. O 
Abu Musab: Be patient, stand fast, and rely only on God' [see full 
paragraph in sec 10]. 
UBL [April 2006] “Oh 
People of Islam” 
90 'It is not permissible for the Muslim to listen to any program in which 
there is a discussion with the Zindeeqs [unbelievers] or any play in 
which the religion or the religious is mocked, for that is one of the 
greatest sins'.  
 
Government in Khartoum failed to implement the Shariah and gave 
away southern Sudan, even though interests with it do overlap.  
 
'The Ummah is sinful if it does not provide what meets the 
sufficiency, and the sufficiency can be met with only a few of our 
sons and a little of our wealth and expertise'. 
AAZ [June 2006] “Support 
for Palestinians” 
85 The corruption of the Saudi regime: 'How, O Ummah, have you kept 
silent about this corruption in order for it to reach this degree of 
despotism?'. 'Muslims are in sin from the fall of Spain until today, 
because they have not performed their personal duty of freeing lands 
of Islam from the infidels'.  
 
To Judges of Egypt: 'You shall not achieve your independence 
because America and Israel [...] don't want that [...] But I must be 
frank with you and tell you that you are part of the problem. You are 
pleased with the constitution and secular laws which were imposed 
on the Ummah by armed force and repression and torture and 
fraudulent elections. And you are the ones who have helped to violate 
the rights of the nation; your hands write the rulings which devastate 
Muslims, and with your hands, they are ruled by the emergency laws 
and laws of ruin and repression'. These laws are opposed to the 
Shariah and imposed on the people through force and false elections. 
Despite the crimes being committed against the people of Egypt, its 
children and free women, the torture, the infiltration of the security 
services in all sections of society and the deals with Israel, the judges 
do not protest, conduct sit-ins etc. They did not protest against the 
launching of aircraft from Egypt to bomb Iraq, nor did they seek to 
investigate the police or security services for misconduct, protest 
against US warships coming through the Suez, Jews operating in 
Sharm without visa or many of the other issues. 'You are regrettably a 
part of the secular regime which makes war on Islam and submits to 
America and Israel and rules its peoples through repression, theft, 
contrived constitutions, secular laws of ill repute, and rigged 
elections'. If they would sacrifice their wealth and jobs they would be 
victorious [constant focus on the domestic: a message which in its 
title points to an emphasis on Palestine, pays almost lip service only 
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to this issue - most of the time goes to talk about a specific issue of 
Egypt].  
 
'I say to the Muslim Ummah [of Egypt]: you shall continue to be 
surprised and repressed so long as you don't liberate yourselves from 
the Crusade and its lackeys'. 
UBL [June 2006] 
“Elegizing the Ummah’s 
Martyr..” 
92 The king of Jordan should allow Abu Musab to be buried in Jordan, 
and he should not be there but in the Hijaz where he belongs, he is 
only in this area because his grandfather was put there by the British. 
UBL [July 2006] “To the 
Ummah in General and the 
Mujahideen in Iraq and 
Somalia in Particular” 
93 Iraqis: 'beware of being deceived by the parties and groups that 
entered and participated in these governments' [the public invariably 
seen as gullible and dumb, needing clear and steadfast guidance, 
rather than choices]. 'If you abandoned your God's order to fight 
them, you would be disappointed and routed and you would have 
disobeyed'. 'Stick to fighting, join the ranks of the mujahideen, and 
listen to and obey the jama'ah'.  
 
To Muslims in Somalia: 'You can survive only by upholding Islam 
and being one hand with the Islamic Courts, which seek to establish 
an Islamic state'. Any Muslim in Somalia who helps 'the renegade 
Abdullahi Yusuf and the invading international forces will be 
considered an infidel and deviant from the creed. There will be no 
prayer at his funeral and he will not be buried in a Muslims cemetery. 
His wife will be divorced from him and he will have no right to 
inheritance'. 
AAZ [September 2006] 
“Hot issues..” 
21 'Charlatans' in Iraq who abandoned Sharia and supported the 
occupiers. The danger is the occupier's goals will be fulfilled if these 
traitors stay in place. These are criminals, with full intent (like the 
killer of al Husayn bin-Ali) and religion-sellers. All betrayals of those 
who collaborate with the crusaders are documented. The worst are the 
rulers of Egypt, the Arabian peninsula, Jordan and the traitors in Iraq. 
Along with the religious-trading charlatans, the Americans also 
cooperate with 'defeatists' (those who accept the status quo and 
embrace majority rule and Sykes-Picot), and 'beggars' - 'those who 
sell their religion for position, salaries, visas and citizenships', like 
those who join the Western military forces, 'like those who take pride 
in their British citizenship'. Those who recognized Arafat as leader of 
the Palestinians and permitted the French to ban the veil. All these 
groups have renounced the shariah, accepted the status quo, and curse 
and abuse the mujahideen. 
AAZ [September 2006] 
“Bush, the Vatican’s Pope, 
Darfur and the Crusades” 
89 'As for the government of Khartoum, which conceded the south, is 
too weak to defend Darfur after inciting wars and seditions in it. This 
government permits the impermissible, seeks its own interests, and 
garners spoils'. 
AAZ [December 2006] 
“Realities of Conflict 
Between Islam and 
Unbelievers” 
94 The duties of the Ummah: (1) ''the fighting must be for elevating the 
Word of Allah, and that the elevation of Allah's word on His earth 
means the elevation of His Law (Shari'ah), and that the Muslim 
cannot possibly be a believer without litigating to Divine Law alone 
to the exclusion of all other laws'. (2) 'And the second of these facts is 
that the recovery of every land which was once a land of Islam is the 
personal duty of every Muslim'. Thus recognizing any of the 
international Resolutions on Palestine amounts to 'recognizing the 
Hebrew state', 'criminalizing Jihad against it'. (3) every way other 
than Jihad will only lead us to loss and failure. (4) Membership of the 
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UN also means recognising Israel.  
 
Some brothers in Palestine have gradually been going down the path 
of submission in Palestine, accepting resolutions, taking part in 
elections etc. 'How is it that they didn't demand that Palestine have an 
Islamic constitution before entering any elections? Aren't they and 
Islamic movement? [HAMAS].  
 
I call on every independent, honourable and intelligent follower of 
the religion-sellers who support and beg for the Crusader presence in 
Iraq and Afghanistan and forbid Jihad against it to examine himself 
and to remember that he will meet his Lord alone'. 'And I call on 
[them] to ask himself a courageous and brave question: were Imam 
Ali [...] or our chief Hasan [...] or our chief Husayn [...] present today 
in Iraq or Afghanistan, would they have colluded with the Crusaders 
in the invasion of the lands of Islam, and then cooperate with them 
and fight the Mujahideen in defence of them? Would they have 
participated in the governments out in place by the Crusaders and 
blessed by the United Nations, and would they have obeyed the order 
of Bremer, Tommy Franks and Lakhdar Brahimi? Or would they 
have declared Jihad against them and those who help them?' [Shia - 
criticism, but perhaps also outreach]. 
AAZ [January 2007] “Rise 
and Support our Brothers in 
Somalia” 
96 'He who cooperates with the invaders is similar to them and shall face 
the same disgraceful fate'. 
AAZ [January 2007] “The 
Correct Equation” 
28 If the Islamic organizations become an obstacle to fulfilling the 
objectives of Allah, then Muslims must free themselves of them. ... 
There is no excuse for accepting the resolutions on Palestine. 
AAZ [February 2007] 
“Lessons, Examples and 
Great Events in the Year 
1427” 
97 [veiled criticism of shia:] 'and those who claim that confronting the 
Zionist Crusade in Lebanon is Jihad whereas confronting it in Iraq is 
strife and foolishness are the real instigators of strife'. 'He who claims 
that the fighting in Iraq is an American plot to create warring 
sectarian mini-states fools no one with such claims. The entire world 
knows who cooperated with the Americans in their Crusade, before, 
during and after the invasion'.  
 
'Arab League became a museum for mummified Arab dignity'. ... 
Arab nationalists have sunken to extreme lows, esp. with giving up 
Palestine - the most important nationalist cause. Islam forbids 
fighting on a patriotic basis. Asks Fatah to return to Islam to fight for 
an Islamic state in all of Palestine, not a secular state in the 'crumbs of 
Palestine'. 'Regrettable' that some Palestinians follow Abbas. To 
Palestinians: 'for the sake of what have you abandoned ruling by 
Shari'ah?', for a 'farcical government', 'the soap opera of embargoes 
and pursuits and killings and denunciations' will continue unless 
Palestine is liberated and Shari'ah implemented. 
AAZ [March 2007] 
“Palestine is the concern of 
all Muslims” 
18 HAMAS leadership has 'trampled on the rights of the Muslim 
Ummah' by reclaiming to respect what it calls international accords. 
Mourns the loss of HAMAS leadership, it has sunk into a swamp of 
surrender. It wants to win the affection of America and get close to it 
[implied through poem]. Has abandoned martyrdom and bowed to 
international legitimacy. The leadership is contemptuous of Muslims' 
intelligence in implying it will respect but not comply with 
international agreements. Doctrinal deviation facilitates behavioural 
deviation. Having abandoned the Shariah, it was easy for them to 
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abandon Palestine. If Muslims fail to fight they will 'lose both this life 
and the next'. The people of Egypt have recognized the authority of 
Mubarak, citizenship instead of Muslim brotherhood, and the secular 
political institutions and renounced the Shariah and cooperated with 
the foreign Crusader occupier. 
AAZ [May 2007] “The 
Empire of Evil is about to 
End” 
23 Leaders in Iraq are driving their supporters to losing their religion, 
those who support the Iraqi authorities support America and Israel. 
They must cease doing so. On the HAMAS signing the Mekkah 
accords - 'they have been transformed from a Mujahid movement to 
part of the Arab consensus which surrenders to America', 'which sells 
the lands of Muslims', 'which represses the Muslim Ummah'. 
'Awareness is a must, because the governments have betrayed, the 
organizations have abandoned, and the leaderships have tired, and the 
Ummah must wage its Jihad and depend on its Lord and shoulder its 
responsibility without waiting for any straggler, haggler or 
manoeuvre'. 'What does the preservation of Palestinian blood have to 
do with the abandonment and selling of Palestine and its interment in 
the tomb of oblivion? Palestinian blood must be sacrificed cheaply 
for the elevation of Allah’s word and the liberation of Palestine'. 
HAMAS must not relinquish Shariah. ' I request every Muslim to 
look at this map to appreciate the ugliness of the crime in which the 
leadership of HAMAS took part.'. 
AAZ [June 2007] “Forty 
Years since the Fall of 
Jerusalem” 
101 'The nation discovered that it had been worshipping a calf that could 
do no harm or good' [Nasser]. Mahathir Mohammed [Malaysian PM 
until 2003] - spoke correctly of Western oppression but is to blame 
since he did not implement Sharia and fought the mujahidin. 
'Surprised at those Arab nationalists and leftists', how have they not 
reconsidered after monumental failures? 'Why do leftists stubbornly 
insist on their views to this day? Russia and China have become two 
trading companies: one is controlled by the Mafia, while the other is 
dominated by the Communist Party which is immersed in the market'.  
 
Criticism of HAMAS leaders who claim to seek positive relations 
with the West, see the Chechen issue as a local Russian affair and 
disagree with UBL [all conflicts are the same here, Chechnya not 
separate from Palestine. HAMAS has crossed several 'red lines' in 
relinquishing rule of Sharia, accepting majority rule, a national state 
in stead of Caliphate etc, international resolutions etc. 
AAZ [July 2007] “The 
Advice of one Concerned” 
102 Why do critics attack the ISI when the so-called government of 
HAMAS in Gaza and Ramallah, has no power, was forced to 
relinquish a third of seats and four-fifths of Palestine, and the right to 
negotiate to Mahmud Abbas. ISI has more soldiers and supporters 
than HAMAS, welcomes all Palestinian brothers who had to flee, is 
attacking America. HAMAS leaders in contrast disown their 
mujahidin and declared Chechnya an internal Russian issue. ... Dr 
Saud al-Hashimi, believes in non-interference in the affairs of the 
rulers [includes excerpts from his speeches]. The most dangerous 
weapon of the Saudi-American alliance, are individuals who 
'cowardly profess advice, guidance and instruction, while they are in 
fact mouthpieces of Al Saud'.  
 
[appeal to shia and criticism:] 'the Mujahideen are the supporters of 
al-Husayn [...] and are his allies and soldiers', Americans and 
Crusaders are enemies of al-Husayn, asks where is their intellect, 
conscience and religion, 'you obey al-Husayn [...] by obeying 
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America?! And you raise the banner of al-Husayn [...] under the cross 
of America?! And you champion al-Husayn [...] in the armies of 
America?! And you pave the way for the state of al-Husayn [...] by 
pleading for the forces of America to stay?!' [not doctrinal animosity 
as with Zarqawi, but rather criticism of their current policies and 
alliances in Iraq].  
 
Prisoners must not neglect the trust they have been shown.  
 
HAMAS leadership abandoned government by Shari'ah and 
abandoned four-fifths of Palestine, and agreed to only a third of the 
government, all for nothing. Loylaty to Allah must be more than to 
organisations or leadership. The deviation from march must be 
corrected. The leadership of HAMAS must 'return to the truth', 
otherwise they will get something worse than Arafat got. And what 
would the Muslim Brothers and their Guide, Muhammad Mahdi Akif, 
think of the Arab peace initiative in Palestine? Which would concede 
four-fiths. And what would the Guide say about the words of Dr. 
Sa'ad al-Katatni on BBC radio 7 April, concerning a two state 
solution - Israel and Palestine - to be the best one? To Fatah: how do 
they justify killing HAMAS members, flying a secular banner and 
aiding Israeli spies? They must return to their religion and join 
HAMAS. Arab nationalists have lost both Islam and Arab-ness. They 
need to return to Islam. Kurdish nationalists led Kurds from one 
occupation to another in Iraq. 
AAZ [July 2007] 
“Malicious Britain and its 
Indian Slaves” 
103 Pakistanis should not waste time in 'fictitious' elections, but rather 
support the jihad in Afghanistan. Some forces in Lebanon 
[Hezballah] are being contradictory when they say fighting Jews and 
Americans is permissible in Lebanon and Palestine, but not Iraq and 
Afghanistan. 
AAZ [July 2007] “The 
Aggression against Lal 
Masjid” 
104 'Muslims of Pakistan: your salvation is only through Jihad. Rigged 
elections will not save you, politics will not save you', 'so you must 
now back the Mujahideen in Afghanistan with your persons, wealth, 
opinion and expertise'. 'Aren't there any honourable ones in 
Pakistan?', 'Isn't there anyone who prefers the hereafter to the life of 
this world?' 'O you who believe! What is the matter with you, that, 
when you are asked to go forth in the cause of Allah, you cling 
heavily to the earth?' 'Unless you go forth, He will punish you with a 
painful punishment'. 
UBL [September 2007] 
“Come to Jihad..” 
14 Muslims obliged to remove Musharraf as he is a traitor, soldiers must 
resign. Toppling apostate rulers is obligatory according to Shariah. 
There are only two ways: jihad, which is an individual obligation, or 
sitting and doing nothing which is the way of the disobedient ones. 
AAZ [December 2007] 
“Annapolis – the Betrayal” 
12 It is time Palestinians declare they are not a national resistance 
movement but rather a 'fighting Islamic movement' , above 
nationalism, believing in Islamic brotherhood who will not 'accede 
anything except Shariah rule'. Palestinians betrayed their brothers in 
Chechnya by interacting with Russia. The mujahideen are closer to 
Palestinians than Abbas. People of Egypt allowed it to become a base 
of support for crusaders. 
AAZ [December 2007] “A 
Review of Events” 
13 On Shia: 'People of the House' have been wrong twice: once at the 
hands of unjust rulers and on the hands of religion traders who used 
them to get rich, worship humans and collect money from invented 
rituals, then bombed themselves in order to get richer and more 
  429 
Communiqué and author ID 
 
Criticism of Muslims and Direct Warnings 
[excerpts, quotes, notes] 
 
powerful, and who cooperated with the Americans. 'We haven't heard 
even one Fatwa from one Shiite authority, whether in Iran or 
elsewhere, calling for Jihad against the Americans in Iraq and 
Afghanistan'.  
 
Hassan Nasrullah allows himself to be controlled by the Ayatollahs 
and has not fought for the Sheb'a Farms and is 'narrow, nationalistic, 
partisan'. And he adheres to UNSCR 1701.  
 
'The primary cause of the humiliation and disgrace we have reached 
in Egypt and the other countries of the Muslims is in the Muslims' 
tardiness in resisting oppression, enjoining good and forbidding evil. 
Fear; hesitation; clinging to life's crumbs; the culture of withdrawal; 
the methodology of defeatism; these are the most important reasons 
for Egypt being transformed from a fortress for the defence of Islam 
into a helper, aide and partner in the American-Zionist Crusade 
assault'. Need for a 'believing vanguard to press forward'. 
UBL [December 2007] 
“The Way to Frustrate the 
Conspiracies” 
27 Islamic leaders and scholars in Iraq have neglected to support the 
efforts of the mujahideed against the Badr Corps, Sadr's army and 
other such criminals, initially spearheaded by Zarqawi. The leaders 
have forced the division of the mujahideen since some support only 
attacks on Americans and not on the police or these apostate militias. 
... Hassan Nasrallah has deceived his people by accepting the foreign 
troops in Lebanon under Resolution 1701 - he has signed similar 
agreements as Sadat and King Hussain. 
AAZ [early 2008] 
“Exoneration..” 
20 The 'author' began his revision with the 1994 publication of 'The 
Compilation', other members of the Islamic Group went down this 
path of 'the no-violence imitative' in 1997, and again after 9/11. The 
advice included in the document would mean the complete 
submission of the Egyptian people. Claims the author 'washed his 
hands' of jihadist activity 14 years ago [references to the 1997 
pacification of EIJ]. 
UBL [March 2008] “A 
Way for the Salvation of 
Palestine” 
6 Three factions: (1) mujahideen and their supporters, (2) the apathetic, 
those refraining from supporting jihad, (3) advocates of the Christian-
Zionist treaty. 
AAZ [March 2008] “A Call 
to Help our People in 
Gaza” 
17 Screaming and shouting every time a Muslim gets killed does nothing 
and will lead to defeat. 
AAZ [April 2008] “The 
Open Meeting part one..” 
105 Hizballah criticised for withdrawing and respecting international 
protocols. . Shaykh al-Qardawi repeats lies of the 'criminal Algerian 
regime', in his accusations of AQIM. This is the man who supports 
Mubarak, who has committed so many crimes against Muslims. His 
fatwa condoning Muslim participation in Western armed forces and 
taking part in the battles against those thought to be or help terrorists 
condemned. This amounts to 'grand treason'. Qardawi has also no 
problems recognising Israel and normalising relations with it, if 
Palestine can be created in the 'scraps' left for it.  
 
HAMAS: 'I took a gradual approach with HAMAS, from support to 
repeated advice to warning to general criticism'. This became even 
more profound when they signed the Mekkah accords. They entered 
elections, complied with secular constitutions, abandoned brothers in 
Chechnya and four-fifths of Palestine. But the leadership of HAMAS 
needs to be separated from the rest of the mujahideen, who are 
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supported. .  
 
Dr Fadl's publication of al-Jaami fee Talb al-'Ilm ash-Sharif, [written 
before 'document of guidance'] containing numerous issues al-Jihad 
disagreed with such as attacking Islamic scholars rather than leaders 
and being resentful of Abdallah Azzam and Abd al-Rahman of 
Islamic Group.  
 
Shia: 'my stance towards the Shii'ite laity is [...] that they are excused 
through their ignorance', 'those who participated with their leaders in 
cooperating with the Crusader and attacking the Muslims, their status 
n that case is that of the groups refraining from the laws of Islam', 
those who didn't assist the Crusade: 'our way with them is invitation 
and displaying of facts, and clarifying the extent of the crimes 
committed by their leaders against Islam' [leaders separated from the 
rest]. Hassan Nasrullah welcomes Crusader forces in Lebanon, 
Rafsanjani has backed from the demand to remove Israel, Iran is a 
member of the UN.  
 
Those who supported the 'document of guidance' by Dr Fadl, 
constituted a small minority within al-Jihad, many were not members 
or had left, and some claimed support just to deceive the government. 
Many prominent figures in prison spoke out against the document. Dr 
Fadl left al-Jihad 15 years ago.  
 
HAMAS has followed the 'disasters of the Muslim Brotherhood' in 
entering elections and embracing man-made laws. 'It is the duty of 
the Mujahideen of al-Qassam to advise their leaders and demand of 
them to return to the correct methodology'. Loyalty to Allah must 
come before loyalty to the organisation.  
 
'I only criticised the Muslim Brothers after it became intolerable and 
their compromising lead them to request [...] him [Mubarak] to 
extend his presidency'. The Second printing of the Bitter Harvest was 
published after the Brothers organisations in Afghanistan and Iraq 
committed treason by joining the government. Makes clear 
distinction between HAMAS mujahideen and its compromising 
leaders. Says he didn't attack the Islamic Group, but only its 
compromising leadership who consider Sadat a martyr, recognise 
Mubarak as president and called for the Islamic Emirate's extradition 
of Usama. As for the Islamic Group represented by Umar Abd al-
Rahman, 'my stance towards it is one of support and appreciation'. 
'Criticism of mistakes is a must, especially with those which touch 
doctrinal constants, like agreeing with democracy'. 
AAZ [April 2008] “Shaykh 
Ayman Al-Zawahiri – On 
the Fifth Anniversary of the 
Invasion and Torture of 
Iraq” 
7 Criticism of apathy of Egyptians, allowing enemy to operate in Israel, 
Iraq, killing Muslims. Cooperating with Egyptian authorities 
AAZ [April 2008] “The 
Open Meeting.. Part 2..” 
107 'I call on the Islamic nation to fear the day when God will ask it why 
it failed to back its mujahideen brothers' . Long debate about the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in response to a question arguing that 
it was split and that parts of it wanted to embrace Sharia, support the 
mujahideen, ban Christian and female presidents etc. Ayman argues 
the Brotherhood still embraces the secular constitution and does not 
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see that the Brotherhood's agenda embraces government by sharia. It 
only pledges support for vague 'principles of Sharia' which can apply 
to many sets of laws and does not exclude man-made law as well. 
The Brotherhood's suggestion of a Ulema Commission is a step in the 
right direction but insufficient and it is too weak and its role unclear. 
The programme does not support the mujahideen or express support 
for jihad, even though it does claim the need to liberate every inch of 
Palestine (but calls for a referendum on the issue of peace agreements 
with the Hebrew states). It claims it would embrace UN resolutions 
based on the majority of nations, but this would include the 1947 
decision of partitioning Palestine. In some ways the draft programme 
is a step in the right direction, but the Brotherhood should seek 
further reform.  
 
The 'jurisconsults of the marines' who support Mubarak's decisions 
and legitimise his reign. They do not deserve to be called imams. 
Reminds young followers of these that since they do not support the 
sharia those whose mothers or sisters are assaulted, they will not be 
allowed to defend them. . 'Muslims in the West are prohibited from 
residing permanently under the laws of the infidels except in 
necessity', their duty is to defend Islam. [in response to another 
question] 'permanent residence in the countries of infidelity is only 
allowed when necessary. This is because this means that he accepts 
their laws to be applied to him'. . 'The Islamic world has not only 
failed to support the Islamic Emirate in Afghanistan, but a 
propaganda campaign was launched against it by the rulers' scholars, 
Iran's agents, and groups affiliated with Islam in support of their 
colleagues who were in control of five per cent of Afghanistan'. 
'Muslims should repent to God for failing to support [the] Taliban, 
and they should know that God will ask them about their failure to 
support it' [this goes a bit against the notion expressed in section 21 
about how the Taliban had the support of the majority].  
 
In his criticism of the Muslim Brothers and others, Ayman stresses 
that it is important to be objective in criticism and differentiate 
between leaders and followers, and that this is amended in the second 
version of the Bitter Harvest. 
UBL [May 2008] “A 
Message to the Muslim 
Nation”  
24 'Every one of us bears responsibility for the death of our oppressed 
kinfolk in the Gaza Strip, where scores have died as result of an 
unjust blockade'. The Muslims did not realise the impact of the power 
vacuum left by the Ottoman state and this lead to the colonial powers 
entering. Then they entrusted the liberation of Palestine to the corrupt 
leaders.  
 
Hassan Nasrallah cooperated with the UN and failed liberate 
Palestine.  
 
Criticism of the ulema who recognize apostate rulers. 
AAZ [June 2008] “On the 
Anniversary of the 
Naksa..” 
15 'People who have collapsed and are still collapsing' -beginning with 
the acceptance of resolution 242 and including cooperation with 
Mossad. Jihad is the only salvation for Muslims from the corrupt 
Arab regimes, jihad is an individual duty. There can be no acceptance 
of the 1967 borders, Palestinians must multiply their rocket attacks, 
martyrdom operations and ambushes. 
AAZ [November 2008] 237 'Our fundamental enemy is this defeatist spirit, hesitation, and 
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“Al-Azhar: The Lions 
Den” 
attachment to safety which motivates us to backtrack whenever the 
tyrants attack us and to plead with them' and to protest only with 
means they deem acceptable. 
AAZ [January 2009] “The 
Massacre of Gaza and the 
Siege of the Traitors” 
121 Arab rulers doing nothing to stop the massacres of Gaza, only giving 
empty statements. . Muslims of Egypt: 'ending the siege of Gaza is an 
obligation upon you which you must fulfil'. Egyptian soldiers: 'how 
much longer will you remain soldiers of Satan?' . 
UBL [January 2009] “Call 
for Jihad to Stop the Gaza 
Assault” 
122 The Ummah cannot give up their responsibility of Palestine and 
expect their rulers to act. . Criticism of the wealthy who fail to donate 
funds to the jihad, they must not fail to realise that their actions will 
be judged in this life. 
AAZ [February 2009] 
“From Kabul to 
Mogadishu” 
132 Why did Somalis 'sacrifice thousands of martyrs' defending against 
America, when they then allow a government to rule that says 
America has 'a positive role in Somalia'?  
 
On the futility of protests and demonstrations (Al-Wuhayshi). .. How 
can Yemeni tribes accept Saleh as a ruler, a 'treasonous traitor'? 'Be 
helpers of Allah and not of America'.  
 
Those groups who initially criticised the Taliban for being a Pakistani 
agent, and now welcome the presence of '20 Crusader banners' over 
Kabul. 
UBL [March 2009] 
“Practical Steps to Liberate 
Palestine” 
133 Why have Muslims being so slow in responding to the suffering of 
the people of Gaza?  
 
Warns those who think secularists [Obama] are 'Gaza's hope' in the 
crisis, since they are part of the problem.  
 
Muslims need to 'wake up' and abandon rulers, scholars, leadership of 
Islamic groups and others who stand in the way of the liberation of 
Palestine. 
UBL [March 2009] “Fight 
on, Oh Champions of 
Somalia” 
134 'My Muslim brothers in Somalia: you must beware of the initiatives 
which wear the dress of Islam and the religious institutions even as 
they contradict the rules of Islamic Shari’ah.' Criticism of Ulama of 
Somalia who gave Shaykh Shareef a deadline to implement Shari'ah.  
 
'My Muslim Ummah: the victory of the Mujahideen in Somalia is a 
matter of extreme importance, and not backing them nor taking their 
hand is extremely dangerous, because if the limbs are eaten, it is easy 
for the enemy to devour the heart of the Islamic world, and in that is a 
move from occupation by proxy to direct occupation by the 
Zionist/Crusader coalition.' 'So exonerate yourselves from loyalty to 
the idol-kings.' 
AAZ [April 2009] “Six 
years since the invasion of 
Iraq..” 
136 Implicit criticism of HAMAS in taking part in political negotiation 
rather than fighting. Later more explicit criticism of Hamas 
leadership and their role in the Mekkah talks. Expresses anger and 
dismay with their appreciation for negotiations.  
 
Speeches, demonstrations and protests will not suffice to change the 
ways of the Zionist Crusaders. 
AAZ [June 2009] “The 
Executioner, Egypt and the 
American Puppets 
Welcome Obama” 
137 Obama is not to be welcomed or greeted in Egypt. 
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AAZ [July 2009] “My 
Muslim Brothers and 
Sisters in Pakistan” 
139 'It is the individual duty of every Muslim in Pakistan to join the 
Mujahedeen, or at the very least, to support the Jihad in Pakistan and 
Afghanistan.'  
 
'If we stand by passively without offering due support to the 
Mujahedeen, we shall not only contribute to the destruction of 
Pakistan and Afghanistan, but we shall also deserve the painful 
punishment of Almighty Allah.' 
AAZ [August 2009] “The 
Realities of Jihad and 
Fallacy of Hypocrisy” 
140 Criticism of Shia. Extensive criticism of Hizballah and Hasan 
Nasrallah who is declared hypocrite for his lack of support for people 
of Gaza whilst complaining about Egyptian blockade. Compared to 
Mubarak. Said to be reluctant to attack Israel, and yet accusing his 
detractors of cooperating with Israel. Hizballah described as an 
essentially secular organisation because it takes part in the party 
political process. Complains that the Arab media focuses much more 
on it than the Islamic Emirate in Afghanistan. Warns people of 
Lebanon not to support groups that support negotiations and reminds 
them they constitute an 'Islamic trench' against Israel.  
 
'The duty of Muslim girls and women in the Islamic Maghreb is to 
face-off those who want to remove their Hijab.' 
AAZ [August 2009] “The 
Path of Doom” 
142 One of the reasons for the terrible state of affairs in Pakistan is that 
the Muslims have come to love the worldly life. 'Muslims have 
abandoned the obligation of enjoining good and forbidding evil'. The 
Muslim umma in Pakistan must appreciate that America is waging a 
unique war against them seeking to detach religion from society and 
governance.  
 
Warns Muslims in Pakistan that if they fail to meet their obligation of 
jihad they will be punished by Allah. 
AAZ [September 2009] 
“Shaykh Dr Ayman al-
Zawahiri: Eulogy for the 
Role Model of Youth” 
147 'Hizbullah wants to take part and play in the secular political field, 
and then pass away its weapon to Beirut'. Muslims must avoid the 
example set by Hizbullah of political bargains and domestic politics.  
 
'Oh, my Muslim nation! If you will not stand against the crusader-
Zionist campaign and their allies with all your force, you will inherit 
only shame to our next generation.' 
AAZ [December 2009] 
“The Morning and the 
Lamp..” 
141 'I was amazed: how was this fraud successfully carried out against 
major scholars and preachers of Islam - those that honor this 
Constitution and recognize it? I am even more amazed at those 
“virtuous ones” who continue to adhere to it: those that even after 
sixty years, persist to this day in propagating these expectations about 
the false promises that the Shari`ah will be implemented.' .. 'The 
expulsion of the Crusading invaders from Afghanistan and Pakistan is 
an individual obligation on every Muslim in Pakistan', just as was 
declared during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 
AAZ [July 2010] “Al Quds 
will not be converted to 
Judaism” 
223 Implicit frustration that Hezbollah fires on rocket on Israel and 
everyone takes note, whilst the successes and heroics of Afghan 
mujahideen are not noted by the media  
 
Criticism of defeatist ulema, 'juristrs of the Marines' who wrote 
Fatwas urging people to stay home. The 'Mujahideen of Khorasan' 
today teach a lesson in unification and dependence on Allah', 'so did 
you learn anything O' holders of certificates, degrees, positions, 
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podiums and channels?'  
 
For too long Muslims have favoured safety and been lazy in their 
acquesence of Jewish and American control over Palestine. Derides 
those who say attacking America brought them to the lands of 
Muslims, they were already there with all their bases, Israel being the 
biggest of them. The 'tendency to be enslaved' is the reason Muslims 
have not won Palestine back. Derides those who fail to fight for 
Palestine out of fear over material possessions and gain, favouring 
truce making and public protest. Muslims are losing Palestine since 
some call for unity with 'Arab Zionists' who are even more dangerous 
than Jewish Zionists. These include Mubarak. The metal wall 
surrounding Gaza is 'the shame of the people of Egypt who let the 
leader of Zionist Arabs [Mubarak] sanction their brothers and 
families.' Jihad must be carried out against him [but he was toppled 
by other means by the people!]. 'We are the biggest reason in losing 
Palestine because we regressed in fighting for the cause of Allah.' .. 
'Sorrowful and shameful' that Muslim groups in Egypt accepted 
invitations to listen to Obama speech and that others flocked to hear 
him speak. They accept the constitution and secular laws, 'shouting 
for fake elections.' 
AAZ [August 2010] 
“Message to the People of 
Turkey” 
225 Change will not come by sending a few aid shipments and through 
protesting. Change will only come if the people of Turkey demand 
that their government stops cooperating with Israel and sending 
troops to Afghanistan.  
 
How can the sons of the Ottomans be reduced to sending a few aid 
shipments? 
AAZ [September 2010] “A 
Victorious Ummah, A 
Broken Crusade” 
226 The silence of the people of Pakistan in the face of corruption is the 
reason for the incapability of Pakistan to relieve them during natural 
disasters and is the cause of the catastrophes that have befallen 
Pakistan. Talks of the 'deviations from Islam' among 'many of the 
people of Pakistan.' Many are secularists or only take part in Islam as 
ritual which is meaningless beyond the walls of the masjid, many are 
polytheists and accept innovation.  
 
Pakistanis must repent and re-enter Islam.  
 
Talks of two orientations during the nine years against the 
contemporary Crusade, the brave mujahideen who rule according to 
correct aqeedah, and those who are 'defeated people' with 'distorted 
creeds' who 'prefer safety' and 'beg for residency permits and 
citizenships' [see inability to appeal to Diaspora] and those who 
embrace Western style politics, calling for 'civil government' which is 
another word for 'non-religious government' and nationalism.  
 
Condemns those who follow Mohammed el Baradei, who 'fell on us 
out of the sky of American providence'  
 
Muslims must change 'from the falsehood of shirk ruling by other 
than Shari'ah and vassalage to the enemies of Islam to the truth of 
Tawheed, ruling by Shar'iah and liberation from the enemies of Islam' 
UBL [October 2010] “Help 
your brothers in Pakistan” 
228 Governments of Pakistan and other Islamic countries have not helped 
the victims of the floods and the media did not discuss it in detail 
AAZ [November 2010] 229 Muslims of Pakistan: ‘Your government and the leaders of your army 
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Criticism of Muslims and Direct Warnings 
[excerpts, quotes, notes] 
 
“Who is going to support 
Aifa Siddique” 
have made you into an people without honour without sanctity, 
without pride, rather without any worth.’ 
AAZ [February 2011] “A 
Message of Glad 
Tidings…(1)” 
232 The current condition of Egypt is that it has deviated from Islam 
(main focus on government apparatus) 
AAZ [February 2011] “A 
Message of Glad 
Tidings…(3)” 
234 'Be extremely cautious that your sacrifices are not stolen, that your 
suffering is not used by others, and that outer appearances change, 
but injustice and servitude continues to exist.' 
AAZ [March 2011] “A 
Message of Glad 
Tidings…(4)” 
235 Warns Muslims of the evils of democracy and how this would only 
be a tool wielded by the West to control Islamic lands and secure 
Israel, fight jihad and Shari'ah, introduce vices, etc 
AAZ [April 2011] “A 
Message of Glad 
Tidings…(5)” 
236 [benign warning] '“The Egyptian people’s revolution succeeded in 
removing the tyrant, and then what? And this is the dangerous 
question and the big challenge.” The leadership of the Egyptian 
armed forces is not to be trusted. The military council accepted and 
carried out Mubarak's tyrranny, imprisonment, oppression etc.  
 
“I warn those who are trying to establish a regime in Egypt that is 
estranged from its religion, that they are creating an extended Fitna 
that won’t calm' 
UBL [May 2011] “The 
Speech by the Martyr of 
Islam..” 
240 Warns of the sin participants will incur if this opportunity to 
"establish justice and faith" are missed.  
 
Talks of weak awareness in many of the sons of the Ummah that is a 
result of the wrong culture spread by the rulers for many decades" 
and recommends “Concepts that Must be Corrected” by Sheikh 
Muhammad Qutb.. 
AAZ [May 2011] “A 
Message of Glad 
Tidings…(6)” 
238 "As for our message for our people in Libya, I wish for our Muslim 
Ummah in Libya to be very careful concerning the NATO plot 
against Libya."  
 
"The military council that’s governing in Egypt, which surrendered 
supporting the Muslim, Arab neighbours, and he welcomed the 
invaders’ neighbouring of Egypt" 
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APPENDIX 3.10 Geographic Scope of Activism Message  
 
UBL=Usama bin Ladin 
AAZ=Ayman Al-Zawahiri 
 
Communiqué and author [ID] Where to focus support and activism: major emphases [excerpts, quotes, notes] 
UBL [unknown date] 
“Methodological Guidelines” 
112 Iraq, Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya, and Afghanistan. 
UBL [unknown date] Letter to 
Mullah Omar 
61 Need to support brothers in 'Burkhart, Samarqand 
[Uzbekistan]  
 
Tormoz and other Muslim countries'. Afghanistan. The 
importance of Saudi Arabia: 1) due to the Kabah and the 
Prophet's mosque, 2) the existence of 75% of the worlds oil, 
'and whoever controls the oil controls the world’s economy'. 
 
Need to continue jihad operations in Central Asian republics, 
not least to alleviate pressure of Afghanistan. 
AAZ [early 1992] “The Black 
Book: An account of the Torture of 
Muslims in the Time of Husni 
Mubarak” 
114 Stresses the need to remove American and Israeli 
interests/agents from Egypt in particular, and to counteract 
the influences of Zionism and Christianity in the region in 
general 
UBL [April 1994] “Our Invitation to 
Give Advice and Reform” 
36 Saudi Arabia: 'God only knows how much we miss our 
homeland, and there is no other country that we long for. 
How could this not be true, given that it is the cradle of 
Islam'. 
UBL [September 1994] “Urgent 
Letter to Security Officials” 
42 Saudi Arabia 
UBL [December 1994] “Open 
Letter for Shaykh bin Baz on the 
Invalidity of his Fatwa on Peace 
with the Jews” 
63 The religiously required solution for Palestine is jihad in the 
way of God until it is liberated and back into Muslim hands.  
 
'May the rippling flag of jihad be raised high so that the 
ummah may restore its honour and dignity. May the flag of 
unity be raised above all the stolen land of Islam beginning 
with Palestine and continuing to Andalusia, and other lands of 
Islam lost due to the treachery of rulers and the helplessness 
of Muslims'. 
UBL [February 1995] “Prince 
Salman and Ramadan Alms” 
65 Saudi Arabia 
UBL [March 1995] “Saudi Arabia 
Continues its War against Islam and 
its Scholars” 
66 Saudi Arabia 
UBL [July 1995] “Prince Sultan and 
the Air Aviation Commissions” 
68 Saudi Arabia 
UBL [August 1995] “The Bosnia 
Tragedy and the Deception of the 
Servant of the Two Mosques” 
69 Palestine. Bosnia, and elsewhere. [Although the Bosnian 
cause is mentioned extensively, the main emphasis is on the 
Saudi Arabian context, and how this underlines the apostasy 
and infidelity of the regime, and its inability to rule]. 
UBL [June 1996] “Usama bin Ladin 
Reportedly Interviewed..” 
3 "To put it simply, the Bin Ladin Establishment's aid covers 13 
countries, including Albania, Malaysia, Pakistan, the 
Netherlands, Britain, Romania, Russia, Turkey, Lebanon, 
Iraq, and some Gulf countries which there is no need to 
mention." 
UBL [July 1996] “Interview with 4 America’s war against the Saudis means war against all 
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Saudi Dissident Bin Ladin” Muslims. Resistance will spread throughout Muslim world. 
Solution to crisis is removal of US forces from Peninsula. 
UBL [November 1996] “Bin Ladin 
interviewed on Jihad against US” 
150 On sanctuary: 'Iraq is not on the cards. The choice is between 
Afghanistan and.Yemen's topography is mountainous, and its 
people are tribal, armed, and allow one to breathe clear air 
unblemished with humiliation.' 
 
'This nation is linked together like electricity. I am talking 
about the nation as a whole. I am not addressing the sons of 
the peninsula only; US interests exist throughout the Islamic 
world, the world has become a small village, and with God's 
help, the contacts exists and the interaction is there.'  
 
Asked to respond to criticism Palestine is not high on the list: 
'Interest in issues is determined by their closeness to the 
people's life and their sequence. Without doubt the Afghan 
issue [Soviet invasion] was the most recent responsibility 
compared with the al-Aqsa Mosque and then came the 
country of the two holy mosques [US 'occupation']. The event 
was a hot issue and prompted the nation's interest, so God 
helped us to stage the jihad in Afghanistan. The same applied 
to the two holy mosques, they were occupied recently 
compared with the occupation of the al-Aqsa mosque, which 
made them more important because they are the qiblah of all 
Muslims.' 
UBL [March 1997] “Bin Ladin 
Cited on Prince Sultan’s US Visit” 
152 Arabian peninsula and Palestine 
UBL [March 1997] “Bin Ladin 
Charges US involvement in China 
bombings” 
153 'In recent interview, Ben Ladin called for jihad against foreign 
troops whether US, British or French.' 
UBL [August 1997] “Usama bin 
Ladin Urges ‘Befitting Reply’ to 
Horan” 
157 Against US 
UBL + AAZ + others [February 
1998] “Text of Fatwa Urging Jihad 
Against Americans” 
161 Global 
UBL [March 1998] “Bin Ladin 
Urges Expulsion of Invaders..” 
162 Saudi Arabia 
UBL [May 1998] “Supporting the 
Fatwa of the Afghani Religious 
Scholars of Ejecting the American 
Forces from the Land of the Two 
Holy Mosques” 
71 Need to declare jihad against the American occupiers in the 
Land of the Two Holy Mosques. 
UBL [May 1998] “Bin Ladin: 
Afghanistan’s inclusion on US 
terrorism list is ‘Certificate of good 
conduct’ for Taliban” 
166 Afghanistan 
UBL [May 1998] “World Islamic 
Front Backs Intifadah of Palestine’s 
Sons/Wounds of Al-Aqsa” 
167 No limits on geographical targeting against Israel and 
America 
UBL [May 1998] “Bin Ladin 
Creates New Front Against US, 
Israel” 
168 Arabian Peninsula 
UBL [May 1998] “United States 169 Saudi Arabia 
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Admits that Keeping its Troops in 
the Gulf is Causing 
Dissatisfaction…” 
UBL [February 1999] May 1998 
interview reported 
182 'I announce that geographical boundaries have no importance 
for us. We are Muslims and wish to be martyred.' 
UBL [June 1999] “Usama bin Ladin 
Pens Letter in Support of Kashmir 
Jihad” 
183 Kashmir - India 
UBL [May 2000] “UBL Sees Holy 
War in ‘Every Street’ of US” 
188 Mujahideen in 'all corners' of the world ready to strike 
UBL [May 2000] “Usama Speaks 
on Hijra and the Islamic State” 
189 Arabian Peninsula and other holy lands of Islam, but with 
further global connotations 
UBL [June 2000] “Usama bin Ladin 
Renews Calls for jihad” 
190 Kashmir, Palestine, and 'other oppressed Muslim places' 
UBL [January 2001] “Daily Prints 
Usama bin Ladin Letter Calling for 
Global Islamic State” 
192 All Muslim lands, although emphasis on holy lands of Saudi 
Arabia and Palestine at first 
Muhammad bin Ladin [January 
2001] video speech addressed to his 
father 
127 Liberation of Palestine 
UBL [April 2001] letter to scholars 
of Deyubende in Peshawar 
120 The entire Ummah needs to support the fight in Afghanistan. 
 
UBL [April 2001] “Usama urges 
Muslims to help Afghans” 
196 Afghanistan/Pakistan 
UBL [September 2001] “Text of bin 
Ladin letter to the Pakistani People” 
201 Pakistan is 'the first line of defence for Islam in the region' 
UBL [September 2001] “The US 
Should search attackers within 
itself” 
202 'There are areas in all parts of the world where strong jihadi 
forces are present, from Indonesia to Algeria, from Kabul to 
Chechnya, from Bosnia to Sudan, and from Burma to 
Kashmir. Then it is not the problem of my person.' 
 
Afghanistan/Pakistan 
UBL [October 2001] “Tayseer 
Allouni interviews bin Ladin in 
Afghanistan” 
130 When asked why he has now started to focus more on 
Palestine, when previously the focus was on Saudi Arabia: 'I 
say that no doubt the jihad to liberate Al-Aqsa and save the 
oppressed people in Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, and all Muslim 
countries is a religious duty. No doubt also, the liberation of 
the Arabian Peninsula from the infidels is a religious duty. 
But the talk that I have given priority to the Palestine question 
is not correct.'  
 
'Sometimes, developments in one issue prompt us to take 
more action in its direction without ignoring the other 
direction.' Claims the intifada prompted greater focus on 
Palestine. 
AAZ [December 2001] “Knights 
under the Prophet’s Banner” 
119 'The battle today cannot be fought on a regional level without 
taking into account the global hostility towards us'.  
 
Saw Afghanistan as a 'tributary and a base for jihad in Egypt 
and the Arab region, the heart of the Islamic world, where the 
basic battle of Islam was being fought'. 
UBL/AAZ [April 2002] “The Wills 
of the Martyrs..” 
207 UBL emphasis on 'the Land of the Two Holy Places', 
described as 'the land of faith, the greatest treasure of 
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Muslims' which produced 15 of the hijackers. 
 
References to the importance of fighting for Palestinians as 
defensive jihad.  
 
9/11 and similar attacks presented as the way out for Muslims 
from the 'oppression' and 'occupation' they are suffering and a 
way for true Muslims to show their devotion to their faith and 
cause. 
UBL/others [April 2002] “The Wills 
of the Martyrs..” 
108 'Spain has yet to return after five centuries' [UBL]. Palestine, 
Afghanistan. 
AAZ [September 2002] “The 
Interview of Dr Ayman Al 
Zawahiri” 
22 America. 
UBL [October 2002] “A Message 
Addressed to the American People” 
75 America or its interests abroad 
UBL [October 2002] “Statement 
from shaykh Usama bin Ladin, may 
God protect him, and the Al-Qa’ida 
Organization” 
211 'We reiterate our support for our brothers who are holding the 
live coal around Bayt al-Maqdis in Palestine and the 
mujahidin and the ones standing fast in Chechnya, 
Afghanistan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Kashmir, and 
elsewhere.' 
UBL [October 2002] “Letter from 
Usama bin Mohammed bin Ladin to 
the American People” 
212 US interests 
UBL [November 2002]  “Osama bin 
Laden hails recent operations..” 
76 Palestine 
UBL [November 2002] “Statement 
from Abdullah Usama bin Ladin to 
the Peoples of countries Allied to 
Tyrannical US Government” 
214 West/ countries allied to US 
UBL [November 2002] “Bin Ladin 
in a special message to the people of 
the Peninsula..” 
215 Arabian Peninsula 
 
Iraq and elsewhere 
UBL [February 2003] audio 
statement 
78 Palestine, 'and the other lands of the Muslims'.  
 
'Palestine, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Indonesia, the 
Philippines, and other Muslim lands'. 'It is a compulsive 
obligation upon the Ummah today to lend assistance to the 
Jihad in Afghanistan because it is one of the most important 
arenas of Jihad'. 
UBL [February 2003] “A Message 
to our Brothers in Iraq”  
79 'The most important regions for liberation are Jordan, 
Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, the land of the two holy 
mosques, and Yemen'. 
AAZ [May 2003] statement 54 Chechnya, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq. 
UBL/AAZ [September 2003] Audio 
statement 
110 Palestine, Peninsula, Iraq 
UBL [October 2003] “Second letter 
to the Muslims of Iraq” 
98 Young Muslims everywhere, especially in Yemen. 
 
Iraq, Palestine. And Chechnya, Kashmir, the Philippines, and 
Afghanistan. 
AAZ [December 2003] audio 
recording 
57 Iraq, Afghanistan. 
UBL [January 2004] “Resist the 111 Iraq, Palestine. Fighting against apostate Arab rulers and 
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New Rome” occupiers in the region. 
AAZ [March 2004] audio statement 59 'The crusade in Afghanistan, Iraq, Chechnya and Palestine is 
targeting Pakistan primarily, because America does not want 
Pakistan to be a special power in the center of Asia'. 
UBL [April 2004] Message to 
Europe 
52 Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine. 
UBL [April 2004] Peace offering to 
Europeans 
80 Europe 
UBL [May 2004] “People of Iraq” 82 Iraq, Muslim world. 
Iraq. Also Palestine, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Philippines, 
Chechnya, Pakistan. 
UBL [October 2004] “Message to 
Americans” 
83 Iraq, Afghanistan. 
UBL [December 2004] “Message 
concerning Saudi Arabia” 
84 Saudi Arabia. Palestine, Iraq, Bosnia, and Chechnya, 
Afghanistan. 
Iraq, Palestine, Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Chechnya. ... 'It is 
no secret that the most heated issues of the nation nowadays 
has to do with jihad in Palestine and Iraq. Support them the 
best you can'. 
UBL [December 2004] audio 
statement 
86 Iraq: 'the nation today has a very rare opportunity to come out 
of the subservience and enslavement to the West and to smash 
the chains with which the Crusaders have fettered it'. 
Palestine, Afghanistan. If fighting in Palestine is impossible: 
'there are ways to strike the Americans, the allies of the Jews. 
This includes Jihad in Iraq through the help of trustworthy 
guides' [implicitly emphasises Iraq over Palestine]. Chechnya 
and 'other jihad arenas'. 
AAZ [June 2005] video statement 72 'My dear brothers, the history of our victorious nation is being 
written in Iraq, Palestine, Afghanistan, Chechnya and 
Kashmir'. 
AAZ [December 2005] “Obstacles 
to Jihad” 
25 Afghanistan, Iraq mostly. But also where the ummah needs to 
rise up against corrupt rulers 
AAZ [March 2006] “The 
Alternative is Da’wa and Jihad” 
73 'Palestine represents the spearhead of the Crusader campaign 
on Islam and the Muslims [...] Palestine is the cause of every 
Muslim'. 
 
Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan and Chechnya. 
AAZ [April 2006] “Four Years 
since the Battle of Tora Bora” 
238 'The nation should support the heroic mujahideen of Iraq who 
are fighting in the frontline to defend Islam's glory and 
dignity'. 
American withdrawal will 'mean a capable Islamic state that 
seeks to mobilize the Muslim nation in a war of liberation 
from the crusader-Zionist aggression'. 'O Bush, the son of 
Bush, you should know that in spite of you, and if it means 
you die of your frustration and lose your mind, removing 
Israel is an individual duty on every Muslim'.  
 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine and Chechnya'. 'O nation of 
Islam: The arena of jihad in Iraq is now the most important 
arena of jihad in this age'. 
UBL [April 2006] “Oh People of 
Islam” 
90 Western Sudan. 'Iraq, Palestine, Afghanistan, the Sudan, 
Kashmir, and Chechnya'. The 'axis and mill of this war 
[against the Zionist/Crusader] is located in Baghdad'. Nigeria 
and Indonesia too. 
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AAZ [April 2006] “Letter to the 
People of Pakistan” 
81 Pakistan 
Iraq 
AAZ [June 2006] “Support for 
Palestinians” 
85 Palestine. Also Chechnya, Iraq, Afghanistan, the Philippines, 
and Guantanamo. 
Palestine. Egypt. Sudan. 
AAZ [June 2006] “The Zionist 
Crusader’s Aggression in Gaza and 
Lebanon” 
88 'The whole world is an open field for us. As they attack us 
everywhere, we will attack them everywhere'.  
 
'We must today target Jewish and American interests 
everywhere. We must also target the interests of all the 
countries that took part in the aggression against the Muslims 
in Chechnya, Kashmir, Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine and 
Lebanon'.  
 
'Iraq is characterized with its  
 
to Palestine. The Muslims must support its mujahideen so that 
a mujahid Islamic emirate can be established there which can, 
with the will of God, move jihad to the borders of Palestine. 
Then, the mujahideen inside and outside Palestine can unite 
and the great contest will arrive, God willing'. 
UBL [June 2006] “Elegizing the 
Ummah’s Martyr..” 
92 'Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Sudan, until we waste your 
money and kill your men, and until [...] you return defeated to 
your homeland'. 
UBL [July 2006] “To the Ummah in 
General and the Mujahideen in Iraq 
and Somalia in Particular” 
93 'Palestine, Iraq, Somalia, Afghanistan, and Sudan'. Also 
Kashmir, Chechnya, Algeria and the land of the two holy 
mosques. 
AAZ [September 2009] “Bush, the 
Vatican’s Pope, Darfur and the 
Crusades” 
89 'Afghanistan and Iraq are the two most important fields for 
confronting the contemporary Crusader war'. 
AAZ [December 2006] “Realities of 
Conflict Between Islam and 
Unbelievers” 
94 Palestine. Afghanistan, Iraq, Chechnya, Kashmir. 'The 
backing of the Jihad in Afghanistan and Iraq today is to back 
the most important battlefields in which the Crusade against 
Islam and Muslims is in progress'. 
AAZ [January 2007] “Rise and 
Support our Brothers in Somalia” 
96 Somalia 
AAZ [January 2007] “The Correct 
Equation” 
28 Iraq, Palestine, Somalia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Algeria and 
'all lands of Islam'. 
AAZ [February 2007] “Lessons, 
Examples and Great Events in the 
Year 1427” 
97 'Chechnya, the Philippines, Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine, 
Lebanon, the Arabian Peninsula, Egypt, Somalia, Algeria, and 
everywhere the Crusader and Zionists have desecrated the 
lands of Islam with their feet'. Mauritania, Kashmir, 
Indonesia. 
AAZ [May 2007] “The Empire of 
Evil is about to End” 
23 The regions where jihad is taking place: from the Maghreb, 
through Iraq and Afghanistan, Chechnya. Palestine. The 
suppressed peoples everywhere - minorities, blacks etc. 
 
Chechnya, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Iraq, Palestine, Somalia, 
Egypt. 
AAZ [June 2007] “Forty Years 
since the Fall of Jerusalem” 
101 'Today we must support the mujahideen in Palestine, 
including the mujahideen in HAMAS, despite all the mistakes 
of their leaders' 
Palestine 
AAZ [July 2007] “The Advice of 102 Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Palestine and 'the Atlas 
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one Concerned” Mountains' [range in Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria]. Striking 
the enemy: 'in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine and Somalia, and 
everywhere we are able to strike their interests' (at home and 
in their countries). 
AAZ [July 2007] “Malicious Britain 
and its Indian Slaves” 
103 Palestine. 
Afghanistan. 
AAZ [December 2007] “Annapolis 
– the Betrayal” 
12 'We will not surrender out faith, nor Andalusia, nor Ceuta and 
Melilla, nor Bosnia, Kosovo, Cyprus, Jerusalem, Haifa, Um 
Rashrash (Eliat), Baghdad, Kabul, Kashmir, and Grozny. 
AAZ [December 2007] “A Review 
of Events” 
13 Iraq. Muslim countries in general. 
Iraq is the most important fields in which the mujahideen are 
engaging. Egypt. Palestine, Somalia, Chechnya and 'other 
fields of competition'. Pakistan. 
UBL [December 2007] “The Way to 
Frustrate the Conspiracies” 
27 Iraq, the Ummah 
Iraq, Afghanistan, Islamic Maghreb, Somalia. 
AAZ [early 2008] “Exoneration..” 20 Egypt: 'There is a US occupation in Egypt and the number of 
Muslim dead who were killed by US planes that took off from 
Egypt and from the US warships that passed through the Suez 
Canal were supplied at Egyptian ports and were loaded from 
the US military stores in Egypt was greater than the number 
of Palestinians whom the Jews are killing in Gaza; 1 million 
Iraqi children were killed by the embargo, not the war.' The 
current regime in Egypt has carried out more death penalties 
than any other Egyptian regime, sold Egypt to the Zionist-US-
Israeli crusade. Talks of victories in Palestine, Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Somalia, and importance of these battles and 
those of Chechnya and others. Predicts protracted conflict in 
Algeria, Iraq and Afghanistan. 
UBL [March 2008] “May our 
Mothers be Bereaved of us if we fail 
to help our Prophet, peace be upon 
him” 
11 Europe/Europeans responsible for drawings 
UBL [March 2008] “A Way for the 
Salvation of Palestine” 
6 Waziristan, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Islamic Maghreb, 
Kashmir, Somalia, and the most important – Baghdad. The 
‘nearest field’ to support the Palestinian people is the Iraqi 
field. 
AAZ [March 2008] “A Call to Help 
our People in Gaza” 
17 The battle against Jews and infidels is not limited to Palestine. 
AAZ [April 2008] “The Open 
Meeting part one..” 
105 Egypt. Global. 
 
Battalions will go from Iraq to Jerusalem. Somalia, Iraq, 
Algeria, Afghanistan. 
AAZ [April 2008] “The Open 
Meeting.. Part 2..” 
107 Defends his decision not to attack Palestine directly in favour 
of focusing on Afghanistan and Iraq by quoting Abdallah 
Azzam at length where he explains how the mujahideen in 
Afghanistan need aid and how leadership stuctures and 
movements are prepared for a wider battle. 'Afghanistan is 
Palestine and Palestine is Afghanistan' says Azzam. 
AAZ [June 2008] “On the 
Anniversary of the Naksa..” 
15 Remembering the setback raises the issue of Egypt's 'pivotal 
role in the history of Islam'. If the leadership of Egypt is 
strong and mujahideen it leads the Muslim nation to victory, 
when it is treacherous the nation fails. Egypt's historic role is 
defending the people of Islam. Therefore the people of Egypt 
have a clear duty of ridding it of its treacherous leaders. Need 
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to regain all of Palestine through hostile action. 
AAZ [August 2008] “A Message 
form Shaikh Ayman al-Zawahiri to 
the Pakistani Army and the People 
of Pakistan” 
41 Pakistan, 'we have a deep emotional and sentimental 
relationship with this land and its people'. 'Pakistan [...] 
represented a hope and a dream of establishing a strong, 
independent Muslim government after the colonial era'.  
 
'I still consider Pakistan to represent a hope and a bastion for 
the establishment of a strong independent Muslim country not 
only in the post-colonial era but also in the face of the 
contemporary Zio-Crusader campaign'.  
 
'My belief that there are millions of Muslims in Pakistan 
ready to sacrifice all that can be sacrificed for the victory of 
Islam'. 
Kashmir - the jihad there has to be freed of the influences of 
the ISI 'because corrupt governments spoil jihads'. 
AAZ [November 2008] “Al-Azhar: 
The Lions Den” 
237 Egypt 
Afghanistan, Palestine - Gaza. Sudan. Yemen. 
UBL [January 2009] “Call for Jihad 
to Stop the Gaza Assault” 
122 The enemy need to be exhausted on the battlefield in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Palestine, Waziristan, Islamic Maghreb, and 
Somalia. 
AAZ [February 2009] “The 
Sacrifices of Gaza” 
131 Seeking revenge in 'Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia and Algeria, 
battling the Modern Crusades from Chechnya to Somalia, and 
from Afghanistan to the Islamic West.' 'This Zionist-Christian 
Crusader invasion has revealed that if we do not defend 
ourselves and fight Jihad, the jets, tanks, and missiles which 
struck Gaza, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia will strike 
Riyadh, Cairo, Algeria and Islamabad tomorrow.' 
 
'What is taking place in Gaza is only part of the Zionist-
Christian Crusade targeting this Muslim Ummah in 
Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine, Somalia, Algeria, and 
Darfur.' .. 
 
'All those capable of making Jihad must set out to the present 
battlefields of Jihad in Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq, 
Palestine, Somalia, and Algeria.' 
AAZ [February 2009] “From Kabul 
to Mogadishu” 
132 Discusses four major fields of operations where support for 
the jihad is needed and where progress is being made: 
Somalia; the Arabian Peninsula, specifically Yemen; Gaza, 
and specifically the Arab-supported siege of Gaza; 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
UBL [March 2009] “Fight on, Oh 
Champions of Somalia” 
134 Somalia. Areas of jihad. 
'The war which has been taking place on your soil [Somalia] 
these past years is a war between Islam and the international 
Crusade' 
AAZ [April 2009] “Six years since 
the invasion of Iraq..” 
136 Emphasises global targeting.  
 
'A front has been established in the beloved land of Iraq free 
from the shackles of any government or regime', the Islamic 
state of Iraq 'burns with the passion to towards Masjid Al-
Aqsa.' [when did this justification for supporting the IsI since 
it will target Israel next start?] Iraq is the 'gateway to 
Jerusalem'. 
AAZ [July 2009] “My Muslim 139 'New Crusade, being waged against Muslims from Algeria to 
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Brothers and Sisters in Pakistan” East Turkistan and from Somalia to Chechnya. And Pakistan 
without a doubt is at the heart of that campaign.'  
 
The scholars of Islam have unanimously agreed that if the 
infidel enemy enters a Muslim country, it is the duty of all of 
its inhabitants – and when needed, their neighbors – to 
mobilize for Jihad; and the Americans are today occupying 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, so it is the duty of every Muslim in 
Pakistan to rise up to fight them.' 
AAZ [August 2009] “The Realities 
of Jihad and Fallacy of Hypocrisy” 
140 Crusader forces failed in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia and are 
now failing in Pakistan.  
 
Emphasises that Muslims who want to see Palestine freed 
from the Israelis must first assist the jihad in Iraq, since 
success here will open up a front against Israel. 
AAZ [August 2009] “The Path of 
Doom” 
142 Pakistan is a hot spot, but only the latest manifestation in the 
wider Crusader plot against Muslims, 'one of the battlefields 
of the contemporary Crusade.' 
AAZ [December 2009] “The 
(Palestinian) National Unity” 
146 'Crusader-Zionist campaign over Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, 
Somalia and the rest of the Muslims homelands.' 'The battle in 
Waziristan and the battle in Pakistan and the battle in 
Afghanistan aren’t tribal or familial or regional or state or 
country battles; they are the battles of Islam against Kufr.' 
AAZ [July 2010] “Al Quds will not 
be converted to Judaism” 
223 Claims the mujahideen in Afghanistan are winning the war, 
but that its victories are ignored in the mainstream media.'O' 
Obama whether you admit it or not, the Muslims have 
defeated you in Iraq and Afghanistan, and they will defeat 
you - and the powers that brought you - soon, Inshallah in 
Palestine, Somalia, and the Islamic Maghreb.'  
 
Emphasises the local: 'My dear nation: we first have to 
liberate ourselves in order to liberate what is outside of it, we 
will not liberate our homelands if we are weak slaves with our 
fear, incompetence, greed, and delusions', Jihad can be fought 
outside Palestine  
 
Then he says Jihad is not tied to Palestine but is taking place 
elsewhere, e.g. Chechnya etc.In this sense Jihad in Iraq by the 
ISI presents real hope in the liberation of Palestine. Palestine 
is not a case of national liberation but jihad in the name of 
Allah. The mujahideen are taking revenge for events in 
Palestine by striking the enemies in Afghanistan and Iraq.  
 
Praises Jihad successes in Somalia, Islamic Maghreb, Yemen, 
Pakistan, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Kashmir. 
AAZ [August 2010] “Message to 
the People of Turkey” 
225 Turkey 
Primary emphasis on Turkey, at end of communication 
mujahideen support for oppressed Muslims in Cyprus, 
Kashmir, Philippines, Somalia and elsewhere pledged. 
Afghanistan 
AAZ [September 2010] “A 
Victorious Ummah, A Broken 
Crusade” 
226 The plight of Muslims by the hands of Western secularism 
and their lackeys form 'east Turkistan to Ceuta and Melilla' 
 
Afghanistan, other fields of jihad (Chechnya, Isl Maghreb 
elsewhere) but primarily focus is on Pakistan, Turkey, 
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Palestine, Afghanistan, Egypt 
UBL [October 2010] “Some points 
regarding the method of relief 
work” 
227 Sudan, Africa, Pakistan 
 
 
UBL [October 2010] “Help your 
brothers in Pakistan” 
228 Islamic Crescent - all areas where Muslims live 
AAZ [November 2010] “Who is 
going to support Aifa Siddique” 
229 Mostly Pakistan 
UBL [November 2010] “Message 
from Shaykh Usama bin Ladin to 
the People of France” 
230 French in Africa primarily, France. 
UBL [January 2011] “From al-
Sheikh Osama bin Mohammed bin 
Ladin to the French People” 
231 France and French interests/individuals in Africa 
AAZ [February 2011] “A Message 
of Glad Tidings…(1)” 
232 Focuses on Egypt but seeks to offer 'practical examples' to 
Muslims elsewhere where situations are similar. 
AAZ [February 2011] “A Message 
of Glad Tidings…(2) 
233 Egypt for support 
 
Clear focus on far enemies for activism and blame: 'we in Al-
Qaeda have reached the conclusion that the Zio-American 
enemies – who have invaded our religion, lands, and 
sanctities – and their lackey aides need to be focused on more 
than others. If this invading enemy breaks, then by Allah’s 
permission their agents and others who seek their help and 
emboldening will also break. So let us focus our efforts on 
this Zio-American invading enemy and its agents' 
AAZ [February 2011] “A Message 
of Glad Tidings…(3)” 
234 Egypt, Tunisia, region 
 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, the Arabian Peninsula, Somalia 
and the Islamic Maghreb. 
AAZ [March 2011] “A Message of 
Glad Tidings…(4)” 
235 Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen chiefly 
AAZ [April 2011] “A Message of 
Glad Tidings…(5)” 
236 Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Yemen primarily 
AAZ [May 2011] “A Message of 
Glad Tidings…(6)” 
238 Focus on "Libya, Egypt and Syria due to the danger of what’s 
taking place there" 
 
Egypt, Israel, Libya, Syria. Also against US. 
AAZ [June 2011] “The Noble 
Knight Dismounted” 
239 Emphasis on UBL's love for Palestine. 
 
"Likewise, we confirm to all the Muslim people that we are 
their soldiers, and we will not spare any effort, Allah willing, 
to liberate them from the occupiers in Kashmir, the 
Philippines, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Iraq, and Palestine. And 
we support their blessed uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, 
Yemen, and Syria. We are fighting a single battle with them 
against America and its servants. We call upon the masses of 
the Muslim Ummah in beloved Syria to continue the struggle, 
the fight, and the jihad against the corrupt, criminal regime 
which sheds the blood of its people." 
AAZ [July 2011] “Glory of the East. 
The first Being Damascus..”  
241 Syria + Jerusalem/Palestine 
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AAZ [unknown 
date] “Response 
to a Grave 
Uncertainty..” 
117 Article co-written with `Abd al-Qadir [a.k.a. Sayyid Imam al-Sharif / Dr Fadl]. 
UBL [unknown 
date] Letter to 
Mullah Omar 
61 Talks of close ties with brothers in Tajikistan: 'We were able train a good number of 
them, arm them and deliver them to Tajikistan. Moreover, Allah facilitated to us 
delivering weapons and ammunition to them' 
UBL [March 
1994] ‘Usama bin 
Ladin Denies 
“Terrorism” Link’ 
1 Cordial but lose relations with other ‘Islamic groups’. 
UBL [July 1994] 
“Quran Scholars 
in the Face of 
Despotism” 
39 The righteous ulema - scholars and preachers who took the just stand in the Yemeni 
issue, Gulf war, Saudi govt etc. 
UBL [September 
1994]  “Saudi 
Arabia Unveils its 
War against Islam 
and its Scholars” 
40 Righteous preachers and venerated scholars 
UBL [December 
1994] “Open 
Letter for Shaykh 
bin Baz on the 
Invalidity of his 
Fatwa on Peace 
with the Jews” 
63 The 'stone throwing heroes and the Muslim youth of jihad in Palestine' 
UBL [February 
1995] “Prince 
Salman and 
Ramadan Alms” 
65 Numerous members of the ulema 
UBL [March 
1995] “Saudi 
Arabia Continues 
its War against 
Islam and its 
Scholars” 
66 Numerous members of the ulema 
UBL [May 1995] 
“Scholars are the 
Prophet’s 
Successors” 
67 Scholars are successors of the Prophet and defenders of religion, although one should 
be careful to distinguish between scholars working to further the word of Allah and 
those 'preferring earthly things'. Several scholars praised for their 'courageous stand 
for speaking the truth'. 
UBL [June 1996] 
“Usama bin Ladin 
reportedly 
interviewed” 
3 Talks of ‘Iranian friends’ he met in Turkey before Afghanistan. Close association 
with Sudanese Al-Tahir whom he met in Afghanistan. Hassan Al-Turabi 
UBL [November 
1996] “Bin Ladin 
150 'The British and others respected the feelings of more than 1 billion Muslims, which 
is why they did not occupy the land of the two holy mosques' since they stopped in 
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interviewed on 
Jihad against US” 
Oman and did not enter the land of the two holy mosques. [This contrast subsequent 
rhetoric and also the historical narrative of Zawahiri who blames the British for much 
of the problems Muslims are facing. It also brushes over the relationship with Sharif 
Husayn, to which Zawahiri has alluded.]  
 
Claims the Sudan authorities asked him to leave because they came under intense 
pressure from Saudi authorities to stop UBL from issuing open letters criticising the 
regime.  
 
of 'good' relations with the Taliban whom he credits with 'eliminating fear' from the 
region where they rule and says they were 'accepted' and their measures 'welcomed' 
by the people . 
UBL [March 
1997] “Bin Ladin 
Charges US 
involvement in 
China bombings” 
153 On alliances with 'extreme anti-US groups, including Mohammad al Masari, head of 
the Saudi Committee of the Defence of Legitimate Rights, Ayman al-Zawahiri of the 
Egyptian Islamic Jihad and Ashra al-Hadi of the Egyptian Islamic Group.' 
UBL [March 
1997] “Pakistan 
interviews Usama 
bin Ladin” 
154 Shia/Iran: 'The United States is the common enemy of both Iran and the Taleban. 
One day, relations between Iran and Afghanistan will improve.' 'If Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, Iran and China get united, the United States and India will become 
ineffective.' [Geopolitics before Salafist doctrine]. 
UBL [March 
1997] “Interview 
with Usama bin 
Ladin” 
155 More tolerance for Europe, since it is distancing itself from America. 
UBL [February 
1998] “Bin LAdin 
Condoles with Al-
Bashir on Salih’s 
Death” 
160 Sudanese president 
UBL + AAZ + 
others [February 
1998] “Text of 
Fatwa Urging 
Jihad Against 
Americans” 
161 Co-signatories, in addition to UBL and Zawahiri [As leader of Al-Jihad]: Abu-Yasir 
Rifa'i Ahmad Taha, a leader of the [Egyptian] Islamic Group; Shaykh Mir Hamzah, 
secretary of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan; and Fazlul Rahman, amir of the Jihad 
Movement in Bangladesh. 
UBL [March 
1998] “Bin Ladin 
Urges Expulsion 
of Invaders..” 
162 Praises the 'courage' of Prince Talal Bin-'Abd-al-'Aziz (brother of King Fahd) who 
said in BBC interview that the US and UK forces in the country were occupation 
forces.  
 
May God help our ulema and shaykhs who are behind bars: Shaykh 'Umar 'Abd-al-
Rahman, Shaykh Salman Bin-Fahd al-'Awdah, Shaykh Safar Bin-'Abd-al-Rahman 
al-Hawali, Shaykh Yahya al-Yahya, Shaykh Ibrahim al-Dubyan, Shaykh Sa'id Bin-
Zu'ayr, Shaykh Bishr al-Bishr, and their brothers.' 
UBL [May 1998] 
“Supporting the 
Fatwa of the 
Afghani Religious 
Scholars of 
Ejecting the 
American Forces 
from the Land of 
the Two Holy 
Mosques” 
71 The Religious scholars of Afghanistan who issued the Fatwa. And other religious 
scholars who issued earlier fatwas calling for ejection of US forces from LTHM. The 
Imam of the Prophet's Holy Mosque. 
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UBL [May 1998] 
“Clerics in 
Afghanistan Issue 
Fatwa..” 
165 Ulema Union of Afghanistan who issued a fatwa condemning US presence in 
Arabian Peninsula, the seeking of help from such atheists and demanded their 
expulsion. .. UBL also praises the Saudi-based ulema who spoke out in similar terms 
at the start of the US 'occupation': Shaykh Salman al 'Awdah and Shaykh Safar al-
Hawali. 
UBL [May 1998] 
“Bin Ladin: 
Afghanistan’s 
inclusion on US 
terrorism list is 
‘Certificate of 
good conduct’ for 
Taliban” 
166 US decision to add Afghanistan to list of state sponsors of terrorism is 'certificate of 
good conduct for the Taliban government and proof that it is not subservient to the 
United States as it had previously been accused of.' 
UBL [May 1998] 
“World Islamic 
Front Backs 
Intifadah of 
Palestine’s 
Sons/Wounds of 
Al-Aqsa” 
167 Praise for 'Sons of Muslim Palestine' and their 'blessed intifadah' 
UBL [May 1998] 
“Bin Ladin 
Creates New 
Front Against US, 
Israel” 
168 Talks of imprisonment of vocal oppositionists in Saudi Arabia for criticising US 
presence in the Peninsula 
UBL [June 1998] 
“Bin Ladin 
Congratulates 
Pakistan on 
Possession of 
Nuclear 
Weapons” 
170 Pakistani efforts praised [note difference with later] 
UBL [June 1998] 
“In the Way of 
Allah” 
171 Urges Muslims to focus on US/Israel as enemies not e.g. China. 
UBL [August 
1998] “The Battle 
Has Not Yet 
Started” 
173 Praises Taliban for not giving up Arab fighters in their midst 
UBL [September 
1998] “Bin Ladin 
Praises Pakistanis 
for Love of 
Islam” 
174 Praises Pakistani journalists who have been coming to see him and spreading his 
message 
UBL [September 
1998] Letter to 
anti-US Islamist 
conference 
126 Taliban 
UBL [November 
1998] “Bin Ladin: 
Expel Jews, 
Christians, from 
Holy Places” 
175 Tablian 
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UBL [December 
1998] “Bin Ladin 
Denies Role in 
Bombings of US 
Missions” 
176 Taliban 'more Islamic' than previous mujahideen administrations in Afghanistan 
UBL [January 
1999] “Taliban let 
Bin Ladin Break 
his Silence” 
177 Introduction refers to previous meeting where the contact points were Harkatul Ansar 
(renamed Harkatul Mujahidin). .. Taliban 
UBL [February 
1999] May 1998 
interview reported 
182 Saudi scholars who opposed the presence of US in the Peninsula and called for jihad 
against it. 'Eminent' scholars from Afghanistan and Pakistan who have also declared 
jihad against America occupying these regions 
UBL [June 1999] 
“Usama bin Ladin 
Pens Letter in 
Support of 
Kashmir Jihad” 
183 Praise for Prime Minister Mohammad Nawaz Sharif as protector of Muslim interests 
during the Afghan war. 
UBL [June 1999] 
“Usama bin 
Ladin, The 
Destruction of the 
Base” 
184 Praises Abdallah Azzam and HAMAS for their efforts in jihad.  
 
Describes the Taliban as a blessing from God, refutes claims the group was 'being 
pushed' from abroad, argues it was 'a pulling force from the inside', welcomed by the 
people and popular. 
UBL [September 
1999] “UBL 
Orders 
Mujahideen to 
Shoot US 
Commandos..” 
186 'Brothers' in Kashmir and Chechnya 
UBL [May 2000] 
“Usama Speaks 
on Hijra and the 
Islamic State” 
189 Afghanistan and its implementation of Shari'ah law 
UBL [September 
2000] “Bin Ladin, 
others pledge 
‘Jihad’ to release 
Prisoners..” 
191 Praise for Omar Abd Ar-Rahman and other incarcerated mujahideen. 
UBL [January 
2001] “Daily 
Prints Usama bin 
Ladin Letter 
Calling for Global 
Islamic State” 
192 Other groups, organisations of movements seeking to establish Shar'iah and an 
Islamic state 
Muhammad bin 
Ladin [January 
2001] video 
speech addressed 
to his father 
127 'The Palestinians are the one who in name of Allah, take on the enemies without arms 
and equipment' 
UBL [March 
2001] “Ausaf 
receives Bin 
Ladin’s Poem..” 
193 'Our chief' Mullah Omar. 
UBL [April 2001] 120 The leader of the Islamic nation is Mullah Omar. Hamud bin Akla al-Shabi, Saudi 
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letter to scholars 
of Deyubende in 
Peshawar 
cleric, and other like-minded scholars who have argued that the Afghan emirate is the 
only state properly implementing the Shari'a. It is under the leadership of Mullah 
Omar that the Islamic Emirate will be established. 
UBL [April 2001] 
“Usama urges 
Muslims to help 
Afghans” 
196 Conference hosted by Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam. 'Almighty Allah and you should be 
witness that I, Oasma-Bin-Mohammad-Bin Ladin, am giving 'Baiat' [allegiance] to 
Mulla Omar.' 
UBL [September 
2001] 
“Afghanistan: Bin 
Ladin denies 
involvement in 
terrorist attacks..” 
200 'His Eminence Amir al Momenin' [Mullah Omar] has been contacted following 9/11 
- for he does not allow such operations to be prepared from Afghan territory 
UBL [September 
2001] “Text of 
bin Ladin letter to 
the Pakistani 
People” 
201 Follows the leadership of Mullah Omar 
UBL [September 
2001] “The US 
Should search 
attackers within 
itself” 
202 Taliban/Mullah Omar 
UBL [October 
2001] “Tayseer 
Allouni 
interviews bin 
Ladin in 
Afghanistan” 
130 Scholars Sami Zai of Pakistan and Abdallah bin Ukhma al-Shahabi of Saudi Arabia 
who both endorsed the fighting against Jews and Christans (although the question 
refers to 'Christians' and UBL talks about 'Americans'). 
AAZ [December 
2001] “Knights 
under the 
Prophet’s 
Banner” 
119 Isam al-Qamari and other mujahideen leaders. On the mujahideen groups: 'They 
possess a quality that their enemies cannot hope to acquire', using God's strength to 
turn 'into a power that is feared and that threatens the stability of the new world 
order'. Kamal al-Sananiri - A Muslim brother who set up the clinic in Pakistan to 
help Afghan mujahideen, imprisoned and allegedly tortured in Egypt to death. . On 
Sayyid Qutub, Al-Zawahiri says: "He [Sayyid Qutub] affirmed that the issue of 
unification in Islam is important and that the battle between Islam and its enemies is 
primarily an ideological one over the issue of unification. It is also a battle over to 
whom authority and power should belong-- to God's course and shari'ah, to man-
made laws and material principles, or to those who claim to be intermediaries 
between the Creator and mankind'. ' "This affirmation greatly helped the Islamic 
movement to know and define its enemies. It also helped it to realize that the internal 
enemy was not less dangerous than the external enemy was and that the internal 
enemy was a tool used by the external enemy and a screen behind which it hid to 
launch its war on Islam'. 
UBL [December 
2001] “The Fact 
of the Conflict 
between us and 
America” 
129 Taliban.  
 
"Our battle is no different from the battle of our brothers in Palestine like Hamas". 
Praise for the 9/11 hijackers, special praise for those who came from SA. 
UBL/others 
[April 2002] “The 
Wills of the 
Martyrs..” 
108 'Scholars in the Arabian Peninsula' [UBL]. 
UBL [October 211 'There is the group of the media people and writers who have a prominent impact on 
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2002] “Statement 
from shaykh 
Usama bin Ladin, 
may God protect 
him, and the Al-
Qa’ida 
Organization” 
and a big role in directing the battle, breaking the enemy's morale, and boosting the 
nation's morale. The time has come for the media to occupy its rightful position and 
play its required role in confronting this vicious campaign and the declared Crusade 
with all its visual, audio, and written organs. The media men -- whether they are 
writers, journalists, analysts, or correspondents -- should rise to the level of 
responsibility and the event and play their required role of enlightening the nation, 
revealing the truth about the enemy, and exposing his schemes and ploys' 
UBL [October 
2002] “Al-
Majallah Obtains 
Bin Ladin’s 
Will..” 
213 Small number of clerics who have stayed true to their cause 
UBL [February 
2003] audio 
statement 
78 Sheikhs Umar Abdur-Rahman and Saeed bin Zuair, and our brothers in Guantanamo. 
UBL [February 
2003] “A 
Message to our 
Brothers in Iraq”  
79 Implying that supporters of Saddam should unite with others fighting the Americans: 
'Under these circumstances, there will be no harm if the interests of Muslims 
converge with the interests of the socialists in the fight against the crusaders, despite 
our belief in the infidelity of socialists'. Explains how in the fighting against the 
Byzantine, interests converged, temporarily, with the Persians. 
UBL/AAZ 
[September 2003] 
Audio statement 
110 The 9/11 hijackers: Sa'id al-Ghamidi, Muhammad Ata, Khalid al-Mihdar, Ziyad al-
Jarrahi, Marwan al-Shihhi. [UBL] 
UBL [November 
2003] “Al-Jazirah 
TV: Al-Qa’ida 
claims 
responsibility for 
Istanbul 
bombings” 
221 The 'Martyr Abu-Hafs al-Misri Brigades' announced that they carried out the Istanbul 
bombings 
UBL [January 
2004] “Resist the 
New Rome” 
111 Ulema, notables, popular leaders etc 
AAZ [March 
2004] audio 
statement 
59 The tribes in North-West Pakistan, 'which defended Islam throughout all of its 
history, will not give up to one slave of America'. 'I call on the Pakistani army: you, 
poor army, what a miserable state Musharraf has put you in' 'will you stay silent if 
Pakistan is divided again?' ... The Taliban. 
UBL [May 2004] 
“People of Iraq” 
82 The mujahideen fighting in Iraq. 
UBL [December 
2004] “Message 
concerning Saudi 
Arabia” 
84 'I love Hijaz from the bottom of my heart, but the rulers there are wolves. In 
Afghanistan I have a home and companions'. ... 'We beseech God to have mercy on 
our brothers the martyrs everywhere in Palestine, Iraq, the land of the two holy 
mosques, Maghreb, Kashmir, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Nigeria, Indonesia, the 
Philippines and Thailand. May God have mercy on Sheikh Yusuf al-Uyayri, Abu-Ali 
al-Harithi, Khalid al-Hajj, Abd-al-Aziz al-Muqrin, Isa al-Ushan, and all their 
brothers'. 
UBL [December 
2004] audio 
statement 
86 On the fighter in Fallujah: 'They did not only raise the head of the Islamic nation, but 
also raised the head of humanity at a time when the culture of slavery, humiliation, 
and submission prevails in the world'. 'They stood firm before them despite their 
small numbers and their inadequate gear; bareheaded with chests uncovered'. 'The 
nation searched for you for a whole century', like a mother who is looking for its lost 
child'.  
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'The Iraqi who is waging Jihad against the infidel Americans or Allawi's renegade 
government is our brother and companion, even if he was of Persian, Kurdish or 
Tukomen [sic] origin' [Shia].  
 
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, 'the emir of Tanzim al-Qaeda fi Bilad al-Rafidayn', and the 
groups affiliated with him, 'we, in the al-Qaeda organization, warmly welcome their 
union with us'. 
AAZ [June 2005] 
video statement 
72 Mujahideen brothers in Iraq, who foiled the plans of the crusaders. 'I thank my dear 
brother Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, all his brothers, all the emirs of the mujahideen, their 
brigades and their groups'. The 'honest scholars of Iraq'.  
 
The mujahideen of Afghanistan and their leader, Mullah Omar, 'the emir of the 
believers'. 
AAZ [December 
2005] interview 
49 Mullah Omar as an ally. 
AAZ [December 
2005] “Obstacles 
to Jihad” 
25 Mullah Omar, the Commander of the Faithful and the Taliban. 
AAZ [January 
2006] “Bajawr 
Massicre and the 
Lies of the 
Crusaders" 
51 Mullah Umar. 
AAZ [April 2006] 
“Four Years since 
the Battle of Tora 
Bora” 
238 'My beloved brother Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who I knew very well and was close to 
him. God is my witness. I have only seen good things from him. I know that he is 
sincere and faithful and his heart is pained by the pains of his nation. God knows 
better his hidden intents, which I hope are better than his public ones. O Abu Musab: 
Be patient, stand fast, and rely only on God. I urge you to take good care of your 
brother mujahideen, and I urge your mujahideen brother to take good care of you'. 
UBL [May 2006] 
“A Testimony to 
the Truth” 
91 Zacarias Moussaoui 
AAZ [June 2006] 
“Support for 
Palestinians” 
85 Zarqawi, the mujahideen of Iraq, the Shura of the Mujahideen in Iraq. Mullah 
Muhammad Umar. The Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (CSPC). Lions of 
Islam in Chechnya, Palestine, Kashmir, Indonesia, the Philippines, Egypt, the 
Levant, the Arabian Peninsula and every where else. 
AAZ [June 2006] 
“Elegizing the 
Ummah’s 
Martyr..” 
32 Mullah Omar and the Taliban. 
UBL [June 2006] 
“Elegizing the 
Ummah’s 
Martyr..” 
92 'Abu Musab always held his head high and was proud, generous, and loyal. He never 
yielded when his religion was involved, he never tolerated injustice, and he never 
cajoled anyone on matters of truth. He was tough on infidels and merciful toward the 
believers'. 'He had established a base for defending religion and regaining Palestine'. 
'He avenged the oppressed there' by killing Americans, the allies of Jews. 'He 
appeared, together with a small group of believers. They were 17 men, not 17 
armies'. 'Thus, our knight got off his horse, carrying the banner, determined to fight 
to the end'. Mullah Mohammed Omar. 
UBL [July 2006] 
“To the Ummah 
in General and the 
Mujahideen in 
Iraq and Somalia 
93 Association of Muslim scholars - esp. Sheikh Bashar al-Faydi, Aheikh Abd-al-Salam 
al-Kubaysi, Sheikh Harith al-Dari. 'We have heard that' Abu-Hamzah al-Mujahir is to 
succeed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi as emir of the Al-Qaeda organization in Iraq. 'I also 
urge him to strongly remain in the Mujhaideen Shura Council. Disagreement is full 
of evil. Union is mercy, but division is nothing but a plight'. 
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in Particular” 
AAZ + Gadhan 
[September 2006] 
“An Invitation to 
Islam” 
33 Zawahiri recognises Assam Amriki as a brother who heeded the call to Islam. G: 
George Galloway, Robert Fisk and others recognized as those who have supported 
and recognized the greatness of Islam, but urged to 'stop sitting on the fence' and 
come to Islam. 
AAZ [September 
2006] “Hot 
issues..” 
21 Anyone who resists America and seeks to establish the rule of Islam in Iraq, 'we are 
prepared to talk and come to an understanding with him'. The Mujahideen consist of 
Muslims of all races and ethnic groups, from the Philippines to Iraq. AQ pledged 
allegiance to Mullah Omar who is not an Arab - regions are of no consequence. 
Declares the joining of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat to Qaeda al-
Jihad. 
AAZ [September 
2006] “Bush, the 
Vatican’s Pope, 
Darfur and the 
Crusades” 
89 Khalid al-Shaykh Muhammad... 'leader of a march, pioneer of an awakening and 
vanguard of a nation'. 
AAZ [December 
2006] “Realities 
of Conflict 
Between Islam 
and Unbelievers” 
94 Mullah Muhammad Umar. Representing a new era: 'Khalid Islambouli, Abdullah 
Azzam, Abu Hafs the Commander, Khattab, Muhammed Atta, Muhammed Siddique 
Khan, and Shehzad Tanwir'. Mujahiden in Iraq, Somalia, Chechnya, Lebanon, 
Afghanistan etc. The Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat. 
AAZ [December 
2006] 
“Congratulations 
on the Eid to the 
Ummah of 
Tawhed” 
95 The 'Emir of the Islamic State of Iraq, the Mujahid Shaykh Abu Umar al-Baghdadi 
and all groups of the champion mujahideen'. 'Commander of the Faithful, Mullah 
Muhammad Omar'. 
AAZ [January 
2007] “Rise and 
Support our 
Brothers in 
Somalia” 
96 Mujahideen in Somalia 
AAZ [January 
2007] “The 
Correct Equation” 
28 Mullah Omar, Commander of the Faithful. 
AAZ [February 
2007] “Lessons, 
Examples and 
Great Events in 
the Year 1427” 
97 'The Muslim Ummah and its mujahid vanguard do not make alliances and hold 
animosities on the basis of tribalism and nationalism, nor to help Arabs against the 
Persians [shia], or the Kurds against the Arabs, and the Amazight against the Arabs. 
Rather [...] we ally ourselves to the helpers of Islam, even if they be Afghans, 
Persians [shia, Iran], Turks or Kurds, and we are hostile to its enemies who collude 
with the Crusaders and Jews, even of they be pure-blooded Hashemite, Qurayshite 
Arabs'. .. 
 
 'And we [...] have pledged allegiance to the Commander of the Believers, Mulla 
Muhammad Umar, who is an Afghan'.  
 
Islamic State of Iraq and its 'Mujahid Amir, Abu Umar al-Baghdadi'.  
 
Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed (Somalia).  
 
The 'western garrison of Islam' in Algeria. Brothers in the Maghreb and Mauritania.  
 
Sheikh Umar Abd al-Rahman, and brothers in Guantanamo and secret prisons. 
AAZ [March 18 Taliban and their attack on Bagram airbase when Cheney was there. 
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2007] “Palestine 
is the concern of 
all Muslims” 
AAZ [May 2007] 
statement 
announcing the 
death of Taliban 
leader Mullah 
Dadullah Akhud 
30 References to the Taliban leader Mullah Dadullah and his 'martyrdom' in Helmand 
province. Mullah Omar addressed and he urged to 'be patient and seek your reward'. 
AAZ [June 2007] 
“Forty Years 
since the Fall of 
Jerusalem” 
101 HAMAS, despite their mistakes. Claims to support people of Palestine with 
information, experience and opinion, as well as by attacking Zionist Crusader 
interests. 
AAZ [July 2007] 
“The Advice of 
one Concerned” 
102 Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a 'forerunner' in establishing unity in Iraq through joining 
Qaida al-Jihad and pledging allegiance to UBL, he 'resurrected' in the Ummah the 
'spirit of unity, solidarity and aid'. Zarqawi's successor - Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, and 
the establishment of ISI. The ISI 'declare their defence of all causes of the Muslims 
from Grozny to Ceuta and Melilla' and strive to free Muslim captives, the foremost 
among them is Ahaykh Umar Abd al-Rahman. 
AAZ [July 2007] 
“Malicious 
Britain and its 
Indian Slaves” 
103 Praises Dr Abd-al-Aziz al-Rantisi for his comments on the need to besiege America 
through economic blockade, terror blockade, media blockade, and tourism blockade. 
UBL [September 
2007] “The 
Solution..” 
10 Noam Chomsky trying to speak the truth to the American people 
UBL [September 
2007] “Come to 
Jihad..” 
14 Mufti Sizamuddin Shamzai 
UBL [November 
2007] “Message 
to the People of 
Europe” 
9 Mullah Umar, Hajji Mansoor Dadullah 
AAZ [December 
2007] “A Review 
of Events” 
13 On the merger of the main part of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. Says there is 
no 'al-Qaeda' in Iraq. The 'Qaeda al Jihad in Mesopotamia' merged with other jihadi 
organizations into the Islamic State of Iraq, a legitimate emirate. The al-Qaeda 
organization in Mesopotamia, then the Mujahideen's Shura, then the Pact of 
Perfumed ones, then the ISI all tried to unify the mujahideen in Iraq. ISI is the 
primary force in Iraq and others have a duty to support it. Calls out to the 'noble 
brothers' in Ansar al-Sunnah, the lions of Islam in Iraq with sound methodology 
aiming to establish a Caliphate and their Shaykh Abu Abdullah al-Shaafee. Calls for 
the unification of this group with ISI. The ISI has 'pristine methodology'. 'The Kurds 
are a genuine part of the Ummah and every Muslim is proud of their sacrifice and 
history’. And sympathise with their injustices and demands. But no-one can tolerate 
establishment of a secular Iraqi Kurdistan. 
UBL [December 
2007] “The Way 
to Frustrate the 
Conspiracies” 
27 Welcomes allegiance pledged to 'Shaykh Abu Omar al-Baghdadi'. Although shared 
consultation is important, the establishment of the Islamic State (ISI) could not be 
delayed - and therefore not everyone could be consulted. 'Appointing an Amir comes 
before the unification of opinion' if that unity is not already in place. .. 
Acknowledges that many do not recognize the biographies of Iraqi leaders, esp. 
Baghdadi - but he was recommended by the mujahideen, including Zarqawi and Abu 
Hamza al-Muhajir.  
 
'Joining hands with the true mujahideen in HAMAS' not those who sold Palestine. 
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AAZ [April 2008] 
“The Open 
Meeting part 
one..” 
105 'Unknown soldiers' in the 'jihadi media'. Ansar al-Sunnah (although urged to respect 
unity, i.e. follow ISI). .  
 
Refers all questions about the friction between Islamic Army of Iraq and ISI to the 
'Commander of the Faithful Abu Umar al-Baghdadi'. .  
 
The 'truthful notables of the Salafist call' in Egypt. . The 'Fighting Islamic Group' in 
Libya joining AQ. .  
 
'The brothers in Fatah al-Islam are heroes of Islam'.   
 
Shaykh Hamid al-'Ali and Shaykh Abu Baseer al-Tartoosi 'receive all our respect and 
appreciation', despite their opposition to Islamic State of Iraq, 'no human is infallible' 
and these differences will be discussed 'through scientific and applied research'. . 
 
'We bless and support the Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus' 
 
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi 'heroic Amir'  
AAZ [April 2008] 
“The Open 
Meeting.. Part 2..” 
107 'The Commander of the Faithful, Abu-Umar al-Baghdadi [...] is one of the leaders of 
the Muslims and the mujahideen in this age'. .  
 
Zawahiri explains how UBL has explicitly called for allegiance and loyalty to Abu 
Umar al-Baghdadi and the ISI and dismisses criticism of them. . The al-Qaida 
organization in the Islamic Maghreb, those who live there urged to rush to its 
support. .  
 
'Liberation [of brother captives] is a debt we will have to pay’. These include Rifa'i 
Taha and Abu-Talal al-Qasimi and Abu-Mus'ab al-Suri whose theories 'prevents a 
rich thought from which the mujahideen will benefit'. . 
 
Islamic movement for reform in Pakistan.   
 
'Sincere mujahideen scholars' like Abdallah Azzam, Omar Abd-al-Rahman, Humud 
al-Uqala and Abdalla al-Rushud.  
 
'The intellectual wealth of Sheikh Abu Musab, may God free him from his captivity, 
is considered a rich source of support for the mujahideen' [never seems to speak 
about him when not asked directly in a question].   
 
Sheikh Ahmad Yasin 'one of the nation's renowned heroes'.  
 
The emir of the Islamic Emirate in Afghanistan, Mullah Muhammad Omar.  
 
Qualifies the alliance between the al-Qaeda grouip and the Libyan Islamic Fighting 
Group (al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyah al-Muqatilah), saying that the group did not merge 
with AQ but only that 'a group of the notables' of al-Jama'ah had joined AQ.  
 
Couple of innuendos towards the end that AQ is not only for Muslims, i.e. it seeks to 
stop America and Crusader West aggression against 'mankind', providing a 'great 
service to the human community', it 'seeks to lift injustice from Muslims and all the 
victims of the system of the Western-Crusader-Zionist injustice'.  
 
The ISI continues to be a major force facing the crusaders and their agents and 
confronting Iranian ambitions. It still controls large areas of Iraq. 'The ISI's banner 
and creed are one of the purest banners and creeds in Iraq' and 'threatens the usurper 
state of the Jews with destruction'. 
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 (see section 21) - Assumes that the Taliban state of Afghanistan has the support of 
the majority.  
 
In responding to a question urging Zawahiri to be critical of the Sudanese 
government openly for cooperating with the UN, the Saudis and others, Ayman 
replies 'I think the Sudanese Government has enough problems, and can do without 
any more'.   
 
Sheikh Hamid al-Ali - 'the youth should express to him the love, appreciation, and 
respect they harbor toward him', 'I longed to meet him and benefit from his 
knowledge and experience'. If he were to meet him, Ayman would stress the 
importance of establishing the Islamic State of Iraq. 
AAZ [August 
2008] “In 
Lamentation of a 
Group of Heroes” 
74 Shaykh Abu Khabaab who was martyred recently, along with his friends: Shaykh 
Abi al-Faraj al-Masri, known since childhood, whose father is in captivity. Also 
Shaykh Abdul Wahab and Shaykh Abu Islam - 'This blessed caravan departed to 
their Lord, to complain to him about the injustice of the Americans and treachery of 
the Pakistani government'. 
AAZ [November 
2008] “The Exit 
of Bush and 
Arrival of 
Obama” 
100 Malcolm X - Malik al-Shabazz 'condemned the crimes of the Crusader-West against 
the weak and oppressed'.  
 
Islamic State of Iraq and its Amir - the 'towering mountain Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi: 
your enemy has admitted defeat, and the forthcoming stage is expected to be 
dominated by conspiracies and betrayals in order to cover the American withdrawal, 
so you must persevere, for victory is in an hour of perseverance'. 
AAZ [November 
2008] “Al-Azhar: 
The Lions Den” 
237 The 'bright side' of Al-Azhar, the 'lions of Al-Azhar' including Rahman and Azzam, 
not dark side, such as Sayyaf, Rabbani, Mujadidi, and Tantawi.   
 
'The honest Ulema, whom the Ummah respects', like Shaykh Hamood al-Uqla, 
Abdullah al-Rashood, Umar al-Sayf (deceased) and Umar Abd al-Rahman.. Abu 
Basir Nasir al-Wuhayshi mujahideen leader in Yemen. 
AAZ [December 
2008] “The Death 
of our Heroes and 
Betrayal of our 
Rulers” 
106 Notes the 'martyrdom' of Amrozi Nur Haasheem, Ali Ghufran Nur Hasheem, and 
Abdelaziz Imam Samudra [the executed Bali bombers]. 
AAZ [February 
2009] “From 
Kabul to 
Mogadishu” 
132 Al-Shabaab al Mujahideen. Video features Abu Saleem 'field commander', Hasan 
Turki 'one of the commanders and Ulama'. Turki mentions his allegiance to AQ but 
also with all other miujahideen (including HAMAS).  
 
Second part features Sa'eed al-Shihri 'Deputy Amir' AQ in the Arabian Peninsula as 
well as other leaders of the group sitting in a circle, including 'Amir of Qaida Al-
Jihad in the Arabian Peninsula Abu Baseer Nasir Al-Wuhayshi'.   
 
Mullah Omar and the Taliban. 
UBL [March 
2009] “Practical 
Steps to Liberate 
Palestine” 
133 Need to identify and list 'the honest scholars, preachers, thinkers and writers who 
advise their ummah' and make their works available. These include: “‘Achievement 
of the Glorious’ by Shaykh Abd al-Rahman bin Hasan Al Shaykh; “Two books by 
Shaykh Muhammad Qutb, ‘Concepts Which Must Be Corrected’ and ‘Are We 
Muslims?’” 
 
'The Clarification of the Unbelief of He Who Aids the Americans’ by Nasir bin 
Hamd al-Fahd. Another book of value evaluates the Islamic regimes. Many of these 
and others are available on the website al-Tawheed wal-Jihad. 
UBL [March 134 Somali Mujahideen 
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2009] “Fight on, 
Oh Champions of 
Somalia” 
AAZ [April 2009] 
“Six years since 
the invasion of 
Iraq..” 
136 Islamic State of Iraq and its leaders Omar al-Baghdadi and Al-Husseini al-Quraishi 
and other 'lions' in Iraq, Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, and his 'brothers and beloved from 
Ansar al-Islam especially his excellence, Sheikh Abu Abdullah Al-Shafi'I'. 
AAZ [July 2009] 
“My Muslim 
Brothers and 
Sisters in 
Pakistan” 
139 Pakistan 'is deeply involved in a fierce internal struggle between two forces', one of 
them represents 'Islamic values' in a struggle against foreign occupation and 
intervention, domestic corruption etc. 
AAZ [August 
2009] “The 
Realities of Jihad 
and Fallacy of 
Hypocrisy” 
140 Lists and endorses numerous militant Islamist leaders in response to question 
concerning AQ's critical rhetoric, as well as political groups Inc. Front of al-Azhar 
Ulama. 
AAZ [August 
2009] “The Path 
of Doom” 
142 Plays last message from Abdul Rashid Ghazi urging revenge against Pakistani 
military establishment and their allies. 
UBL [September 
2009] “A 
Statement to the 
American People” 
144 Praises book by John Perkins - Confessions of an Economic Hitman - and argues this 
shows how America has harmed the world. Also quotes a statement from Jimmy 
Carter during a visit to Gaza expressing horror over the living conditions of local 
population. Notes how Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer have warned against the 
power of the Jewish lobby.  
AAZ [September 
2009] “Shaykh Dr 
Ayman al-
Zawahiri: Eulogy 
for the Role 
Model of Youth” 
147 Baitullah Meshud and his Taliban Movement in Pakistan, which consolidated the 
efforts of local tribes, all of which come under the overall command of Mullah Omar. 
'Do we have doubts, that the Jews will not stop committing their crimes without 
Jihad? The Quranic verses of Shia agree about these laws.' Appeal to the 'jihadi 
information field' [media] 
AAZ [December 
2009] “The 
(Palestinian) 
National Unity” 
146 'We will not forget Omar Abdulrahman, Ramzi Yusef and his companions, Khalid 
Sheikh Muhammad' 
UBL [February 
2010] “From 
Osama to Obama” 
148 Omar Farouk Abdulmutallab 
UBL [February 
2010] “The Way 
to Save the Earth” 
149 Quotes, and expresses agreement, with works by Noam Chomsky and James E 
Hansen.  
 
Calls for help to 'disaster stricken people' in Asia, Africa and South America [Note 
scant emphasis on Islam or Muslims] 
AAZ [July 2010] 
“Al Quds will not 
be converted to 
Judaism” 
223 Mulla Bradar, Abu Dujanah al-Khorasani and other Afghan mujahideen and martyrs. 
Renewes his 'bay'at', allegiance to Mullah Omar.  
 
'Knights of the jihadist media' thanked for their efforts and encouraged to 'spread 
awareness and encourage the nation and wake it up […] and uncover the traitors.' 
AAZ [August 
2010] “Message 
to the People of 
Turkey” 
225 Turkish mujahideen and martyrs 
AAZ [September 226 Islamic Emirate Afghanistan, Mujahideen world over 
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2010] “A 
Victorious 
Ummah, A 
Broken Crusade” 
UBL [October 
2010] “Help your 
brothers in 
Pakistan” 
228 Note relatively friendly descriptions of UN role in Pakistan [in terms of leadership 
arriving to survey damage]. Red Crescent work in appreciated 
AAZ [February 
2011] “A 
Message of Glad 
Tidings…(1)” 
232 Some brave scholars in al Azhar, elsewhere 
AAZ [April 2011] 
“A Message of 
Glad 
Tidings…(5)” 
236 Sheikh Omar Abdulrahman, Sheikh Aboud al-Zumurand, Sheikh Muhammad al-
Zawahiri, and other incarcerated brothers. References to large number of pious 
Egyptian (and other) activists such as Hassan al Banna, Qutb, Abdullah Azzam, and 
others with the whish of reinstating Egypt according to their vision. 
AAZ [May 2011] 
“A Message of 
Glad 
Tidings…(6)” 
238 Quotes from Malcolm X 
AAZ [June 2011] 
“The Noble 
Knight 
Dismounted” 
239 "I mention as examples and not exhaustively: Sheikh Hafiz Salama, Mufti 
Kifayatullah, Sheikh Hasan Aweys, Professor Ismail Hanniya, and many others, may 
Allah reward them all greatly."  
 
Renews his pledge to Mullah Omar. 
AAZ [July 2011] 
“Glory of the 
East. The first 
Being 
Damascus..”  
241 Praise for several notable Syrians through the ages, such as Ibn Tamiyyah 
AAZ [August 
2011] “A 
Message of Hope 
and Glad 
Tidings..(7)” 
242 "I am with Usama in the desired meeting in paradise where we live amongst the 
happy" [part of poem at the beginning]. Mullah Omar. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
